40 Ronald L.Tammen and Jacek Kugler turns the balance of power concept on its head.In Figure 2,by comparison, the region of cooperation and integration is vastly expanded.This preponderant'view of the world is now accepted explicitly by those who measure the probability of wars,and implicitly by many in the policy community. The basic argument of power parity is that key contenders in the international system challenge one another for dominance when they anticipate that the prospects of overtaking the regime leader are credible An important new insight emerges from Figure 1.Conflict can still take place despite strong power asymmetry,but its severity will be much reduced. This deduction is supported by empirical evidence. When the global hierarchy was uniform,the United States and its allies were engaged in World War II.After 1945,the United States emerged as the preponderant power.It continued to wage wars in Korea,Vietnam, Kuwait and Iraq,but these wars produced limited casualties (compared to World Wars),as did the attack on the US by Al Qaeda.Despite US preponderance,these wars were not deterred but losses were reduced.This formally derived figure also accounts for what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman identify as a seeming contradiction;the Seven Weeks'War between Austria and Prussia occurred at parity,but both nations were jointly satisfied producing a conflict of low intensity among contenders. The probability of conflict under parity is high,thus the conflict,but the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that war limited.8 This new representation of the parity model also offers a formal answer to the argument of Choucri and North that the theory is inconsistent in failing to account for the peaceful transfer of control over the world hierarchy from England to the United States.As Figure I indicates,the condition required for peaceful overtaking between two major powers includes agreement on the rules that guide the hierarchy.It is not just power relations-as realists would argue-that lead nations to wage conflict.Agreement or 6 Under balance of power,relative power equilibrium insures the peace.Under power parity or power transition,relative power equilibrium increases the probability of war.Figure 2 is a graphical display of the balance of power concept for comparison with the preponderance model in Figure 1. A.F.K.Organski,World Politics 2nd Edition (New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1968):Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds.Parity and War:Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,1996):Ronald Tammen et al.,Power Transitions. s Like in elections within a single party,two satisfied nations may wage a war of low severity. but under similar circumstances,like in elections across parties,two dissatisfied nations will wage total war of high severity. Nazli Choucri and Robert North,Nations in Conflict:National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco:Freeeman,1983). Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55
turns the balance of power concept on its head.6 In Figure 2, by comparison, the region of cooperation and integration is vastly expanded. This ‘preponderant’ view of the world is now accepted explicitly by those who measure the probability of wars, and implicitly by many in the policy community.7 The basic argument of power parity is that key contenders in the international system challenge one another for dominance when they anticipate that the prospects of overtaking the regime leader are credible. An important new insight emerges from Figure 1. Conflict can still take place despite strong power asymmetry, but its severity will be much reduced. This deduction is supported by empirical evidence. When the global hierarchy was uniform, the United States and its allies were engaged in World War II. After 1945, the United States emerged as the preponderant power. It continued to wage wars in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait and Iraq, but these wars produced limited casualties (compared to World Wars), as did the attack on the US by Al Qaeda. Despite US preponderance, these wars were not deterred but losses were reduced. This formally derived figure also accounts for what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman identify as a seeming contradiction; the Seven Weeks’ War between Austria and Prussia occurred at parity, but both nations were jointly satisfied producing a conflict of low intensity among contenders. The probability of conflict under parity is high, thus the conflict, but the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that war limited.8 This new representation of the parity model also offers a formal answer to the argument of Choucri and North that the theory is inconsistent in failing to account for the peaceful transfer of control over the world hierarchy from England to the United States.9 As Figure 1 indicates, the condition required for peaceful overtaking between two major powers includes agreement on the rules that guide the hierarchy. It is not just power relations—as realists would argue—that lead nations to wage conflict. Agreement or 6 Under balance of power, relative power equilibrium insures the peace. Under power parity or power transition, relative power equilibrium increases the probability of war. Figure 2 is a graphical display of the balance of power concept for comparison with the preponderance model in Figure 1. 7 A.F.K. Organski, World Politics 2nd Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Ronald Tammen et al., Power Transitions. 8 Like in elections within a single party, two satisfied nations may wage a war of low severity, but under similar circumstances, like in elections across parties, two dissatisfied nations will wage total war of high severity. 9 Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: Freeeman, 1983). 40 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55
Power Transition and China-US Conflicts 41 disagreement with preferences,in coordination with parity,leads to war and peace.10 This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that informs our political strategy.At the bottom left corner,Figure I accounts for the process of integration.Integration is the most important new phenomenon emerging since World War II.A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric period.Deutsch et al.independently observed such a pattern in 1957.They indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity. Rather,integration occurred around 'cores of strength'where a dominant nation provided the nucleus'for integration. A hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation imposes high costs for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for integration This produces a bias towards stability.The dominant power desires to maintain the status quo.As Keohane correctly infers,preponderant powers have the ability to absorb the costs of integration and allow smaller nations to 'free ride'because their actions are consistent with stable economic growth.2 In a uniform hierarchy(Figure 2),the probability of conflict and escalation to severe war increases,while prospects for integrations are reduced.No single party is willing to carry the burden of integration,and concurrently each member of the hierarchy is able to enhance individual growth by avoiding the costs of the collective good.Thus,rather than supporting trade opportunities that lead to expansion among all,large nations that can affect the market price of goods impose tariffs in a selfish attempt to advance their own growth.3 Policy Implications The internal mobilization of resources,and effective alliance formation or neutralization,can be manipulated in response to policy changes.A reliable strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics,particularly for the United States,as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of either global stability or instability. 10 John Mearsheimer.The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,(New York:W.Norton,2001). Karl Deutsch et al.,Political Community and the North Atlantic Area(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1957).pp.28-38.Such arguments are also constant with expectations of Black's median voter theorem where a dominant party should prompt smaller organizations to join a large winning coaltion. 12 Robert Keohane.After Hegemony (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1984). Feng Yi.Democracy.Governance,and Economic Performance:Theory.Data Analysis.and Case Studies (Boston:MIT Press,2003). Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55
disagreement with preferences, in coordination with parity, leads to war and peace.10 This leads us to the final unexpected implication of the graphic that informs our political strategy. At the bottom left corner, Figure 1 accounts for the process of integration. Integration is the most important new phenomenon emerging since World War II. A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that this process is most likely in a post-overtaking asymmetric period. Deutsch et al. independently observed such a pattern in 1957. They indicated that integration did not take place when nations were at parity. Rather, integration occurred around ‘cores of strength’ where a dominant nation provided the ‘nucleus’ for integration.11 A hierarchy dominated by a preponderant nation imposes high costs for conflict on smaller challengers and reduces costs for integration. This produces a bias towards stability. The dominant power desires to maintain the status quo. As Keohane correctly infers, preponderant powers have the ability to absorb the costs of integration and allow smaller nations to ‘free ride’ because their actions are consistent with stable economic growth.12 In a uniform hierarchy (Figure 2), the probability of conflict and escalation to severe war increases, while prospects for integrations are reduced. No single party is willing to carry the burden of integration, and concurrently each member of the hierarchy is able to enhance individual growth by avoiding the costs of the collective good. Thus, rather than supporting trade opportunities that lead to expansion among all, large nations that can affect the market price of goods impose tariffs in a selfish attempt to advance their own growth.13 Policy Implications The internal mobilization of resources, and effective alliance formation or neutralization, can be manipulated in response to policy changes. A reliable strategic perspective is needed to make choices in world politics, particularly for the United States, as key decisions can sway the balance in favour of either global stability or instability. 10 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. Norton, 2001). 11 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 28–38. Such arguments are also constant with expectations of Black’s median voter theorem where a dominant party should prompt smaller organizations to join a large winning coaltion. 12 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 13 Feng Yi, Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: Theory, Data Analysis, and Case Studies (Boston: MIT Press, 2003). Power Transition and China–US Conflicts 41 Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55