上海交通大学：《当代中国外交》课程教学资源（相关阅读）Taiwan Strait Crisis_Sino-Soviet relations in the bombardment of Jjinmen 1958

The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations Dai Chaowu* 198年炮击金门是中苏关系走向破裂进程中的重要事件。炮击金门体现了这一时期中共领导人 对国际问题的新看法和外交战略的显著变化，是毛泽东推行“革命外交”的具体实践。这种思想和 实践同赫鲁晓夫的社会主义国家外交政策总路线存在着根本的分歧。炮击事件严重损害了中苏同 盟，进一步加深了双方的矛盾和分歧，并促使苏联领导人决定停止向中国提供核武器，从而成为中 苏矛盾和分歧公开化以及国家关系迅速走向恶化的重要标志之一。 The bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 termediate zones,the issue of war and peace, put the Soviet Union in a very difficult situ- the argument that "The East wind prevails ation to make decisions.The crisis in Sino- over the West wind,"a dialectical understand- Soviet relations not only affected the two ing of tense international situations and so countries'alliance,but deepened the two on.There can be no doubt that in bombard- sides'differences and conflicts on the issue ing Jinmen he was putting his views into con- of Taiwan and the offshore islands.At the crete practice. same time,the crisis resulted in the Soviet The issue of intermediate zones was an Union's decision to stop providing nuclear important one to which Mao gave consider- technical support to China.Therefore the able thought in the late 1950s and on which crisis was a very important event in the Sino- his views changed fundamentally.This is- Soviet split and had a profound influence. sue became the basic starting point for Mao's observation of international problems in that The Significant Change in Chinese Dip- period and his decisions on China's foreign lomatic Ideas,the Strategic Differences policy.First of all,Mao Zedong thought that between China and Soviet Union and the the US tried to control the intermediate zones Decision to Bombard Jinmen not only to oppose communism but also to weaken the intermediate countries.Secondly, Mao Zedong once said that over twenty he made new judgments and analysis on the years of turning over international issues in nature of nation-states and thus changed his his mind he had gradually formed some opin- previous opinions.Mao Zedong regarded ions and achieved a certain clarity.These those states'neutral policy in the Cold War important views included the theory of in- as an"independent and autonomous stand" C 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations Dai Chaowu* 1958年炮击金门是中苏关系走向破裂进程中的重要事件。炮击金门体现了这一时期中共领导人 对国际问题的新看法和外交战略的显著变化，是毛泽东推行“革命外交”的具体实践。这种思想和 实践同赫鲁晓夫的社会主义国家外交政策总路线存在着根本的分歧。炮击事件严重损害了中苏同 盟，进一步加深了双方的矛盾和分歧，并促使苏联领导人决定停止向中国提供核武器，从而成为中 苏矛盾和分歧公开化以及国家关系迅速走向恶化的重要标志之一。 The bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 put the Soviet Union in a very difficult situ￾ation to make decisions. The crisis in Sino￾Soviet relations not only affected the two countries’alliance, but deepened the two sides’differences and conflicts on the issue of Taiwan and the offshore islands. At the same time, the crisis resulted in the Soviet Union’s decision to stop providing nuclear technical support to China. Therefore the crisis was a very important event in the Sino￾Soviet split and had a profound influence. The Significant Change in Chinese Dip￾lomatic Ideas, the Strategic Differences between China and Soviet Union and the Decision to Bombard Jinmen Mao Zedong once said that over twenty years of turning over international issues in his mind he had gradually formed some opin￾ions and achieved a certain clarity. These important views included the theory of in￾termediate zones, the issue of war and peace, the argument that “The East wind prevails over the Westwind,”a dialectical understand￾ing of tense international situations and so on. There can be no doubt that in bombard￾ing Jinmen he was putting his views into con￾crete practice. The issue of intermediate zones was an important one to which Mao gave consider￾able thought in the late 1950s and on which his views changed fundamentally. This is￾sue became the basic starting point for Mao’s observation of international problems in that period and his decisions on China’s foreign policy. First of all, Mao Zedong thought that the US tried to control the intermediate zones not only to oppose communism but also to weaken the intermediate countries. Secondly, he made new judgments and analysis on the nature of nation-states and thus changed his previous opinions. Mao Zedong regarded those states’neutral policy in the Cold War as an “independent and autonomous stand

SPECIALISSUE THE COLD WARAND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 135 that China welcomed.Furthermore,Mao but also pointed out that in the treatment of Zedong pointed out that the main areas im- some specific problems there existed the ten- perialist countries tried to control were in Asia dencies of rightist conservatism.These and Africa.He said:"Among communism, included,in relations with other socialist nationalism and imperialism,communism and countries,neglecting necessary criticism and nationalism are closer."At the same time failing to refute revisionist opinions;in rela- Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that the in- tions with nationalist countries,overlooking termediate zones were strategic areas that necessary struggles and thus obscuring the could pin down and even wipe out imperial- boundaries between socialist and nationalist ist strength.He stressed mutual support countries;in relations with imperialist among nationalist and socialist countries.He countries,harboring unrealistic expectations. also pointed out that it was very important Mao Zedong especially stressed that his in- to make relative strengths more favorable to structions to contact the US at the Geneva the socialist camp to win over the countries Conference in 1954 were inconsistent with in intermediate zones.2 To achieve that goal, his thought,and that it was better to go on Mao Zedong emphasized that "we must sup- fighting against the US and not to develop port"the struggles against imperialism in relations with it.It was concluded at the meet- Asia,Africa,Latin America,and people's ing that Chinese foreign policy was to"de- revolutionary struggles in all countries.He nounce Yugoslavia,consolidate socialism; also stressed that the national liberation move- strike the US,rout imperialism;isolate Japan, ments in Asia,Africa and Latin America con- and win over nationalism."In light of this,in stituted“the major support'”to socialist the future foreign affairs,"struggle would countries.3 be absolute;the Cold War could not be In addition to international factors, avoided;and compromise would be relative China's diplomatic strategy underwent fun- and temporary."4 damental changes due to some important That the intermediate zone theory was domestic factors,namely,the "Great Leap re-proposed and given new meanings pointed Forward"in national economic construction. to the new characteristics of"revolutionary The theoretical base of the "Great Leap For- diplomacy"in China's foreign affairs guide- ward"was consistent with the guidelines of lines in the late 1950s.It required that China China's"revolutionary diplomacy"in late should support world revolution and oppose 1950s and each complemented the other.The imperialism,especially the US But it was fever of the"Great Leap Forward"had pro- basically different from the Soviet Union's foundly influenced China's diplomacy and socialist foreignpolicy,especially that latter's Mao Zedong asked diplomatic workers to policy of"peaceful coexistence,peaceful conquer conservative ideas and break down competition and peaceful transition"and its blind faith in the West.In June 1958,the intended detente with the US In the middle Foreign Ministry convened a conference to and late 1950s,Sino-Soviet relations began discuss the international situation.The con- to undergo an obvious change.In the realm ference affirmed foreign policy since 1949,of ideology China opposed the Soviet Union's 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 135 that China welcomed. Furthermore, Mao Zedong pointed out that the main areas im￾perialist countries tried to control were inAsia and Africa. He said: “Among communism, nationalism and imperialism, communism and nationalism are closer.”1 At the same time Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that the in￾termediate zones were strategic areas that could pin down and even wipe out imperial￾ist strength. He stressed mutual support among nationalist and socialist countries. He also pointed out that it was very important to make relative strengths more favorable to the socialist camp to win over the countries in intermediate zones. 2 To achieve that goal, Mao Zedong emphasized that “we must sup￾port”the struggles against imperialism in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and people’s revolutionary struggles in all countries. He also stressed that the national liberation move￾ments in Asia, Africa and Latin America con￾stituted “the major support”to socialist countries. 3 In addition to international factors, China’s diplomatic strategy underwent fun￾damental changes due to some important domestic factors, namely, the “Great Leap Forward”in national economic construction. The theoretical base of the “Great Leap For￾ward”was consistent with the guidelines of China’s “revolutionary diplomacy”in late 1950s and each complemented the other. The fever of the “Great Leap Forward”had pro￾foundly influenced China’s diplomacy and Mao Zedong asked diplomatic workers to conquer conservative ideas and break down blind faith in the West. In June 1958, the Foreign Ministry convened a conference to discuss the international situation. The con￾ference affirmed foreign policy since 1949, but also pointed out that in the treatment of some specific problems there existed the ten￾dencies of rightist conservatism. These included, in relations with other socialist countries, neglecting necessary criticism and failing to refute revisionist opinions; in rela￾tions with nationalist countries, overlooking necessary struggles and thus obscuring the boundaries between socialist and nationalist countries; in relations with imperialist countries, harboring unrealistic expectations. Mao Zedong especially stressed that his in￾structions to contact the US at the Geneva Conference in 1954 were inconsistent with his thought, and that it was better to go on fighting against the US and not to develop relations with it. It was concluded at the meet￾ing that Chinese foreign policy was to “de￾nounce Yugoslavia, consolidate socialism; strike the US, rout imperialism; isolate Japan, and win over nationalism.”In light of this, in the future foreign affairs, “struggle would be absolute; the Cold War could not be avoided; and compromise would be relative and temporary.”4 That the intermediate zone theory was re-proposed and given new meanings pointed to the new characteristics of “revolutionary diplomacy”in China’s foreign affairs guide￾lines in the late 1950s. It required that China should support world revolution and oppose imperialism, especially the US But it was basically different from the Soviet Union’s socialist foreign policy, especially that latter’s policy of “peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition and peaceful transition”and its intended detente with the US In the middle and late 1950s, Sino-Soviet relations began to undergo an obvious change. In the realm of ideology China opposed the Soviet Union’s

136 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 blanket negation of Stalin.Besides,the two would become and the fewer its friends in countries basically had divided opinions on China would be."6 Therefore onrelations with some important strategic problems. the US,China's policy was to "isolate and The systematization of the intermediate strike the US imperialists,eliminate fear of zones theory and the imagined rapid increase the US,give people more confidence and in Chinese economic strength directly re- make them dare to fight firmly against the sulted in Mao Zedong's famous statement US imperialists"7 Chinese leaders later even that "the East wind prevails over the West thought,"The fight between socialism and wind."In 1957,Mao pointed out at the Con- imperialism is a fight to the death.It's very ference of the Communist and the Workers' dangerous to neglect this fight and sing the Parties in Moscow that"the Western coun- praises of peaceful coexistence,and not tries have been surpassed and we have gained speak of the confrontation between the two the advantage over them."5 With that worlds."8 So when Chinese leaders publicly judgment,China and the Soviet Union be- stated "only the Chinese government dares came fundamentally divided in opinions upon to confront the US,"the bombardment on the guiding principle in foreign policy of so- Jinmen was the best answer to the Soviet cialist countries.The disparities demon- Union's policy of detente. strated themselves first in their different Another significant difference in the for- views on“peaceful coexistence”and "de- eign policies of China and the Soviet Union tente with US"Peaceful coexistence was 'the was the issue of how to treat the national general guideline of socialist countries'for- liberation movement.Along with the putting eign policies"put forward in the 20th Con- forward of the intermediate zone theory and gress of the Soviet Communist Party.The new judgments on the international situation, Communist Party of China had also spoken Chinese leaders began to take the "mutual highly of the principle of peaceful coexist- desire for peace of Asian and African coun- ence since 1954.Related to this was the tries and their struggles against colonialism question of whether to seek detente with the and imperialism”as“a basis for socialist US in the international situation of that time. countries to establish a united front with On the basis of the general line on peaceful them."In the view of the Chinese leaders, coexistence,Khrushchev made improvingre- this united front was to fight imperialism and lations with the US a top priority of Soviet colonialism rather than to "peacefully coex- foreign policy.This was precisely what ist"with them.However,in the view of the China opposed firmly.At the beginning of Soviet leaders,peaceful coexistence,coop- 1957 Mao Zedong clearly pointed out,"Ithink eration among socialist countries and sup- it is more advantageous to us to establish port to national liberation movement were diplomatic relations with the US a few years three separate principles,and"it is for the later";and to do so could "isolate the US, cooperation,unity and mutual support of the deprive it completely of political resources socialist camp that the USSR regards peace- and put it in an unjustifiable position.The ful coexistence as the general line of social- longer this went on the more passive US ist countries'foreign policies.It is not only 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

136 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 blanket negation of Stalin. Besides, the two countries basically had divided opinions on some important strategic problems. The systematization of the intermediate zones theory and the imagined rapid increase in Chinese economic strength directly re￾sulted in Mao Zedong’s famous statement that “the East wind prevails over the West wind.”In 1957, Mao pointed out at the Con￾ference of the Communist and the Workers’ Parties in Moscow that “the Western coun￾tries have been surpassed and we have gained the advantage over them.”5 With that judgment, China and the Soviet Union be￾came fundamentally divided in opinions upon the guiding principle in foreign policy of so￾cialist countries. The disparities demon￾strated themselves first in their different views on “peaceful coexistence”and “de￾tente with US”Peaceful coexistence was “the general guideline of socialist countries’for￾eign policies”put forward in the 20 th Con￾gress of the Soviet Communist Party. The Communist Party of China had also spoken highly of the principle of peaceful coexist￾ence since 1954. Related to this was the question of whether to seek detente with the US in the international situation of that time. On the basis of the general line on peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev made improving re￾lations with the US a top priority of Soviet foreign policy. This was precisely what China opposed firmly. At the beginning of 1957 Mao Zedong clearly pointed out, “I think it is more advantageous to us to establish diplomatic relations with the US a few years later”; and to do so could “isolate the US, deprive it completely of political resources and put it in an unjustifiable position. The longer this went on the more passive US would become and the fewer its friends in China would be.”6 Therefore on relations with the US, China’s policy was to “isolate and strike the US imperialists, eliminate fear of the US, give people more confidence and make them dare to fight firmly against the US imperialists”7 Chinese leaders later even thought, “The fight between socialism and imperialism is a fight to the death. It’s very dangerous to neglect this fight and sing the praises of peaceful coexistence, and not speak of the confrontation between the two worlds.”8 So when Chinese leaders publicly stated “only the Chinese government dares to confront the US,”the bombardment on Jinmen was the best answer to the Soviet Union’s policy of detente. Another significant difference in the for￾eign policies of China and the Soviet Union was the issue of how to treat the national liberation movement. Along with the putting forward of the intermediate zone theory and new judgments on the international situation, Chinese leaders began to take the “mutual desire for peace of Asian and African coun￾tries and their struggles against colonialism and imperialism”as “a basis for socialist countries to establish a united front with them.”In the view of the Chinese leaders, this united front was to fight imperialism and colonialism rather than to “peacefully coex￾ist”with them. However, in the view of the Soviet leaders, peaceful coexistence, coop￾eration among socialist countries and sup￾port to national liberation movement were three separate principles, and “it is for the cooperation, unity and mutual support of the socialist camp that the USSR regards peace￾ful coexistence as the general line of social￾ist countries’foreign policies. It is not only

SPECIALISSUE THE COLD WARAND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 137 a matter of supporting national liberation our international relations and our foreign movements."9 As Mao Zedong repeatedly policy.”o explained,the objective of the bombardment The Soviet Union believed that oppos- was in the first place to support the Arab ing peaceful coexistence and insisting on the anti-imperialism struggle.Peng Dehuai also anti-imperialist struggle would certainly make stressed that"the Chinese people must give the international situations tense and would their support through actual actions,of which fundamentally harm the common interests one is the deployment of the air force in of socialist camp.But China's view was just Fujian,and another is the bombardment on the opposite.Mao Zedong believed that ten- Jinmen....It is also to tell people all over the sion "could arouse the masses,backward world that if the U.S.imperial ists want war strata and people in the middle to struggle," Chinese people are not be afraid."The bom- and at the same time "a tense situation could bardment showed the idea of supporting na- make people all over the world stop and think, tional liberation movement in China's"revo- and could mobilize people all over the world, lutionary diplomacy." workers,and other laboring masses to make Besides,the judgment that "the East more a few more communists.Mao wind prevails over the West wind"directly Zedong also believed that struggle against the brought about another question,"Who is U.S.could eliminate people's superstitious afraid of whom?"The question was in fact belief and fear of the US.In the view of the concerned with how to estimate the strength Chinese leaders,bombardment on Jinmenand of the US.The Soviet leaders held that,when creating a tense situation was also a means analyzing US strength and economic to achieve this goal. potential,consideration should be given to the fact that the US had already renewed its The Soviet Response to the Bombard- industrial facilities and had greater economic ment on Jinmen and Its Policy Choice and military strength at the time;they also had a large army and many advanced Soviet leaders were not surprised at the weapons,and therefore couldn't be simply bombardment on 23 August 1958.Khru- regarded as“a paper tiger.”About this,Mao shchev wrote in his memoirs that Chinese Zedong questioned Soviet foreign minister leaders had said they had prepared to take Andrei A.Gromyko:"Is US really so eco- new military operation against Jiang Jieshi. nomically powerful that it is hard for us to They asked for air cover,long-range and sea- take it on?"Mao Zedong's answer to this shore artillery.12 However the outbreak of the was "it is imperialism that is more afraid of second Taiwan Straits crisis still outran us."So the objective of Chinese foreign Khrushchev's expectations.First,that was policy was to"explain clearly and bring into because China did not inform the USSR of play”Mao Zedong's idea that“it is imperial- the time and plan of the bombardment ac- ism that is more afraid of us,"without hav- cording to regular practice.Secondly, ing to“consider Soviet views.”In addition, Khrushchev himself did not expect so strong it was to "publicly announce standpoint in a response from the US.So the crisis put 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

SPECIAL ISSUE: THE COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET RELATION 137 a matter of supporting national liberation movements.”9 As Mao Zedong repeatedly explained, the objective of the bombardment was in the first place to support the Arab anti-imperialism struggle. Peng Dehuai also stressed that “the Chinese people must give their support through actual actions, of which one is the deployment of the air force in Fujian, and another is the bombardment on Jinmen. … It is also to tell people all over the world that if the U.S. imperialists want war Chinese people are not be afraid.”The bom￾bardment showed the idea of supporting na￾tional liberation movement in China’s “revo￾lutionary diplomacy.” Besides, the judgment that “the East wind prevails over the West wind”directly brought about another question, “Who is afraid of whom?”The question was in fact concerned with how to estimate the strength of the US. The Soviet leaders held that, when analyzing US strength and economic potential, consideration should be given to the fact that the US had already renewed its industrial facilities and had greater economic and military strength at the time; they also had a large army and many advanced weapons, and therefore couldn’t be simply regarded as “a paper tiger.”About this, Mao Zedong questioned Soviet foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko: “Is US really so eco￾nomically powerful that it is hard for us to take it on?”Mao Zedong’s answer to this was “it is imperialism that is more afraid of us.”So the objective of Chinese foreign policy was to “explain clearly and bring into play”Mao Zedong’s idea that “it is imperial￾ism that is more afraid of us,”without hav￾ing to “consider Soviet views.”In addition, it was to “publicly announce standpoint in our international relations and our foreign policy.”10 The Soviet Union believed that oppos￾ing peaceful coexistence and insisting on the anti-imperialist strugglewould certainly make the international situations tense and would fundamentally harm the common interests of socialist camp. But China’s view was just the opposite. Mao Zedong believed that ten￾sion “could arouse the masses, backward strata and people in the middle to struggle,” and at the same time “a tense situation could make people all overthe world stop and think, and could mobilize people all over the world, workers, and other laboring masses to make more a few more communists.”11 Mao Zedong also believed that struggle against the U.S. could eliminate people’s superstitious belief and fear of the US. In the view of the Chinese leaders, bombardment on Jinmen and creating a tense situation was also a means to achieve this goal. The Soviet Response to the Bombard￾ment on Jinmen and Its Policy Choice Soviet leaders were not surprised at the bombardment on 23 August 1958. Khru￾shchev wrote in his memoirs that Chinese leaders had said they had prepared to take new military operation against Jiang Jieshi. They asked for air cover, long-range and sea￾shore artillery. 12 However the outbreak of the second Taiwan Straits crisis still outran Khrushchev’s expectations. First, that was because China did not inform the USSR of the time and plan of the bombardment ac￾cording to regular practice. Secondly, Khrushchev himself did not expect so strong a response from the US. So the crisis put

138 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 the USSR into a difficult dilemma.Soviet Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the policy choices at the time were based on their matter.According to these reports,the Rus- understanding and knowledge of China's sians believed that"It would not be entirely policy decisions and their judgments about correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan the US response to the crisis.Their policy issue...as purely a domestic affair ofChina. choices can be roughly divided into two In the first stage of the development of the phases.Throughout the course of the crisis Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have the Soviet response and policy decisions were demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to passive and cautious. evaluating the degree of urgency of the Tai- In the first phase of the crisis (from the wan problem and have let the possibility of beginning of the bombardment to the end of aggravating the international situation emerge September 1958),because the USSR did not to keep the United States 'on the verge of know what China's strategic objectives war'from their side too."The reports also were,it announced its support for China's pointed out that"Our Chinese friends started actions and tried to take some concrete steps to show excessive sensitivity toward the on the one hand,while on the other hand it problems of sovereignty and independence sought through a variety of channel to as- of their country,and reservations about the certain China's intentions so as to influence measures that used to be taken by both coun- and restrict China's actions.Realizing that tries jointly."The Soviets obviously believed war might break out in the Taiwan Straits that the Chinese showed a tendency towards area,the Soviet military showed great cau- solving Asian problems themselves.They did tion and restraint at this stage.Although the not think it necessary to consult the USSR USSR might have known in advance what about their planned actions,though they action China would take,the Soviet leaders would expect its support when the situation were nonetheless astonished that China had got out of control.14 absolutely not informed them of the time, On receiving the reports from the So- objective and plan of the bombardment.13 viet Embassy,Khrushchev immediately de- Hence the knowledge of China's intentions manded that the embassy inform Beijing that became the essential prerequisite for the China had just begun socialist construction USSR's policy decisions and the Soviet em- and was quite backward both economically bassy in China became the important source and militarily,she did not at present have the of relevant information.After the bombard- capacity to launch a modern war and carry ment the Soviet embassy immediately tele- out a landing operation on Taiwan.There was graphed the Central Committee of the Soviet no need for the whole socialist camp includ- Communist Party to say that China had sent ing the USSR to get involved in this war.To a message only after the bombardment on this Mao Zedong replied,via Foreign Ministry, 23 August and had not in any way given ad- that these islands were Chinese territory and vance notice of its intentions in this impor- their liberation was China's internal affair.5 tant military and political action.From the Because the USSR could not exactly learn beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958, what China had in mind,it decided to send 1994-2010 China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House.All rights reserved.http://www.cnki.net

138 SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CHINA Summer 2005 the USSR into a difficult dilemma. Soviet policy choices at the time were based on their understanding and knowledge of China’s policy decisions and their judgments about the US response to the crisis. Their policy choices can be roughly divided into two phases. Throughout the course of the crisis the Soviet response and policy decisions were passive and cautious. In the first phase of the crisis (from the beginning of the bombardment to the end of September 1958), because the USSR did not know what China’s strategic objectives were, it announced its support for China’s actions and tried to take some concrete steps on the one hand, while on the other hand it sought through a variety of channel to as￾certain China’s intentions so as to influence and restrict China’s actions. Realizing that war might break out in the Taiwan Straits area, the Soviet military showed great cau￾tion and restraint at this stage. Although the USSR might have known in advance what action China would take, the Soviet leaders were nonetheless astonished that China had absolutely not informed them of the time, objective and plan of the bombardment. 13 Hence the knowledge of China’s intentions became the essential prerequisite for the USSR’s policy decisions and the Soviet em￾bassy in China became the important source of relevant information. After the bombard￾ment the Soviet embassy immediately tele￾graphed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to say that China had sent a message only after the bombardment on 23 August and had not in any way given ad￾vance notice of its intentions in this impor￾tant military and political action. From the beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958, Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the matter. According to these reports, the Rus￾sians believed that “It would not be entirely correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan issue … as purely a domestic affair of China. In the first stage of the development of the Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to evaluating the degree of urgency of the Tai￾wan problem and have let the possibility of aggravating the international situation emerge to keep the United States ‘on the verge of war’from their side too.”The reports also pointed out that “Our Chinese friends started to show excessive sensitivity toward the problems of sovereignty and independence of their country, and reservations about the measures that used to be taken by both coun￾tries jointly.”The Soviets obviously believed that the Chinese showed a tendency towards solvingAsian problems themselves. They did not think it necessary to consult the USSR about their planned actions, though they would expect its support when the situation got out of control. 14 On receiving the reports from the So￾viet Embassy, Khrushchev immediately de￾manded that the embassy inform Beijing that China had just begun socialist construction and was quite backward both economically and militarily, she did not at present have the capacity to launch a modern war and carry out a landing operation on Taiwan. There was no need for the whole socialist camp includ￾ing the USSR to get involved in this war. To this Mao Zedong replied, via Foreign Ministry, that these islands were Chinese territory and their liberation was China’s internal affair. 15 Because the USSR could not exactly learn what China had in mind, it decided to send