170 Charles Tilly coercive exploitation forced would-be power holders to concede protection and constraints on their own action.It will therefore help us to eliminate faulty implicit comparisons between today's Third World and yesterday's Europe.That clarification will make it easier to understand exactly how War Making and State Making as Organized Crime today's world is different and what we therefore have to explain.It may even Charles Tilly help us to explain the current looming presence of military organization and action throughout the world.Although that result would delight me,I do not in Bringing the State Back In edited by Peter Evans,Dietrich promise anything so grand. Rueschemeyer,and Theda Skocpol(Cambridge:Cambridge This essay,then,concerns the place of organised means of University Press,1985). violence in the growth and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states:relatively centralized,differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory.The argument grows from historical work on the formation of national states in Western Europe,especially on the growth of It protection rackets represent organised crime at its smoothest, the French state from 1600 onward.But it takes several deliberate steps then war risking and state making-quintessential protection rackets with away from that work,wheels,and stares hard at it from theoretical ground. the advantage of legitimacy-qualify as our largest examples of organised The argument brings with it few illustrations and no evidence worthy of the crime.Without branding all generals and statesmen as murderers or name. thieves,I want to urge the value of that analogy.At least for the European Just as one repacks a hastily filled rucksack after a few days on the experience of the past few centuries,a portrait of war makers and state trail-throwing out the waste,putting things in order of importance,and bal- makers .r.coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater ancing the load-I have repacked my theoretical baggage for the climb to resemblance to the facts than do its chief altematives:the idea of a social come;the real test of the new packing arrives only with the next stretch of contract,the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states the trail.The trimmed-down argument stresses the interdependence of war offer services to willing consumers.the idea of a society whose shared making and state making and the analogy between both of those processes norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government. and what,when less successful and smaller in scale,we call organised The reflections that follow merely illustrate the analogy of war crime.War makes states,I shall claim.Banditry,piracy,gangland rivalry, making and state making with organized crime from a few hundred years of policing,and war making all belong on the same continuum-that I shall European experience and offer tentative arguments concerning principles of claim as well.For the historically limited period in which national states were change and variation underlying the experience.My reflections grow from becoming the dominant organisations in Western countries,I shall also contemporary concerns:worries about the increasing destructiveness of claim that mercantile capitalism and state making reinforced each other. war,the expanding role of great powers as suppliers of arms and military o'ganization to poor countries,and the growing importance of military r tile in Double-Edged Protection those same countries.They spring from the hope that the European In contemporary American parlance,the word "protection"sounds two experience,properly understood,will help us to grasp what is happening contrasting tones.One is comforting,the other ominous.With one tone, today.perhaps even to do something about it. "protection"calls up images of the shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend,a large insurance policy,or a sturdy roof.With the other,it evokes the The Third World of the twentieth century does not greatly resemble racket in which a local strong man forces merchants to pay tribute in order to Europe of the sixteenth or seventeenth century.In no simple sense can we avoid damage -damage the strong man himself threatens to deliver.The read the future of Third World countries from the pasts of European coun- difference,to be sure,is a matter of degree:A hell-and-damnation priest is likely tries.Yet a thoughtful exploration of European experience will serve us well. to collect contributions from his parishioners only to the extent that they believe It will show us that coercive exploitation played a large part in the creation of his predictions of brimstone for infidels;our neighborhood mobster may actually the European states.It will show us that popular resistance to be,as he claims to be,a brothel's best guarantee of operation free of police interference. Which image the word "protection"brings to mind depends mainly on our assessment of the reality and eternality of the threat.Someone who
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime Charles Tilly in Bringing the State Back In edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). It protection rackets represent organised crime at its smoothest, then war risking and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organised crime. Without branding all generals and statesmen as murderers or thieves, I want to urge the value of that analogy. At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers .r. coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government. The reflections that follow merely illustrate the analogy of war making and state making with organized crime from a few hundred years of European experience and offer tentative arguments concerning principles of change and variation underlying the experience. My reflections grow from contemporary concerns: worries about the increasing destructiveness of war, the expanding role of great powers as suppliers of arms and military organization to poor countries, and the growing importance of military r tile in those same countries. They spring from the hope that the European experience, properly understood, will help us to grasp what is happening today, perhaps even to do something about it. The Third World of the twentieth century does not greatly resemble Europe of the sixteenth or seventeenth century. In no simple sense can we read the future of Third World countries from the pasts of European countries. Yet a thoughtful exploration of European experience will serve us well. It will show us that coercive exploitation played a large part in the creation of the European states. It will show us that popular resistance to 170 Charles Tilly coercive exploitation forced would-be power holders to concede protection and constraints on their own action. It will therefore help us to eliminate faulty implicit comparisons between today's Third World and yesterday's Europe. That clarification will make it easier to understand exactly how today's world is different and what we therefore have to explain. It may even help us to explain the current looming presence of military organization and action throughout the world. Although that result would delight me, I do not promise anything so grand. This essay, then, concerns the place of organised means of violence in the growth and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states: relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory. The argument grows from historical work on the formation of national states in Western Europe, especially on the growth of the French state from 1600 onward. But it takes several deliberate steps away from that work, wheels, and stares hard at it from theoretical ground. The argument brings with it few illustrations and no evidence worthy of the name. Just as one repacks a hastily filled rucksack after a few days on the trail – throwing out the waste, putting things in order of importance, and balancing the load – I have repacked my theoretical baggage for the climb to come; the real test of the new packing arrives only with the next stretch of the trail. The trimmed-down argument stresses the interdependence of war making and state making and the analogy between both of those processes and what, when less successful and smaller in scale, we call organised crime. War makes states, I shall claim. Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war making all belong on the same continuum – that I shall claim as well. For the historically limited period in which national states were becoming the dominant organisations in Western countries, I shall also claim that mercantile capitalism and state making reinforced each other. Double-Edged Protection In contemporary American parlance, the word "protection" sounds two contrasting tones. One is comforting, the other ominous. With one tone, "protection" calls up images of the shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend, a large insurance policy, or a sturdy roof. With the other, it evokes the racket in which a local strong man forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage – damage the strong man himself threatens to deliver. The difference, to be sure, is a matter of degree: A hell-and-damnation priest is likely to collect contributions from his parishioners only to the extent that they believe his predictions of brimstone for infidels; our neighborhood mobster may actually be, as he claims to be, a brothel's best guarantee of operation free of police interference. Which image the word "protection" brings to mind depends mainly on our assessment of the reality and eternality of the threat. Someone who
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 171 172 Charles Tilly produces both the danger and,at a price,the shield against it is a racketeer. authority's monopoly of force.A tendency to monopolies the means of violence Someone who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger's makes a government's claim to provide protection,in either the comforting or the appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector,especially if his price is no higher ominous sense of the word.more credible and more difficult to resist than his competitors'.Someone who supplies reliable,low-priced shielding both Frank recognition of the central place of force in governmental activity from local racketeers and from outside marauders makes the best offer of all. does not require us to believe that governmental authority rests "only"or Apologists for particular governments and for government in general "ultimately"on the threat of violence.Nor does it entail the assumption that a commonly argue,precisely,that they offer protection from local and external government's only service is protection.Even when a government's use of force violence.They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs of imposes a large cost,some people may well decide that the government's other protection.They call people who complain about the price of protection services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence. anarchists,""subversives,"or both at once.But consider the definition of a Recognition of the centrality of force opens the way to an understanding of the racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. growth and change of governmental forms. Governments'provision of protection,by this standard,often qualifies as Here is a preview of the most general argument:Power holders'pursuit racketeering.To the extent that the threats against which a given government of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for war making protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities,the from the populations over which they had control and in the promotion of capital government has organized a protection racket.Since governments themselves accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy.War making, commonly simulate,stimulate,or even fabricate threats of extemnal war and extraction,and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making. since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens,many governments intention of creating national states -centralized,differentiated,autonomous, operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers.There is,of course,a extensive political organizations.Nor did they ordinarily foresee that national difference:Racketeers,by the conventional definition,operate without the states would emerge from war making,extraction,and capital accumulation. sanctity of governments. Instead,the people who controlled European states and states in the How do racketeer governments themselves acquire authority?As a making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus to question of fact and of ethics,that is one of the oldest conundrums of political enjoy the advantages of power within a secure or expanding territory.To make analysis.Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes,nevertheless,political observers more effective war,they attempted to locate more capital.In the short run,they have recognized that,whatever else they do,governments organize and, might acquire that capital by conquest,by selling off their assets,or by coercing wherever possible,monopolize violence.It matters little whether we take or dispossessing accumulators of capital.In the long run,the quest inevitably violence in a narrow sense,such as damage to persons and objects,or in a involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and broad sense,such as violation of people's desires and interests;by either arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the criterion,governments stand out from other organisations by their tendency to people and activities within their spheres of control. monopolize the concentrated means of violence.The distinction between As the process continued,state makers developed a durable interest in "legitimate"and "illegitimate"force,furthermore,makes no difference to the fact. promoting the accumulation of capital,sometimes in the guise of direct return to If we take legitimacy to depend on conformity to an abstract principle or on the their own enterprises.Variations in the difficulty of collecting taxes,in the assent of the governed(or both at once),these conditions may serve to justify, expense of the particular kind of ammed force adopted,in the amount of war perhaps even to explain,the tendency to monopolies force;they do not making required to hold off competitors,and so on resulted in the principal contradict the fact. variations in the forms of European states.It all began with the effort to In any case,Arthur Stinchcombe's agreeably cynical treatment of legiti- monopolies the means of violence within a delimited territory adjacent to a macy serves the purposes of political analysis much more efficiently.Le- power holder's base. gitimacy,according to Stinchcombe,depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed:"The person over whom power is exercised is not Violence and Government usually as important as other power-holders.Legitimacy is the probability that What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence delivered other authonties will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority.Other by anyone else?In the long;run,enough to make the division be authorities,I would add,are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authorty that controls substantial force;not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule. The rule underscores the importance of the
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 171 produces both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it is a racketeer. Someone who provides a needed shield but has little control over the danger's appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector, especially if his price is no higher than his competitors'. Someone who supplies reliable, low-priced shielding both from local racketeers and from outside marauders makes the best offer of all. Apologists for particular governments and for government in general commonly argue, precisely, that they offer protection from local and external violence. They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs of protection. They call people who complain about the price of protection "anarchists," "subversives," or both at once. But consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments' provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers. There is, of course, a difference: Racketeers, by the conventional definition, operate without the sanctity of governments. How do racketeer governments themselves acquire authority? As a question of fact and of ethics, that is one of the oldest conundrums of political analysis. Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, nevertheless, political observers have recognized that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence. It matters little whether we take violence in a narrow sense, such as damage to persons and objects, or in a broad sense, such as violation of people's desires and interests; by either criterion, governments stand out from other organisations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence. The distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force, furthermore, makes no difference to the fact. If we take legitimacy to depend on conformity to an abstract principle or on the assent of the governed (or both at once), these conditions may serve to justify, perhaps even to explain, the tendency to monopolies force; they do not contradict the fact. In any case, Arthur Stinchcombe's agreeably cynical treatment of legitimacy serves the purposes of political analysis much more efficiently. Legitimacy, according to Stinchcombe, depends rather little on abstract principle or assent of the governed: "The person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders."1 Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority. Other authorities, I would add, are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule. The rule underscores the importance of the 172 Charles Tilly authority's monopoly of force. A tendency to monopolies the means of violence makes a government's claim to provide protection, in either the comforting or the ominous sense of the word, more credible and more difficult to resist. Frank recognition of the central place of force in governmental activity does not require us to believe that governmental authority rests "only" or "ultimately" on the threat of violence. Nor does it entail the assumption that a government's only service is protection. Even when a government's use of force imposes a large cost, some people may well decide that the government's other services outbalance the costs of acceding to its monopoly of violence. Recognition of the centrality of force opens the way to an understanding of the growth and change of governmental forms. Here is a preview of the most general argument: Power holders' pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of resources for war making from the populations over which they had control and in the promotion of capital accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. War making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making. Power holders did not undertake those three momentous activities with the intention of creating national states – centralized, differentiated, autonomous, extensive political organizations. Nor did they ordinarily foresee that national states would emerge from war making, extraction, and capital accumulation. Instead, the people who controlled European states and states in the making warred in order to check or overcome their competitors and thus to enjoy the advantages of power within a secure or expanding territory. To make more effective war, they attempted to locate more capital. In the short run, they might acquire that capital by conquest, by selling off their assets, or by coercing or dispossessing accumulators of capital. In the long run, the quest inevitably involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the people and activities within their spheres of control. As the process continued, state makers developed a durable interest in promoting the accumulation of capital, sometimes in the guise of direct return to their own enterprises. Variations in the difficulty of collecting taxes, in the expense of the particular kind of armed force adopted, in the amount of war making required to hold off competitors, and so on resulted in the principal variations in the forms of European states. It all began with the effort to monopolies the means of violence within a delimited territory adjacent to a power holder's base. Violence and Government What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence delivered by anyone else? In the long; run, enough to make the division be
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 173 174 Charles Tilly tween "legitimate"and "illegitimate"force credible.Eventually,the personnel tics but also the quality of daily life.There occurred a change in English of states purveyed violence on a larger scale,more effectively,more habits that can only be compared with the further step taken in the efficiently,with wider assent from their subject populations,and with readier nineteenth century,when the growth of a police force finally consolidated collaboration from neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other the monopoly and made it effective in the greatest cities and the smallest organizations.But it took a long time for that series of distinctions to become villages. established.Early in the state-making process,many parties shared the right Tudor demilitarization of the great lords entailed four complementary cam- to use violence,the practice of using it routinely to accomplish their ends,or paigns:eliminating their great personal bands of armed retainers,razing their both at once.The continuum ran from bandits and pirates to kings via tax fortresses,taming their habitual resort to violence for the settlement of collectors,regional power holders,and professional soldiers. disputes,and discouraging the cooperation of their dependents and tenants. The uncertain,elastic line between "legitimate"and "illegitimate"vio- In the Marches of England and Scotland,the task was more delicate.for the lence appeared in the upper reaches of power.Early in the state-making Percys and Dacres,who kept armies and castles along the border,threatened process,many parties shared the right to use violence,its actual employ- the Crown but also provided a buffer against Scottish invaders.Yet they,too, ment,or both at once.The long love-hate affair between aspiring state eventually fell into line. makers and pirates or bandits illustrates the division."Behind piracy or the In France.Richelieu began the great disarmament in the 1620s.With seas acted cities and city-states,"writes Femand Braudel of the sixteenth Richelieu's advice,Louis XIll systematically destroyed the castles of the great century."Behind banditry,that terrestrial piracy,appeared the continual aid rebel lords,Protestant and Catholic,against whom his forces battled of lords."2 In times of war,indeed,the managers of full-fledged states often incessantly.He began to condemn dueling.the carrying of lethal weapons, commissioned privateers,hired sometime bandits to raid them enemies,and and the maintenance of private armies.By the later 1620s,Richelieu was encouraged their regular troops to take booty.In royal service,soldiers and declaring the royal monopoly of force as doctrine.The doctrine took another sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by preying on the half-century to become effective: civilian population:commandeering,raping,looting,taking prizes.When demobilized,they commonly continued the same practices,but without the Once more the conflicts of the Fronde had witnessed armies assembled by the same royal protection;demobilized ships became pirate vessels, "grands."Only the last of the regencies,the one after the death of Louis XIV. demobilized troops bandits. did not lead to armed uprisings.By that time Richelieu's principle had become It also worked the other way:A king's best source of armed a reality.Likewise in the Empire after the Thirty Years'War only the territorial supporter was sometimes the world of outlaws.Robin Hood's conversion to princes had the right of levying troops and of maintaining fortresses.... royal archer may be a myth,but the myth records a practice.The distinctions Everywhere the razing of castles,the high cost of artillery,the attraction of between "legitimate"and "illegitimate"users of violence came clear only very court life,and the ensuing domestication of the nobility had its share in this slowly,in the process during which the states armed forces became development. relatively unified and permanent. Up to that point,as Braudel says,maritime cities and terrestrial lords By the later eighteenth century,through most of Europe,monarchs controlled commonly offered protection,or even sponsorship,to freebooters.Man+ permanent,professional military forces that rivaled those of their neighbors lords who did not pretend to be kings,furthermore,successfully claimed the and far exceeded any other organized armed force within their own territories. right to levy troops and maintain their own armed retainers.Without calling The state's monopoly of large-scale violence was turning from theory to reality on some of those lords to bring their armies with them,no king could fight a The elimination of local rivals,however,posed a serious problem.Beyond war;yet the same armed lords constituted the king's rival and opponents,his the scale of a small city-state,no monarch could govern a population with his enemies'potential allies.For that reason,before the seventeenth century, armed force alone,nor could any monarch afford to create a professional staff regencies for child sovereigns reliably produced civil wars.For the same large and strong enough to reach from him to the ordinary citizen.Before quite reason,disarming the great stood high on the agenda of every would-be recently,no European government approached the completeness of state maker. articulation from top to bottom achieved by imperial China.Even the Roman The Tudors,for example,accomplished that agenda through most Empire did not come close.In one way or another,every European England."The greatest triumph of the Tudors,"writes Lawrence Stone, government before the French Revolution relied on indirect rule via local magnates.The magnates collaborated with the government without becoming was the ultimately successful assertion of a royal monopoly of violence both officials in any strong sense of the term,had some access to govemment- public and private,an achievement which profoundly altered not only the backed force,and exercised wide discretion within their own territories: nature of poli- junkers,justices of the peace,lords.Yet the same magnates were potential rivals,possible allies of a rebellious people
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 173 tween "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force credible. Eventually, the personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject populations, and with readier collaboration from neighboring authorities than did the personnel of other organizations. But it took a long time for that series of distinctions to become established. Early in the state-making process, many parties shared the right to use violence, the practice of using it routinely to accomplish their ends, or both at once. The continuum ran from bandits and pirates to kings via tax collectors, regional power holders, and professional soldiers. The uncertain, elastic line between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" violence appeared in the upper reaches of power. Early in the state-making process, many parties shared the right to use violence, its actual employment, or both at once. The long love-hate affair between aspiring state makers and pirates or bandits illustrates the division. "Behind piracy or the seas acted cities and city-states," writes Fernand Braudel of the sixteenth century. "Behind banditry, that terrestrial piracy, appeared the continual aid of lords."2 In times of war, indeed, the managers of full-fledged states often commissioned privateers, hired sometime bandits to raid them enemies, and encouraged their regular troops to take booty. In royal service, soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by preying on the civilian population: commandeering, raping, looting, taking prizes. When demobilized, they commonly continued the same practices, but without the same royal protection; demobilized ships became pirate vessels, demobilized troops bandits. It also worked the other way: A king's best source of armed supporter was sometimes the world of outlaws. Robin Hood's conversion to royal archer may be a myth, but the myth records a practice. The distinctions between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" users of violence came clear only very slowly, in the process during which the states armed forces became relatively unified and permanent. Up to that point, as Braudel says, maritime cities and terrestrial lords commonly offered protection, or even sponsorship, to freebooters. Man+ lords who did not pretend to be kings, furthermore, successfully claimed the right to levy troops and maintain their own armed retainers. Without calling on some of those lords to bring their armies with them, no king could fight a war; yet the same armed lords constituted the king's rival and opponents, his enemies' potential allies. For that reason, before the seventeenth century, regencies for child sovereigns reliably produced civil wars. For the same reason, disarming the great stood high on the agenda of every would-be state maker. The Tudors, for example, accomplished that agenda through most England. "The greatest triumph of the Tudors," writes Lawrence Stone, was the ultimately successful assertion of a royal monopoly of violence both public and private, an achievement which profoundly altered not only the nature of poli- 174 Charles Tilly tics but also the quality of daily life. There occurred a change in English habits that can only be compared with the further step taken in the nineteenth century, when the growth of a police force finally consolidated the monopoly and made it effective in the greatest cities and the smallest villages.3 Tudor demilitarization of the great lords entailed four complementary campaigns: eliminating their great personal bands of armed retainers, razing their fortresses, taming their habitual resort to violence for the settlement of disputes, and discouraging the cooperation of their dependents and tenants. In the Marches of England and Scotland, the task was more delicate, for the Percys and Dacres, who kept armies and castles along the border, threatened the Crown but also provided a buffer against Scottish invaders. Yet they, too, eventually fell into line. In France, Richelieu began the great disarmament in the 1620s. With Richelieu's advice, Louis XIII systematically destroyed the castles of the great rebel lords, Protestant and Catholic, against whom his forces battled incessantly. He began to condemn dueling, the carrying of lethal weapons, and the maintenance of private armies. By the later 1620s, Richelieu was declaring the royal monopoly of force as doctrine. The doctrine took another half-century to become effective: Once more the conflicts of the Fronde had witnessed armies assembled by the "grands." Only the last of the regencies, the one after the death of Louis XIV, did not lead to armed uprisings. By that time Richelieu's principle had become a reality. Likewise in the Empire after the Thirty Years' War only the territorial princes had the right of levying troops and of maintaining fortresses.... Everywhere the razing of castles, the high cost of artillery, the attraction of court life, and the ensuing domestication of the nobility had its share in this development.4 By the later eighteenth century, through most of Europe, monarchs controlled permanent, professional military forces that rivaled those of their neighbors and far exceeded any other organized armed force within their own territories. The state's monopoly of large-scale violence was turning from theory to reality. The elimination of local rivals, however, posed a serious problem. Beyond the scale of a small city-state, no monarch could govern a population with his armed force alone, nor could any monarch afford to create a professional staff large and strong enough to reach from him to the ordinary citizen. Before quite recently, no European government approached the completeness of articulation from top to bottom achieved by imperial China. Even the Roman Empire did not come close. In one way or another, every European government before the French Revolution relied on indirect rule via local magnates. The magnates collaborated with the government without becoming officials in any strong sense of the term, had some access to governmentbacked force, and exercised wide discretion within their own territories: junkers, justices of the peace, lords. Yet the same magnates were potential rivals, possible allies of a rebellious people
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 175 176 Charles Tilly Eventually,European governments reduced their reliance on indirect markets at less than the 15-pound shares paid by the merchant's foreign rule by means of two expensive but effective strategies:(a)extending their competitors to their princes,the merchant also gained a protection rent of officialdom to the local community and (b)encouraging the creation of (15-10 =)5 pounds by virtue of his prince's greater efficiency.That rea- police forces that were subordinate to the government rather than to soning differs only in degree and in scale from the reasoning of violence- individual patrons,distinct from war-making forces,and therefore less wielding criminals and their clients.Labor racketeering (in which,for ex- useful as the tools of dissident magnates.In between,however,the ample,a ship owner holds off trouble from longshoremen by means of a builders of national power all played a mixed strategy:eliminating, timely payment to the local union boss)works on exactly the same princi- subjugating,dividing,conquering,cajoling,buying as the occasions ple:The union boss receives tribute for his no-strike pressure on the long- presented themselves.The buying manifested itself in exemptions from shoremen,while the ship owner avoids the strikes and slowdowns long- taxation,creations of honorific offices,the establishment of claims on the shoremen impose on his competitors. national treasury,and a variety of other devices that made a magnate's Lane pointed out the different behavior we might expect of the welfare dependent on the maintenance of the existing structure of power. managers of a protection-providing government owned by In the long run,it all came down to massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion. 1.Citizens in general 2.A single self-interested monarch Protection as Business 3.The managers themselves In retrospect,the pacification,cooptation,or elimination of fractious rivals to the sovereign seems an awesome,noble,prescient enterprise,destined If citizens in general exercised effective ownership of the government-O to bring peace to a people;yet it followed almost ineluctably from the logic distant ideal!-we might expect the managers to minimize protection costs of expanding power.If a power holder was to gain from the provision of and tribute,thus maximizing protection rent.A single self-interested mon- protection,his competitors had to yield.As economic historian Frederic arch.in contrast.would maximize tribute.set costs so as to accomplish Lane put it twenty-five years ago,governments are in the business of sell- that maximization of tribute,and be indifferent to the level of protection ing protection...whether people want it or not.Lane argued that the very rent.If the managers owned the government,they would tend to keep activity of producing and controlling violence favored monopoly,because costs high by maximizing their own wages,to maximize tribute over and competition within that realm generally raised costs,instead of lowering above those costs by exacting a high price from their subjects,and them.The production of violence,he suggested,enjoyed large economies likewise to be indifferent to the level of protection rent.The first model of scale. approximates a Jeffersonian democracy.the second a petty despotism. Working from there,Lane distinguished between (a)the monopoly and the third a military junta. profit.or tribute.coming to owners of the means of producing violence as Lane did not discuss the obvious fourth category of owner:a dominant a result of the difference between production costs and the price exacted class.If he had,his scheme would have yielded interesting empirical cri- from "customers"and(b)the protection rent accruing to those customers teria for evaluating claims that a given government was "relatively auton- for example,merchants-who drew effective protection against outside omous"or strictly subordinate to the interests of a dominant class.Pre- competitors.Lane,a superbly attentive historian of Venice,allowed sumably,a subordinate government would tend to maximize monopoly specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for profits-returns to the dominant class resulting from the difference be- its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors.In their tween the costs of protection and the price received for it-as well as adaptation of Lane's scheme,furthermore,Edward Ames and Richard tuning protection rents nicely to the economic interests of the dominant Rapp substitute the apt word "extortion"for Lane's "tribute."In this model, class.An autonomous government,in contrast,would tend to maximize predation,coercion,piracy,banditry,and racketeering share a home with managers'wages and its own size as well and would be indifferent to pro- their upright cousins in responsible government. tection rents.Lane's analysis immediately suggests fresh propositions and This is how Lane's model worked:If a prince could create a sufficient ways of testing them. armed force to hold off his and his subjects'external enemies and to keep Lane also speculated that the logic of the situation produced four the subjects in line for 50 megapounds but was able to extract 75 mega- successive stages in the general history of capitalism: pounds in taxes from those subjects for that purpose,he gained a tribute of(75-50=)25 megapounds.If the 10-pound share of those taxes paid by 1.A period of anarchy and plunder 2.A stage in which tribute takers attracted customers and established one of the prince's merchant-subjects gave hire assured access to world their monopolies by struggling to create exclusive,substantial states
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 175 Eventually, European governments reduced their reliance on indirect rule by means of two expensive but effective strategies: (a) extending their officialdom to the local community and (b) encouraging the creation of police forces that were subordinate to the government rather than to individual patrons, distinct from war-making forces, and therefore less useful as the tools of dissident magnates. In between, however, the builders of national power all played a mixed strategy: eliminating, subjugating, dividing, conquering, cajoling, buying as the occasions presented themselves. The buying manifested itself in exemptions from taxation, creations of honorific offices, the establishment of claims on the national treasury, and a variety of other devices that made a magnate's welfare dependent on the maintenance of the existing structure of power. In the long run, it all came down to massive pacification and monopolization of the means of coercion. Protection as Business In retrospect, the pacification, cooptation, or elimination of fractious rivals to the sovereign seems an awesome, noble, prescient enterprise, destined to bring peace to a people; yet it followed almost ineluctably from the logic of expanding power. If a power holder was to gain from the provision of protection, his competitors had to yield. As economic historian Frederic Lane put it twenty-five years ago, governments are in the business of selling protection ... whether people want it or not. Lane argued that the very activity of producing and controlling violence favored monopoly, because competition within that realm generally raised costs, instead of lowering them. The production of violence, he suggested, enjoyed large economies of scale. Working from there, Lane distinguished between (a) the monopoly profit, or tribute, coming to owners of the means of producing violence as a result of the difference between production costs and the price exacted from "customers" and (b) the protection rent accruing to those customers – for example, merchants – who drew effective protection against outside competitors. Lane, a superbly attentive historian of Venice, allowed specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors. In their adaptation of Lane's scheme, furthermore, Edward Ames and Richard Rapp substitute the apt word "extortion" for Lane's "tribute." In this model, predation, coercion, piracy, banditry, and racketeering share a home with their upright cousins in responsible government. This is how Lane's model worked: If a prince could create a sufficient armed force to hold off his and his subjects' external enemies and to keep the subjects in line for 50 megapounds but was able to extract 75 megapounds in taxes from those subjects for that purpose, he gained a tribute of (75-50=) 25 megapounds. If the 10-pound share of those taxes paid by one of the prince's merchant-subjects gave hire assured access to world 176 Charles Tilly markets at less than the 15-pound shares paid by the merchant's foreign competitors to their princes, the merchant also gained a protection rent of (15 -10 =) 5 pounds by virtue of his prince's greater efficiency. That reasoning differs only in degree and in scale from the reasoning of violence-- wielding criminals and their clients. Labor racketeering (in which, for example, a ship owner holds off trouble from longshoremen by means of a timely payment to the local union boss) works on exactly the same principle: The union boss receives tribute for his no-strike pressure on the longshoremen, while the ship owner avoids the strikes and slowdowns longshoremen impose on his competitors. Lane pointed out the different behavior we might expect of the managers of a protection-providing government owned by 1. Citizens in general 2. A single self-interested monarch 3. The managers themselves If citizens in general exercised effective ownership of the government – O distant ideal! – we might expect the managers to minimize protection costs and tribute, thus maximizing protection rent. A single self-interested monarch, in contrast, would maximize tribute, set costs so as to accomplish that maximization of tribute, and be indifferent to the level of protection rent. If the managers owned the government, they would tend to keep costs high by maximizing their own wages, to maximize tribute over and above those costs by exacting a high price from their subjects, and likewise to be indifferent to the level of protection rent. The first model approximates a Jeffersonian democracy, the second a petty despotism, and the third a military junta. Lane did not discuss the obvious fourth category of owner: a dominant class. If he had, his scheme would have yielded interesting empirical criteria for evaluating claims that a given government was "relatively autonomous" or strictly subordinate to the interests of a dominant class. Presumably, a subordinate government would tend to maximize monopoly profits – returns to the dominant class resulting from the difference between the costs of protection and the price received for it – as well as tuning protection rents nicely to the economic interests of the dominant class. An autonomous government, in contrast, would tend to maximize managers' wages and its own size as well and would be indifferent to protection rents. Lane's analysis immediately suggests fresh propositions and ways of testing them. Lane also speculated that the logic of the situation produced four successive stages in the general history of capitalism: 1. A period of anarchy and plunder 2. A stage in which tribute takers attracted customers and established their monopolies by struggling to create exclusive, substantial states
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 177 178 Charles Tilly 3.A stage in which merchants and landlords began to gain more from curred only during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.Artillery did protection rents than governors did from tribute improve during the fifteenth century,but the invention of new fortifications, 4.A period (fairly recent)in which technological changes surpassed especially the trace italienne,rapidly countered the advantage of artillery.The protection rents as sources of profit for entrepreneurs arrival of effective artillery came too late to have caused the increase in the In their new economic history of the Western world,Douglass North viable size of states.(However,the increased cost of fortifications to defend and Robert Paul Thomas make stages 2 and 3-those in which state against artillery did give an advantage to states enjoying larger fiscal bases.) makers created their monopolies of force and established property rights Nor is it obvious that changes in land war had the sweeping influence that permitted individuals to capture much of the return from their own Bean attributes to them.The increasing decisiveness of naval warfare,which growth-generating innovations -the pivotal moment for sustained occurred simultaneously,could well have shifted the military advantage to economic growth.Protection,at this point,overwhelms tribute.If we small maritime powers such as the Dutch Republic.Furthermore,although many city-states and other microscopic entities disappeared into larger po- recognize that the protected property rights were mainly those of capital litical units before 1600,such events as the fractionation of the Habsburg and that the development of capitalism also facilitated the accumulation of Empire and such facts as the persistence of large but loosely knit Poland and the wherewithal to operate massive states,that extension of Lane's Russia render ambiguous the claim of a significant increase in geographic analysis provides a good deal of insight into the coincidence of war scale.In short,both Bean's proposed explanation and his statement of what making.state making,and capital accumulation. must be explained raise historical doubts. Unfortunately,Lane did not take full advantage of his own insight. Stripped of its technological determinism,nevertheless,Bean's logic Wanting to contain his analysis neatly within the neoclassical theory of provides a useful complement to Lane's,for different military formats do cost industrial organization,Lane cramped his treatment of protection:treating substantially different amounts to produce and do provide substantially all taxpayers as "customers"for the "service"provided by protection-man- different ranges of control over opponents,domestic and foreign.After 1400 ufacturing governments,brushing aside the objections to the idea of a the European pursuit of larger,more permanent,and more costly varieties of forced sale by insisting that the "customer"always had the choice of not military organization did,in fact,drive spectacular increases in princely paying and taking the consequences of nonpayment,minimizing the budgets,taxes,and staffs.After 1500 or so,princes who managed to create problems of divisibility created by the public-goods character of protection, the costly varieties of military organization were,indeed,able to conquer new and deliberately neglecting the distinction between the costs of producing chunks of territory the means of violence in general and the costs of giving "customers" The word "territory"should not mislead us.Until the eighteenth cen- protection by means of that violence.Lane's ideas suffocate inside the tury,the greatest powers were maritime states.and naval warfare remained neoclassical box .end breathe easily outside it.Nevertheless,inside or crucial to international position.Consider Fernand Braudel's roll call of outside,they properly draw the economic analysis of government back to successive hegemonic powers within the capitalist world:Venice and its the chief activities that real governments have carried on historically:war, empire,Genoa and its empire,Antwerp-Spain,Amsterdam-Holland,London- England,New York-the United States.Although Brandenburg-Prussia offers a repression,protection,adjudication. partial exception,only in our own time have such essentially land-bound states More recently,Richard Bean has applied a similar logic to the rise of as Russia and China achieved preponderant positions in the world's system of European national states between 1400 and 1600.He appeals to states.Naval warfare was by no means the only reason for that bias toward economies of scale in the production of effective force,counteracted by the sea.Before the later nineteenth century,land transportation was so diseconomies of scale in command and control.He then claims that the expensive everywhere in Europe that no country could afford to supply a large improvement of artillery in the fifteenth century (cannon made small army or a big city with grain and other heavy goods without having efficient medieval forts much more vulnerable to an organised force)shifted the water transport.Rulers fed major inland centers such as Berlin and Madrid curve of economies and diseconomies to make larger armies,standing only at great effort and at considerable cost to their hinterlands.The armies,and centralized governments advantageous to their masters. exceptional efficiency of waterways in the Netherlands undoubtedly gave the Hence,according to Bean.military innovation promoted the creation of Dutch great advantages at peace and at war. large.expensive,well-armed national states. Access to water mattered in another important way.Those metropolises on Braudel's list were all major ports,great centers of commerce, History Talks and out Bean's summary does not stand up to historical scrutiny.As a matter of practice,the shift to infantry-backed artillery sieges of fortified cities oc-
War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 177 3. A stage in which merchants and landlords began to gain more from protection rents than governors did from tribute 4. A period (fairly recent) in which technological changes surpassed protection rents as sources of profit for entrepreneurs In their new economic history of the Western world, Douglass North and Robert Paul Thomas make stages 2 and 3 – those in which state makers created their monopolies of force and established property rights that permitted individuals to capture much of the return from their own growth-generating innovations – the pivotal moment for sustained economic growth. Protection, at this point, overwhelms tribute. If we recognize that the protected property rights were mainly those of capital and that the development of capitalism also facilitated the accumulation of the wherewithal to operate massive states, that extension of Lane's analysis provides a good deal of insight into the coincidence of war making, state making, and capital accumulation. Unfortunately, Lane did not take full advantage of his own insight. Wanting to contain his analysis neatly within the neoclassical theory of industrial organization, Lane cramped his treatment of protection: treating all taxpayers as "customers" for the "service" provided by protection-manufacturing governments, brushing aside the objections to the idea of a forced sale by insisting that the "customer" always had the choice of not paying and taking the consequences of nonpayment, minimizing the problems of divisibility created by the public-goods character of protection, and deliberately neglecting the distinction between the costs of producing the means of violence in general and the costs of giving "customers" protection by means of that violence. Lane's ideas suffocate inside the neoclassical box .end breathe easily outside it. Nevertheless, inside or outside, they properly draw the economic analysis of government back to the chief activities that real governments have carried on historically: war, repression, protection, adjudication. More recently, Richard Bean has applied a similar logic to the rise of European national states between 1400 and 1600. He appeals to economies of scale in the production of effective force, counteracted by diseconomies of scale in command and control. He then claims that the improvement of artillery in the fifteenth century (cannon made small medieval forts much more vulnerable to an organised force) shifted the curve of economies and diseconomies to make larger armies, standing armies, and centralized governments advantageous to their masters. Hence, according to Bean, military innovation promoted the creation of large, expensive, well-armed national states. History Talks Bean's summary does not stand up to historical scrutiny. As a matter of practice, the shift to infantry-backed artillery sieges of fortified cities oc- 178 Charles Tilly curred only during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Artillery did improve during the fifteenth century, but the invention of new fortifications, especially the trace italienne, rapidly countered the advantage of artillery. The arrival of effective artillery came too late to have caused the increase in the viable size of states. (However, the increased cost of fortifications to defend against artillery did give an advantage to states enjoying larger fiscal bases.) Nor is it obvious that changes in land war had the sweeping influence Bean attributes to them. The increasing decisiveness of naval warfare, which occurred simultaneously, could well have shifted the military advantage to small maritime powers such as the Dutch Republic. Furthermore, although many city-states and other microscopic entities disappeared into larger political units before 1600, such events as the fractionation of the Habsburg Empire and such facts as the persistence of large but loosely knit Poland and Russia render ambiguous the claim of a significant increase in geographic scale. In short, both Bean's proposed explanation and his statement of what must be explained raise historical doubts. Stripped of its technological determinism, nevertheless, Bean's logic provides a useful complement to Lane's, for different military formats do cost substantially different amounts to produce and do provide substantially different ranges of control over opponents, domestic and foreign. After 1400 the European pursuit of larger, more permanent, and more costly varieties of military organization did, in fact, drive spectacular increases in princely budgets, taxes, and staffs. After 1500 or so, princes who managed to create the costly varieties of military organization were, indeed, able to conquer new chunks of territory. The word "territory" should not mislead us. Until the eighteenth century, the greatest powers were maritime states, and naval warfare remained crucial to international position. Consider Fernand Braudel's roll call of successive hegemonic powers within the capitalist world: Venice and its empire, Genoa and its empire, Antwerp-Spain, Amsterdam-Holland, LondonEngland, New York-the United States. Although Brandenburg-Prussia offers a partial exception, only in our own time have such essentially land-bound states as Russia and China achieved preponderant positions in the world's system of states. Naval warfare was by no means the only reason for that bias toward the sea. Before the later nineteenth century, land transportation was so expensive everywhere in Europe that no country could afford to supply a large army or a big city with grain and other heavy goods without having efficient water transport. Rulers fed major inland centers such as Berlin and Madrid only at great effort and at considerable cost to their hinterlands. The exceptional efficiency of waterways in the Netherlands undoubtedly gave the Dutch great advantages at peace and at war. Access to water mattered in another important way. Those metropolises on Braudel's list were all major ports, great centers of commerce, and out