14 ignored by Tilly,the maintenance of economic infrastructure,notably water control and the operation of the Grand Canal between the Yangzi river valley and Beijing.20 The great weakness in the late imperial system of government was at the local level.County magistrates,the lowest level of officials in the formal bureaucracy,were overburdened and under financed.Responsible for fulfilling all government functions in a sizable county,and with only limited staff,the magistrate had to depend on unpaid functionaries,"yamen runners,"to do much of the work.They in turn extracted "squeeze"to pay for their services.For major projects the magistrate needed the cooperation of local elites,to provide funds and managerial skills.Weakness at the local level-a lack of infrastructural power--was a major constraint on the kinds of policies that could be implemented.For example,changes to the land tax system would be extremely difficult with out the support of local elites.Nevertheless there is no reason to think that this in itself was an insuperable obstacle to state making.Michael Braddick argues that the English central state between 1550 and 1700 was extremely dependent on local notables to operate local goverment.22 It was only with the creation of professional police forces in the nineteenth century--after the beginning of the industrial revolution- For a discussion of the Qing govement's involvement in econmic infrastructure see Susan Mann Jones and Philip A.Kuhn "Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion,"in John K.Fairbank,ed., The Cambridge History ofChina,v.10,(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1978)119-128. 21 Ch'T'ung-tsu,Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing,(Cambridge Mass.:Harvard University Press,1962). 2 Braddick's description of the British state at the local level is reminiscent of China: "administration was not in the hands of a political elite,but of an elite that had access to political power by virtue of social influence.This was a recipe for political stability and a cheap form of government. However,if political activity threatened social standing,than political action would be stymied."Michael Braddick,"The Early Modern English State and the Question of Differentiation,from 1550 to 1700." Comparative Studies of Sociery and History 38.1 (1996):92-111,the quotation is from page 104
ignored by Tilly, the maintenance of economic infrastructure, notably water control·and the operation of the Grand Canal between the Yangzi river valley and Beijing.20 The great weakness in the late imperial system of government was at the local level. County magistrates, the lowest level of officials in the fonnal bureaucracy, were 14 overburdened and under financed. Responsible for fulfilling all government functions in a sizable county, and with only limited staff, the magistrate had to depend on unpaid functionaries, ''yamen runners," to do much of the work. They in tum extracted "squeeze" to pay for their services. For major projects the magistrate needed the cooperation of local elites, to provide funds and managerial Skills. 21 Weakness at the local level - a lack of infrastructural power - was a major constraint on the kinds of policies that could be implemented. For example, changes to the land tax system would be extremely difficult with out the support of local elites. Nevertheless there is no reason to think that this in itselfwas an insuperable obstacle to state making. Michael Braddick argues that the English central state between 1550 and 1700 was extremely dependent on local notables to operate local government. 22 It was only with the creation of professional police forces in the nineteenth century - after the beginning of the industrial revolution - 20 For a discussion of the Qing government's involvement in economic infrastructure see Susan Mann Jones and Philip A. Kuhn "Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion," in John K. Fairbank. ed., The Cambridge History of China, v. 10, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1978) 119-128. 21 Ch 'Q T'uog-tsu. Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, (962). . 22 Braddick's description of the British state at the local level is reminiscent of China: "administration was not in the hands of a political elite, but of an elite that had access to political power by virtue of social influence. This was a recipe for political stability and a cheap form of government. However, if political activity threatened social standing, than political action would be stymied. n Michael Braddick, "The Early Modem English State and the Question ofDiffcreotiation, from 1550 to 1700." Comparative Studies of Society and History 38.1 (1996): 92-111, the quotation is from page 104
15 that local control began to take on a modern shape in Britain.23 The Qing state's difficulties at the local level were hardly unique. But if the Qing state shared many of the functions of its European contemporaries, its geopolitical situation was completely different.Where European states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries(and indeed earlier)faced intense international competition,the Qing state during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was not under serious external pressure.At its pinnacle the Qing state had no peers in East Asia; its campaigns in inner Asia were wars of conquest rather than struggles for survival.The Kangxi emperor(r.1661-1722)had effectively subdued the major internal rivals to Qing dominance late in the seventeenth century.In the 1720s and 1730s,the state's military activities led to some significant institutional developments such as the creation of the Grand Council and the rationalization of the fiscal system.24 But for most of the eighteenth century the state's main concern seems to have been the maintenance of long- term stability,and its active role in areas like food supply and land reclamation was in pursuit of this goal.Similarly,the active search to purchase and construct superior. wester firearms during the tumultuous seventeenth century was largely put aside.25 David H.Bayley,"The Policeand Political Development in Europe,"in Tilly,The Formation of National States in Western Europe,340-350. On the Grand Council see Beatrice S.Bartlett,Monarchs and Ministers:The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China,1723-1820,(Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press,1991),on fiscal reforms,Madeleine Zelin,The Magistrates Tael:Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth Century Ch'ing China,(Berkeley:University of Califoria Press,1984). 2Will and Wong,Nourish the People;Peter C.Perdue,Exhausting the Earth:State and Peasant in Hunan,/500-1850,(Cambridge,Mass.:Council for East Asian Studies,1984).On the acquisition of Western firearms see Thomas L.Kennedy,The Arms ofKiangnan (Boulder:Westview Press,1978),10-13 Joanna Waley-Cohen points to renewed interest in Western ordnance during the Jinchuan wars in the 1770s,see "China and Westem Technology in the Eighteenth Century"American Historical Review,98.5 (1993:152544
IS that local control began to take on a modern shape in Britain.23 The Qing state's difficulties at the local level were hardly unique. But if the Qing state shared many of the functions of its European contemporaries, its geopolitical situation was completely different. Where European states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (and indeed earlier) faced intense international competition, the Qing state during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was not under serious external pressure. At its pinnacle the Qing state had no peers in East Asia; its campaigns in inner Asia were wars of conquest rather than struggles for survival. The Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722) had effectively subdued the major internal rivals to Qing dominance late in the seventeenth century. In the 1720s and 1730s, the state's military activities led to some significant institutional developments such as the creation of the Grand Council and the rationalization of the fiscal system.24 But for most of the eighteenth century the state's main concern seems to have been the maintenance of longterm stability, and its active role in areas like food supply and land reclamation was in pursuit of this goal. Similarly, the active search to purchase and construct superior· western firearms during the tumultuous seventeenth century was largely put aside.2s 23 David H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," in Tilly, ed., The Formation o/National Stales in Western Europe, 340-350. 24 On the Grand Council see Beatrice S. BanJett, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch 'ing China, 1723-1820, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), on fiscal refonns, Madeleine Zelin, The Magislrales TaeI: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth Century Ch 'ing China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 25 Will and Wong, Nourish the People; Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan. 1500-1850, (Cambridge, Mass.: Council for East Asian Studies, 1984). On the acquisition of Western fJl'e8lll1s see Thomas L. Kennedy, The Arms o/Kiangnan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 10-13. Joanna Waley-Cohen points to renewed interest in Western ordnance during the Jinchuan wars in the 17705, see "China and Western Technology in the Eighteenth Century" American Historical Review, 98.5 (1993): 1525-44
16 In the nineteenth century the situation changed dramatically.Western merchants had long engaged in a lucrative and growing trade in Canton in tea,silk,porcelain and opium.Beginning with the famous expedition of Lord Macartney in 1793,European states,especially Britain and France,began to demand regular diplomatic contacts and better trading conditions in China.The Qing state,beset with internal problems,refused to cooperate.By 1839,the patience of British diplomats had run out and military conflict ensued.Qing forces were badly beaten in the Opium War(1839-43)and humiliated in the Arrow War(1858-1860,sometimes called the Second Opium War),Qing statesmen could no longer ignore the empire's international situation. The domestic situation was equally difficult.During the preceding century and a half Chinese society had undergone dramatic changes:the population doubled between 1720 and 1820,forcing intensive commercialization of the economy,an expansion of cultivated land,and mass migration.The Qing state did not adapt:the size of the administrative bureaucracy remained stable and systemic corruption remained unchecked.Major sectarian rebellions(White Lotus)and minority revolts (Miao peoples) brought the "prosperous age"of the Qianlong emperor(r.1736-1796)to a close at the turn of the nineteenth century.The 1830s and 1840s saw numerous tax rebellions. Intellectuals,often supported by official patrons showed a growing concern for the problems of public policy and produced anfforesence of scholarship on statecraft But in spite of the best efforts of officials,the situation only got worse.The eruption out ǒJones and Kuhn,“Dynastic Decline
16 In the nineteenth century the situation changed dramatically. Western merchants had long engaged in a lucrative and growing trade in Canton in tea, silk, porcelain and opium. Beginning with the famous expedition of Lord Macartney in 1793, European states, especially Britain and France, began to demand regular diplomatic contacts and better trading conditions in China. The Qing state, beset with internal problems, refused to cooperate. By 1839, the patience of British diplomats had run out and military conflict ensued. Qing forces were badly beaten in the Opium War (1839-43) and humiliated in the Arrow War (1858-1860, sometimes called the Second Opium War), Qing statesmen could no longer ignore the empire's international situation. The domestic situation was equally difficult During the preceding century and a half Chinese society had undergone dramatic changes: the population doubled between 1720 and 1820, forcing intensive commercialization of the economy, an expansion of cultivated land, and mass migration. The Qing state did not adapt: the size of the administrative bureaucracy remained stable and systemic corruption remained unchecked. Major sectarian rebellions (White Lotus) and minority revolts (Miao peoples) brought the "prosperous age" of the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1796) to a close at the tum of the nineteenth century. The 1830s and 1840s saw numerous tax rebellions. Intellectuals, often supported by official patrons showed a growing concern for the problems of public policy and produced an efilorescence of scholarship on statecraft.26 But in spite of the best efforts of officials, the situation only got worse. The eruption out 26 Jones and Kuhn. "Dynastic Decline
17 of Guangxi province of a new sectarian group,the quasi-Christian Taipings,ignited the tinder of social unrest. By the 1850s the Qing was confronted by enemies on all sides:foreign powers demanded commercial and diplomatic concessions,and within the empire's borders massive rebellions raged:the Taiping,the Nian in the Yellow river valley,and Muslim rebellions in the Southwest and Northwest,and a multitude of lesser revolts.While the internal revolts were eventually subdued,pressure from Western imperialism,and later Japan,would continue and indeed increase through the end of the nineteenth century. Self-Strengthening and State Making Tilly's state making model suggests that the military competition the Qing Dynasty faced in the mid nineteenth century should have compelled efforts to strengthen the state.It clearly did:starting around 1860 Qing officials embarked on a variety of measures that was often described loosely as zigiang,"self-strengthening,"and by Chinese historians as the self-strengthening movement or(particularly in mainland China)as the western matters movement (yangwu yundong).While the term self- strengthening itself came to be used extremely broadly(see Chapter Two),it has been particularly associated with the reformist efforts proposals of a few officials:among provincial leaders,Zeng Guofan(1811-1872),Li Hongzhang(1823-1901),Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885)and (in a later era)Zhang Zhidong(1837-1909),and Prince Gong and Wenxiang in Beijing.These officials called for limited reforms to adapt the existing state institutions to promote the use of new Western military methods and develop industrial
of Guangxi pro~ce of a new sectarian group, the quasi-Christian Taipings, ignited the tinder of social unrest. By the 1850s the Qing was confronted by enemies on all sides: foreign powers demanded commercial and diplomatic concessions, and within the empire's borders massive rebellions raged: the Taiping, the Nian in the Yellow river valley, and Muslim rebellions in the Southwest and Northwest, and a multitude of lesser revolts. While-the internal revolts were eventually subdued, pressure from Western imperialism, and later Japan, would continue and indeed increase through the end of the nineteenth century. Self-Strengthening and State Making 17 Tilly's state making model suggests that the military competition the Qing Dynasty faced in the mid nineteenth century should have compelled efforts to strengthen the state. It clearly did: starting around 1860 Qing officials embarked on a variety of measures that was often described loosely as ziqiang, "self-strengthening," and by Chinese historians as the self-strengthening movement or (particularly in mainland China) as the western matters movement (yangwu yundong). While the tenn selfstrengthening itself came to be used extremely broadly (see Chapter Two), it has been particularly associated with the reformist efforts proposals of a few officials: among provincial leaders, Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) and (in a later era) Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), and Prince Gong and Wenxiang in Beijing. These officials called for limited reforms to adapt the existing state institutions to promote the use of new Western military methods and develop industrial
18 technology.When compared with the contemporaneous Meiji Restoration,in which new political,military,educational and even social institutions (often based on western models)were put in place,the intent of Qing self-strengthening was fundamentally conservative.Viewed in light of China's humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-5,self strengthening is usually seen as a failed effort at modernization.Considered in terms of the theoretical approach discussed above,however,we can see it somewhat differently--as a serious effort at state making that substantially altered the Qing state. An outline of the story can be drawn from previous scholarship.27 Reeling from rebel assaults and foreign threats,the first priority was to upgrade the Qing military as the established forces,the Eight Banners and the Army of the Green Standard,proved utterly incapable of handling either the Taiping threat or western armies.Leading provincial officials like Zeng Guofan,Hu Linyi,Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang created new armies of recruits (yongying),promoting strong personal loyalties among their members, proper training,and improved discipline.28 There was also a major effort to strengthen 27The scholarship on the self-strengthening period is too large to allow a comprehensive review. I have drawn on extensively number of useful historiographical discussions.Paul Cohen,"Self- Strengthening in 'China-Centered'Perspective:The Evolution of American Historiography"in Oingji zigiang yundong yan tao hui lun wen ji (Taipei:Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo,1988),5-35, and Discovering History in China:American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press,1984)are important analyses of American scholarship.Li Zhigang"Ziqiang yundong"in Liushi nian lai de zhongguo jindai shi yanjiu,vol.2,(Taipei:Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo,1989),,691-718 surveys research from Taiwan,Hong Kong,mainland China and the United States;Thomas L.Kennedy,"Self-strengthening:an Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings," Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i,3.1:(1974):3-35 is a valuable discussion of work from the United States and Taiwan. On mainland scholarship see Chen Jiang,"Recent Historiography on the Wester Affairs Movement"Late Imperial China,7.1(1986):112-127.On Japanese scholarship see K.H.Kim,Japanese Perspectives on China's Early Modernization:A Bibliographical Survey,(Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies,1974). For an overview see Richard J.Smith,"Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,1850-1860,"Journal ofAsian History 8.2(1974):122-161;on the Zeng Guofan's army see Philip A.Kuhn,Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China:Militarization and Social Structure,1796- 1864(Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1970),135-152;on Li Hongzhang's army see Stanley
18 technology. When compared with the contemporaneous Meiji Restoration, in which new political, military, educational and even social institutions (often based on western models) were put in place, the intent ofQing self-strengthening was fundamentally conservative. Viewed in light of China's humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-5, self strengthening is usually seen as a failed effort at modernization. Considered in tenns of the theoretical approach discussed above, however, we can see it somewhat differently - as a serious effort at state making that substantially altered the Qing state. An outline of the story can be drawn from previous scholarship.27 Reeling from rebel assaults and foreign threats, the first priority was to upgrade the Qing military as the established forces, the Eight Banners and the Army of the Green Standard, proved utterly incapable ofbandling either the Taiping threat or western armies. Leading provinciat officials like Zeng Guofan, Hu Linyi, Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang created new armies of recruits (yongying), promoting strong personal loyalties among their members, proper training, and improved discipline?8 There was also a major effort to strengthen 27 The scholarship on the self-strengthening period is too large to allow a comprebensive review. I bave drawn on extensively number of useful bistoriographical discussions. Paul Coben, "SelfStrengthening in 'Cbina-Centered' Perspective: The Evolution of American Historiography" in Qingji ziqiang yundong yan tao hui lun wen ji (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo, 1988), 5-35, and Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press. 1984) are important analyses of American scholarship. Li Zhigang "Ziqiang yundong" in Liushi nian lai de zhongguo jindai shi yanjiu. vol. 2, (Taipei: Zbongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo. 1989),.691-718 surveys researcb from Taiwan, Hong Kong. mainland Cbina and the United States; Thomas L. Kennedy. "Self-strengthening: an Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings." Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i. 3.1:(1974): 3-35 is a valuable discussion of work from the United States and Taiwan. On mainland scbolarship see Cben Jiang. "Recent Historiography on the Western Affairs Movement" Late Imperial China. 7.1 (1986): 112-127. On Japanese scholarsbip see K.H. Kim. Japanese Perspectives on China's Early Modernization: A Bibliographical Survey. (Ann Arbor. University ofMicbigan Center for Chinese Studies. 1974). 21 For an overview see Richard J. Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth" Century. 1850-1860." Journal of Asian History 8.2(1974): 122-161; on the Zeng Guofan's anny see Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796- 1864 (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1970). 135-152; on Li Hongzhang's anny see Stanley