480:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY problems.'5 The subtext was aimed at maintaining the new strategic triangle: "We are making some progress with the Soviets,and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us,so that we don't get ahead of you in relations with the Russians."16 While it was true that Washington sought good relations with both Moscow and Beijing,it did not necessarily wish for better Sino-Soviet relations.Accord- ing to Kissinger's model of triangular politics,while the United States did not seek a Sino-Soviet war,it did require some frigidity in Sino-Soviet relations because the pivotal American position would be beneficial only so long as the Chinese and Soviets regarded each other as a greater threat than the Ameri- cans.Thus,in their dialogues,Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that while Moscow harbored ill intent toward them,Washing- ton was China's firm friend. During the early talks,the Americans quickly realized that Beijing's key secu- rity concern revolved around superpower collusion to encircle China.At their opening meeting,Kissinger made sure to assure Zhou at the outset that the United States would never collude with other countries against the PRC.7 He added the remarkable statements that,because-apart from the Taiwan issue which he fully expected to be resolved in the near future-the United States and China had "no conflicting interests at all"in great power relations,the United States would be"your supporter and not your opponent."As evidence, Nixon sent his assurance that Washington would not take any "major steps" affecting Chinese interests without prior discussion with Beijing,and that he was prepared to provide information regarding Soviet-American negotiations to alleviate Chinese concerns.Moreover,the Nixon administration was pre- pared to make with Beijing any arms control agreement it concluded with Moscow.The Chinese politely declined these offers.s Despite their perceived fear of the Soviets,the Chinese leaders were rela- tively taciturn on the subject in the early meetings:in July 197I,Zhou referred only obliquely to"our northern neighbour"and "the other superpower,"but did not initiate any further discussion on the issue."9 Kissinger put Zhou's ret- icence down to a sense of "face."During the October trip,although Zhou had placed the Soviet Union last on a list of six key issues on the substantive agenda for the talks and declared that Beijing was not opposed to U.S.-USSR relations, Kissinger was convinced that the Chinese were displaying bravado in the face 15.Memcon,Io/22/71,p.3o;Kissinger to Nixon,"My October China Visit:Discussions of the Issues,"Box 851,NSF,NPM,p.29.Zhou's phlegmatic response was that"it does not natter.” 16.Winston Lord oral history interview,in Nancy Tucker,ed.,China Confidential:Amer- ican Diplomats and Sino-American Relations,1945-1996 (New York,2001),278. 17.Memcon,7/9/71,Box 851,NSE,NPM,p.6. 18.Memcon,7/1o/71,12.10-6pm,pp.7,28;Memcon,7/11/71,10.35-11.55am,p.8; Io/22/71,Pp.32-33 1g.Memcon,7/1o/71,12.Io-6pm,P.35-
problems.15 The subtext was aimed at maintaining the new strategic triangle: “We are making some progress with the Soviets, and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us, so that we don’t get ahead of you in relations with the Russians.”16 While it was true that Washington sought good relations with both Moscow and Beijing, it did not necessarily wish for better Sino-Soviet relations. According to Kissinger’s model of triangular politics, while the United States did not seek a Sino-Soviet war, it did require some frigidity in Sino-Soviet relations because the pivotal American position would be beneficial only so long as the Chinese and Soviets regarded each other as a greater threat than the Americans. Thus, in their dialogues, Nixon and Kissinger sought to persuade the Chinese leaders that while Moscow harbored ill intent toward them, Washington was China’s firm friend. During the early talks, the Americans quickly realized that Beijing’s key security concern revolved around superpower collusion to encircle China. At their opening meeting, Kissinger made sure to assure Zhou at the outset that the United States would never collude with other countries against the PRC.17 He added the remarkable statements that, because—apart from the Taiwan issue which he fully expected to be resolved in the near future—the United States and China had “no conflicting interests at all” in great power relations, the United States would be “your supporter and not your opponent.” As evidence, Nixon sent his assurance that Washington would not take any “major steps” affecting Chinese interests without prior discussion with Beijing, and that he was prepared to provide information regarding Soviet-American negotiations to alleviate Chinese concerns. Moreover, the Nixon administration was prepared to make with Beijing any arms control agreement it concluded with Moscow. The Chinese politely declined these offers.18 Despite their perceived fear of the Soviets, the Chinese leaders were relatively taciturn on the subject in the early meetings: in July 1971, Zhou referred only obliquely to “our northern neighbour” and “the other superpower,” but did not initiate any further discussion on the issue.19 Kissinger put Zhou’s reticence down to a sense of “face.” During the October trip, although Zhou had placed the Soviet Union last on a list of six key issues on the substantive agenda for the talks and declared that Beijing was not opposed to U.S.-USSR relations, Kissinger was convinced that the Chinese were displaying bravado in the face 480 : diplomatic history 15. Memcon, 10/22/71, p. 30; Kissinger to Nixon, “My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues,” Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 29. Zhou’s phlegmatic response was that “it does not matter.” 16. Winston Lord oral history interview, in Nancy Tucker, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945–1996 (New York, 2001), 278. 17. Memcon, 7/9/71, Box 851, NSF, NPM, p. 6. 18. Memcon, 7/10/71, 12.10-6pm, pp. 7, 28; Memcon, 7/11/71, 10.35-11.55am, p. 8; 10/22/71, pp. 32–33. 19. Memcon, 7/10/71, 12.10-6pm, p. 35
Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974:481 of the Soviet threat.Thus,he reminded them that the Soviet menace was directed mainly toward China.As his staff noted,even at the public banquet, Kissinger used "anti-Soviet play"and deliberately "always [used]Soviet exam- ples as bad guys."In private,he warned Zhou that in the wake of the Sino- American rapprochement,Moscow had reached agreement with Washington on Berlin and SALT,and was pushing for a European Security Community, because of its "desire to free itself in Europe so it can concentrate on other areas,"namely China.Furthermore,he fanned Beijing's ire about superpower nuclear hegemony in August by informing the Chinese leaders that,in bilateral negotiations about an agreement to prevent accidental nuclear war,the Soviets had tried unsuccessfully to make provisions in the agreement which would have obliged Washington to report about nuclear events in China.*3 The first opportunity for the White House to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington recognized and would act to support Chinese national interests occurred during the South Asia crisis at the end of 1971.While the U.S."tilt" toward Pakistan was motivated by various reasons,the desire to boost the new opening to China played an important role.Kissinger encouraged Beijing to support actively its Pakistani ally in several ways.He provided the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations,Huang Hua,with detailed intelligence information about Indian deployments,including unconfirmed reports that the Indians were moving their divisions away from the Chinese border toward East Pakistan.'When war broke out between India and Pakistan on 3 December, Kissinger argued that strong U.S.action was necessary to counter the growing Soviet influence on the subcontinent,telling Nixon,"We really don't have any choice.We can't allow a friend of ours and China's to get screwed in a conflict with a friend of Russia's."5 Against this backdrop,he informed Huang Hua about U.S.moves in the subcontinent and indicated "our approval of Chinese support for Pakistan, including diversionary troop movements."6 To demonstrate U.S.support for China and its ally,Kissinger made his first offer to Beijing of U.S.satellite intel- 20.Kissinger to Nixon,"My October China Visit:Discussions of the Issues,"pp.5,7,29. 21.Dwight Chapin,"Zhou-Dinner 1o/24,"10/25/71,Box 27,Chapin Files,NPM. 22.Memcon,Io/22/71,pp.29-30. 23.Memcon,8/16/71,Box 330,Lord Files,LOT 77DI12,Record Group [RG]59,NA, pp.4-5.But Garthoff argues that Kissinger misread the Soviet position,which was not intended to be anti-Chinese-see Detente and Confrontation,202,272. 24.Memcon,11/23/71,Box 330,Lord Files,pp.I2-13. 25.White House Years,897-98;Richard Nixon,RN:The Memoirs of Richard Nicon (London, 1978),527.The State Department,Joint Chiefs of Staff,and CIA disagreed with the White House,and there was"open rebellion"by the interagency Special Action Group for the crisis- see H.R.Haldeman,Tbe Haldeman Diaries:Inside the Nixon Wbite House (New York,1994), 381. 26.Kissinger to Nixon,"My December to Meeting with the Chinese in New York," National Security Archives NSA],China and the United States:From Hostility to Engagement, Special Collections Series,Microfiche Document no.233,p.I.Emphasis mine
of the Soviet threat.20 Thus, he reminded them that the Soviet menace was directed mainly toward China. As his staff noted, even at the public banquet, Kissinger used “anti-Soviet play” and deliberately “always [used] Soviet examples as bad guys.”21 In private, he warned Zhou that in the wake of the SinoAmerican rapprochement, Moscow had reached agreement with Washington on Berlin and SALT, and was pushing for a European Security Community, because of its “desire to free itself in Europe so it can concentrate on other areas,” namely China.22 Furthermore, he fanned Beijing’s ire about superpower nuclear hegemony in August by informing the Chinese leaders that, in bilateral negotiations about an agreement to prevent accidental nuclear war, the Soviets had tried unsuccessfully to make provisions in the agreement which would have obliged Washington to report about nuclear events in China.23 The first opportunity for the White House to demonstrate to Beijing that Washington recognized and would act to support Chinese national interests occurred during the South Asia crisis at the end of 1971. While the U.S. “tilt” toward Pakistan was motivated by various reasons, the desire to boost the new opening to China played an important role. Kissinger encouraged Beijing to support actively its Pakistani ally in several ways. He provided the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, Huang Hua, with detailed intelligence information about Indian deployments, including unconfirmed reports that the Indians were moving their divisions away from the Chinese border toward East Pakistan.24 When war broke out between India and Pakistan on 3 December, Kissinger argued that strong U.S. action was necessary to counter the growing Soviet influence on the subcontinent, telling Nixon, “We really don’t have any choice. We can’t allow a friend of ours and China’s to get screwed in a conflict with a friend of Russia’s.”25 Against this backdrop, he informed Huang Hua about U.S. moves in the subcontinent and indicated “our approval of Chinese support for Pakistan, including diversionary troop movements.”26 To demonstrate U.S. support for China and its ally, Kissinger made his first offer to Beijing of U.S. satellite intelNixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 481 20. Kissinger to Nixon, “My October China Visit: Discussions of the Issues,” pp. 5, 7, 29. 21. Dwight Chapin, “Zhou—Dinner 10/24,” 10/25/71, Box 27, Chapin Files, NPM. 22. Memcon, 10/22/71, pp. 29–30. 23. Memcon, 8/16/71, Box 330, Lord Files, LOT 77D112, Record Group [RG] 59, NA, pp. 4–5. But Garthoff argues that Kissinger misread the Soviet position, which was not intended to be anti-Chinese—see Détente and Confrontation, 202, 272. 24. Memcon, 11/23/71, Box 330, Lord Files, pp. 12–13. 25. White House Years, 897–98; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London, 1978), 527. The State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA disagreed with the White House, and there was “open rebellion” by the interagency Special Action Group for the crisis— see H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994), 381. 26. Kissinger to Nixon, “My December 10 Meeting with the Chinese in New York,” National Security Archives [NSA], China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, Special Collections Series, Microfiche Document no. 233, p. 1. Emphasis mine
482:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY ligence information about the disposition of Soviet forces."7 Further,Nixon sent the message that if Beijing"took measures to protect its security"as a result of the situation in South Asia,the United States would "oppose any effort of others to interfere with the PRC."Clearly,the intention was to encourage the PRC to move its troops to the Indian border as a way to help divert Indian mil- itary attention away from Pakistan,by helping to ensure that Beijing was able to monitor its northern flank at the same time.Kissinger stated in his memoirs that "an active if tacit collaboration"developed.*Yet,the White House's belief that Beijing would take military action contributed significantly to a series of escalatory and potentially dangerous actions in December,including Nixon's order for the U.S.naval force to sail toward the Bay of Bengal.*9 In any event, Beijing did not accept U.S.offers and instead supported a ceasefire in both East and West Pakistan followed by mutual troop withdrawals.3 In January 1972,Kissinger's deputy Alexander Haig headed an advance team to China for a "rehearsal"for the president's visit,and the White House tried to use Haig's brusque,military style to convey more forcefully the Soviet threat.For instance,Haig told Zhou that in the wake of the South Asian crisis, Soviet policy on the subcontinent had moved toward greater involvement in order to "encircle the PRC with unfriendly states."Evidence of this included its recent announcement of support for Bangladesh,offer of assistance to Pakistan,increased material support for Hanoi,and Gromyko's planned visit to Japan.The United States objected to these Soviet moves because "the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest."Because Washington was convinced that the Soviet strategy was first to neutralize the PRC and then turn on the United States itself,the United States and PRC "must concert at this critical juncture."In Washing- ton's first substantial offer of cooperation with the PRC against the Soviet Union,Haig told Zhou that the United States would,as it had done during the crisis between India and Pakistan,attempt to "neutralize"Soviet threats in the PRC's periphery,and to "deter threats against the PRC]."Specifically,the White House would-"unilaterally and without any reciprocity"-provide Beijing with U.S.strategic and tactical intelligence pertaining to the Soviet threat against China.3 27.Kissinger's talking points for this meeting,however,suggest that there would have been considerable limits to what intelligence information the United States could provide,as the next relevant satellite information would not be available until the end of December or begin- ning of January,when,as it turned out,the crisis had already passed.See NSC,"Talking Points South Asia,"n.d.,NSA Doc.229,p.7. 28.Kissinger,Wbite House Years,9o6. 29.Ibid.,91o. 30.Haig-Huang memcon,12/12/71,Box 330,Lord Files. 31.Zhou-Haig memcon,1/3/72,Box 1037,NSF,NPM,pp.2-4,6;NSC,"Talking Points for Haig Trip,"n.d.,Box 1037,NSF,NPM,pp.6-7.Haig's presentation did not go down well. Mao reportedly commented,"To worry about us,[the Americans]are the cat who is crying over the death of a mouse!When [the Soviets]are in Vietnam,they want to surround China
ligence information about the disposition of Soviet forces.”27 Further, Nixon sent the message that if Beijing “took measures to protect its security” as a result of the situation in South Asia, the United States would “oppose any effort of others to interfere with the PRC.” Clearly, the intention was to encourage the PRC to move its troops to the Indian border as a way to help divert Indian military attention away from Pakistan, by helping to ensure that Beijing was able to monitor its northern flank at the same time. Kissinger stated in his memoirs that “an active if tacit collaboration” developed.28 Yet, the White House’s belief that Beijing would take military action contributed significantly to a series of escalatory and potentially dangerous actions in December, including Nixon’s order for the U.S. naval force to sail toward the Bay of Bengal.29 In any event, Beijing did not accept U.S. offers and instead supported a ceasefire in both East and West Pakistan followed by mutual troop withdrawals.30 In January 1972, Kissinger’s deputy Alexander Haig headed an advance team to China for a “rehearsal” for the president’s visit, and the White House tried to use Haig’s brusque, military style to convey more forcefully the Soviet threat. For instance, Haig told Zhou that in the wake of the South Asian crisis, Soviet policy on the subcontinent had moved toward greater involvement in order to “encircle the PRC with unfriendly states.” Evidence of this included its recent announcement of support for Bangladesh, offer of assistance to Pakistan, increased material support for Hanoi, and Gromyko’s planned visit to Japan. The United States objected to these Soviet moves because “the future viability of the PRC was of the greatest interest to us and a matter of our own national interest.” Because Washington was convinced that the Soviet strategy was first to neutralize the PRC and then turn on the United States itself, the United States and PRC “must concert at this critical juncture.” In Washington’s first substantial offer of cooperation with the PRC against the Soviet Union, Haig told Zhou that the United States would, as it had done during the crisis between India and Pakistan, attempt to “neutralize” Soviet threats in the PRC’s periphery, and to “deter threats against the [PRC].” Specifically, the White House would—“unilaterally and without any reciprocity”—provide Beijing with U.S. strategic and tactical intelligence pertaining to the Soviet threat against China.31 482 : diplomatic history 27. Kissinger’s talking points for this meeting, however, suggest that there would have been considerable limits to what intelligence information the United States could provide, as the next relevant satellite information would not be available until the end of December or beginning of January, when, as it turned out, the crisis had already passed. See NSC, “Talking Points South Asia,” n.d., NSA Doc. 229, p. 7. 28. Kissinger, White House Years, 906. 29. Ibid., 910. 30. Haig-Huang memcon, 12/12/71, Box 330, Lord Files. 31. Zhou-Haig memcon, 1/3/72, Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 2–4, 6; NSC, “Talking Points for Haig Trip,” n.d., Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 6–7. Haig’s presentation did not go down well. Mao reportedly commented, “To worry about us, [the Americans] are the cat who is crying over the death of a mouse! When [the Soviets] are in Vietnam, they want to surround China
Nixon,Kissinger,and the "Soviet Card"in the U.S.Opening to China,1971-1974 483 During the February 1972 summit,Nixon repeated this offer and assured Zhou that the United States would "oppose"any attempt by the Soviets to engage in "aggressive action"against China.*The declassified transcript of a meeting on 23 February 1972 shows that Kissinger-along with his aides Winston Lord,Jonathan Howe,and John Holdrige-briefed Marshal Yeh Jianying,the vice chairman of the military commission and Qiao Guanhua,the vice minister of foreign affairs,about the deployment of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border.The briefing included details about ground forces,tactical aircraft and missiles,strategic air defense systems,and strategic attack forces, especially nuclear forces.3 Kissinger's assistant Robert MacFarlane has revealed that he and other aides provided intelligence briefings to the Chinese on each of Kissinger's subsequent trips to Beijing.Winston Lord,Kissinger's key aide on China,confirms that these briefings occurred,but added that they were more a gesture to back up the verbal exchanges than of significant substance;the main purpose was "to build trust,confidence,a sense of shared danger."There was also a degree of "political symbolism":according to Lord,the White House assumed that the Soviets might well "get to hear of it,"and by implication,had regarded this action as a means to further load the China card.35 The signifi- cance of the intelligence information provided over this period is debatable,as the full documentary record is not available.However,the secret provision of regular intelligence information to Beijing regarding Soviet disposition of forces from Indochina,and again,when they are in the subcontinent,the Russians want to encircle China from the subcontinent....What about Taiwan,the Philippines,and South Korea?Do all these countries need [U.S.]protection?Isn't it dangerous that China's independence and living should be protected by you?"Accordingly,Zhou took umbrage with Haig,stating that he was"surprised"that the United States seemed to be"all of a sudden express[ing]doubts over China's viability,asserting that it wants to maintain China's independence and viability." Zhou retorted that China would never rely on "external forces"to maintain its independence and viability,because this would make it"a protectorate or a colony."Gong Li,"Chinese Deci- sion Making and the Thawing of Sino-US Relations,"in Re-examining the Cold War:US-Cbina Diplomacy,1954-1973,eds.Robert S.Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge,MA,2001), 352-53;Hong Zhaohui,"The Role of Individuals in US-China Relations,1949-1972,"in Image,Perception,and the Making of US-Cbina Relations,eds.Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui (Lanham,MD,1998),358;Memcon,1//72,Box 1o37,NSE,NPM,pp.2,4. 32.Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/23/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.21.Nixon did not elaborate on just how Washington would oppose Soviet aggression. 33.See Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/22/72,Box 87,POF,NPM,p.Io;Kissinger-Yeh memcon,2/23/72,Box 92,NSE,NPM.These documents are also available at http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBBIo6/index.htm. 34.See Robert MacFarlane,Special Trust (New York,1994),149-69.MacFarlane writes that apart from detailed briefings about Soviet military dispositions and readiness at the Chinese border,they also provided information on Soviet military aid to North Vietnam and other Third World countries and guerilla movements. 35.Author interview with Winston Lord,3/7/o1.Moscow apparently did learn about the provision of intelligence information:Anatoly Dobrynin,the Soviet ambassador in Washing- ton,told Kissinger in March that Moscow had it on Chinese sources that Kissinger had given the Chinese "a complete rundown of the 'dislocation'of Soviet forces on the Chinese border, as well as of the location of Soviet missile installations."Kissinger denied it.See Memcon, 3/9/72,Box 493,NSF,NPM,p.3
During the February 1972 summit, Nixon repeated this offer and assured Zhou that the United States would “oppose” any attempt by the Soviets to engage in “aggressive action” against China.32 The declassified transcript of a meeting on 23 February 1972 shows that Kissinger—along with his aides Winston Lord, Jonathan Howe, and John Holdrige—briefed Marshal Yeh Jianying, the vice chairman of the military commission and Qiao Guanhua, the vice minister of foreign affairs, about the deployment of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The briefing included details about ground forces, tactical aircraft and missiles, strategic air defense systems, and strategic attack forces, especially nuclear forces.33 Kissinger’s assistant Robert MacFarlane has revealed that he and other aides provided intelligence briefings to the Chinese on each of Kissinger’s subsequent trips to Beijing.34 Winston Lord, Kissinger’s key aide on China, confirms that these briefings occurred, but added that they were more a gesture to back up the verbal exchanges than of significant substance; the main purpose was “to build trust, confidence, a sense of shared danger.” There was also a degree of “political symbolism”: according to Lord, the White House assumed that the Soviets might well “get to hear of it,” and by implication, had regarded this action as a means to further load the China card.35 The signifi- cance of the intelligence information provided over this period is debatable, as the full documentary record is not available. However, the secret provision of regular intelligence information to Beijing regarding Soviet disposition of forces Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974 : 483 from Indochina, and again, when they are in the subcontinent, the Russians want to encircle China from the subcontinent. ... What about Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea? Do all these countries need [U.S.] protection? Isn’t it dangerous that China’s independence and living should be protected by you?” Accordingly, Zhou took umbrage with Haig, stating that he was “surprised” that the United States seemed to be “all of a sudden express[ing] doubts over China’s viability, asserting that it wants to maintain China’s independence and viability.” Zhou retorted that China would never rely on “external forces” to maintain its independence and viability, because this would make it “a protectorate or a colony.” Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and the Thawing of Sino-US Relations,” in Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, eds. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA, 2001), 352–53; Hong Zhaohui, “The Role of Individuals in US-China Relations, 1949–1972,” in Image, Perception, and the Making of US-China Relations, eds. Li Hongshan and Hong Zhaohui (Lanham, MD, 1998), 358; Memcon, 1/7/72, Box 1037, NSF, NPM, pp. 2, 4. 32. Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/23/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 21. Nixon did not elaborate on just how Washington would oppose Soviet aggression. 33. See Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/22/72, Box 87, POF, NPM, p. 10; Kissinger-Yeh memcon, 2/23/72, Box 92, NSF, NPM. These documents are also available at http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/index.htm. 34. See Robert MacFarlane, Special Trust (New York, 1994), 149–69. MacFarlane writes that apart from detailed briefings about Soviet military dispositions and readiness at the Chinese border, they also provided information on Soviet military aid to North Vietnam and other Third World countries and guerilla movements. 35. Author interview with Winston Lord, 3/7/01. Moscow apparently did learn about the provision of intelligence information: Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, told Kissinger in March that Moscow had it on Chinese sources that Kissinger had given the Chinese “a complete rundown of the ‘dislocation’ of Soviet forces on the Chinese border, as well as of the location of Soviet missile installations.” Kissinger denied it. See Memcon, 3/9/72, Box 493, NSF, NPM, p. 3
484:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY indicates that in spite of their rhetoric about even-handedness,Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to lean covertly toward Beijing in order to strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as a shared adversary. The Chinese were more cautious.Marshal Yeh responded positively to the February 1972 intelligence briefing,but his remark that the information was "an indication of your wish to improve our relationship"suggested that the Chinese appreciated it mainly as a demonstration of mutual trust and confi- dence.s6 Zhou himself was circumspect in response to Nixon's indirect refer- ences to the Soviet threat,37 agreeing that the Soviets pursued a "policy of expansion"but insisting that China was willing to improve relations with Moscow.s Zhou's presentation appears to accord with official Chinese accounts which report that Mao's understanding of the basic issue in the Sino-American rapprochement was that "no matter whether it is the United States or China, neither of us could fight simultaneously on two fronts."That is,the Chinese leaders were primarily seeking detente with the United States,but not a de facto alliance-they had decided to rely upon themselves in defending against the Soviets-in order to concentrate on their main Soviet adversary.39 Be that as it may,the Shanghai Communique signed at the end of the summit carried clear anti-Soviet overtones.The short list of five issues on which the two sides agreed included the following: Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region,and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony;and neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. As Kissinger's memoirs noted,these boiled down to an agreement not to coop- erate with the Soviet bloc,and to oppose any attempt by any country to dom- inate Asia.Because the Soviet Union was the only other country capable of such domination,the text suggested that "a tacit alliance to block Soviet expansion- ism in Asia was coming into being."4 This reflected the centrality of the Soviet threat to the developing U.S.-PRC relationship,and foreshadowed the way in which Kissinger's progressive construction of this threat would bring the Nixon administration closer to a U.S.-China coalition against the Soviet Union. 36.Kissinger-Yeh memcon,p.20. 37.For instance,Nixon told Mao that the United States and PRC did not want to dom- inate each other,or "reach out and control the world,"but "this cannot be said of some other nations,"and observed to Zhou that China was "so significant a power that the Soviet Union has more units on its border with China than it does on the border with Western Europe." Nixon-Mao memcon,2/21/72,in William Burr,ed.,The Kissinger Transcripts:The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York,1999),64;Nixon-Zhou memcon,2/21/72,p.Io. 38.Memcon,2/23/72,Pp.22-36;Memcon,2/25/72,pp.45 39.Li,"Chinese Decision Making,"353;Garver,Cbinese Decision for Rapprocbement,chaps. I-3. 40.Kissinger,Diplomacy,728
indicates that in spite of their rhetoric about even-handedness, Nixon and Kissinger were prepared to lean covertly toward Beijing in order to strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as a shared adversary. The Chinese were more cautious. Marshal Yeh responded positively to the February 1972 intelligence briefing, but his remark that the information was “an indication of your wish to improve our relationship” suggested that the Chinese appreciated it mainly as a demonstration of mutual trust and confi- dence.36 Zhou himself was circumspect in response to Nixon’s indirect references to the Soviet threat,37 agreeing that the Soviets pursued a “policy of expansion” but insisting that China was willing to improve relations with Moscow.38 Zhou’s presentation appears to accord with official Chinese accounts which report that Mao’s understanding of the basic issue in the Sino-American rapprochement was that “no matter whether it is the United States or China, neither of us could fight simultaneously on two fronts.” That is, the Chinese leaders were primarily seeking détente with the United States, but not a de facto alliance—they had decided to rely upon themselves in defending against the Soviets—in order to concentrate on their main Soviet adversary.39 Be that as it may, the Shanghai Communiqué signed at the end of the summit carried clear anti-Soviet overtones. The short list of five issues on which the two sides agreed included the following: Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states. As Kissinger’s memoirs noted, these boiled down to an agreement not to cooperate with the Soviet bloc, and to oppose any attempt by any country to dominate Asia. Because the Soviet Union was the only other country capable of such domination, the text suggested that “a tacit alliance to block Soviet expansionism in Asia was coming into being.”40 This reflected the centrality of the Soviet threat to the developing U.S.-PRC relationship, and foreshadowed the way in which Kissinger’s progressive construction of this threat would bring the Nixon administration closer to a U.S.-China coalition against the Soviet Union. 484 : diplomatic history 36. Kissinger-Yeh memcon, p. 20. 37. For instance, Nixon told Mao that the United States and PRC did not want to dominate each other, or “reach out and control the world,” but “this cannot be said of some other nations,” and observed to Zhou that China was “so significant a power that the Soviet Union has more units on its border with China than it does on the border with Western Europe.” Nixon-Mao memcon, 2/21/72, in William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York, 1999), 64; Nixon-Zhou memcon, 2/21/72, p. 10. 38. Memcon, 2/23/72, pp. 22–36; Memcon, 2/25/72, pp. 4–5. 39. Li, “Chinese Decision Making,” 353; Garver, Chinese Decision for Rapprochement, chaps. 1–3. 40. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 728