10 HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES settler colonies,represented a vast expansion of sedentary agriculture.In the "neo-Europes"such as North America,Australia,Argentina,and New Zea- land,Europeans reproduced,as far as possible,the agriculture with which they were familiar.In colonies with preexisting states based on sedentary agriculture,the Europeans replaced the indigenous overlords as sovereigns, collecting taxes and encouraging agriculture as had their predecessors,but more effectively.All other subsistence patterns,except when they provided valuable trade goods(for example,furs),were,fiscally speaking,considered sterile.Thus foragers,hunters,shifting-cultivators,and pastoralists were by- passed and ignored or driven from potentially arable farmland into territo- ries considered wastelands.Nevertheless.as late as the end of the eighteenth century,though they were no longer a majority of the world's population, nonstate peoples still occupied the greater part of the world's land mass- forest lands,rugged mountains,steppes,deserts,polar regions,marshes,and inaccessibly remote zones.Such regions were still a potential refuge for those who had reason to flee the state. These stateless peoples were not,by and large,easily drawn into the fiscally legible economy of wage labor and sedentary agriculture.On this defi- nition,"civilization"held little attraction for them when they could have all the advantages of trade without the drudgery,subordination,and immobility of state subjects.The widespread resistance of stateless peoples led directly to what might be called the golden age of slavery along the littoral of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and in Southeast Asia.+From the perspective adopted here,populations were forcibly removed en masse from settings where their production and labor were illegible and inappropriable and were relocated in colonies and plantations where they could be made to grow cash crops(tea, cotton,sugar,indigo,coffee)which might contribute to the profits of land- owners and the fiscal power of the state.15 This first step of enclosure required forms of capture and bondage designed to relocate them from nonstate spaces where they were generally more autonomous (and healthy!)to places where their labor could be appropriated. The final two stages of this massive enclosure movement belong,in the case of Europe,to the nineteenth century and,in the case of Southeast Asia, largely to the late twentieth century.They mark such a radical shift in the relationship between states and their peripheries that they fall largely outside the story I tell here.In this last period,"enclosure"has meant not so much shifting people from stateless zones to areas of state control but rather colo nizing the periphery itself and transforming it into a fully governed,fiscally fertile zone.Its immanent logic,unlikely ever to be fully realized,is the com-
10 Hills, Valleys, and States settler colonies, represented a vast expansion of sedentary agriculture. In the “neo-Europes” such as North America, Australia, Argentina, and New Zealand, Europeans reproduced, as far as possible, the agriculture with which they were familiar. In colonies with preexisting states based on sedentary agriculture, the Europeans replaced the indigenous overlords as sovereigns, collecting taxes and encouraging agriculture as had their predecessors, but more effectively. All other subsistence patterns, except when they provided valuable trade goods (for example, furs), were, fiscally speaking, considered sterile. Thus foragers, hunters, shifting-cultivators, and pastoralists were bypassed and ignored or driven from potentially arable farmland into territories considered wastelands. Nevertheless, as late as the end of the eighteenth century, though they were no longer a majority of the world’s population, nonstate peoples still occupied the greater part of the world’s land mass— forest lands, rugged mountains, steppes, deserts, polar regions, marshes, and inaccessibly remote zones. Such regions were still a potential refuge for those who had reason to flee the state. These stateless peoples were not, by and large, easily drawn into the fiscally legible economy of wage labor and sedentary agriculture. On this definition, “civilization” held little attraction for them when they could have all the advantages of trade without the drudgery, subordination, and immobility of state subjects. The widespread resistance of stateless peoples led directly to what might be called the golden age of slavery along the littoral of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and in Southeast Asia.14 From the perspective adopted here, populations were forcibly removed en masse from settings where their production and labor were illegible and inappropriable and were relocated in colonies and plantations where they could be made to grow cash crops (tea, cotton, sugar, indigo, coffee) which might contribute to the profits of landowners and the fiscal power of the state.15 This first step of enclosure required forms of capture and bondage designed to relocate them from nonstate spaces where they were generally more autonomous (and healthy!) to places where their labor could be appropriated. The final two stages of this massive enclosure movement belong, in the case of Europe, to the nineteenth century and, in the case of Southeast Asia, largely to the late twentieth century. They mark such a radical shift in the relationship between states and their peripheries that they fall largely outside the story I tell here. In this last period, “enclosure” has meant not so much shifting people from stateless zones to areas of state control but rather colonizing the periphery itself and transforming it into a fully governed, fiscally fertile zone. Its immanent logic, unlikely ever to be fully realized, is the com-
HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES 11 plete elimination of nonstate spaces.This truly imperial project,made pos- sible only by distance-demolishing technologies(all-weather roads,bridges railroads,airplanes,modern weapons,telegraph,telephone,and now modern information technologies including global positioning systems),is so novel and its dynamics so different that my analysis here makes no further sense in Southeast Asia for the period after say,.Modern conceptions of national sovereignty and the resource needs of mature capitalism have brought that final enclosure into view The hegemony,in this past century,of the nation-state as the standard and nearly exclusive unit of sovereignty has proven profoundly inimical to nonstate peoples.State power,in this conception,is the state's monopoly of coercive force that must,in principle,be fully projected to the very edge of its territory,where it meets,again in principle,another sovereign power project- ing its command to its own adjacent frontier.Gone,in principle,are the large areas of no sovereignty or mutually canceling weak sovereignties.Gone too, of course,are peoples under no particular sovereignty.As a practical matter, most nation-states have tried.insofar as they had the means.to give substance to this vision,establishing armed border posts,moving loyal populations to the frontier and relocating or driving awaydisloyal"populations,clearing frontier lands for sedentary agriculture,building roads to the borders,and registering hitherto fugitive peoples. On the heels of this notion of sovereignty came the realization that these neglected and seemingly useless territories to which stateless peoples had been relegated were suddenly of great value to the economies of mature capitalism.6 They contained valuable resources-oil,iron ore,copper,lead timber,uranium,bauxite,the rare metals essential to the aerospace and electronics industries,hydroelectric sites,bioprospecting and conservation areas-that might in many cases be the linchpin of state revenue.Places that long ago might have been desirable for their deposits of silver,gold,and gems not to mention slaves,became the object of a new gold rush.All the more reason to project state power to the nethermost reaches of these ungoverned regions and bring their inhabitants under firm control. Occupying and controlling the margins of the state implied a cultural policy as well.Much of the periphery along national borders of mainland Southeast Asia is inhabited by peoples linguistically and culturally distinct from the populations that dominate the state cores.Alarmingly,they spill promiscuously across national frontiers,generating multiple identities and possible foci of irredentism or secession.Weak valley states have permitted, or rather tolerated,a certain degree of autonomy when they had little choice
Hills, Valleys, and States 11 plete elimination of nonstate spaces. This truly imperial project, made possible only by distance-demolishing technologies (all-weather roads, bridges, railroads, airplanes, modern weapons, telegraph, telephone, and now modern information technologies including global positioning systems), is so novel and its dynamics so different that my analysis here makes no further sense in Southeast Asia for the period after, say, 1950. Modern conceptions of national sovereignty and the resource needs of mature capitalism have brought that final enclosure into view. The hegemony, in this past century, of the nation-state as the standard and nearly exclusive unit of sovereignty has proven profoundly inimical to nonstate peoples. State power, in this conception, is the state’s monopoly of coercive force that must, in principle, be fully projected to the very edge of its territory, where it meets, again in principle, another sovereign power projecting its command to its own adjacent frontier. Gone, in principle, are the large areas of no sovereignty or mutually canceling weak sovereignties. Gone too, of course, are peoples under no particular sovereignty. As a practical matter, most nation-states have tried, insofar as they had the means, to give substance to this vision, establishing armed border posts, moving loyal populations to the frontier and relocating or driving away “disloyal” populations, clearing frontier lands for sedentary agriculture, building roads to the borders, and registering hitherto fugitive peoples. On the heels of this notion of sovereignty came the realization that these neglected and seemingly useless territories to which stateless peoples had been relegated were suddenly of great value to the economies of mature capitalism.16 They contained valuable resources—oil, iron ore, copper, lead, timber, uranium, bauxite, the rare metals essential to the aerospace and electronics industries, hydroelectric sites, bioprospecting and conservation areas—that might in many cases be the linchpin of state revenue. Places that long ago might have been desirable for their deposits of silver, gold, and gems, not to mention slaves, became the object of a new gold rush. All the more reason to project state power to the nethermost reaches of these ungoverned regions and bring their inhabitants under firm control. Occupying and controlling the margins of the state implied a cultural policy as well. Much of the periphery along national borders of mainland Southeast Asia is inhabited by peoples linguistically and culturally distinct from the populations that dominate the state cores. Alarmingly, they spill promiscuously across national frontiers, generating multiple identities and possible foci of irredentism or secession. Weak valley states have permitted, or rather tolerated, a certain degree of autonomy when they had little choice
12 HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES Where they could,however,all states in the region have tried to bring such peoples under their routine administration,to encourage and,more rarely, to insist upon linguistic,cultural,and religious alignment with the majority population at the state core.This meant,in Thailand,encouraging,say,the Lahu to become Thai-speaking,literate,Buddhist subjects of the monarchy. In Burma it meant encouraging,say,the Karen to become Burmese-speaking Buddhists loyal to the military junta.7 Parallel to policies of economic,administrative,and cultural absorption has been the policy,driven by both demographic pressure and self-conscious design,of engulfment.Huge numbers of land-hungry majorities from the plains have moved,or been moved,to the hills.There,they replicate valley settlement patterns and sedentary agriculture,and,over time,they demo- graphically dominate the dispersed,less numerous hill peoples.The com- bination of forced settlement and engulfment is nicely illustrated by a series of Vietnamese mobilization campaigns in the 195os and 196os:"Campaign to Sedentarize the Nomads,"Campaign for Fixed Cultivation and Fixed Residence,”“Storm the Hills Campaign,”and“Clear the Hills by Torchlight Campaign.”i8 Culturally,this reduction and standardization of relatively autonomous self-governing communities is a process of long historical lineage.It is an integral theme of the historical consciousness of each of the large mainland Southeast Asian states.In the Vietnamese official national narrative,the "march to the south"-to the Mekong and the trans-Bassac Deltas-inaccu- rate though it is as a description of the historical process,vies with the wars of national liberation for pride of place.Burmese and Thai history are no less marked by the movement of population from their more northern historical cores of Mandalay,Ayutthaya,and what is now Hanoi into the Irrawaddy, Chao Praya,and Mekong river deltas,respectively.The great cosmopolitan, maritime cities of Saigon(now Ho Chi Minh City),Rangoon,and Bangkok that grew to serve this onetime frontier.delta.hinterland have come.demo- graphically,to dominate the earlier inland capitals Internal colonialism.broadly understood.aptly describes this process It involved the absorption,displacement,and/or extermination of the previ- ous inhabitants.It involved a botanical colonization in which the landscape was transformed-by deforestation,drainage,irrigation,and levees-to ac- commodate crops,settlement patterns,and systems of administration famil- iar to the state and to the colonists.One way of appreciating the effect of this colonization is to view it as a massive reduction of vernaculars of all kinds:of vernacular languages,minority peoples,vernacular cultivation techniques
12 Hills, Valleys, and States Where they could, however, all states in the region have tried to bring such peoples under their routine administration, to encourage and, more rarely, to insist upon linguistic, cultural, and religious alignment with the majority population at the state core. This meant, in Thailand, encouraging, say, the Lahu to become Thai-speaking, literate, Buddhist subjects of the monarchy. In Burma it meant encouraging, say, the Karen to become Burmese-speaking Buddhists loyal to the military junta.17 Parallel to policies of economic, administrative, and cultural absorption has been the policy, driven by both demographic pressure and self-conscious design, of engulfment. Huge numbers of land-hungry majorities from the plains have moved, or been moved, to the hills. There, they replicate valley settlement patterns and sedentary agriculture, and, over time, they demographically dominate the dispersed, less numerous hill peoples. The combination of forced settlement and engulfment is nicely illustrated by a series of Vietnamese mobilization campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s: “Campaign to Sedentarize the Nomads,” “Campaign for Fixed Cultivation and Fixed Residence,” “Storm the Hills Campaign,” and “Clear the Hills by Torchlight Campaign.”18 Culturally, this reduction and standardization of relatively autonomous, self-governing communities is a process of long historical lineage. It is an integral theme of the historical consciousness of each of the large mainland Southeast Asian states. In the Vietnamese official national narrative, the “march to the south”—to the Mekong and the trans-Bassac Deltas—inaccurate though it is as a description of the historical process, vies with the wars of national liberation for pride of place.19 Burmese and Thai history are no less marked by the movement of population from their more northern historical cores of Mandalay, Ayutthaya, and what is now Hanoi into the Irrawaddy, Chao Praya, and Mekong river deltas, respectively. The great cosmopolitan, maritime cities of Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City), Rangoon, and Bangkok that grew to serve this onetime frontier, delta, hinterland have come, demographically, to dominate the earlier inland capitals. Internal colonialism, broadly understood, aptly describes this process. It involved the absorption, displacement, and/or extermination of the previous inhabitants. It involved a botanical colonization in which the landscape was transformed—by deforestation, drainage, irrigation, and levees—to accommodate crops, settlement patterns, and systems of administration familiar to the state and to the colonists. One way of appreciating the effect of this colonization is to view it as a massive reduction of vernaculars of all kinds: of vernacular languages, minority peoples, vernacular cultivation techniques
HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES 13 vernacular land tenure systems,vernacular hunting,gathering,and forestry techniques,vernacular religion,and so on.The attempt to bring the periph- ery into line is read by representatives of the sponsoring state as provid- ing civilization and progress-where progress is,in turn,read as the intru- sive propagation of the linguistic,agricultural,and religious practices of the dominant ethnic group:the Han,the Kinh,the Burman,the Thai.20 The remaining self-governing peoples and spaces of mainland South- east Asia are much diminished.We shall,for the most part,concentrate on the so-called hill peoples (often mistakenly called tribes)of mainland South- east Asia,particularly Burma.While I will clarify what I mean by the awk ward term nonstate spaces,it is not simply a synonym for hills or for higher altitudes.States,being associated with concentrated grain production,typi- cally arise where there is a substantial expanse of arable land.In mainland Southeast Asia,this agro-ecology is generally at low elevations,allowing us to speak of“valley states'”and“hill peoples.”Vhere,as in the Andes,most easily cultivable land under traditional conditions is located at high eleva- tions,it is the other way around.The states were in the hills and nonstate spaces were downhill in the humid lowlands.Thus the key variable is not so much elevation per se as the possibility for concentrated grain produc- tion.Nonstate space,by contrast,points to locations where,owing largely to geographical obstacles,the state has particular difficulty in establishing and maintaining its authority.A Ming emperor had something like this in mind when he described the southwest provinces of his kingdom:"The roads are long and dangerous,the mountains and rivers present great obstacles,and the customs and practices differ."2 But swamps,marshes,mangrove coasts deserts,volcanic margins,and even the open sea,like the ever growing and changing deltas of Southeast Asia's great rivers,all function in much the same way.Thus it is difficult or inaccessible terrain,regardless of elevation, that presents great obstacles to state control.As we shall see at great length such places have often served as havens of refuge for peoples resisting or flee- ing the state The Great Mountain Kingdom;or,"Zomia";or, The Marches of Mainland Southeast Asia One of the largest remaining nonstate spaces in the world,if not the largest, is the vast expanse of uplands,variously termed the Southeast Asian mas- sifand,more recently,Zomia.22 This great mountain realm on the marches
Hills, Valleys, and States 13 vernacular land tenure systems, vernacular hunting, gathering, and forestry techniques, vernacular religion, and so on. The attempt to bring the periphery into line is read by representatives of the sponsoring state as providing civilization and progress—where progress is, in turn, read as the intrusive propagation of the linguistic, agricultural, and religious practices of the dominant ethnic group: the Han, the Kinh, the Burman, the Thai.20 The remaining self-governing peoples and spaces of mainland Southeast Asia are much diminished. We shall, for the most part, concentrate on the so-called hill peoples (often mistakenly called tribes) of mainland Southeast Asia, particularly Burma. While I will clarify what I mean by the awkward term nonstate spaces, it is not simply a synonym for hills or for higher altitudes. States, being associated with concentrated grain production, typically arise where there is a substantial expanse of arable land. In mainland Southeast Asia, this agro-ecology is generally at low elevations, allowing us to speak of “valley states” and “hill peoples.” Where, as in the Andes, most easily cultivable land under traditional conditions is located at high elevations, it is the other way around. The states were in the hills and nonstate spaces were downhill in the humid lowlands. Thus the key variable is not so much elevation per se as the possibility for concentrated grain production. Nonstate space, by contrast, points to locations where, owing largely to geographical obstacles, the state has particular difficulty in establishing and maintaining its authority. A Ming emperor had something like this in mind when he described the southwest provinces of his kingdom: “The roads are long and dangerous, the mountains and rivers present great obstacles, and the customs and practices differ.”21 But swamps, marshes, mangrove coasts, deserts, volcanic margins, and even the open sea, like the ever growing and changing deltas of Southeast Asia’s great rivers, all function in much the same way. Thus it is difficult or inaccessible terrain, regardless of elevation, that presents great obstacles to state control. As we shall see at great length, such places have often served as havens of refuge for peoples resisting or fleeing the state. The Great Mountain Kingdom; or, “Zomia”; or, The Marches of Mainland Southeast Asia One of the largest remaining nonstate spaces in the world, if not the largest, is the vast expanse of uplands, variously termed the Southeast Asian massif and, more recently, Zomia.22 This great mountain realm on the marches
14 HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES of mainland Southeast Asia,China,India,and Bangladesh sprawls across roughly 2.5 million square kilometers-an area roughly the size of Europe As one of the first scholars to identify the massif and its peoples as a single object of study,Jean Michaud has traced its extent:"From north to south,it includes southern and western Sichuan,all of Guizhou and Yunnan,western and northern Guangxi,western Guangdong,most of northern Burma with an adjacent segment of extreme [north]eastern India,the north and west of Thailand,practically all of Laos above the Mekong Valley,northern and cen- tral Vietnam along the Annam Cordillera,and the north and eastern fringes of Cambodia."23 Rough calculations would put Zomia minority populations alone at around eighty million to one hundred million.24 Its peoples are fragmented into hundreds of ethnic identities and at least five language families that defy any simple classification. Lying at altitudes from two hundred or three hundred meters above sea level to more than four thousand meters,Zomia could be thought of as a Southeast Asian Appalachia,were it not for the fact that it sprawls across eight nation-states.A better analogy would be Switzerland,a mountain kingdom at the periphery of Germany,France,and Italy that itself became a nation-state.Borrowing Ernest Gellner's felicitous phrase referring to the erve tion,however,this upland belt lies on the marches,far from the main popu lation centers of the nations it traverses.26 Zomia is marginal in almost every respect.It lies at a great distance from the main centers of economic activity; it bestrides a contact zone between eight nation-states and several religious traditions and cosmologies.27 Scholarship organized historically around the classical states and their cultural cores and,more recently,around the nation-state is singularly ill- equipped to examine this upland belt as a whole.Willem van Schendel is one of a handful of pioneers who have argued that these cumulative nation state "shards"merit consideration as a distinctive region.He has gone so far as to give it the dignity of a name of its own:Zomia,a term for highlander common to several related Tibeto-Burman languages spoken in the India- Bangladesh-Burma border area.More precisely,o is a relational term meaning"remote"and hence carries the connotation of living in the hills; Map 1.Mainland Southeast Asia
14 Hills, Valleys, and States of mainland Southeast Asia, China, India, and Bangladesh sprawls across roughly 2.5 million square kilometers—an area roughly the size of Europe. As one of the first scholars to identify the massif and its peoples as a single object of study, Jean Michaud has traced its extent: “From north to south, it includes southern and western Sichuan, all of Guizhou and Yunnan, western and northern Guangxi, western Guangdong, most of northern Burma with an adjacent segment of extreme [north]eastern India, the north and west of Thailand, practically all of Laos above the Mekong Valley, northern and central Vietnam along the Annam Cordillera, and the north and eastern fringes of Cambodia.”23 Rough calculations would put Zomia minority populations alone at around eighty million to one hundred million.24 Its peoples are fragmented into hundreds of ethnic identities and at least five language families that defy any simple classification. Lying at altitudes from two hundred or three hundred meters above sea level to more than four thousand meters, Zomia could be thought of as a Southeast Asian Appalachia, were it not for the fact that it sprawls across eight nation-states. A better analogy would be Switzerland, a mountain kingdom at the periphery of Germany, France, and Italy that itself became a nation-state. Borrowing Ernest Gellner’s felicitous phrase referring to the Berbers of the High Atlas Mountains, this huge hilly zone might be seen as a “pervasive Switzerland without cuckoo clocks.”25 Far from being a hilly nation, however, this upland belt lies on the marches, far from the main population centers of the nations it traverses.26 Zomia is marginal in almost every respect. It lies at a great distance from the main centers of economic activity; it bestrides a contact zone between eight nation-states and several religious traditions and cosmologies.27 Scholarship organized historically around the classical states and their cultural cores and, more recently, around the nation-state is singularly illequipped to examine this upland belt as a whole. Willem van Schendel is one of a handful of pioneers who have argued that these cumulative nationstate “shards” merit consideration as a distinctive region. He has gone so far as to give it the dignity of a name of its own: Zomia, a term for highlander common to several related Tibeto-Burman languages spoken in the IndiaBangladesh-Burma border area.28 More precisely, Zo is a relational term meaning “remote” and hence carries the connotation of living in the hills; Map 1. Mainland Southeast Asia