The MIT Press To the Nuclear Brink:Eisenhower,Dulles,and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Author(s):Gordon H.Chang Source:International Security,Vol.12.No.4(Spring.1988),pp.96-123 Published by:The MIT Press Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538996 Accessed:15/05/201301:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms&Conditions of Use,available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,researchers,and students discover,use,and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive.We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to International Security. 29 STOR http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Author(s): Gordon H. Chang Source: International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring, 1988), pp. 96-123 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538996 . Accessed: 15/05/2013 01:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
To the Nuclear Brink Gordon H.Chang Eisenhower,Dulles,and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Shortly after the first anniversary of the end of the Korean War,the United States confronted the possibility of renewed hostilities with the People's Republic of China.On September 3,1954,while Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was in Manila finalizing the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),Chinese Communist coastal batteries began heavy shelling of Jin- men(Quemoy)',one of the small Nationalist-held islands off the coast of the China mainland.Acting Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson alerted Pres- ident Dwight D.Eisenhower that the intensity of the attack seemed a prelude to an all-out assault.Over the next nine months the United States,in sup- porting the Nationalists'defense of these islands,lurched toward disaster- in Eisenhower's own recollection,the crisis almost caused a "split between the United States and nearly all its allies"and seemingly carried the country to the“edge of war..w2 The president's critics at the time accused him of bringing the country to the verge of war over real estate of little consequence.Much of the historical evaluation was not much kinder.Early literature on Eisenhower portrayed him as a"weak president,"surrounded by advisers who wanted to use the crisis in the Strait to bring about a war with China.His administration,it was said,pursued an inflexible foreign policy that assumed,despite evidence to the contrary,a monolithic "international communism."The picture drawn by even those sympathetic to Eisenhower was one of an unimaginative president preoccupied with maintaining the status quo.3 The author would like to thank Barton Bernstein,David Kennedy,and John Lewis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support. Gordon H.Chang is a historian at the International Strategic Institute at Stanford UIniversity and Coordinator of the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region. 1.The pinyin romanization system will be used for Chinese names in this essay,except in the title.Traditional spellings will appear in parentheses after the first use of the pinyin. 2.Robert Anderson to Eisenhower,September 3,1954,Dwight D.Eisenhower Papers as Pres- ident of the United States,1953-1961(Ann Whitman File),Eisenhower Library,Abilene,Kansas, hereafter Eisenhower Papers (AW),Dulles-Herter Series,Box 3,Dulles,Sept.1954(2);Dwight D.Eisenhower,Mandate for Change,1953-1956(New York:Doubleday,1963),p.459. 3.Marquis William Childs,Eisenhower:Captive Hero,A Critical Study of the General and the President International Security,Spring 1988 (Vol.12,No.4) 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 96 soamoR=2213016AM
To the Nuclear Brinik Gordon H. Chang Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis Shortly after the first anniversary of the end of the Korean War, the United States confronted the possibility of renewed hostilities with the People's Republic of China. On September 3, 1954, while Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was in Manila finalizing the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Chinese Communist coastal batteries began heavy shelling of Jinmen (Quemoy)1, one of the small Nationalist-held islands off the coast of the China mainland. Acting Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson alerted President Dwight D. Eisenhower that the intensity of the attack seemed a prelude to an all-out assault. Over the next nine months the United States, in supporting the Nationalists' defense of these islands, lurched toward disasterin Eisenhower's own recollection, the crisis almost caused a "split between the United States and nearly all its allies" and seemingly carried the country to the "edge of war."2 The president's critics at the time accused him of bringing the country to the verge of war over real estate of little consequence. Much of the historical evaluation was not much kinder. Early literature on Eisenhower portrayed him as a "weak president," surrounded by advisers who wanted to use the crisis in the Strait to bring about a war with China. His administration, it was said, pursued an inflexible foreign policy that assumed, despite evidence to the contrary, a monolithic "international communism." The picture drawn by even those sympathetic to Eisenhower was one of an unimaginative president preoccupied with maintaining the status quo.3 The author would like to thank Barton Bernstein, David Kennedy, and John Lewis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and the MacArthur Foundation for financial support. Gordon H. Chang is a historian at the International Strategic Institute at Stanford University and Coordinator of the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region. International Security, Spring 1988 (Vol. 12, No. 4) C 1988 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 96 1. The pinyin romanization system will be used for Chinese names in this essay, except in the title. Traditional spellings will appear in parentheses after the first use of the pinyin. 2. Robert Anderson to Eisenhower, September 3, 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, hereafter Eisenhower Papers (AW), Dulles-Herter Series, Box 3, Dulles, Sept. 1954 (2); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 459. 3. Marquis William Childs, Eisenhower: Captive Hero, A Critical Study of the Generalnd the President This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu,1954-55 97 In recent years,in contrast,a "revisionist"literature on Eisenhower has tried to draw an entirely different picture.Now,he is seen as a commanding chief executive,and is applauded for deft handling of the 1954-55 confron- tation.One recent account characterizes Eisenhower's policy as one of "re- straint and avoidance of conflict in the Taiwan Strait."4 But newly available documentary evidence contradicts many of the revi- sionist contentions and shows that Eisenhower actually brought the country to the "nuclear brink,"far closer to war than a distraught public feared in 1955,closer than Eisenhower acknowledged in his own memoirs,and closer than most historians have heretofore even suspected.5 Among the revelations of the new evidence,three are most important:(1) the Eisenhower administration made a secret commitment to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)to help defend Jinmen and Mazu(Matsu)in the event of a major Communist attack;(2)Eisenhower,despite his public ambiguity on (New York:Harcourt,Brace,1958),pp.188-212,204,291;Townsend Hoopes,The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston:Little,Brown,1973),pp.262-273;Foster Rhea Dulles,American Policy Toward Communist China,1949-1969(New York:Thomas Y.Crowell,1972),pp.130-160;Peter Lyon,Eisenhower:Portrait of the Hero (Boston:Little,Brown,1974),pp.632,637,853-54.Other literature on the 1954-55 crisis:O.Edmund Clubb,"Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy,1950-1955,"Political Science Quarterly,Vol.74,No.4 (Dec.1959),pp. 517-31;Morton H.Halperin and Tang Tsou,"United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands," Public Policy,Vol.15 (1966),pp.119-38;Alexander George and Richard Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York:Columbia University Press,1971),pp.266-94;J.H.Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises:Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s(London:Cambridge University Press,1975),pp.120-155;and Thomas E.Stolper,China,Taiwan,and the Offshore Islands (Armonk,N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe,1985). 4.Leonard H.D.Gordon,"United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait,1954- 1962,"Journal of American History,Vol.72,No.3(December 1985),pp.637-660.See also Robert Divine,Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York:Oxford University Press,1981);Stephen E. Ambrose,Eisenhower,Vol.II:The President (New York:Simon and Schuster,1985);and Bennett C.Rushkoff,"Eisenhower,Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,1954-1955,"Political Science Quarterly,Vol.96,No.3 (Fall 1981),pp.465-480. 5.Declassified material used in this essay includes memoranda of discussions between Eisen- hower and his advisers and of top-level policy-making meetings,diary entries,cables,corre- spondence,and position papers.The federal government has released many of these documents in just the last few years,and they are kept in different locations throughout the country.The Dwight D.Eisenhower Library in Abilene,Kansas holds the Dwight D.Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States,1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File),(hereafter Eisenhower Papers [AW]);John Foster Dulles Papers,1951-1959 (hereafter Dulles Papers);and papers from the White House Office,Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs(hereafter WHO OSANSA).The National Archives in Washington,D.C.,in its Diplomatic Branch,holds papers from the Department of State and,in its Military Branch,papers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many State Department documents for the period covered by this essay are reproduced in Department of State,Foreign Relations of the UInited States (hereafter FRUS).The Seeley G.Mudd Library of Princeton University holds the personal papers of John Foster Dulles (hereafter Princeton Dulles Papers),and the Karl Lott Rankin Papers. hs coe o313AM
Quemoy-Matsu, 1954-55 197 In recent years, in contrast, a"revisionist" literature on Eisenhower has tried to draw an entirely different picture. Now, he is seen as a commanding chief executive, and is applauded for deft handling of the 1954-55 confrontation. One recent account characterizes Eisenhower's policy as one of "restraint and avoidance of conflict in the Taiwan Strait."4 But newly available documentary evidence contradicts many of the revisionist contentions and shows that Eisenhower actually brought the country to the "nuclear brink," far closer to war than a distraught public feared in 1955, closer than Eisenhower acknowledged in his own memoirs, and closer than most historians have heretofore even suspected.5 Among the revelations of the new evidence, three are most important: (1) the Eisenhower administration made a secret commitment to Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to help defend Jinmen and Mazu (Matsu) in the event of a major Communist attack; (2) Eisenhower, despite his public ambiguity on (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), pp. 188-212, 204, 291; Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 262-273; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist China, 1949-1969 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), pp. 130-160; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 632, 637, 853-54. Other literature on the 1954-55 crisis: 0. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Dec. 1959), pp. 517-31; Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "United States Policy toward the Offshore Islands," Public Policy, Vol. 15 (1966), pp. 119-38; Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 266-94; J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 120-155; and Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). 4. Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954- 1962," Journal of American History, Vol. 72, No. 3 (December 1985), pp. 637-660. See also Robert Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol. II: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); and Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Fall 1981), pp. 465-480. 5. Declassified material used in this essay includes memoranda of discussions between Eisenhower and his advisers and of top-level policy-making meetings, diary entries, cables, correspondence, and position papers. The federal government has released many of these documents in just the last few years, and they are kept in different locations throughout the country. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas holds the Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), (hereafter Eisenhower Papers [AW]); John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-1959 (hereafter Dulles Papers); and papers from the White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (hereafter WHO OSANSA). The National Archives in Washington, D.C., in its Diplomatic Branch, holds papers from the Department of State and, in its Military Branch, papers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many State Department documents for the period covered by this essay are reproduced in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS). The Seeley G. Mudd Library of Princeton University holds the personal papers of John Foster Dulles (hereafter Princeton Dulles Papers), and the Karl Lott Rankin Papers. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:498 the subject,was privately determined to defend the islands,and to use nuclear weapons if necessary;and(3)in April 1955,as the crisis reached its peak,Eisenhower and Dulles proposed to Jiang,if he would withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu,that the United States would establish a 500-mile blockade of China's coastal waters until the Communists renounced their intention to liberate Taiwan. Taken together,these points make it plain that for a time in the spring of 1955,the Eisenhower administration pursued policies that could have led to war with China by either of two paths.If the Chinese Communists had attacked Jinmen or Mazu in force while Eisenhower's secret pledge to defend them was in effect,or if Jiang had accepted the evacuation/blockade plan, Washington almost certainly would have found itself in direct military conflict with Beijing.In such a conflict,Eisenhower was fully prepared to use nuclear weapons. The fact that war was averted was due to Jiang's refusal to give up the offshore islands,thus releasing Washington from the blockade plan,and to the conciliatory gesture of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai(Chou En-lai)to the United States in late April 1955 which dramatically reduced the tensions in the region.Ironically,it was thus the actions of the two directly belligerent parties,the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists,that pulled the United States back from the brink. The Eisenhower administration's truculence belies the picture which the revisionist historians have tried to paint of a restrained and supple president. Eisenhower was not a compliant chief executive-the revisionists have dis- pelled that misconception-but he must bear primary responsibility for lead- ing the country to an untenable position in April 1955 and to the verge of military conflict with China.Moreover,the new evidence reveals that Eisen- hower's leadership was not as skillful and steady as revisionists have claimed. At two critical junctures of the crisis-in late January when the administration committed itself to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu,and in April,when it proposed the evacuation/blockade plan-Eisenhower equivocated,seriously confusing his subordinates and infuriating the Nationalist government. September,1954:Background of the Crisis In 1954,the United States believed that the legal status of Jinmen,Mazu, Dachen (Tachen),and several other clusters of small offshore islands under the control of the Nationalists differed from that of Taiwan and the Penghus This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
International Security 12:4 | 98 the subject, was privately determined to defend the islands, and to use nuclear weapons if necessary; and (3) in April 1955, as the crisis reached its peak, Eisenhower and Dulles proposed to Jiang, if he would withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu, that the United States would establish a500-mile blockade of China's coastal waters until the Communists renounced their intention to liberate Taiwan. Taken together, these points make it plain that for a time in the spring of 1955, the Eisenhower administration pursued policies that could have led to war with China by either of two paths. If the Chinese Communists had attacked Jinmen or Mazu in force while Eisenhower'secret pledge to defend them was in effect, or if Jiang had accepted the evacuation/blockade plan, Washington almost certainly would have found itself in direct military conflict with Beijing. In such a conflict, Eisenhower was fully prepared to use nuclear weapons. The fact that war was averted was due to Jiang's refusal to give up the offshore islands, thus releasing Washington from the blockade plan, and to the conciliatory gesture of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) to the United States in late April 1955 which dramatically reduced the tensions in the region. Ironically, it was thus the actions of the two directly belligerent parties, the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, that pulled the United States back from the brink. The Eisenhower administration's truculence belies the picture which the revisionist historians have tried to paint of a restrained and supple president. Eisenhower was not a compliant chief executive-the revisionists have dispelled that misconception-but he must bear primary responsibility for leading the country to an untenable position in April 1955 and to the verge of military conflict with China. Moreover, the new evidence reveals that Eisenhower's leadership was not as skillful and steady as revisionists have claimed. At two critical junctures of the crisis-in late January when the administration committed itself to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu, and in April, when it proposed the evacuation/blockade plan-Eisenhower equivocated, seriously confusing his subordinates and infuriating the Nationalist government. September, 1954: Background ofthe Crisis In 1954, the United States believed that the legal status of Jinmen, Mazu, Dachen (Tachen), and several other clusters of small offshore islands under the control of the Nationalists differed from that of Taiwan and the Penghus This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu,1954-55 99 (Pescadores).The latter had been colonized by the Japanese after their victory over China in the war of 1895 and,even though the jurisdiction of Taiwan and the Penghus had reverted to China following World War II,the United States considered their ultimate disposition still unsettled.On the other hand, the offshore islands-some thirty in number just off the central coast of the mainland-had remained subject to China,and there was no legal question that they were Chinese territory.As the Nationalists retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949,they retained control of the offshore islands for use as staging areas to harass the Communists.Jinmen,Mazu,and the others actually possessed questionable value for the defense of Taiwan,over one hundred miles away on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait.The several thousand inhabitants of the small islands were mainly farmers and fisher- men.(See map,p.123.) Eisenhower described many of the offshore islands as practically within "wading distance"of the mainland shore,including two important harbors. The Jinmen group is just two miles from the port of Xiamen(Amoy);the Mazu group is ten miles from the port of Fuzhou(Foochow).Both groups lie opposite Taiwan.The third main group,the Dachens,is located two hundred miles north of Taiwan. The Communists and Nationalists had occasionally skirmished over the islands since 1949.By the start of the 1954 crisis,with American help and encouragement,Jiang had transformed them into formidable forward posi- tions.More than fifty thousand Nationalist soldiers,many of them first-line regulars,were stationed on Jinmen alone.Apparently,Jiang was preparing the island as stepping stones for his future invasion of the mainland.6 The United States opposed any effort by the Chinese Communists to expand the amount of territory under their control and was fully committed to the Nationalist regime,which refused to budge from any territory it held. Since 1949,Washington had provided $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to the Nationalists.7 Would the United States go to war with China over these insignificant specks of land?A few days after the Communists started 6.George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.266-74;Stewart Alsop,"The Story Behind Quemoy:How We Drifted Close to War,"Saturday Evening Post,December 13, 1958,pp.26-27,86-88;memorandum of conversation,Yu Ta-wei,Walter Robertson and others, December 6,1955,Office of Chinese Affairs,1948-56,Box 53,Offshore Islands,1955,RG 59, National Archives. 7.John Foster Dulles,"Preliminary draft of possible statement of position for communication to the Republic of China,"April 4,1955,Office of Chinese Affairs,1948-56,Box 53,Offshore Islands,1955,RG 59,National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Quemoy-Matsu, 1954-55 | 99 (Pescadores). The latter had been colonized by the Japanese after their victory over China in the war of 1895 and, even though the jurisdiction of Taiwan and the Penghus had reverted to China following World War II, the United States considered their ultimate disposition still unsettled. On the other hand, the offshore islands-some thirty in number just off the central coast of the mainland-had remained subject to China, and there was no legal question that they were Chinese territory. As the Nationalists retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, they retained control of the offshore islands for use as staging areas to harass the Communists. Jinmen, Mazu, and the others actually possessed questionable value for the defense of Taiwan, over one hundred miles away on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait. The several thousand inhabitants of the small islands were mainly farmers and fishermen. (See map, p. 123.) Eisenhower described many of the offshore islands as practically within "wading distance" of the mainland shore, including two important harbors. The Jinmen group is just two miles from the port of Xiamen (Amoy); the Mazu group is ten miles from the port of Fuzhou (Foochow). Both groups lie opposite Taiwan. The third main group, the Dachens, is located two hundred miles north of Taiwan. The Communists and Nationalists had occasionally skirmished over the islands since 1949. By the start of the 1954 crisis, with American help and encouragement, Jiang had transformed them into formidable forward positions. More than fifty thousand Nationalist soldiers, many of them first-line regulars, were stationed on Jinmen alone. Apparently, Jiang was preparing the island as stepping stones for his future invasion of the mainland.6 The United States opposed any effort by the Chinese Communists to expand the amount of territory under their control and was fully committed to the Nationalist regime, which refused to budge from any territory it held. Since 1949, Washington had provided $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to the Nationalists.7 Would the United States go to war with China over these insignificant specks of land? A few days after the Communiststarted 6. George and Smoke, Deterrence inAmerican Foreign Policy, pp. 266-74; Stewart Alsop, "The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War," Saturday Evening Post, December 13, 1958, pp. 26-27, 86-88; memorandum of conversation, Yu Ta-wei, Walter Robertson and others, December 6, 1955, Office of Chinese Affairs, 1948-56, Box 53, Offshore Islands, 1955, RG 59, National Archives. 7. John Foster Dulles, "Preliminary draft of possible statement of position for communication to the Republic of China," April 4, 1955, Office of Chinese Affairs, 1948-56, Box 53, Offshore Islands, 1955, RG 59, National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions