Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations by Dai Chaowu The bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 put the Soviet Union in a very difficult situation to make decisions.The crisis in Sino-Soviet relations not only affected the two countries'alliance,but deepened the two sides'differences and conflicts on the issue of Taiwan and the offshore islands.At the same time,the crisis resulted in the Soviet Union's decision to stop providing nuclear technical support to China. Therefore the crisis was a very important event in the Sino-Soviet split and had a profound influence. The Significant Change in Chinese Diplomatic Ideas,the Strategic Differences between China and Soviet Union and the Decision to Bombard Jinmen Mao Zedong once said that over twenty years of turning over international issues in his mind he had gradually formed some opinions and achieved a certain clarity. These important views included the theory of intermediate zones,the issue of war and peace,the argument that"The East wind prevails over the West wind,"a dialectical understanding of tense international situations and so on.The can be no doubt that in bombarding Jinmen he was putting his views into concrete practice. The issue of intermediate zones was an important one to which Mao gave considerable thought in the late 1950s and on which his views changed fundamentally. This issue became the basic starting point for Mao's observation of international problems in that period and his decisions on China's foreign policy.First of all,Mao thought that the U.S.tried to control the intermediate zones not only to oppose communism but also to weaken the intermediate countries.Secondly,he made new judgments and analysis on the nature of nation-states and thus changed his previous opinions.Mao Zedong regarded those states'neutral policy in the Cold War as an "independent and autonomous stand"that China welcomed.Furthermore,Mao Zedong pointed out that the main areas imperialist countries tried to control were in Asia and Africa.He said:"Among communism,nationalism and imperialism, communism and nationalism are closer."1 At the same time Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that the intermediate zones were strategic areas that could affect and wipe out imperialist strength.He stressed mutual support among nationalist and socialist countries.He also pointed out that it was very important to make relative
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 The Impact of the Bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 upon Sino-Soviet Relations by Dai Chaowu The bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 put the Soviet Union in a very difficult situation to make decisions. The crisis in Sino-Soviet relations not only affected the two countries’ alliance, but deepened the two sides’ differences and conflicts on the issue of Taiwan and the offshore islands. At the same time, the crisis resulted in the Soviet Union’s decision to stop providing nuclear technical support to China. Therefore the crisis was a very important event in the Sino-Soviet split and had a profound influence. The Significant Change in Chinese Diplomatic Ideas, the Strategic Differences between China and Soviet Union and the Decision to Bombard Jinmen Mao Zedong once said that over twenty years of turning over international issues in his mind he had gradually formed some opinions and achieved a certain clarity. These important views included the theory of intermediate zones, the issue of war and peace, the argument that “The East wind prevails over the West wind,” a dialectical understanding of tense international situations and so on. The can be no doubt that in bombarding Jinmen he was putting his views into concrete practice. The issue of intermediate zones was an important one to which Mao gave considerable thought in the late 1950s and on which his views changed fundamentally. This issue became the basic starting point for Mao’s observation of international problems in that period and his decisions on China’s foreign policy. First of all, Mao thought that the U.S. tried to control the intermediate zones not only to oppose communism but also to weaken the intermediate countries. Secondly, he made new judgments and analysis on the nature of nation-states and thus changed his previous opinions. Mao Zedong regarded those states’ neutral policy in the Cold War as an “independent and autonomous stand” that China welcomed. Furthermore, Mao Zedong pointed out that the main areas imperialist countries tried to control were in Asia and Africa. He said:“Among communism、nationalism and imperialism, communism and nationalism are closer.”1 At the same time Mao Zedong clearly pointed out that the intermediate zones were strategic areas that could affect and wipe out imperialist strength. He stressed mutual support among nationalist and socialist countries. He also pointed out that it was very important to make relative 1
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 strengths more favorable to the socialist camp to win over the countries in intermediate zones.2 To achieve that goal,Mao Zedong emphasized that"we must support"the popular struggles against imperialism in Asia,Africa,Latin America,and other countries.He also stressed that the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America constituted"the major support"to socialist countries.3 In addition to international factors,China's diplomatic strategy underwent fundamental changes due to some important domestic factors,namely,the"Great Leap Forward"in national economic construction.The theoretical base of the Great Leap Forward was consistent with the guidelines of China's"revolutionary diplomacy" in late 1950s and each complemented the other.The fever of the Great Leap Forward had profoundly influenced China's diplomacy and Mao Zedong asked diplomatic workers to conquer conservative ideas and break down blind faith in the West.In June 1958,the foreign ministry convened a conference to discuss the international situation The conference affirmed foreign policy since 1949,but also pointed out that in the treatment of some specific problems there existed the tendency of rightist conservatism.In relations with other socialist countries,these included neglecting necessary criticism in relations and failing to refute revisionist opinions;in relations with nationalist countries,overlooking necessary struggles and thus obscuring the boundaries between socialist and nationalist countries;in relations with imperialist countries,unrealistic expectations.Mao Zedong especially stressed that his instructions to contact the U.S.at the Geneva Conference in 1954 were inconsistent with his thought,and that it was better to go on fighting against the U.S.and not to develop relations with it.It was concluded at the meeting that Chinese foreign policy was to"denounce Yugoslavia,consolidate socialism;strike the U.S.,rout imperialism; isolate Japan,and win over nationalism."In light of this,in the future foreign affairs, "struggle would be absolute;the Cold War could not be avoided;and compromise would be relative and temporary.4 That the intermediate zone theory was re-proposed and given new meanings pointed to the new characteristics of"revolutionary diplomacy"in China's foreign affairs guidelines in the late 1950s.It required that China should support world revolution and oppose imperialism,especially the U.S.But it was basically different from the Soviet Union's socialist foreign policy,especially that latter's policy of "peaceful co-existence,peaceful competition and peaceful transition"and its intended detente with the U.S.In the middle and late 1950s,Sino-Soviet relations began to undergo an obvious change.In the realm of ideology China opposed the Soviet Union's blanket negation of Stalin.Besides,the two countries basically had divided opinions on some important strategic problems. The systematization of the intermediate zones theory and the imagined rapid increase in Chinese economic strength directly resulted in Mao Zedong's famous statement that"the East wind prevails over the West wind."In 1957,Mao pointed out at the conference of the Communist Party and the Workers Party at Moscow that "the Western countries have been surpassed and we have gained the advantage over 2
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 strengths more favorable to the socialist camp to win over the countries in intermediate zones.2 To achieve that goal, Mao Zedong emphasized that “we must support” the popular struggles against imperialism in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other countries. He also stressed that the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America constituted “the major support” to socialist countries.3 In addition to international factors, China’s diplomatic strategy underwent fundamental changes due to some important domestic factors, namely, the “Great Leap Forward” in national economic construction. The theoretical base of the Great Leap Forward was consistent with the guidelines of China’s “revolutionary diplomacy” in late 1950s and each complemented the other. The fever of the Great Leap Forward had profoundly influenced China’s diplomacy and Mao Zedong asked diplomatic workers to conquer conservative ideas and break down blind faith in the West. In June 1958, the foreign ministry convened a conference to discuss the international situation. The conference affirmed foreign policy since 1949, but also pointed out that in the treatment of some specific problems there existed the tendency of rightist conservatism. In relations with other socialist countries, these included neglecting necessary criticism in relations and failing to refute revisionist opinions; in relations with nationalist countries, overlooking necessary struggles and thus obscuring the boundaries between socialist and nationalist countries; in relations with imperialist countries, unrealistic expectations. Mao Zedong especially stressed that his instructions to contact the U.S. at the Geneva Conference in 1954 were inconsistent with his thought, and that it was better to go on fighting against the U.S. and not to develop relations with it. It was concluded at the meeting that Chinese foreign policy was to “denounce Yugoslavia, consolidate socialism; strike the U.S., rout imperialism; isolate Japan, and win over nationalism.” In light of this, in the future foreign affairs, “struggle would be absolute; the Cold War could not be avoided; and compromise would be relative and temporary.”4 That the intermediate zone theory was re-proposed and given new meanings pointed to the new characteristics of “revolutionary diplomacy” in China’s foreign affairs guidelines in the late 1950s. It required that China should support world revolution and oppose imperialism, especially the U.S. But it was basically different from the Soviet Union’s socialist foreign policy, especially that latter’s policy of “peaceful co-existence, peaceful competition and peaceful transition” and its intended detente with the U.S. In the middle and late 1950s, Sino-Soviet relations began to undergo an obvious change. In the realm of ideology China opposed the Soviet Union’s blanket negation of Stalin. Besides, the two countries basically had divided opinions on some important strategic problems. The systematization of the intermediate zones theory and the imagined rapid increase in Chinese economic strength directly resulted in Mao Zedong’s famous statement that “the East wind prevails over the West wind.” In 1957, Mao pointed out at the conference of the Communist Party and the Workers Party at Moscow that “the Western countries have been surpassed and we have gained the advantage over 2
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 them".5 With that judgment,China and the Soviet Union became fundamentally divided in opinions upon the guiding principle in foreign policy of socialist countries. The disparities demonstrated themselves first in their different views on"peaceful co-existence"and "detente with U.S."Peaceful co-existence was "the general guideline of socialist countries'foreign policies"put forward in the 20th congress of Soviet Communist Party.The Chinese Communist Party had also spoken highly of the principle of peaceful co-existence since 1954.Related to this was the question of whether to seek detente with the U.S.in the international situation of that time.On the basis of the general line on peaceful co-existence,Khrushchev made improving relations with the U.S a top priority of Soviet foreign policy.This was precisely what China opposed firmly.At the beginning of 1957 Mao Zedong clearly pointed out,"I think it is more advantageous to us to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.a few years later;"and to do so could"isolate the U.S.,deprive it completely of political resources and put it in an unjustifiable position.The longer this went on the more passive U.S.would become and the fewer its friends in China would be."Therefore on relations with the U.S.,China's policy was to "isolate and strike the U.S. imperialists,eliminate fear of the US,give people more confidence and make them dare to fight firmly against the U.S.imperialists"7Chinese leaders later even thought, "The fight between socialism and imperialism is a fight to the death.It's very dangerous to neglect this fight and sing the praises of peaceful co-existence,and not speak of the confrontation between the two worlds."8 So when Chinese leaders publicly stated that"only the Chinese government dares to confront the U.S.,"the bombardment on Jinmen was the best answer to the Soviet Union's policy of detente. Another significant difference in the foreign policies of China and the Soviet Union was the issue of how to treat the national liberation movement.Along with the putting forward of the intermediate zone theory and new judgments on the international situation,Chinese leaders began to take the "mutual desire for peace of Asian and African countries and their struggles against colonialism and imperialism" as"a basis for socialist countries to establish a united front with them."In the view of the Chinese leaders,this united front was to fight imperialism and colonialism rather than to "peacefully co-exist"with them.However,in the view of the Soviet leaders, peaceful co-existence,cooperation among socialist countries and support to national liberation movement were three separate principles,and"it is for the cooperation. unity and mutual support of the socialist camp that the USSR regards peaceful co-existence as the general line of socialist countries'foreign policies.It is not only a matter of supporting national liberation movements.As Mao Zedong repeatedly explained,the objective of the bombardment was in the first place to support the Arab anti-imperialism struggle.Peng Dehuai also stressed that"the Chinese people must give their support through actual actions,of which one is the deployment of the air force in Fujian and another is the bombardment on Jinmen...It is also to tell people all over the world that if the U.S.imperialists want war Chinese people are not be afraid." The bombardment showed the idea of supporting national liberation movement in 3
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 them”.5 With that judgment, China and the Soviet Union became fundamentally divided in opinions upon the guiding principle in foreign policy of socialist countries. The disparities demonstrated themselves first in their different views on “peaceful co-existence” and “detente with U.S.” Peaceful co-existence was “the general guideline of socialist countries’ foreign policies” put forward in the 20th congress of Soviet Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party had also spoken highly of the principle of peaceful co-existence since 1954. Related to this was the question of whether to seek detente with the U.S. in the international situation of that time. On the basis of the general line on peaceful co-existence, Khrushchev made improving relations with the U.S a top priority of Soviet foreign policy. This was precisely what China opposed firmly. At the beginning of 1957 Mao Zedong clearly pointed out, “I think it is more advantageous to us to establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. a few years later;” and to do so could “isolate the U.S., deprive it completely of political resources and put it in an unjustifiable position. The longer this went on the more passive U.S. would become and the fewer its friends in China would be.”6 Therefore on relations with the U.S., China’s policy was to “isolate and strike the U.S. imperialists, eliminate fear of the US, give people more confidence and make them dare to fight firmly against the U.S. imperialists” 7 Chinese leaders later even thought, “The fight between socialism and imperialism is a fight to the death. It’s very dangerous to neglect this fight and sing the praises of peaceful co-existence, and not speak of the confrontation between the two worlds.”8 So when Chinese leaders publicly stated that “only the Chinese government dares to confront the U.S.,” the bombardment on Jinmen was the best answer to the Soviet Union’s policy of detente. Another significant difference in the foreign policies of China and the Soviet Union was the issue of how to treat the national liberation movement. Along with the putting forward of the intermediate zone theory and new judgments on the international situation, Chinese leaders began to take the “mutual desire for peace of Asian and African countries and their struggles against colonialism and imperialism” as “a basis for socialist countries to establish a united front with them.” In the view of the Chinese leaders, this united front was to fight imperialism and colonialism rather than to “peacefully co-exist” with them. However, in the view of the Soviet leaders, peaceful co-existence, cooperation among socialist countries and support to national liberation movement were three separate principles, and “it is for the cooperation、 unity and mutual support of the socialist camp that the USSR regards peaceful co-existence as the general line of socialist countries’ foreign policies. It is not only a matter of supporting national liberation movements.”9 As Mao Zedong repeatedly explained, the objective of the bombardment was in the first place to support the Arab anti-imperialism struggle. Peng Dehuai also stressed that “the Chinese people must give their support through actual actions, of which one is the deployment of the air force in Fujian and another is the bombardment on Jinmen…It is also to tell people all over the world that if the U.S. imperialists want war Chinese people are not be afraid.” The bombardment showed the idea of supporting national liberation movement in 3
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 China's "revolutionary diplomacy." Besides,the judgment that"the East wind prevails over the West wind"directly brought about another question,"Who is afraid of whom?"The question was in fact concerned with how to estimate the strength of the U.S.The Soviet leaders held that, when analyzing U.S.strength and economic potential,consideration should be given to the fact that the U.S.had already renewed its industrial facilities and had greater economic and military strength at the time;they also had a large army and many advanced weapons,and therefore couldn't be simply regarded as"a paper tiger." About this,Mao Zedong questioned Soviet foreign minister Andrei A.Gromyko:"Is U.S.really so economically powerful that it is hard for us to take it on?"Mao's answer to this was"it is imperialism that is more afraid of us."So the objective of Chinese foreign policy was to "explain clearly and bring into play"Mao's idea that"it is imperialism that is more afraid of us,"without having to "consider Soviet views."In addition,it was to "publicly announce standpoint in our international relations and our foreign policy.0 The Soviet Union believed that opposing peaceful co-existence and insisting on the anti-imperialist struggle would certainly make the international situations tense and would fundamentally harm the common interests of socialist camp.But China's view was just the opposite.Mao Zedong believed that tension"could arouse the masses,backward strata and people in the middle to struggle,"and at the same time "a tense situation could make people all over the world stop and think,and could mobilize people all over the world,workers,and other laboring masses to make more a few more communists."11 Mao Zedong also believed that struggle against the U.S. could eliminate people's superstitious fear of the U.S.In the view of the Chinese leaders,bombard Jinmen and creating a tense situation was also a means to achieve this goal. The Soviet Response to the Bombardment on Jinmen and Its Policy Choice Soviet leaders were not surprised at the bombardment on August 23,1958. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that Chinese leaders had said they had prepared to take New military operation against Chiang Kai-shek.They asked for air cover, long-range and seashore artillery.12 However the outbreak of the second Taiwan Straits crisis still outran Khrushchev's expectations.First,that was because China did not inform the USSR of the time and plan of the bombardment according to regular practice.Secondly,Khrushchev himself did not expect so strong a response from the U.S..So the crisis put the USSR into a difficult dilemma.Soviet policy choices at the time were based on their understanding and knowledge of China's policy decisions and their judgments about the US response to the crisis.Their policy choices can be roughly divided into two phases.Throughout the course of the crisis the Soviet response and policy decisions were passive and cautious. In the first phase of the crisis(from the beginning of the bombardment to the end
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 China’s “revolutionary diplomacy.” Besides, the judgment that “the East wind prevails over the West wind” directly brought about another question, “Who is afraid of whom?” The question was in fact concerned with how to estimate the strength of the U.S. The Soviet leaders held that, when analyzing U.S. strength and economic potential, consideration should be given to the fact that the U.S. had already renewed its industrial facilities and had greater economic and military strength at the time; they also had a large army and many advanced weapons, and therefore couldn’t be simply regarded as “a paper tiger.” About this, Mao Zedong questioned Soviet foreign minister Andrei A. Gromyko：“Is U.S. really so economically powerful that it is hard for us to take it on?” Mao’s answer to this was “it is imperialism that is more afraid of us.” So the objective of Chinese foreign policy was to “explain clearly and bring into play” Mao’s idea that “it is imperialism that is more afraid of us,” without having to “consider Soviet views.” In addition, it was to “publicly announce standpoint in our international relations and our foreign policy.”10 The Soviet Union believed that opposing peaceful co-existence and insisting on the anti-imperialist struggle would certainly make the international situations tense and would fundamentally harm the common interests of socialist camp. But China’s view was just the opposite. Mao Zedong believed that tension “could arouse the masses, backward strata and people in the middle to struggle,” and at the same time “a tense situation could make people all over the world stop and think, and could mobilize people all over the world, workers, and other laboring masses to make more a few more communists.”11 Mao Zedong also believed that struggle against the U.S. could eliminate people’s superstitious fear of the U.S. In the view of the Chinese leaders, bombard Jinmen and creating a tense situation was also a means to achieve this goal. The Soviet Response to the Bombardment on Jinmen and Its Policy Choice Soviet leaders were not surprised at the bombardment on August 23, 1958. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that Chinese leaders had said they had prepared to take New military operation against Chiang Kai-shek. They asked for air cover, long-range and seashore artillery. 12 However the outbreak of the second Taiwan Straits crisis still outran Khrushchev’s expectations. First, that was because China did not inform the USSR of the time and plan of the bombardment according to regular practice. Secondly, Khrushchev himself did not expect so strong a response from the U.S.. So the crisis put the USSR into a difficult dilemma. Soviet policy choices at the time were based on their understanding and knowledge of China’s policy decisions and their judgments about the US response to the crisis. Their policy choices can be roughly divided into two phases. Throughout the course of the crisis the Soviet response and policy decisions were passive and cautious. In the first phase of the crisis (from the beginning of the bombardment to the end 4
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 of September 1958),because the USSR did not know what China's strategic objectives were,it announced its support for China's actions and tried to take some concrete steps on the one hand,while on the other hand it sought through a variety of channel to ascertain China's intentions so as to influence and restrict China's actions. Realizing that war might break out in the Taiwan Straits area,the Soviet military showed great caution and restraint at this stage.Although the USSR might have known in advance what action China would take,the Soviet leaders were nonetheless astonished that China had absolutely not informed them of the time,objective and plan of the bombardment.13 Hence the knowledge of China's intentions became the essential prerequisite for the USSR's policy decisions and the Soviet embassy in China became the important source of relevant information.After the bombardment the Soviet embassy immediately telegraphed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to say that China had sent a message only after the bombardment on August 23 and had not in any way given advance notice of its intentions in this important military and political action.From the beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958,Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the matter.According to these reports, the Russians believed that"It would not be entirely correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan issue...as purely a domestic affair of China.In the first stage of the development of the Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to evaluating the degree of urgency of the Taiwan problem and have let the possibility of aggravating the international situation emerge to keep the United States'on the verge of war'from their side too."The reports also pointed out that"Our Chinese friends started to show excessive sensitivity toward the problems of soverignty and independence of their country,reservations about the measures that used to be taken by both countries jointly."The Soviets obviously believed that the Chinese showed a tendency towards solving Asian problems themselves.They did not think it necessary to consult the USSR about their planned actions,though they would expect its support when the situation got out of control.14 On receiving the reports from the Soviet Embassy,Khrushchev immediately demanded that the embassy inform Beijing that considering that China had just begun socialist construction and was quite backward both economically and militarily,she did not at present have the capacity to launch a modern war and carry out a landing operation on Taiwan.There was no need for the whole socialist camp including the USSR to get involved in this war.To thise Mao Zedong replied,via Foreign Ministry, that these islands were Chinese territory and their liberation was China's internal affair.15 Because the USSR could not exactly learn what China had in mind,it decided to send Gromyko to China.Before this,the Soviet Embassy Counsellor,Sudarikov, called on Zhou Enlai on September 5 under Khrushchev's instructions.Zhou Enlai used the meeting to discuss China's analysis of the situations in Taiwan Straits from both the domestic and international perspectives,the problems between Taiwan and the U.S.,and China's stand,tactics and the actions China had taken.Zhou Enlai especially stressed that the bombardment of the islands of Jinmen and Mazu did not 5
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations June 2005 of September 1958), because the USSR did not know what China’s strategic objectives were, it announced its support for China’s actions and tried to take some concrete steps on the one hand, while on the other hand it sought through a variety of channel to ascertain China’s intentions so as to influence and restrict China’s actions. Realizing that war might break out in the Taiwan Straits area, the Soviet military showed great caution and restraint at this stage. Although the USSR might have known in advance what action China would take, the Soviet leaders were nonetheless astonished that China had absolutely not informed them of the time, objective and plan of the bombardment.13 Hence the knowledge of China’s intentions became the essential prerequisite for the USSR’s policy decisions and the Soviet embassy in China became the important source of relevant information. After the bombardment the Soviet embassy immediately telegraphed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to say that China had sent a message only after the bombardment on August 23 and had not in any way given advance notice of its intentions in this important military and political action. From the beginning of the crisis till the end of 1958, Soviet embassy sent in all 52 reports on the matter. According to these reports, the Russians believed that “It would not be entirely correct to regard the solution of the Taiwan issue …as purely a domestic affair of China. In the first stage of the development of the Taiwan conflict our Chinese friends have demonstrated a rather simplistic approach to evaluating the degree of urgency of the Taiwan problem and have let the possibility of aggravating the international situation emerge to keep the United States ‘on the verge of war’ from their side too.” The reports also pointed out that “Our Chinese friends started to show excessive sensitivity toward the problems of soverignty and independence of their country, reservations about the measures that used to be taken by both countries jointly.” The Soviets obviously believed that the Chinese showed a tendency towards solving Asian problems themselves. They did not think it necessary to consult the USSR about their planned actions, though they would expect its support when the situation got out of control.14 On receiving the reports from the Soviet Embassy, Khrushchev immediately demanded that the embassy inform Beijing that considering that China had just begun socialist construction and was quite backward both economically and militarily, she did not at present have the capacity to launch a modern war and carry out a landing operation on Taiwan. There was no need for the whole socialist camp including the USSR to get involved in this war. To thise Mao Zedong replied, via Foreign Ministry , that these islands were Chinese territory and their liberation was China’s internal affair. 15 Because the USSR could not exactly learn what China had in mind, it decided to send Gromyko to China. Before this, the Soviet Embassy Counsellor, Sudarikov, called on Zhou Enlai on September 5 under Khrushchev’s instructions. Zhou Enlai used the meeting to discuss China’s analysis of the situations in Taiwan Straits from both the domestic and international perspectives, the problems between Taiwan and the U.S., and China’s stand, tactics and the actions China had taken. Zhou Enlai especially stressed that the bombardment of the islands of Jinmen and Mazu did not 5