CHINA INDIA VIETNAM AND LAOS GULF ONKIN SEA THAILAND CAMBODIA GULF .THAILAND 200KM
16 HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES Mi means "people."As is the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia Mi-zo or Zo-mi designated a remote hill people,while at the same time the ethnic label applies to a geographical niche.29 Although van Schendel proposes a bold expansion of Zomia's boundaries to Afghanistan and beyond,I will confine my use of the term to the hilly areas eastward,beginning with the Naga and Mizo hills in northern India and Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts. Zomia,at first glance,would seem an unlikely candidate for consider- ation as a distinctive region.The premise for calling a geographical area a region is typically that it shares important cultural features that mark it off from adjacent areas.In this fashion,Fernand Braudel was able to show that the coastal societies around the Mediterranean Sea constituted a region. owing to their long and intense commercial and cultural spite political and religious chasms between,say,Venice and Istanbul,they were integral parts of a recognizable world of exchange and mutual influence Anthony Reid has made a similar,and in many respects,more powerful claim for the Sunda Shelf littoral in maritime Southeast Asia,where trade and mi- gration were,if anything,easier than in the Mediterranean.31 The principle behind region-making in each case is that,for the premodern world,water, especially if it is calm,joins people,whereas mountains,especially if they are high and rugged,divide people.As late as 1740 it took no more time to sail from Southampton to the Cape of Good Hope than to travel by stagecoach from London to Edinburgh. On these grounds,hilly Zomia would seem to be a "negative"region Variety,more than uniformity,is its trademark.In the space of a hundred kilometers in the hills one can find more cultural variation-in language dress,settlement pattern,ethnic identification,economic activity,and reli- gious practices-than one would ever find in the lowland river valleys.Zomia may not quite attain the prodigious cultural variety of deeply fissured New Guinea,but its complex ethnic and linguistic mosaic has presented a be wildering puzzle for ethnographers and historians,not to mention would-be rulers.Scholarly work on the area has been as fragmented and isolated as the terrain itself seemed to be.32 I will argue not only that Zomia qualifies as a region in the strong sense of the term,but also that it is impossible to provide a satisfactory account of the valley states without understanding the central role played by Zomia in their formation and collapse.The dialectic or coevolution of hill and valley, Map 2."Zomia,"on the mainland Southeast Asian massif
16 Hills, Valleys, and States Mi means “people.” As is the case elsewhere in Southeast Asia Mi-zo or Zo-mi designated a remote hill people, while at the same time the ethnic label applies to a geographical niche.29 Although van Schendel proposes a bold expansion of Zomia’s boundaries to Afghanistan and beyond, I will confine my use of the term to the hilly areas eastward, beginning with the Naga and Mizo hills in northern India and Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts. Zomia, at first glance, would seem an unlikely candidate for consideration as a distinctive region. The premise for calling a geographical area a region is typically that it shares important cultural features that mark it off from adjacent areas. In this fashion, Fernand Braudel was able to show that the coastal societies around the Mediterranean Sea constituted a region, owing to their long and intense commercial and cultural connections.30 Despite political and religious chasms between, say, Venice and Istanbul, they were integral parts of a recognizable world of exchange and mutual influence. Anthony Reid has made a similar, and in many respects, more powerful claim for the Sunda Shelf littoral in maritime Southeast Asia, where trade and migration were, if anything, easier than in the Mediterranean.31 The principle behind region-making in each case is that, for the premodern world, water, especially if it is calm, joins people, whereas mountains, especially if they are high and rugged, divide people. As late as 1740 it took no more time to sail from Southampton to the Cape of Good Hope than to travel by stagecoach from London to Edinburgh. On these grounds, hilly Zomia would seem to be a “negative” region. Variety, more than uniformity, is its trademark. In the space of a hundred kilometers in the hills one can find more cultural variation—in language, dress, settlement pattern, ethnic identification, economic activity, and religious practices—than one would ever find in the lowland river valleys. Zomia may not quite attain the prodigious cultural variety of deeply fissured New Guinea, but its complex ethnic and linguistic mosaic has presented a bewildering puzzle for ethnographers and historians, not to mention would-be rulers. Scholarly work on the area has been as fragmented and isolated as the terrain itself seemed to be.32 I will argue not only that Zomia qualifies as a region in the strong sense of the term, but also that it is impossible to provide a satisfactory account of the valley states without understanding the central role played by Zomia in their formation and collapse. The dialectic or coevolution of hill and valley, Map 2. “Zomia,” on the mainland Southeast Asian massif
BHUTAN CHINA INDIA BANGLADESH BURMA VIETNAM ANDAM LAOS GULF TONKIN SEA THAILAND CAMBODIAS GULF THAILAND ZOMIA 500 KM
18 HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES as antagonistic but deeply connected spaces,is,I believe,the essential point of departure for making sense of historical change in Southeast Asia. Most of what the hills share as physical and social spaces marks them off fairly sharply from the more populous lowland centers.The population of the hills is far more dispersed and culturally diverse than that of the valleys.It is as if the difficulties of terrain and relative isolation have,over many centuries encouraged a kind of "speciation"of languages,dialects,dress,and cultural practices.The relative availability of forest resources and open,if steep,land has also allowed far more diverse subsistence practices than in the valleys where wet-rice monocropping often prevails.Swiddening(or slash-and-burn agriculture),which requires more land and requires clearing new fields and occasionally shifting settlement sites,is far more common in the hills. As a general rule,social structure in the hills is both more flexible and more egalitarian than in the hierarchical,codified valley societies.Hybrid identities,movement,and the social fluidity that characterizes many frontier societies are common.Early colonial officials,taking an inventory of their new possessions in the hills,were confused to encounter hamlets with several "peoples"living side by side:hill people who spoke three or four languages and both individuals and groups whose ethnic identity had shifted,some- times within a single generation.Aspiring to Linnaean specificity in the clas- sification of peoples as well as flora,territorial administrators were constantly frustrated by the bewildering flux of peoples who refused to stay put.There was,however,one principle of location that brought some order to this ap- parent anarchy of identity,and that was its relation to altitude.33 As Edmund Leach originally suggested,once one looks at Zomia not from a high-altitude balloon but,rather,horizontally,in terms of lateral slices through the topog- raphy,a certain order emerges.4 In any given landscape,particular groups often settled within a narrow range of altitudes to exploit the agro-economic possibilities of that particular niche.Thus,for example,the Hmong have tended to settle at very high altitudes(between one thousand and eighteen hundred meters)and to plant maize,opium,and millet that will thrive at that elevation.If from a high-altitude balloon or on a map they appear to be a random scattering of small blotches,this is because they have occupied the mountaintops and left the midslopes and intervening valleys to other groups. Specialization by altitude and niche within the hills leads to scattering And yet long-distance travel,marriage alliances,similar subsistence patterns, and cultural continuity help foster coherent identities across considerable
18 Hills, Valleys, and States as antagonistic but deeply connected spaces, is, I believe, the essential point of departure for making sense of historical change in Southeast Asia. Most of what the hills share as physical and social spaces marks them off fairly sharply from the more populous lowland centers. The population of the hills is far more dispersed and culturally diverse than that of the valleys. It is as if the difficulties of terrain and relative isolation have, over many centuries, encouraged a kind of “speciation” of languages, dialects, dress, and cultural practices. The relative availability of forest resources and open, if steep, land has also allowed far more diverse subsistence practices than in the valleys, where wet-rice monocropping often prevails. Swiddening (or slash-and-burn agriculture), which requires more land and requires clearing new fields and occasionally shifting settlement sites, is far more common in the hills. As a general rule, social structure in the hills is both more flexible and more egalitarian than in the hierarchical, codified valley societies. Hybrid identities, movement, and the social fluidity that characterizes many frontier societies are common. Early colonial officials, taking an inventory of their new possessions in the hills, were confused to encounter hamlets with several “peoples” living side by side: hill people who spoke three or four languages and both individuals and groups whose ethnic identity had shifted, sometimes within a single generation. Aspiring to Linnaean specificity in the classification of peoples as well as flora, territorial administrators were constantly frustrated by the bewildering flux of peoples who refused to stay put. There was, however, one principle of location that brought some order to this apparent anarchy of identity, and that was its relation to altitude.33 As Edmund Leach originally suggested, once one looks at Zomia not from a high-altitude balloon but, rather, horizontally, in terms of lateral slices through the topography, a certain order emerges.34 In any given landscape, particular groups often settled within a narrow range of altitudes to exploit the agro-economic possibilities of that particular niche. Thus, for example, the Hmong have tended to settle at very high altitudes (between one thousand and eighteen hundred meters) and to plant maize, opium, and millet that will thrive at that elevation. If from a high-altitude balloon or on a map they appear to be a random scattering of small blotches, this is because they have occupied the mountaintops and left the midslopes and intervening valleys to other groups. Specialization by altitude and niche within the hills leads to scattering. And yet long-distance travel, marriage alliances, similar subsistence patterns, and cultural continuity help foster coherent identities across considerable
HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES 19 distances.The"Akha"along the Yunnan-Thai border and the "Hani"in the upper reaches of the Red River in northern Vietnam are recognizably the same culture,though separated by more than a thousand kilometers.They typically have more in common with each another than either group has with valley people a mere thirty or forty miles away.Zomia is thus knitted together as a region not by a political unity,which it utterly lacks,but by compa- rable patterns of diverse hill agriculture,dispersal and mobility,and rough egalitarianism,which,not incidentally,includes a relatively higher status for women than in the valleys.35 The signal,distinguishing trait of Zomia,vis-a-vis the lowland regions it borders,is that it is relatively stateless.Historically,of course,there have been states in the hills where a substantial fertile plateau and/or a key node in the overland trade routes made it possible.Nan Chao,Kengtung,Nan,and Lan-na were among the best known.3 They are the exceptions that prove the rule.While state-making projects have abounded in the hills,it is fair to say that few have come to fruition.Those would-be kingdoms that did manage to defy the odds did so only for a relatively brief,crisis-strewn period. Such episodes aside,the hills,unlike the valleys,have paid neither taxes to monarchs nor regular tithes to a permanent religious establishment.They have constituted a relatively free,stateless population of foragers and hill farmers.Zomia's situation at the frontiers of lowland state centers has con- tributed to its relative isolation and the autonomy that such isolation favors. Lying athwart state borders where multiple competing sovereignties abut one another has itself afforded its peoples certain advantages for smuggling, contraband,opium production,and the"small border powers"that negotiate a tenuous,high-wire act of quasi-independence.37 A stronger and,I believe,more accurate political description is that the hill populations of Zomia have actively resisted incorporation into the frame- work of the classical state,the colonial state,and the independent nation-state Beyond merely taking advantage of their geographical isolation from centers of state power,much of Zomia has"resisted the projects of nation-building and state-making of the states to which it belonged."38 This resistance came especially to light after the creation of independent states after World War II, when Zomia became the site of secessionist movements,indigenous rights struggles,millennial rebellions,regionalist agitation,and armed opposition to lowland states.But it is a resistance with deeper roots.In the precolonial period,the resistance can be seen in a cultural refusal of lowland patterns and in the flight of lowlanders seeking refuge in the hills
Hills, Valleys, and States 19 distances. The “Akha” along the Yunnan-Thai border and the “Hani” in the upper reaches of the Red River in northern Vietnam are recognizably the same culture, though separated by more than a thousand kilometers. They typically have more in common with each another than either group has with valley people a mere thirty or forty miles away. Zomia is thus knitted together as a region not by a political unity, which it utterly lacks, but by comparable patterns of diverse hill agriculture, dispersal and mobility, and rough egalitarianism, which, not incidentally, includes a relatively higher status for women than in the valleys.35 The signal, distinguishing trait of Zomia, vis-à-vis the lowland regions it borders, is that it is relatively stateless. Historically, of course, there have been states in the hills where a substantial fertile plateau and/or a key node in the overland trade routes made it possible. Nan Chao, Kengtung, Nan, and Lan-na were among the best known.36 They are the exceptions that prove the rule. While state-making projects have abounded in the hills, it is fair to say that few have come to fruition. Those would-be kingdoms that did manage to defy the odds did so only for a relatively brief, crisis-strewn period. Such episodes aside, the hills, unlike the valleys, have paid neither taxes to monarchs nor regular tithes to a permanent religious establishment. They have constituted a relatively free, stateless population of foragers and hill farmers. Zomia’s situation at the frontiers of lowland state centers has contributed to its relative isolation and the autonomy that such isolation favors. Lying athwart state borders where multiple competing sovereignties abut one another has itself afforded its peoples certain advantages for smuggling, contraband, opium production, and the “small border powers” that negotiate a tenuous, high-wire act of quasi-independence.37 A stronger and, I believe, more accurate political description is that the hill populations of Zomia have actively resisted incorporation into the framework of the classical state, the colonial state, and the independent nation-state. Beyond merely taking advantage of their geographical isolation from centers of state power, much of Zomia has “resisted the projects of nation-building and state-making of the states to which it belonged.”38 This resistance came especially to light after the creation of independent states after World War II, when Zomia became the site of secessionist movements, indigenous rights struggles, millennial rebellions, regionalist agitation, and armed opposition to lowland states. But it is a resistance with deeper roots. In the precolonial period, the resistance can be seen in a cultural refusal of lowland patterns and in the flight of lowlanders seeking refuge in the hills