26 THE TRAPS different ethnic groups may not like each other,and there may be a noisy discourse of mutual accusation.But there is a big gap between interethnic dislike and civil war. What else makes a country prone to civil war?Geography matters a bit. A huge country with the population dispersed around the edges,such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire),or one with a lot of mountainous terrain,such as Nepal,is more at risk than flat,densely pop- ulated little places,probably because rebel armies find more places to form and to hide. Why Do Civil Wars Last So Long? So much for the causes of civil war.What happens once a civil war has started?The most important question seems to be what determines when the conflict stops,yet it is not always easy to figure this out;often such con- flicts stop temporarily and then start up again later.Is such a case to be treated as if there was one continuous civil war or two wars with an aborted peace in between?There is no right answer;it is a matter of judg- ment,and these judgments will affect the results.Again,we used others'cri- teria,to avoid having our own biases influence the data. Once more,low income featured.The lower a country's income at the onset of a conflict,the longer the conflict lasts.There was also some ten- dency for wars to last longer if important export products of the society became more valuable;perhaps in such cases war becomes easier to fi- nance.The ultimate natural resource war was in Angola,with the rebel group,the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola(UNITA), financed by diamonds,and the government side,the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA),financed by oil.The course of the war broadly followed the price of oil relative to diamonds.The UNITA leader,Jonas Savimbi,intensified the pressure when he had a high income from diamonds and oil prices were at record lows.His undoing began when the price of oil rocketed and when international action started to close off his access to the world diamond market.But that story of inter- national action must wait for Part 4. Civil wars are highly persistent.The average international war,which is nasty enough,lasts about six months.You can do a lot of damage in six
different ethnic groups may not like each other, and there may be a noisy discourse of mutual accusation. But there is a big gap between interethnic dislike and civil war. What else makes a country prone to civil war? Geography matters a bit. A huge country with the population dispersed around the edges, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), or one with a lot of mountainous terrain, such as Nepal, is more at risk than flat, densely populated little places, probably because rebel armies find more places to form and to hide. Why Do Civil Wars Last So Long? So much for the causes of civil war. What happens once a civil war has started? The most important question seems to be what determines when the conflict stops, yet it is not always easy to figure this out; often such conflicts stop temporarily and then start up again later. Is such a case to be treated as if there was one continuous civil war or two wars with an aborted peace in between? There is no right answer; it is a matter of judgment, and these judgments will affect the results. Again, we used others’ criteria, to avoid having our own biases influence the data. Once more, low income featured. The lower a country’s income at the onset of a conflict, the longer the conflict lasts. There was also some tendency for wars to last longer if important export products of the society became more valuable; perhaps in such cases war becomes easier to fi- nance. The ultimate natural resource war was in Angola, with the rebel group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), financed by diamonds, and the government side, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), financed by oil. The course of the war broadly followed the price of oil relative to diamonds. The UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, intensified the pressure when he had a high income from diamonds and oil prices were at record lows. His undoing began when the price of oil rocketed and when international action started to close off his access to the world diamond market. But that story of international action must wait for Part 4. Civil wars are highly persistent. The average international war, which is nasty enough, lasts about six months. You can do a lot of damage in six 26 THE TRAPS
THE CONFLICT TRAP 27 months.But the average civil war lasts more than ten times as long,even longer if you start off poor.In part,such conflicts continue because they become normal.On both sides interests develop that only know how to do well during war.Given the massive costs of war,it should be possible to find a deal that benefits everyone,but often the rebels decide to con- tinue the struggle rather than take the risk of being lured into a peace deal on which the government subsequently reneges. Having looked at why civil wars started and how long they lasted,we then looked at what happened when they were over.As previously noted, the end of a war often is not the end of the conflict;once over,a conflict is alarmingly likely to restart.Furthermore,the experience of having been through a civil war roughly doubles the risk of another conflict.Only around half of the countries in which a conflict has ended manage to make it through a decade without relapsing into war.Low-income coun- tries face disproportionately high risks of relapse. Governments in postconflict societies are well aware that they are living dangerously.Typically,they react to this risk by maintaining their military spending at an abnormally high level.The military during the postconflict decade looks much more like a military at war than one at peace.To give you the orders of magnitude,a civil war typically comes close to doubling the military budget.Military spending during the postconflict decade is only around a tenth lower than during the war.You can hardly blame gov- ernments that face such a high risk of further conflict for setting spending at such a high level,but does it work?I will come back to that in Part 4, which addresses possible solutions,and in particular Chapter 9,which discusses military strategies for keeping the peace. The Costs of War Finally,we looked at what you might think of as the balance sheet of a civil war:the costs and the legacy.Civil war is development in reverse.It damages both the country itself and its neighbors.Let's start with the country itself.Civil war tends to reduce growth by around 2.3 percent per year,so the typical seven-year war leaves a country around 15 percent poorer than it would have been.Of course,war is much worse than just a prolonged economic depression:it kills people.Overwhelmingly,the people
months. But the average civil war lasts more than ten times as long, even longer if you start off poor. In part, such conflicts continue because they become normal. On both sides interests develop that only know how to do well during war. Given the massive costs of war, it should be possible to find a deal that benefits everyone, but often the rebels decide to continue the struggle rather than take the risk of being lured into a peace deal on which the government subsequently reneges. Having looked at why civil wars started and how long they lasted, we then looked at what happened when they were over. As previously noted, the end of a war often is not the end of the conflict; once over, a conflict is alarmingly likely to restart. Furthermore, the experience of having been through a civil war roughly doubles the risk of another conflict. Only around half of the countries in which a conflict has ended manage to make it through a decade without relapsing into war. Low-income countries face disproportionately high risks of relapse. Governments in postconflict societies are well aware that they are living dangerously. Typically, they react to this risk by maintaining their military spending at an abnormally high level. The military during the postconflict decade looks much more like a military at war than one at peace. To give you the orders of magnitude, a civil war typically comes close to doubling the military budget. Military spending during the postconflict decade is only around a tenth lower than during the war. You can hardly blame governments that face such a high risk of further conflict for setting spending at such a high level, but does it work? I will come back to that in Part 4, which addresses possible solutions, and in particular Chapter 9, which discusses military strategies for keeping the peace. The Costs of War Finally, we looked at what you might think of as the balance sheet of a civil war: the costs and the legacy. Civil war is development in reverse. It damages both the country itself and its neighbors. Let’s start with the country itself. Civil war tends to reduce growth by around 2.3 percent per year, so the typical seven-year war leaves a country around 15 percent poorer than it would have been. Of course, war is much worse than just a prolonged economic depression: it kills people. Overwhelmingly, the people THE CONFLICT TRAP 27
28 THE TRAPS who die are not killed in active combat but succumb to disease.Wars create refugees,and mass movements of the population in the context of collaps- ing public health systems create epidemics.A young Spanish researcher, Marta Reynol-Querol,analyzed civil war,migration movements,and the incidence of malaria and came up with a startling result:the migration triggered by civil war sharply increases the incidence of disease among the population in the havens to which refugees run.The increase is too large simply to be accounted for by the refugees themselves;what seems to hap- pen is that in their trek across country,refugees are exposed to disease vectors to which they have little resistance,and the diseases they pick up then move with them to their place of refuge,also infecting the people already living in that area. Both economic losses and disease are highly persistent:they do not stop once the fighting stops.Most of the costs of civil war,perhaps as much as half,accrue after the war is over.Of course,sometimes the rebellion is worth it,with rebel victory ushering in an age of social justice,but this does not happen often.Usually the political legacy is about as bad as the economic legacy-a deterioration in political rights.A rebellion is an ex- tremely unreliable way of bringing about positive change.Rebel leaders who claim to have launched a civil war for the good of their country are usually deceiving themselves,others,or both.By the early 1990s,for ex- ample,Jonas Savimbi had amassed a fortune estimated at around $4 bil- lion from UNITA's control of Angolan diamonds.After losing the presi- dential election he spent it selflessly on relaunching the civil war rather than on a billionaire lifestyle. Their followers,the foot soldiers of rebellion,often do not have much choice about joining the rebel movement.I have previously noted Foday Sankoh's preference for recruiting teenage drug addicts.In Uganda the Lord's Resistance Army,whose stated goal is to establish government ac- cording to the Ten Commandments,recruits members by surrounding a remote school with troops and setting fire to the school.The boys who manage to run out are given the choice of being shot or joining up.Those who join are then required to commit an atrocity in their home district, such as raping an old woman,which makes it harder for the boys to go back home.This style of recruitment is less exceptional than you might think.When the Maoist rebel group in Nepal moves into a district the
who die are not killed in active combat but succumb to disease. Wars create refugees, and mass movements of the population in the context of collapsing public health systems create epidemics. A young Spanish researcher, Marta Reynol-Querol, analyzed civil war, migration movements, and the incidence of malaria and came up with a startling result: the migration triggered by civil war sharply increases the incidence of disease among the population in the havens to which refugees run. The increase is too large simply to be accounted for by the refugees themselves; what seems to happen is that in their trek across country, refugees are exposed to disease vectors to which they have little resistance, and the diseases they pick up then move with them to their place of refuge, also infecting the people already living in that area. Both economic losses and disease are highly persistent: they do not stop once the fighting stops. Most of the costs of civil war, perhaps as much as half, accrue after the war is over. Of course, sometimes the rebellion is worth it, with rebel victory ushering in an age of social justice, but this does not happen often. Usually the political legacy is about as bad as the economic legacy—a deterioration in political rights. A rebellion is an extremely unreliable way of bringing about positive change. Rebel leaders who claim to have launched a civil war for the good of their country are usually deceiving themselves, others, or both. By the early 1990s, for example, Jonas Savimbi had amassed a fortune estimated at around $4 billion from UNITA’s control of Angolan diamonds. After losing the presidential election he spent it selflessly on relaunching the civil war rather than on a billionaire lifestyle. Their followers, the foot soldiers of rebellion, often do not have much choice about joining the rebel movement. I have previously noted Foday Sankoh’s preference for recruiting teenage drug addicts. In Uganda the Lord’s Resistance Army, whose stated goal is to establish government according to the Ten Commandments, recruits members by surrounding a remote school with troops and setting fire to the school. The boys who manage to run out are given the choice of being shot or joining up. Those who join are then required to commit an atrocity in their home district, such as raping an old woman, which makes it harder for the boys to go back home. This style of recruitment is less exceptional than you might think. When the Maoist rebel group in Nepal moves into a district the 28 THE TRAPS
THE CONFLICT TRAP 29 young men run away rather than join up:apparently,they fear the same sort of forced recruitment.And,looking back,it now turns out that re- cruitment for the Long March of the Chinese revolution,the stuff of revo- lutionary legend for two generations of Western romantics,was at the point of a gun.The soldiers were not ideologically committed revolution- aries but scared farmers.And during the Russian Revolution the govern- ment rapidly collapsed,effectively leaving both the Red Army and the White Army as rebels living off the land;four million men deserted,de- spite harsh treatment of any who were caught in the attempt.Interestingly, the desertion rate varied:it was much higher in summer,despite the harsh Russian winter.Why?The recruits were peasant farmers,and in the sum- mer,when they had crops to attend to,fighting was just too costly for them, whereas in the winter it didn't matter so much.Economic opportunities re- ally do shape the ease with which a rebel army can maintain its forces. Scholars are now starting to study the rebel recruitment process more rigorously,through fieldwork among rebels.Jeremy Weinstein,a young pro- fessor at Stanford,has been working on a former rebel group,the Mozambi- can National Resistance (RENAMO),and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),a particularly violent group in Sierra Leone.One of Jeremy's results is both important and depressing:it concerns the gradual erosion of initial motivations among a rebel group.Imagine that you are a rebel leader who has decided to build a movement to fight for social justice.You have bought some guns,or been given them by a friendly foreign government that wants to cause trouble,and now you need recruits.Young men turn up at your bush headquarters and volunteer.Should you accept them? Some of these volunteers are like you,potential warriors for social justice, but others are,unfortunately,just attracted by the opportunity to strut around with a gun.Too,according to psychologists,on average about 3 percent of any population have psychopathic tendencies,so you can be sure that some of those in the recruitment line will be psychopaths.Oth- ers will be attracted by the prospect of power and riches,however un- likely;if the reality of daily existence is otherwise awful,the chances of success do not have to be very high to be alluring.Even a small chance of the good life as a successful rebel becomes worth taking,despite the high risk of death,because the prospect of death is not so much worse than the prospect of life in poverty.The key point of Weinstein's research is that in
young men run away rather than join up: apparently, they fear the same sort of forced recruitment. And, looking back, it now turns out that recruitment for the Long March of the Chinese revolution, the stuff of revolutionary legend for two generations of Western romantics, was at the point of a gun. The soldiers were not ideologically committed revolutionaries but scared farmers. And during the Russian Revolution the government rapidly collapsed, effectively leaving both the Red Army and the White Army as rebels living off the land; four million men deserted, despite harsh treatment of any who were caught in the attempt. Interestingly, the desertion rate varied: it was much higher in summer, despite the harsh Russian winter. Why? The recruits were peasant farmers, and in the summer, when they had crops to attend to, fighting was just too costly for them, whereas in the winter it didn’t matter so much. Economic opportunities really do shape the ease with which a rebel army can maintain its forces. Scholars are now starting to study the rebel recruitment process more rigorously, through fieldwork among rebels. Jeremy Weinstein, a young professor at Stanford, has been working on a former rebel group, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a particularly violent group in Sierra Leone. One of Jeremy’s results is both important and depressing: it concerns the gradual erosion of initial motivations among a rebel group. Imagine that you are a rebel leader who has decided to build a movement to fight for social justice. You have bought some guns, or been given them by a friendly foreign government that wants to cause trouble, and now you need recruits. Young men turn up at your bush headquarters and volunteer. Should you accept them? Some of these volunteers are like you, potential warriors for social justice, but others are, unfortunately, just attracted by the opportunity to strut around with a gun. Too, according to psychologists, on average about 3 percent of any population have psychopathic tendencies, so you can be sure that some of those in the recruitment line will be psychopaths. Others will be attracted by the prospect of power and riches, however unlikely; if the reality of daily existence is otherwise awful, the chances of success do not have to be very high to be alluring. Even a small chance of the good life as a successful rebel becomes worth taking, despite the high risk of death, because the prospect of death is not so much worse than the prospect of life in poverty. The key point of Weinstein’s research is that in THE CONFLICT TRAP 29
30 THE TRAPS the presence of natural resource wealth-oil,diamonds,or perhaps drugs-there are credible prospects of riches,so that some of the young men in the queue to join will be motivated by these prospects rather than by the mission to deliver social justice.The idealistic rebel leader will find it very difficult to screen these people out.He can try rejecting those who fail to come up with the right slogans.But soon everyone will learn to parrot them.Gradually,the composition of the rebel group will shift from idealists to opportunists and sadists. One important incipient rebellion is taking place in the delta region of Nigeria,where the country's oil comes from.Aderoju Oyefusi,a Nigerian doctoral student,has recently done a survey of 1,500 people from the re- gion to find out who is taking part.The delta region is the stuff of rebel legend because it combines four toxic ingredients:oil companies(greed), degradation of the environment(sacrilege),government military interven- tion (oppression),and a dead hero,the activist Ken Saro-Wiwa,who was hanged by the Nigerian government in 1995(sanctity).Aderoju wanted to determine whether local people who joined the violent groups were those who were most aware of grievances.He measured this by asking people whether they felt a sense of grievance and classifying them accordingly. Astonishingly,he found that people with a sense of grievance were no more likely to take part in violent protest than those who were not ag- grieved.So what characteristics did make people more likely to engage in political violence?Well,the three big ones were being young,being uned- ucated,and being without dependents.Try as one might,it is difficult to reconcile these characteristics of recruitment with an image of a vanguard of fighters for social justice. And where are the violent groups most likely to form?One might think it would be in the districts that are most deprived of social amenities,for that is supposedly what it is all about-oil wealth being stolen by the oil companies and the federal government instead of being used for the bene- fit of local communities.But Aderoju found that among these 1,500 people there was no relationship between the social amenities that a district pos- sessed and its propensity to political violence.Instead,the violence oc- curred in the districts with oil wells.The natural inference from this,given the prevailing discourse,is that this demonstrates that the oil companies are to blame because of all that environmental damage.But if this is indeed
the presence of natural resource wealth—oil, diamonds, or perhaps drugs—there are credible prospects of riches, so that some of the young men in the queue to join will be motivated by these prospects rather than by the mission to deliver social justice. The idealistic rebel leader will find it very difficult to screen these people out. He can try rejecting those who fail to come up with the right slogans. But soon everyone will learn to parrot them. Gradually, the composition of the rebel group will shift from idealists to opportunists and sadists. One important incipient rebellion is taking place in the delta region of Nigeria, where the country’s oil comes from. Aderoju Oyefusi, a Nigerian doctoral student, has recently done a survey of 1,500 people from the region to find out who is taking part. The delta region is the stuff of rebel legend because it combines four toxic ingredients: oil companies (greed), degradation of the environment (sacrilege), government military intervention (oppression), and a dead hero, the activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was hanged by the Nigerian government in 1995 (sanctity). Aderoju wanted to determine whether local people who joined the violent groups were those who were most aware of grievances. He measured this by asking people whether they felt a sense of grievance and classifying them accordingly. Astonishingly, he found that people with a sense of grievance were no more likely to take part in violent protest than those who were not aggrieved. So what characteristics did make people more likely to engage in political violence? Well, the three big ones were being young, being uneducated, and being without dependents. Try as one might, it is difficult to reconcile these characteristics of recruitment with an image of a vanguard of fighters for social justice. And where are the violent groups most likely to form? One might think it would be in the districts that are most deprived of social amenities, for that is supposedly what it is all about—oil wealth being stolen by the oil companies and the federal government instead of being used for the bene- fit of local communities. But Aderoju found that among these 1,500 people there was no relationship between the social amenities that a district possessed and its propensity to political violence. Instead, the violence occurred in the districts with oil wells. The natural inference from this, given the prevailing discourse, is that this demonstrates that the oil companies are to blame because of all that environmental damage. But if this is indeed 30 THE TRAPS