上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源_Lesson 10_English materials_Goh Soviet Card Opening to China

EVELYN GOH Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S. Opening to China,I97I-1974* The dramatic reconciliation with the People's Republic of China in 1972 stands as one of Richard Nixon's greatest achievements as the thirty-seventh president of the United States.While previous administrations had attempted minor modifications of the policy of containment and isolation of China,Nixon managed to negotiate a top-level reconciliation that would lead to normaliza- tion of relations in 1979.This rapprochement ended more than twenty years of Sino-American hostility and represented the most significant strategic shift of the Cold War era.It was intimately connected to U.S.relations with its super- power rival and the Nixon administration's general policy of detente.In the writings of Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger-the key primary accounts of the policy change until recently-the central logic of the U.S.-China rapprochement was "triangular relations."Within the context of the Sino-Soviet split,this entailed the opening of relations between the United States and China,bringing China into the realm of great power relations as a third vital power separate from the Soviet Union. The utility of triangular politics was derived from the expectation,accord- ing to Kissinger,that "in a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Beijing and Moscow,we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options toward both."The aim of pursuing better relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union accorded with Nixon's professed strat- egy of detente,to reduce international tensions and American overseas defense The author would like to thank Rosemary Foot,Alastair Iain Johnston,Jeffrey Engel, Robert Schulzinger,and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. I.Recent works reveal important deliberations and limited moves to alter China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,which were unsuccessful because of the con- straints of anti-Communist and racist perceptions,the Vietnam War,and the fact that the Chinese were not ready to respond to American moves.See Noam Kochavi,A Conflict Per- petuated:Cbina Policy during the Kennedy Years(Westport,CT,2002);Victor S.Kaufman,Con- fronting Communism:US and Britisb Policies toward China (Columbia,MO,2001):Evelyn Goh, Constructing the US Rapprocbement with Cbina,1961-1974:From Red Menace to Tacit Ally (New York,2005). 2.Speech written for Nelson Rockefeller,July 1968,quoted in Henry Kissinger,Wbite House Years(Boston,1979),165.For an analysis of triangular diplomacy from 1969 to 1972, see Raymond L.Ghartoff,Detente and Confrontation:American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington,DC,1994),chaps.6-8. DIPLOMATIC HIsToRY,Vol.29,No.3 (June 2005).2o05 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations(SHAFR).Published by Blackwell Publishing,Inc.,350 Main Street,Malden,MA,o2148,USA and 96oo Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ,UK. 475

evelyn goh Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974* The dramatic reconciliation with the People’s Republic of China in 1972 stands as one of Richard Nixon’s greatest achievements as the thirty-seventh president of the United States. While previous administrations had attempted minor modifications of the policy of containment and isolation of China, Nixon managed to negotiate a top-level reconciliation that would lead to normaliza￾tion of relations in 1979. 1 This rapprochement ended more than twenty years of Sino-American hostility and represented the most significant strategic shift of the Cold War era. It was intimately connected to U.S. relations with its super￾power rival and the Nixon administration’s general policy of détente. In the writings of Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger—the key primary accounts of the policy change until recently—the central logic of the U.S.-China rapprochement was “triangular relations.” Within the context of the Sino-Soviet split, this entailed the opening of relations between the United States and China, bringing China into the realm of great power relations as a third vital power separate from the Soviet Union. The utility of triangular politics was derived from the expectation, accord￾ing to Kissinger, that “in a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Beijing and Moscow, we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options toward both.”2 The aim of pursuing better relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union accorded with Nixon’s professed strat￾egy of détente, to reduce international tensions and American overseas defense 475 Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 3 (June 2005). © 2005 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. *The author would like to thank Rosemary Foot, Alastair Iain Johnston, Jeffrey Engel, Robert Schulzinger, and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. 1. Recent works reveal important deliberations and limited moves to alter China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which were unsuccessful because of the con￾straints of anti-Communist and racist perceptions, the Vietnam War, and the fact that the Chinese were not ready to respond to American moves. See Noam Kochavi, A Conflict Per￾petuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years (Westport, CT, 2002); Victor S. Kaufman, Con￾fronting Communism: US and British Policies toward China (Columbia, MO, 2001); Evelyn Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From Red Menace to Tacit Ally (New York, 2005). 2. Speech written for Nelson Rockefeller, July 1968, quoted in Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 165. For an analysis of triangular diplomacy from 1969 to 1972, see Raymond L. Ghartoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC, 1994), chaps. 6–8

476:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY commitments in the post-Vietnam era.Publicly,the goal was a "stable structure of peace,"which would be forged through "creative diplomacy,"and “coexistence”and“accommodation”with adversaries.3 In private,Kissinger's objective was to increase American maneuverability,and to carve out a pre- eminent position for Washington as the "balancer"at the pivot of the new triangle by maintaining better relations with each side than they did with each other.+ The immediate opportunity for creating the triangular balance of power was afforded by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict,and the likelihood that Moscow might launch a broader attack on China.Then,Beijing's urgent requirement for a countervailing force persuaded it to put aside ideology,to contemplate at least temporary compromise on Taiwan,and to turn to new rela- tions with the United States.s This was also the opportunity for Washington to exploit concretely the Sino-Soviet schism to its geopolitical advantage.By playing the "China card"-exercising its option potentially to complicate matters for Moscow at its eastern front-the United States could exert pressure on the Soviets for greater responsiveness in the superpower detente process and in trying to find a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.5 The rapprochement has often been perceived in terms of how the United States played the China card to gain leverage over the Soviet Union.Yet,the logic of triangular relations suggests that there would have been a parallel "Soviet card"being played by the United States toward China,and a "U.S.card" that was played within the Sino-Soviet relationship.?From the American vantage point,the other side of the triangle-how Washington used the Soviet threat and Soviet-American relations as bargaining tools with Beijing-has seen little research to date.Until recently,the lack of documentary material has forced scholars to focus on the broad strategic context in their analyses of the triangular relationship among the United States,the Soviet Union,and China from the Nixon period onward. Recently declassified U.S.documents now allow us to investigate how,and to what effect,the Soviet card was played in Nixon and Kissinger's negotiations 3.Richard Nixon,"Second Annual Report to the Congress on U.S.Foreign Policy," 2/25/71,Public Papers of tbe Presidents:Ricbard Nixon [PPP:RN]197I (Washington,DC,1972), 220-22. 4.Kissinger,Wbite House Years,1076;Kissinger,Years of Upbeaval (London,1982),705. 5.John W.Garver,China's Decision for Rapprocbement with the United States,1968-1971 (Boulder,CO,1982);Yang Kuisong,"The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969:From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,"Cold Wir History 1,no.I (August 2000):21-52; Robert S.Ross,Negotiating Cooperation:The United States and Cbina,1969-1989(Stanford,CA, I995,1-52. 6.See Patrick Tyler,A Great Wall:Six Presidents and Cbina (New York,1999),62-63. 7.The best volume examining the different sides of the strategic triangle is Robert Ross,ed.,China,the United States,and tbe Soviet Union:Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (New York,1993).However,the authors concentrate on exploring the general impacts of the strategic context on dyads in the triangle,rather than on the details of bilateral bargaining

commitments in the post-Vietnam era. Publicly, the goal was a “stable structure of peace,” which would be forged through “creative diplomacy,” and “coexistence” and “accommodation” with adversaries.3 In private, Kissinger’s objective was to increase American maneuverability, and to carve out a pre￾eminent position for Washington as the “balancer” at the pivot of the new triangle by maintaining better relations with each side than they did with each other.4 The immediate opportunity for creating the triangular balance of power was afforded by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, and the likelihood that Moscow might launch a broader attack on China. Then, Beijing’s urgent requirement for a countervailing force persuaded it to put aside ideology, to contemplate at least temporary compromise on Taiwan, and to turn to new rela￾tions with the United States.5 This was also the opportunity for Washington to exploit concretely the Sino-Soviet schism to its geopolitical advantage. By playing the “China card”—exercising its option potentially to complicate matters for Moscow at its eastern front—the United States could exert pressure on the Soviets for greater responsiveness in the superpower détente process and in trying to find a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.6 The rapprochement has often been perceived in terms of how the United States played the China card to gain leverage over the Soviet Union. Yet, the logic of triangular relations suggests that there would have been a parallel “Soviet card” being played by the United States toward China, and a “U.S. card” that was played within the Sino-Soviet relationship.7 From the American vantage point, the other side of the triangle—how Washington used the Soviet threat and Soviet-American relations as bargaining tools with Beijing—has seen little research to date. Until recently, the lack of documentary material has forced scholars to focus on the broad strategic context in their analyses of the triangular relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China from the Nixon period onward. Recently declassified U.S. documents now allow us to investigate how, and to what effect, the Soviet card was played in Nixon and Kissinger’s negotiations 476 : diplomatic history 3. Richard Nixon, “Second Annual Report to the Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy,” 2/25/71, Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon [PPP: RN] 1971 (Washington, DC, 1972), 220–22. 4. Kissinger, White House Years, 1076; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London, 1982), 705. 5. John W. Garver, China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968–1971 (Boulder, CO, 1982); Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (August 2000): 21–52; Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, CA, 1995), 1–52. 6. See Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York, 1999), 62–63. 7. The best volume examining the different sides of the strategic triangle is Robert Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War (New York, 1993). However, the authors concentrate on exploring the general impacts of the strategic context on dyads in the triangle, rather than on the details of bilateral bargaining

Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974:477 with Chinese leaders in the early 1o7os.Works based on this new material,par- ticularly the books by James Mann and Patrick Tyler,have revealed the extent to which the idea of the Soviet Union as a shared enemy fueled the new Sino- American relationship.Mann notes that "[w]hile American and Chinese offi- cials gave toasts to friendship,they talked increasingly of their common enemy," and by 1974,Kissinger and the new premier Deng Xiaoping"could barely say hello to each other without swapping lines about the Russians." The analysis here concentrates on the process of private bargaining that took place between Nixon and Kissinger and the Chinese leaders and their repre- sentatives during the first four years of the opening to China,which eventually led to the state of affairs described by Mann.It explores how the triangular strategic context was portrayed and played to advantage to advance the White House's position and to persuade Chinese leaders about the type of new relationship the United States and China ought to pursue.The aim is to understand and assess the nature and value of the Soviet card to the Nixon administration in the development of Sino-American relations. Given this focus on Sino-American relations,this article offers neither a parallel study of the impact of the China card on Soviet-American relations nor conclusions about the success or otherwise of triangular politics per se. However,concentrating on Sino-American relations does allow us to con- textualize triangular politics within the dynamics of bilateral relations.In this regard,declassified records demonstrate the critical importance of an under- standing on Taiwan,struck at the beginning during Kissinger's first secret trip to Beijing in July 1971,in facilitating the U.S.-China rapprochement.At these initial talks,Kissinger assured Premier Zhou Enlai that the U.S.government did not advocate either a“two Chinas'”ora“one Taiwan one China”solution; that it did not support the Taiwan independence movement;and that it would gradually withdraw U.S.troops on Taiwan as the war in Vietnam ended and as relations with China improved.The Chinese side compromised by not insist- ing on U.S.recognition for the PRC prior to Nixon's visit to China,in part because of Kissinger's secret assurance that the Nixon administration would normalize relations with the PRC during the first half of Nixon's second term in office.'This understanding on Taiwan was necessary in allowing the talks to proceed.In the realm of triangular politics,the temporary agreement on Taiwan initially facilitated the White House play of the Soviet card in developing Sino- American relations,but as Beijing perceived that Washington was less prepared to deliver on the process of normalization as time went by,Taiwan increasingly 8.Tyler,A Great Wall,107-79:James Mann,About Face:A History of America's Curious Rela- tionship witb China,From Nixon to Clinton (New York,1998),56. 9.Kissinger to Zhou,memcon,7/9/71,Box 851,National Security Files [NSF],Nixon Presidential Material [NPM],National Archives [NA]. 10.Kissinger to Zhou,memcon,7/1o/71,Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.19.For a fuller dis- cussion on the dispensation on Taiwan,see Goh,Constructing the US Rapprocbement with China, chap.8

with Chinese leaders in the early 1970s. Works based on this new material, par￾ticularly the books by James Mann and Patrick Tyler, have revealed the extent to which the idea of the Soviet Union as a shared enemy fueled the new Sino￾American relationship. Mann notes that “[w]hile American and Chinese offi- cials gave toasts to friendship, they talked increasingly of their common enemy,” and by 1974, Kissinger and the new premier Deng Xiaoping “could barely say hello to each other without swapping lines about the Russians.”8 The analysis here concentrates on the process of private bargaining that took place between Nixon and Kissinger and the Chinese leaders and their repre￾sentatives during the first four years of the opening to China, which eventually led to the state of affairs described by Mann. It explores how the triangular strategic context was portrayed and played to advantage to advance the White House’s position and to persuade Chinese leaders about the type of new relationship the United States and China ought to pursue. The aim is to understand and assess the nature and value of the Soviet card to the Nixon administration in the development of Sino-American relations. Given this focus on Sino-American relations, this article offers neither a parallel study of the impact of the China card on Soviet-American relations nor conclusions about the success or otherwise of triangular politics per se. However, concentrating on Sino-American relations does allow us to con￾textualize triangular politics within the dynamics of bilateral relations. In this regard, declassified records demonstrate the critical importance of an under￾standing on Taiwan, struck at the beginning during Kissinger’s first secret trip to Beijing in July 1971, in facilitating the U.S.-China rapprochement. At these initial talks, Kissinger assured Premier Zhou Enlai that the U.S. government did not advocate either a “two Chinas” or a “one Taiwan one China” solution; that it did not support the Taiwan independence movement; and that it would gradually withdraw U.S. troops on Taiwan as the war in Vietnam ended and as relations with China improved.9 The Chinese side compromised by not insist￾ing on U.S. recognition for the PRC prior to Nixon’s visit to China, in part because of Kissinger’s secret assurance that the Nixon administration would normalize relations with the PRC during the first half of Nixon’s second term in office.10 This understanding on Taiwan was necessary in allowing the talks to proceed. In the realm of triangular politics, the temporary agreement on Taiwan initially facilitated the White House play of the Soviet card in developing Sino￾American relations, but as Beijing perceived that Washington was less prepared to deliver on the process of normalization as time went by, Taiwan increasingly Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 477 8. Tyler, A Great Wall, 107–79; James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Rela￾tionship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York, 1998), 56. 9. Kissinger to Zhou, memcon, 7/9/71, Box 851, National Security Files [NSF], Nixon Presidential Material [NPM], National Archives [NA]. 10. Kissinger to Zhou, memcon, 7/10/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 19. For a fuller dis￾cussion on the dispensation on Taiwan, see Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, chap. 8

478:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY resurfaced as a serious constraint in bilateral relations that undermined the effectiveness of the Soviet card. Kissinger has written that he did not have to wield any card to try to influ- ence China's foreign-policy decisions;the PRC simply cooperated with the United States out of an obvious convergence of interests engendered by Chinese fears of the Soviet Union."In contrast,this analysis shows that Nixon and Kissinger felt it necessary to devote considerable effort to playing the Soviet card during the rapprochement in order to persuade the Chinese leaders to develop closer ties with Washington.This was done by emphasizing the Soviet threat to the PRC;by explaining that the United States perceived Soviet mili- tarism as a menace to international stability and U.S.security;and by offering Beijing various means of support in preparing for a Soviet attack.There were three phases in the process.The first was the initial opening from Kissinger's secret preparatory trip to Beijing in July 197I to the summit in February 1972, during which he and Nixon professed a balanced approach to both the Soviet Union and China,but subtly tilted toward the Chinese.The second phase was from mid-1972 to Kissinger's fifth trip to Beijing in February 1973,when he consciously tried to compensate for the developing Soviet-American detente by playing up the Soviet threat to China and the need for deeper Sino-American strategic relations.The final phase,from mid-1973 to 1974 saw Kissinger battling increasing Chinese skepticism and constraints imposed by domestic political problems,not only by emphasizing Moscow's belligerent intentions toward Beijing,but by offering the Chinese leaders what amounted to a secret alliance. 197I TO EARLY 1972:PARALLEL DETENTE WITH A TILT TOWARD CHINA Kissinger made two preparatory trips to Beijing in 1971-the infamous secret visit in July,and a publicized one in October.These were followed by an advance trip by his deputy Alexander Haig in January 1972,ahead of Nixon's summit in February.In their talks with the Chinese leaders,the Americans pre- sented their foreign-policy strategy as consisting of three key elements:it was realist and based on the assessment of national interest;it was not aimed at fos- tering conflict among the major powers and would thus be even-handed;but it was antihegemonic and so would favor a strong PRC which could help to act as counterweight against the Soviet Union.In the process,they played the Soviet card in two ways.First,wielding a "stick,"they firmly assured Beijing that Washington would continue to pursue detente with its superpower rival, implying that China would have to do its part to keep up the Sino-American side of the triangle.Second,they played up the Soviet threat so as to justify the II.From Kissinger's realist systemic interest-driven account,the card,if it existed,was automatic-it "played itself"-Diplomacy (New York,1994),729

resurfaced as a serious constraint in bilateral relations that undermined the effectiveness of the Soviet card. Kissinger has written that he did not have to wield any card to try to influ￾ence China’s foreign-policy decisions; the PRC simply cooperated with the United States out of an obvious convergence of interests engendered by Chinese fears of the Soviet Union.11 In contrast, this analysis shows that Nixon and Kissinger felt it necessary to devote considerable effort to playing the Soviet card during the rapprochement in order to persuade the Chinese leaders to develop closer ties with Washington. This was done by emphasizing the Soviet threat to the PRC; by explaining that the United States perceived Soviet mili￾tarism as a menace to international stability and U.S. security; and by offering Beijing various means of support in preparing for a Soviet attack. There were three phases in the process. The first was the initial opening from Kissinger’s secret preparatory trip to Beijing in July 1971 to the summit in February 1972, during which he and Nixon professed a balanced approach to both the Soviet Union and China, but subtly tilted toward the Chinese. The second phase was from mid-1972 to Kissinger’s fifth trip to Beijing in February 1973, when he consciously tried to compensate for the developing Soviet-American détente by playing up the Soviet threat to China and the need for deeper Sino-American strategic relations. The final phase, from mid-1973 to 1974, saw Kissinger battling increasing Chinese skepticism and constraints imposed by domestic political problems, not only by emphasizing Moscow’s belligerent intentions toward Beijing, but by offering the Chinese leaders what amounted to a secret alliance. 1971 to early 1972: parallel détente with a tilt toward china Kissinger made two preparatory trips to Beijing in 1971—the infamous secret visit in July, and a publicized one in October. These were followed by an advance trip by his deputy Alexander Haig in January 1972, ahead of Nixon’s summit in February. In their talks with the Chinese leaders, the Americans pre￾sented their foreign-policy strategy as consisting of three key elements: it was realist and based on the assessment of national interest; it was not aimed at fos￾tering conflict among the major powers and would thus be even-handed; but it was antihegemonic and so would favor a strong PRC which could help to act as counterweight against the Soviet Union. In the process, they played the Soviet card in two ways. First, wielding a “stick,” they firmly assured Beijing that Washington would continue to pursue détente with its superpower rival, implying that China would have to do its part to keep up the Sino-American side of the triangle. Second, they played up the Soviet threat so as to justify the 478 : diplomatic history 11. From Kissinger’s realist systemic interest-driven account, the card, if it existed, was automatic—it “played itself”—Diplomacy (New York, 1994), 729

Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974:479 need for closer U.S.-China relations and cooperation,while offering the “carrot'”of a covert tilt toward China. From the beginning,Kissinger and Nixon sought to manage,at least rhetor- ically,Chinese expectations about the implications the Sino-American opening would have for U.S.relations with its superpower rival.They emphasized to the Chinese leaders at the opening stages of the rapprochement that Washing- ton would be even-handed in developing both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-USSR rela- tions.Thus,Nixon informed Zhou that even as the United States was absolutely not looking to collude with the USSR against China,neither was it seeking a Sino-American condominium against the Soviets.Moreover,rather than seeking a destabilizing Sino-Soviet war,Washington hoped for better relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC.Zhou reciprocated the rhetoric, replying that China did not have "the least opposition"to improved Soviet- American relations.'3 Yet even-handedness vis-a-vis Moscow and Beijing did not mean equal exchanges.As Kissinger's staff expressed it,the United States needed to make clear to China that it would not move to an "overt pro-PRC policy"because it had too much "big concrete business"to do with the Soviets.'+The truth was, in contrast to concrete superpower negotiations about arms reduction and control and other major global strategic issues,China's strategic influence was relatively confined to Asia,and the contacts between Washington and Beijing were new and still had to overcome basic political differences. Moreover,Kissinger was candid about the possible negative impacts of Soviet-American negotiations on the Chinese.In the wake of the announce- ment of Kissinger's secret July trip to Beijing,the Soviets responded to the Sino- American rapprochement by being more forthcoming about the U.S.-USSR summit and other negotiations such as those over Berlin.Kissinger hastened to reassure Zhou that the Nixon administration did not negotiate with the Soviets for the purpose of freeing Soviet hands to concentrate on the East.But he stressed Washington's intention nevertheless to "pursue our interest with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking"and warned that the United States could not be "held accountable"if this complicated China's 12.Memcon,2/23/72,Box 87,President's Office Files [POF],NPM,p.20;Kissinger to Zhou,memcon,20/1o/71,Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.3;Memcon,2/25/72,Box 87,POF,NPM, p.6.The principle that"any nation can be a friend of the US without being someone else's enemy"was Nixon's deliberate public line on the opening to China-see television address, 715/71,PPP:RN1971,819. 13.Memcon,22/2/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.18;also Zhou to Kissinger,memcon, Io/2o/71,p.2I. 14.National Security Council [NSC]briefing paper,"Polo II-Soviet Union,"o/7/71, Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.14.See also Kissinger-Zhou memcon,7/1o/71,12.10-6pm,Box 851, NSF,NPM,p.36.Indeed,prior to Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing,Nixon urged his adviser to "talk up"SALT and the Soviet proposal for Five-Power nuclear disarmament talks when he met the Chinese leaders-NSC briefing paper,"Polo-Review of US and PRC Views on Other Great Powers,"6/21/71,Box 850,NSF,NPM,p.6

need for closer U.S.-China relations and cooperation, while offering the “carrot” of a covert tilt toward China. From the beginning, Kissinger and Nixon sought to manage, at least rhetor￾ically, Chinese expectations about the implications the Sino-American opening would have for U.S. relations with its superpower rival. They emphasized to the Chinese leaders at the opening stages of the rapprochement that Washing￾ton would be even-handed in developing both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-USSR rela￾tions. Thus, Nixon informed Zhou that even as the United States was absolutely not looking to collude with the USSR against China, neither was it seeking a Sino-American condominium against the Soviets. Moreover, rather than seeking a destabilizing Sino-Soviet war, Washington hoped for better relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC.12 Zhou reciprocated the rhetoric, replying that China did not have “the least opposition” to improved Soviet￾American relations.13 Yet even-handedness vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing did not mean equal exchanges. As Kissinger’s staff expressed it, the United States needed to make clear to China that it would not move to an “overt pro-PRC policy” because it had too much “big concrete business” to do with the Soviets.14 The truth was, in contrast to concrete superpower negotiations about arms reduction and control and other major global strategic issues, China’s strategic influence was relatively confined to Asia, and the contacts between Washington and Beijing were new and still had to overcome basic political differences. Moreover, Kissinger was candid about the possible negative impacts of Soviet-American negotiations on the Chinese. In the wake of the announce￾ment of Kissinger’s secret July trip to Beijing, the Soviets responded to the Sino￾American rapprochement by being more forthcoming about the U.S.-USSR summit and other negotiations such as those over Berlin. Kissinger hastened to reassure Zhou that the Nixon administration did not negotiate with the Soviets for the purpose of freeing Soviet hands to concentrate on the East. But he stressed Washington’s intention nevertheless to “pursue our interest with Moscow while we try to improve our dialogue with Peking” and warned that the United States could not be “held accountable” if this complicated China’s Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 479 12. Memcon, 2/23/72, Box 87, President’s Office Files [POF], NPM, p. 20; Kissinger to Zhou, memcon, 20/10/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 3; Memcon, 2/25/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 6. The principle that “any nation can be a friend of the US without being someone else’s enemy” was Nixon’s deliberate public line on the opening to China—see television address, 7/15/71, PPP: RN 1971, 819. 13. Memcon, 22/2/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 18; also Zhou to Kissinger, memcon, 10/20/71, p. 21. 14. National Security Council [NSC] briefing paper, “Polo II—Soviet Union,” 10/7/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 14. See also Kissinger-Zhou memcon, 7/10/71, 12.10-6pm, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 36. Indeed, prior to Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing, Nixon urged his adviser to “talk up” SALT and the Soviet proposal for Five-Power nuclear disarmament talks when he met the Chinese leaders—NSC briefing paper, “Polo—Review of US and PRC Views on Other Great Powers,” 6/21/71, Box 850, NSF, NPM, p. 6