THE CONFLICT TRAP 21 rebel group.Kidnapping tourists was just an unfortunate necessity to se- cure social justice.Anyway,the United States refused to pay up for the American hostage,but the European governments paid up,with Muam- mar Qaddafi of Libya as a go-between,and in short order there was a surge of young men wanting to join the rebels.This sort of recruitment to a rebellion is a bit like joining drug gangs in the United States.A now- famous study of a Chicago drug gang found that young men were at- tracted into the gang and willing to work for practically nothing because of the small chance of big money if they managed to climb up the hierarchy of the gang. On top of that,if the economy is weak,the state is also likely to be weak, and so rebellion is not difficult.Rebel leader Laurent Kabila,marching across Zaire with his troops to seize the state,told a journalist that in Zaire, rebellion was easy:all you needed was $10,000 and a satellite phone. While this was obviously poetic exaggeration,he went on to explain that in Zaire,everyone was so poor that with $10,000 you could hire yourself a small army.And the satellite phone?Well,that takes us to the third and fi- nal economic risk factor in civil war:natural resources. Dependence upon primary commodity exports-oil,diamonds,and the like-substantially increases the risk of civil war.That's why Kabila needed a satellite phone:in order to strike deals with resource extraction companies.By the time he reached Kinshasa he reportedly had arranged $500 million worth of deals.There have been several cases where interna- tional companies have advanced massive amounts of funding to rebel movements in return for resource concessions in the event of rebel victory. That is apparently how Denis Sassou-Nguesso,the present president of the Republic of the Congo(not to be confused with the Democratic Re- public of the Congo,formerly Zaire),came to power.So natural resources help to finance conflict and sometimes even help to motivate it.One exam- ple is"conflict diamonds."The UN defines them as "diamonds that origi- nate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments,and are used to fund military ac- tion in opposition to those governments."In the case of conflict diamonds, the attention that has been drawn to the problem by the NGO Global Wit- ness has paid off.After years of denying that there was a problem,De Beers,the world's largest diamond producer,has made amazing changes
rebel group. Kidnapping tourists was just an unfortunate necessity to secure social justice. Anyway, the United States refused to pay up for the American hostage, but the European governments paid up, with Muammar Qaddafi of Libya as a go-between, and in short order there was a surge of young men wanting to join the rebels. This sort of recruitment to a rebellion is a bit like joining drug gangs in the United States. A nowfamous study of a Chicago drug gang found that young men were attracted into the gang and willing to work for practically nothing because of the small chance of big money if they managed to climb up the hierarchy of the gang. On top of that, if the economy is weak, the state is also likely to be weak, and so rebellion is not difficult. Rebel leader Laurent Kabila, marching across Zaire with his troops to seize the state, told a journalist that in Zaire, rebellion was easy: all you needed was $10,000 and a satellite phone. While this was obviously poetic exaggeration, he went on to explain that in Zaire, everyone was so poor that with $10,000 you could hire yourself a small army. And the satellite phone? Well, that takes us to the third and fi- nal economic risk factor in civil war: natural resources. Dependence upon primary commodity exports—oil, diamonds, and the like—substantially increases the risk of civil war. That’s why Kabila needed a satellite phone: in order to strike deals with resource extraction companies. By the time he reached Kinshasa he reportedly had arranged $500 million worth of deals. There have been several cases where international companies have advanced massive amounts of funding to rebel movements in return for resource concessions in the event of rebel victory. That is apparently how Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the present president of the Republic of the Congo (not to be confused with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire), came to power. So natural resources help to finance conflict and sometimes even help to motivate it. One example is “conflict diamonds.” The UN defines them as “diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments.” In the case of conflict diamonds, the attention that has been drawn to the problem by the NGO Global Witness has paid off. After years of denying that there was a problem, De Beers, the world’s largest diamond producer, has made amazing changes THE CONFLICT TRAP 21
22 THE TRAPS that have gone a long way toward addressing the problem and have turned the company into a corporate role model. So low income,slow growth,and primary commodity dependence make a country prone to civil war,but are they the real causes of civil war?I hear the phrase"root causes"a lot.It is bandied about at many of the con- ferences on conflict to which I am invited.Surprisingly frequently,a hy- pothesized root cause turns out to be predictable if you already know the hobbyhorse of the speaker.If the individual cares about income inequal- ity,he or she imagines that that is what rebels are concerned about;some- one strongly engaged with political rights assumes that rebels are cam- paigners for democracy;if someone's great-grandparents emigrated to escape from some oppressive regime,the person imagines that the descen- dants of those who did not emigrate are still being oppressed in the way that folk memory tells them once happened.Partly in response,the rebel groups generate a discourse of grievance that feeds these concerns,in ef- fect inviting fellow travelers to imagine themselves wearing bandoliers on the barricades.Unfortunately,you simply can't trust the rebel discourse of concern for social justice:what else do you expect them to say? Donations from diasporic communities have been one of the key sources of finance for rebel movements,so rebels have learned how to manipulate their public relations.The Irish Republican Army (IRA)attracted money from Irish Americans,and not just money,either-apparently some of the guns used by the IRA came from the Boston police department(though the attacks of September 11,2001,brought a stop to that one,once Amer- icans realized what terrorism actually meant).The Tamil Tigers got money from Tamils in Canada;the bomb that killed or injured more than 1,400 people in Sri Lanka's capital city,Colombo,in 1996 was paid for from a Canadian bank account.Albanians across the European Union financed the Kosovo Liberation Army,a group that some European politicians actu- ally mistook for a decent political movement until it got its chance to mur- der.The best-organized diaspora movement of all was the Eritrean Peo- ple's Liberation Front.The diaspora financed the war for thirty years,and in 1992 they won.Eritrea is now an independent country.But did the war really achieve a liberation of the Eritrean people?In September 2001,af- ter an unnecessary international war with Ethiopia,half the Eritrean cabi- net wrote to the president,Isaias Afwerki,asking him to think again about
that have gone a long way toward addressing the problem and have turned the company into a corporate role model. So low income, slow growth, and primary commodity dependence make a country prone to civil war, but are they the real causes of civil war? I hear the phrase “root causes” a lot. It is bandied about at many of the conferences on conflict to which I am invited. Surprisingly frequently, a hypothesized root cause turns out to be predictable if you already know the hobbyhorse of the speaker. If the individual cares about income inequality, he or she imagines that that is what rebels are concerned about; someone strongly engaged with political rights assumes that rebels are campaigners for democracy; if someone’s great-grandparents emigrated to escape from some oppressive regime, the person imagines that the descendants of those who did not emigrate are still being oppressed in the way that folk memory tells them once happened. Partly in response, the rebel groups generate a discourse of grievance that feeds these concerns, in effect inviting fellow travelers to imagine themselves wearing bandoliers on the barricades. Unfortunately, you simply can’t trust the rebel discourse of concern for social justice: what else do you expect them to say? Donations from diasporic communities have been one of the key sources of finance for rebel movements, so rebels have learned how to manipulate their public relations. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) attracted money from Irish Americans, and not just money, either—apparently some of the guns used by the IRA came from the Boston police department (though the attacks of September 11, 2001, brought a stop to that one, once Americans realized what terrorism actually meant). The Tamil Tigers got money from Tamils in Canada; the bomb that killed or injured more than 1,400 people in Sri Lanka’s capital city, Colombo, in 1996 was paid for from a Canadian bank account. Albanians across the European Union financed the Kosovo Liberation Army, a group that some European politicians actually mistook for a decent political movement until it got its chance to murder. The best-organized diaspora movement of all was the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. The diaspora financed the war for thirty years, and in 1992 they won. Eritrea is now an independent country. But did the war really achieve a liberation of the Eritrean people? In September 2001, after an unnecessary international war with Ethiopia, half the Eritrean cabinet wrote to the president, Isaias Afwerki, asking him to think again about 22 THE TRAPS
THE CONFLICT TRAP 23 his autocratic style of government.He thought about it and imprisoned them all.He then instituted mass conscription of Eritrean youth.Ethiopia demobilized,but not Eritrea.Eritrean youth may be in the army as much to protect the president from protest as to protect the country from Ethiopia.Many young Eritreans have left the country.As I write,the gov- ernment is in the process of expelling international peace observers,pre- sumably so that it can restart the war.Was such a liberation really worth thirty years of civil war?As a side effect,it cut Ethiopia off from access to the sea.(Wait until Chapter 4 to see what that does.) You might be ready to accept that rebel movements are good at public relations and use grievance as a weapon,but surely,you think,their under- lying grievances must be well founded.Sometimes they are,because gov- ernments can be truly terrible.But is it generally true that well-founded grievances provoke rebellion?The evidence is much weaker than you might imagine.Take the repression of political rights.Political scientists have measured this sort of behavior,scoring it year by year,government by government.There is basically no relationship between political re- pression and the risk of civil war.Take economic or political discrimina- tion against an ethnic minority.Two political scientists at Stanford,Jim Fearon and David Laitin,have measured this for more than two hundred ethnic minorities around the world.They found no relationship between whether a group was politically repressed and the risk of civil war.Ethnic minorities are just as likely to rebel with or without discrimination. Fearon and Laitin did the same for intergroup hatreds and again found no relationship to the risk of civil war.Anke Hoeffler and I investigated the effect of income inequality,and to our surprise we could find no relation- ship.We also investigated the colonial history of each country.We could find no relationship between the subsequent risk of civil war and either the country that had been the colonial power or how long the country had been decolonized.I even came to doubt the apparently incontestable no- tion that today's conflicts are rooted in history.Of course,pretty well wherever you find a conflict today it's true that there was a conflict in the same area some time in the remote past;the current participants usually make a lot of it,and a rebel leader can often get trouble going by appeal- ing to the past.This does not mean that the past conflict caused the pres- ent one,however,nor that we are locked into conflict by history.Most of
his autocratic style of government. He thought about it and imprisoned them all. He then instituted mass conscription of Eritrean youth. Ethiopia demobilized, but not Eritrea. Eritrean youth may be in the army as much to protect the president from protest as to protect the country from Ethiopia. Many young Eritreans have left the country. As I write, the government is in the process of expelling international peace observers, presumably so that it can restart the war. Was such a liberation really worth thirty years of civil war? As a side effect, it cut Ethiopia off from access to the sea. (Wait until Chapter 4 to see what that does.) You might be ready to accept that rebel movements are good at public relations and use grievance as a weapon, but surely, you think, their underlying grievances must be well founded. Sometimes they are, because governments can be truly terrible. But is it generally true that well-founded grievances provoke rebellion? The evidence is much weaker than you might imagine. Take the repression of political rights. Political scientists have measured this sort of behavior, scoring it year by year, government by government. There is basically no relationship between political repression and the risk of civil war. Take economic or political discrimination against an ethnic minority. Two political scientists at Stanford, Jim Fearon and David Laitin, have measured this for more than two hundred ethnic minorities around the world. They found no relationship between whether a group was politically repressed and the risk of civil war. Ethnic minorities are just as likely to rebel with or without discrimination. Fearon and Laitin did the same for intergroup hatreds and again found no relationship to the risk of civil war. Anke Hoeffler and I investigated the effect of income inequality, and to our surprise we could find no relationship. We also investigated the colonial history of each country. We could find no relationship between the subsequent risk of civil war and either the country that had been the colonial power or how long the country had been decolonized. I even came to doubt the apparently incontestable notion that today’s conflicts are rooted in history. Of course, pretty well wherever you find a conflict today it’s true that there was a conflict in the same area some time in the remote past; the current participants usually make a lot of it, and a rebel leader can often get trouble going by appealing to the past. This does not mean that the past conflict caused the present one, however, nor that we are locked into conflict by history. Most of THE CONFLICT TRAP 23
24 THE TRAPS the places that are at peace now have had civil wars some time in the past. Rather,some economic conditions lend themselves to being taken advan- tage of by gutter politicians who build their success on hatred. I do not want to push this too far,and I certainly do not want to con- done governments that perpetrate discrimination or repression.Genuine grievances should be redressed whether or not they provoke rebellion,yet all too often they are not redressed.But the sad reality seems to be that grievances are pretty common.Rebels usually have something to com- plain about,and if they don't they make it up.All too often the really dis- advantaged are in no position to rebel;they just suffer quietly.Looking through history,about the worst case of ethnic discrimination I can think of occurred after the Norman invasion of England.The Normans,a small group of violent,French-speaking Vikings,killed the English elite,stole all the land,and subjected the native 98 percent of the population to two centuries of servitude.During this time there were many civil wars.None of them was a rebellion of English serfs against Norman masters.All the civil wars were one bunch of Norman barons against another,trying to grab yet more resources. A flagrant grievance is to a rebel movement what an image is to a busi- ness.But occasionally we can disentangle a rebellion enough to get past the image.In Fiji,for example,Indian immigration changed the balance of the population,and eventually the better-educated and richer Indians became a small majority;in 1999 they elected an ethnic Indian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry.Fiji is the world's foremost exporter of mahogany, and shortly after the Chaudhry government came to power it decided to put out the state mahogany plantations to international management.Two of the international bidders were the Commonwealth Development Corpo- ration,a British not-for-profit organization with huge experience working in developing countries,and a private U.S.company.As is normal,each of these rival bidders hired local businessmen to support their bids,and in an atmosphere of intense competition the government awarded the contract to the Commonwealth Development Corporation.One month later,a in- digenous Fijian rebel leader named George Speight-who also happened to be the same businessman who had been serving as a consultant to the U.S.company-began an armed struggle against the new government. Speight's slogan,"Fiji for the Fijians,"was a very emotive rallying cry,but
the places that are at peace now have had civil wars some time in the past. Rather, some economic conditions lend themselves to being taken advantage of by gutter politicians who build their success on hatred. I do not want to push this too far, and I certainly do not want to condone governments that perpetrate discrimination or repression. Genuine grievances should be redressed whether or not they provoke rebellion, yet all too often they are not redressed. But the sad reality seems to be that grievances are pretty common. Rebels usually have something to complain about, and if they don’t they make it up. All too often the really disadvantaged are in no position to rebel; they just suffer quietly. Looking through history, about the worst case of ethnic discrimination I can think of occurred after the Norman invasion of England. The Normans, a small group of violent, French-speaking Vikings, killed the English elite, stole all the land, and subjected the native 98 percent of the population to two centuries of servitude. During this time there were many civil wars. None of them was a rebellion of English serfs against Norman masters. All the civil wars were one bunch of Norman barons against another, trying to grab yet more resources. A flagrant grievance is to a rebel movement what an image is to a business. But occasionally we can disentangle a rebellion enough to get past the image. In Fiji, for example, Indian immigration changed the balance of the population, and eventually the better-educated and richer Indians became a small majority; in 1999 they elected an ethnic Indian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry. Fiji is the world’s foremost exporter of mahogany, and shortly after the Chaudhry government came to power it decided to put out the state mahogany plantations to international management. Two of the international bidders were the Commonwealth Development Corporation, a British not-for-profit organization with huge experience working in developing countries, and a private U.S. company. As is normal, each of these rival bidders hired local businessmen to support their bids, and in an atmosphere of intense competition the government awarded the contract to the Commonwealth Development Corporation. One month later, a indigenous Fijian rebel leader named George Speight—who also happened to be the same businessman who had been serving as a consultant to the U.S. company—began an armed struggle against the new government. Speight’s slogan, “Fiji for the Fijians,” was a very emotive rallying cry, but 24 THE TRAPS
THE CONFLICT TRAP 25 was social justice really Speight's only motive?I suppose that as a rallying cry "Give the mahogany contract to the Americans"would have lacked some of the same frisson of an implied struggle on behalf of the oppressed. How about Sierra Leone?Sierra Leone is a poor and miserable country at the bottom of the Human Development Index(a composite measure of life expectancy,literacy,and income),and its inhabitants most surely have plenty of reasons for grievance.The rebel leader Foday Sankoh came close to hitting the jackpot of gaining power-his forces were so strong relative to those of the government that he was offered amazingly generous settle- ment terms,including the post of vice president.Remarkably,Sankoh turned it down;having the number two position in the country was not what he wanted.Instead,he made it very clear that his goal was to be in charge of the part of the government that managed Sierra Leone's lucrative diamond concessions.And Sankoh's rebellion had not exactly been the stuff of heroic armed struggle.His preferred recruits were teenage drug ad- dicts,easily controlled and not excessively inhibited by moral scruples. Their favored strategy was terror against the civilian population,including hacking off the hands and feet of villagers,even children. Let's move on to another illusion:that all civil war is based in ethnic strife.This may seem self-evident if you go by newspaper accounts,but I have come to doubt it.Most societies that are at peace have more than one ethnic group.And one of the few low-income countries that is completely ethnically pure,Somalia,had a bloody civil war followed by complete and persistent governmental meltdown.Statistically,there is not much evi- dence of a relationship between ethnic diversity and proneness to civil war.We do find some effect:societies that have one group that is large enough to form a majority of the population,but where other groups are still significant-what we call "ethnic dominance"-are indeed more at risk.Examples are Rwanda and Burundi,which endured massively bloody conflict between Hutus and Tutsis,and also Iraq,where the country is di- vided among Sunnis,Shiites,and Kurds.Perhaps the majority group in such places throws its weight around,or perhaps the minority groups know that they cannot trust majority rule to protect them and so try to preempt domination by the majority with their own domination.But this effect is not huge,and most of the societies that make up the bottom bil- lion are too diverse for any one group to be this dominant.People from
was social justice really Speight’s only motive? I suppose that as a rallying cry “Give the mahogany contract to the Americans” would have lacked some of the same frisson of an implied struggle on behalf of the oppressed. How about Sierra Leone? Sierra Leone is a poor and miserable country at the bottom of the Human Development Index (a composite measure of life expectancy, literacy, and income), and its inhabitants most surely have plenty of reasons for grievance. The rebel leader Foday Sankoh came close to hitting the jackpot of gaining power—his forces were so strong relative to those of the government that he was offered amazingly generous settlement terms, including the post of vice president. Remarkably, Sankoh turned it down; having the number two position in the country was not what he wanted. Instead, he made it very clear that his goal was to be in charge of the part of the government that managed Sierra Leone’s lucrative diamond concessions. And Sankoh’s rebellion had not exactly been the stuff of heroic armed struggle. His preferred recruits were teenage drug addicts, easily controlled and not excessively inhibited by moral scruples. Their favored strategy was terror against the civilian population, including hacking off the hands and feet of villagers, even children. Let’s move on to another illusion: that all civil war is based in ethnic strife. This may seem self-evident if you go by newspaper accounts, but I have come to doubt it. Most societies that are at peace have more than one ethnic group. And one of the few low-income countries that is completely ethnically pure, Somalia, had a bloody civil war followed by complete and persistent governmental meltdown. Statistically, there is not much evidence of a relationship between ethnic diversity and proneness to civil war. We do find some effect: societies that have one group that is large enough to form a majority of the population, but where other groups are still significant—what we call “ethnic dominance”—are indeed more at risk. Examples are Rwanda and Burundi, which endured massively bloody conflict between Hutus and Tutsis, and also Iraq, where the country is divided among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Perhaps the majority group in such places throws its weight around, or perhaps the minority groups know that they cannot trust majority rule to protect them and so try to preempt domination by the majority with their own domination. But this effect is not huge, and most of the societies that make up the bottom billion are too diverse for any one group to be this dominant. People from THE CONFLICT TRAP 25