SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET University of California,Berkeley The conditions associated with the existence and stability of democratic society have been a leading concern of political philosophy.In this paper the problem is attacked from a sociological and behavioral standpoint,by present- ing a number of hypotheses concerning some social requisites for democracy, and by discussing some of the data available to test these hypotheses.In its concern with conditions-values,social institutions,historical events-external to the political system itself which sustain different general types of political systems,the paper moves outside the generally recognized province of political sociology.This growing field has dealt largely with the internal analysis of or- ganizations with political goals,or with the determinants of action within vari- ous political institutions,such as parties,government agencies,or the electoral process.?It has in the main left to the political philosopher the larger concern with the relations of the total political system to society as a whole. I.INTRODUCTION A sociological analysis of any pattern of behavior,whether referring to a small or a large social system,must result in specific hypotheses,empirically testable statements.Thus,in dealing with democracy,one must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and say:democracy has emerged out of these conditions,and has become stabil- ized because of certain supporting institutions and values,as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining processes.The conditions listed must be ones which differentiate most democratic states from most others. A recent discussion by a group of political theorists on the "cultural pre- requisites to a successfully functioning democracy"points up the difference between the approach of the political sociologist and the political philosopher to a comparable problem.3 A considerable portion of this symposium is devoted 1 This paper was written as one aspect of a comparative analysis of political behavior in western democracies which is supported by grants from the Behavioral Sciences Di- vision of the Ford Foundation and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council.Assistance from Robert Alford and Amitai Etzioni is gratefully acknowledged.It was originally presented at the September 1958 meetings of the Ameri- can Political Science Association in St.Louis,Missouri. See my"Political Sociology,1945-1955,"in Hans L.Zetterberg,ed.,Sociology in the USA (Paris:UNESCO,1956),pp.45-55,for a summary of the various areas covered by political sociology.For a discussion of intellectual trends in political sociology and the rationale underlying a focus on the problem of democracy,see my "Political Sociology," in R.K.Merton,et al.,eds.,Sociology Today (New York:Basic Books,1959),ch.3. s Ernest S.Griffith,John Plamenatz,and J.Roland Pennock,"Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy:A Symposium,"this REvIEw,Vol.50 (1956), pp.101-137. 69 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun,19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY' SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET University of California, Berkeley The conditions associated with the existence and stability of democratic society have been a leading concern of political philosophy. In this paper the problem is attacked from a sociological and behavioral standpoint, by present- ing a number of hypotheses concerning some social requisites for democracy, and by discussing some of the data available to test these hypotheses. In its concern with conditions-values, social institutions, historical events-external to the political system itself which sustain different general types of political systems, the paper moves outside the generally recognized province of political sociology. This growing field has dealt largely with the internal analysis of or- ganizations with political goals, or with the determinants of action within vari- ous political institutions, such as parties, government agencies, or the electoral process.2 It has in the main left to the political philosopher the larger concern with the relations of the total political system to society as a whole. I. INTRODUCTION A sociological analysis of any pattern of behavior, whether referring to a small or a large social system, must result in specific hypotheses, empirically testable statements. Thus, in dealing with democracy, one must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and say: democracy has emerged out of these conditions, and has become stabil- ized because of certain supporting institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining processes. The conditions listed must be ones which differentiate most democratic states from most others. A recent discussion by a group of political theorists on the "cultural pre- requisites to a successfully functioning democracy" points up the difference between the approach of the political sociologist and the political philosopher to a comparable problem.' A considerable portion of this symposium is devoted 1 This paper was written as one aspect of a comparative analysis of political behavior in western democracies which is supported by grants from the Behavioral Sciences Di- vision of the Ford Foundation and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. Assistance from Robert Alford and Amitai Etzioni is gratefully acknowledged. It was originally presented at the September 1958 meetings of the Ameri- can Political Science Association in St. Louis, Missouri. 2 See my "Political Sociology, 1945-1955," in Hans L. Zetterberg, ed., Sociology in the USA (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), pp. 45-55, for a summary of the various areas covered by political sociology. For a discussion of intellectual trends in political sociology and the rationale underlying a focus on the problem of democracy, see my "Political Sociology," in R. K. Merton, et al., eds., Sociology Today (New York: Basic Books, 1959), ch. 3. 3Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamenatz, and J. Roland Pennock, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (1956), pp. 101-137. 69 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun, 19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
70 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW to a debate concerning the contribution of religion,particularly Christian ethics,toward democratic attitudes.The principal author,Ernest Griffith,sees a necessary connection between the Judeo-Christian heritage and attitudes which sustain democratic institutions;the other participants stress the political and economic conditions which may provide the basis for a consensus on basic values which does not depend on religion;and they point to the depression, poverty,and social disorganization which resulted in fascism in Italy and Germany,in spite of strongly religious populations and traditions.What is most striking about this discussion is its lack of a perspective which assumes that theoretical propositions must be subject to test by a systematic compari- son of all available cases,and which treats a deviant case properly as one case out of many.In this symposium,on the contrary,deviant cases which do not fit a given proposition are cited to demonstrate that there are no social condi- tions which are regularly associated with a given complex political system.So the conflicts among political philosophers about the necessary conditions under- lying given political systems often lead to a triumphant demonstration that a given situation clearly violates the thesis of one's opponent,much as if the ex- istence of some wealthy socialists,or poor conservatives,demonstrated that economic factors were not an important determinant of political preference. The advantage of an attempt such as is presented here,which seeks to dis- sect the conditions of democracy into several interrelated variables,is that deviant cases fall into proper perspective.The statistical preponderance of evidence supporting the relationship of a variable such as education to democ- racy indicates that the existence of deviant cases(such as Germany,which suc- cumbed to dictatorship in spite of an advanced educational system)cannot be the sole basis for rejecting the hypothesis.A deviant case,considered within a context which marshals the evidence on all relevant cases,often may actually strengthen the basic hypothesis if an intensive study of it reveals the special conditions which prevented the usual relationship from appearing.4 Thus,elec- toral research indicates that a large proportion of the more economically well- to-do leftists are underprivileged along other dimensions of social status,such as ethnic or religious position. Controversy in this area stems not only from variations in methodology, but also from use of different definitions.Clearly in order to discuss democracy, or any other phenomenon,it is first necessary to define it.For the purposes of +A detailed example of how a deviant case and analysis advances theory may be found in S.M.Lipset,M.Trow,and J.Coleman,Union Democracy,(Glencoe:The Free Press, 1956).This book is a study of the political process inside the International Typographical Union,which has a long-term two-party system with free elections and frequent turn- over in office,and is thus the clearest exception to Robert Michels'"iron law of oligarchy." The research,however,was not intended as a report on this union,but rather as the best means available to test and amplify Michels'"law."The study could only have been made through a systematic effort to establish a basic theory and derive hypotheses.The best way to add to knowledge about the internal government of voluntary associations seemed to be to study the most deviant case.In the process of examining the particular historical and structural conditions sustaining the two-party system in the ITU,the gen- eral theory was clarified. This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun,19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
70 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW to a debate concerning the contribution of religion, particularly Christian ethics, toward democratic attitudes. The principal author, Ernest Griffith, sees a necessary connection between the Judeo-Christian heritage and attitudes which sustain democratic institutions; the other participants stress the political and economic conditions which may provide the basis for a consensus on basic values which does not depend on religion; and they point to the depression, poverty, and social disorganization which resulted in fascism in Italy and Germany, in spite of strongly religious populations and traditions. What is most striking about this discussion is its lack of a perspective which assumes that theoretical propositions must be subject to test by a systematic compari- son of all available cases, and which treats a deviant case properly as one case out of many. In this symposium, on the contrary, deviant cases which do not fit a given proposition are cited to demonstrate that there are no social condi- tions which are regularly associated with a given complex political system. So the conflicts among political philosophers about the necessary conditions under- lying given political systems often lead to a triumphant demonstration that a given situation clearly violates the thesis of one's opponent, much as if the ex- istence of some wealthy socialists, or poor conservatives, demonstrated that economic factors were not an important determinant of political preference. The advantage of an attempt such as is presented here, which seeks to dis- sect the conditions of democracy into several interrelated variables, is that deviant cases fall into proper perspective. The statistical preponderance of evidence supporting the relationship of a variable such as education to democ- racy indicates that the existence of deviant cases (such as Germany, which suc- cumbed to dictatorship in spite of an advanced educational system) cannot be the sole basis for rejecting the hypothesis. A deviant case, considered within a context which marshals the evidence on all relevant cases, often may actually strengthen the basic hypothesis if an intensive study of it reveals the special conditions which prevented the usual relationship from appearing.4 Thus, elec- toral research indicates that a large proportion of the more economically well- to-do leftists are underprivileged along other dimensions of social status, such as ethnic or religious position. Controversy in this area stems not only from variations in methodology, but also from use of different definitions. Clearly in order to discuss democracy, or any other phenomenon, it is first necessary to define it. For the purposes of 4 A detailed example of how a deviant case and analysis advances theory may be found in S. M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. Coleman, Union Democracy, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956). This book is a study of the political process inside the International Typographical Union, which has a long-term two-party system with free elections and frequent turn- over in office, and is thus the clearest exception to Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy." The research, however, was not intended as a report on this union, but rather as the best means available to test and amplify Michels' "law." The study could only have been made through a systematic effort to establish a basic theory and derive hypotheses. The best way to add to knowledge about the internal government of voluntary associations seemed to be to study the most deviant case. In the process of examining the particular historical and structural conditions sustaining the two-party system in the ITU, the gen- eral theory was clarified. This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun, 19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY 71 this paper,democracy (in a complex society)is defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials.It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office.In large measure abstracted from the work of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber,5 this defini- tion implies a number of specific conditions:(a)a "political formula,"a system of beliefs,legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the institutions- parties,a free press,and so forth-which are legitimized,i.e.,accepted as proper by all;(b)one set of political leaders in office;and(c)one or more sets of leaders,out of office,who act as a legitimate opposition attempting to gain office. The need for these conditions is clear.First,if a political system is not char- acterized by a value system allowing the peaceful"play"of power-the adher- ence by the "outs"to decisions made by "ins"and the recognition by "ins"of the rights of the "outs"-there can be no stable democracy.This has been the problem faced by many Latin American states.Second,if the outcome of the political game is not the periodic awarding of effective authority to one group, a party or stable coalition,then unstable and irresponsible government rather than democracy will result.This state of affairs existed in pre-Fascist Italy, and for much,though not all of the history of the Third and Fourth French Republics,which were characterized by weak coalition governments,often formed among parties which had major interest and value conflicts with each other.Third,if the conditions facilitating the perpetuation of an effective op- position do not exist,then the authority of officials will be maximized,and popular influence on policy will be at a minimum.This is the situation in all one-party states;and by general agreement,at least in the West,these are dictatorships. Two principal complex characteristics of social systems will be considered here as they bear on the problem of stable democracy:economic development and legitimacy.These will be presented as structural characteristics of a so- ciety which sustain a democratic political system.After a discussion of the economic development complex (comprising industrialization,wealth,urbani- zation,and education)and its consequences for democracy,we shall move to two aspects of the problem of legitimacy,or the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves,and considered right and proper.The relations between legitimacy and the effectiveness of the system (the latter primarily a function of economic development)will be followed by a discussion of the sources of cleavage in a society and the ways in which various resolutions of historically crucial issues result either in disruptive forms of cleavage or in cross-cutting affiliations which reduce conflict to a manageable level.Finally,the bearing of these various factors upon the future of democracy will be assessed. Joseph Schumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy,(New York:Harper and Bros.,1947),pp.232-302,esp.269;Max Weber,Essays in Sociology,(New York:Oxford University Press,1946),p.226. This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun,19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.istor.org/terms
SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY 71 this paper, democracy (in a complex society) is defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office. In large measure abstracted from the work of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber,5 this defini- tion implies a number of specific conditions: (a) a "political formula," a system of beliefs, legitimizing the democratic system and specifying the institutions- parties, a free press, and so forth-which are legitimized, i.e., accepted as proper by all; (b) one set of political leaders in office; and (c) one or more sets of leaders, out of office, who act as a legitimate opposition attempting to gain office. The need for these conditions is clear. First, if a political system is not char- acterized by a value system allowing the peaceful "play" of power-the adher- ence by the "outs" to decisions made by "ins" and the recognition by "ins" of the rights of the "outs"-there can be no stable democracy. This has been the problem faced by many Latin American states. Second, if the outcome of the political game is not the periodic awarding of effective authority to one group, a party or stable coalition, then unstable and irresponsible government rather than democracy will result. This state of affairs existed in pre-Fascist Italy, and for much, though not all of the history of the Third and Fourth French Republics, which were characterized by weak coalition governments, often formed among parties which had major interest and value conflicts with each other. Third, if the conditions facilitating the perpetuation of an effective op- position do not exist, then the authority of officials will be maximized, and popular influence on policy will be at a minimum. This is the situation in all one-party states; and by general agreement, at least in the West, these are dictatorships. Two principal complex characteristics of social systems will be considered here as they bear on the problem of stable democracy: economic development and legitimacy. These will be presented as structural characteristics of a so- ciety which sustain a democratic political system. After a discussion of the economic development complex (comprising industrialization, wealth, urbani- zation, and education) and its consequences for democracy, we shall move to two aspects of the problem of legitimacy, or the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves, and considered right and proper. The relations between legitimacy and the effectiveness of the system (the latter primarily a function of economic development) will be followed by a discussion of the sources of cleavage in a society and the ways in which various resolutions of historically crucial issues result either in disruptive forms of cleavage or in cross-cutting affiliations which reduce conflict to a manageable level. Finally, the bearing of these various factors upon the future of democracy will be assessed. 5 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), pp. 232-302, esp. 269; Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 226. This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun, 19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
72 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW No detailed examination of the political history of individual countries will be undertaken in accordance with the generic definition,since the relative de- gree or social content of democracy in different countries is not the real prob- lem of this paper.Certain problems of method in the handling of relationships between complex characteristics of total societies do merit brief discussion, however. An extremely high correlation between aspects of social structure,such as income,education,religion,on the one hand,and democracy,on the other,is not to be anticipated even on theoretical grounds,because to the extent that the political sub-system of the society operates autonomously,a particular political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form.Or,a political form may develop because of a syndrome of fairly unique historical factors,even though major social characteristics favor another form.Germany is an example of a nation in which the structural changes- growing industralization,urbanization,wealth,and education-all favored the establishment of a democratic system,but in which a series of adverse historical events prevented democracy from securing legitimacy in the eyes of many important segments of society,and thus weakened German democracy's abil- ity to withstand crisis. The high correlations which appear in the data to be presented between democracy and other institutional characteristics of societies must not be overly stressed,since unique events may account for either the persistence or the failure of democracy in any particular society.Max Weber argued strongly that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set one process in motion in one country,and a second process in another.To illustrate his point,he used the analogy of a dice game in which each time the dice came up with a certain number they were increasingly loaded in the direc- tion of coming up with that number again.To Weber,an event predisposing a country toward democracy sets a process in motion which increases the likeli- hood that at the next critical point in the country's history democracy will win out again.This process can only have meaning if we assume that once estab- lished,a democratic political system gathers some momentum,and creates some social supports (institutions)to ensure its continued existence.Thus a "premature"democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy,such as universal literacy,or autonomous private associations.This paper is primarily concerned with explicating the social conditions which serve to support a demo- cratic political system,such as education or legitimacy;it will not deal in detail with the kinds of internal mechanisms which serve to maintain democratic sys- tems such as the specific rules of the political game.7 Max Weber,The Methodology of the Social Sciences,(Glencoe:The Free Press,1949), pp.182-185;see also S.M.Lipset,"A Sociologist Looks at History,"Pacific Sociological Review,Vol.1 (Spring 1958),pp.13-17. See Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick,Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent,Michigan Governmental Studies,no.32 (Bureau of Government,Institute of This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun,19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
72 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW No detailed examination of the political history of individual countries will be undertaken in accordance with the generic definition, since the relative de- gree or social content of democracy in different countries is not the real prob- lem of this paper. Certain problems of method in the handling of relationships between complex characteristics of total societies do merit brief discussion, however. An extremely high correlation between aspects of social structure, such as income, education, religion, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, is not to be anticipated even on theoretical grounds, because to the extent that the political sub-system of the society operates autonomously, a particular political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form. Or, a political form may develop because of a syndrome of fairly unique historical factors, even though major social characteristics favor another form. Germany is an example of a nation in which the structural changes- growing industralization, urbanization, wealth, and education-all favored the establishment of a democratic system, but in which a series of adverse historical events prevented democracy from securing legitimacy in the eyes of many important segments of society, and thus weakened German democracy's abil- ity to withstand crisis. The high correlations which appear in the data to be presented between democracy and other institutional characteristics of societies must not be overly stressed, since unique events may account for either the persistence or the failure of democracy in any particular society. Max Weber argued strongly that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set one process in motion in one country, and a second process in another. To illustrate his point, he used the analogy of a dice game in which each time the dice came up with a certain number they were increasingly loaded in the direc- tion of coming up with that number again.6 To Weber, an event predisposing a country toward democracy sets a process in motion which increases the likeli- hood that at the next critical point in the country's history democracy will win out again. This process can only have meaning if we assume that once estab- lished, a democratic political system gathers some momentum, and creates some social supports (institutions) to ensure its continued existence. Thus a "premature" democracy which survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth of other conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal literacy, or autonomous private associations. This paper is primarily concerned with explicating the social conditions which serve to support a demo- cratic political system, such as education or legitimacy; it will not deal in detail with the kinds of internal mechanisms which serve to maintain democratic sys- tems such as the specific rules of the political game.' 6 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 182-185; see also S. M. Lipset, "A Sociologist Looks at History," Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 1 (Spring 1958)7 pp. 13-17. 7 See Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent, Michigan Governmental Studies, no. 32 (Bureau of Government, Institute of This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun, 19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY 73 Comparative generalizations dealing with complex social systems must neces- sarily deal rather summarily with particular historical features of any one society within the scope of the investigation.In order to test these generaliza- tions bearing on the differences between countries which rank high or low in possession of the attributes associated with democracy,it is necessary to estab- lish some empirical measures of the type of political system.Individual devi- ations from a particular aspect of democracy are not too important,as long as the definitions unambiguously cover the great majority of nations which are located as democratic or undemocratic.The precise dividing line between "more democratic"and "less democratic"'is also not a basic problem,since presumably democracy is not a quality of a social system which either does or does not exist,but is rather a complex of characteristics which may be ranked in many different ways.For this reason it was decided to divide the countries under consideration into two groups,rather than to attempt to rank them from highest to lowest.Ranking individual countries from the most to the least democratic is much more difficult than splitting the countries into two classes, "more"or "less"democratic,although even here borderline cases such as Mexico pose problems. Efforts to classify all countries raise a number of problems.Most countries which lack an enduring tradition of political democracy lie in the traditionally underdeveloped sections of the world.It is possible that Max Weber was right when he suggested that modern democracy in its clearest forms can only occur under the unique conditions of capitalist industrialization.8 Some of the com- plications introduced by the sharp variations in political practices in different parts of the earth can be reduced by dealing with differences among countries within political culture areas.The two best areas for such internal comparison are Latin America as one,and Europe and the English-speaking countries as the other.More limited comparisons may be made among the Asian states,and among the Arab countries. The main criteria used in this paper to locate European democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I,and the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic "rules of the game."The somewhat less stringent criterion em- ployed for Latin America is whether a given country has had a history of more Public Administration,University of Michigan,1956),and Robert A.Dahl,A Preface to Democralic Theory,(University of Chicago,1956),esp.pp.90-123,for recent systematic efforts to specify some of the internal mechanisms of democracy.See David Easton,"An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"World Politics,Vol.9(1957),pp.383- 400,for discussion of problems of internal analysis of political systems. s See Max Weber,"Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland,"Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,Vol.22 (1906),pp.346 fi. The latter requirement means that no totalitarian movement,either Fascist or Com- munist,received 20 per cent of the vote during this time.Actually all the European na- tions falling on the democratic side of the continuum had totalitarian movements which secured less than seven per cent of the vote. This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun,19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SOME SOCIAL REQUISITES OF DEMOCRACY 73 Comparative generalizations dealing with complex social systems must neces- sarily deal rather summarily with particular historical features of any one society within the scope of the investigation. In order to test these generaliza- tions bearing on the differences between countries which rank high or low in possession of the attributes associated with democracy, it is necessary to estab- lish some empirical measures of the type of political system. Individual devi- ations from a particular aspect of democracy are not too important, as long as the definitions unambiguously cover the great majority of nations which are located as democratic or undemocratic. The precise dividing line between "more democratic" and "less democratic" is also not a basic problem, since presumably democracy is not a quality of a social system which either does or does not exist, but is rather a complex of characteristics which may be ranked in many different ways. For this reason it was decided to divide the countries under consideration into two groups, rather than to attempt to rank them from highest to lowest. Ranking individual countries from the most to the least democratic is much more difficult than splitting the countries into two classes, "more" or "less" democratic, although even here borderline cases such as Mexico pose problems. Efforts to classify all countries raise a number of problems. Most countries which lack an enduring tradition of political democracy lie in the traditionally underdeveloped sections of the world. It is possible that Max Weber was right when he suggested that modern democracy in its clearest forms can only occur under the unique conditions of capitalist industrialization.8 Some of the com- plications introduced by the sharp variations in political practices in different parts of the earth can be reduced by dealing with differences among countries within political culture areas. The two best areas for such internal comparison are Latin America as one, and Europe and the English-speaking countries as the other. More limited comparisons may be made among the Asian states, and among the Arab countries. The main criteria used in this paper to locate European democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of political democracy since World War I, and the absence over the past 25 years of a major political movement opposed to the democratic "rules of the game."9 The somewhat less stringent criterion em- ployed for Latin America is whether a given country has had a history of more Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1956), and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (University of Chicago, 1956), esp. pp. 90-123, for recent systematic efforts to specify some of the internal mechanisms of democracy. See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, Vol. 9 (1957), pp. 383- 400, for discussion of problems of internal analysis of political systems. 8 See Max Weber, "Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland," Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Vol. 22 (1906), pp. 346 ff. 9 The latter requirement means that no totalitarian movement, either Fascist or Com- munist, received 20 per cent of the vote during this time. Actually all the European na- tions falling on the democratic side of the continuum had totalitarian movements which secured less than seven per cent of the vote. This content downloaded from 202.120.14.67 on Sun, 19 Feb 2017 15:39:15 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms