19 naval forces,beginning in the 1860s as part of the campaigns against the Taipings,and with ever greater urgency in thereafter to combat foreign threats.9 As the superiority of western arms and military techniques became obvious,efforts were made to purchase them,and westemn instructors were hired to train Qing troops near Shanghai and in Tianjin.In the 1860s new government operated arsenals in Shanghai and Tianjin and a large navy yard were created near Fuzhou to manufacture modem western ordnance and warships.30 In the 1870s,1880s and 1890s we also see efforts by leading officials to encourage private investment in strategic modern industries like shipping,mining, telegraphs,and iron and steel.3 The enormous costs of war making forced the Qing authorities to find new sources of revenue.Previously heavily dependent on revenues from the land tax the Qing authorities now looked towards commerce.A domestic transit tax on commerce known as the lijin (often referred to in English writings as 'likin')was imposed as an emergency measure in a few provinces,and soon became widespread.32 Forced to implement fixed Spector,Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army,and Wang Ermin,Huai jun zhi,(Taipei:Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo,1967). John L.Rawlinson,China's Struggle for Naval Development,1839-1895,(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,1967). 30 Richard J.Smith,"Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening:The Case of Feng-huang- shan,1864-1873,"Modern Asian Studies,10.2:195-223;on the Kiangnan and Tianjin Arsenals see Kennedy,Arms of Kiangnan;on the Fuzhou Navy Yard see David Pong,Shen Pao-chen and China's Modernization in the Nineteenth Century,(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1994). The literature on these govemment-supervision merchant manager(guandu shangban) enterprises is extensive,for an overview see Wellington K.K.Chan,"Government,Merchants,and Industry to 1911,"in John K.Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu,eds.,The Cambridge History ofChina, Volume 1I:Late Ch'ing,1800-1911,Part 2,(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1980). Luo Yudong,Zhongguo lijin shi.(Shanghai:Shangwu yinshuguan,1936);Edwin George Beal, Jr.,The Origin of Likin,1853-1864,(Cambridge Mass.:Chinese Economic and Political Studies,Harvard University,1958)
19 naval forces, beginning in the 1860s as part of the campaigns against the Taipings, and with ever greater urgency in thereafter to combat foreign threats.29 As the superiority of western arms and military techniques became obvious, efforts were made to purchase them, and westem instructors were hired to train Qing troops near Shanghai and in Tianjin. In the 1860s new govemment operated arsenals in Shanghai and Tianjin and a large navy yard were created near Fuzhou to manufacture modem western ordnance. and warships.30 In the 1870s, 18805 and 1890s we also see efforts by leading officials to encourage private investment in strategic modem industries like shipping, mining, telegraphs, and iron and steel. 31 The enormous costs ofwar making forced the Qing authorities to find new sources of revenue. Previously heavily dependent on revenues from the land tax the Qing authorities now looked towards commerce. A domestic transit tax on commerce known as the /ijin (often referred to in English writings as 'likin') was imposed as an emergency measure in a few provinces, and soon became widespread.32 Forced to implement fixed Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army, and Wang Ermin, Huai jun zhi, (Taipei: Zhongyang yaojiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo, 1967) . 29 10hn L. Rawlinson, China'sStrugglefor Naval Development, /839-/895, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). 30 Richard J. Smith, "Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huangshan, 1864-1873," Modem Asian Studies, 10.2: 195-223; on the Kiangnan and Tianjin Arsenals see Kennedy, Arms 0/ Kiangnan; on the Fuzbou Navy Yard see David Pong. Shen Pao-chen and China's Modernization in the Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 31 The literature on these government-supervision merchant manager (guandu shangban) enterprises is extensive, for an overview see Wellington K.K. Chan, "Government, Merchants, and Industry to 1911," in John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu. eds., The Cambridge History a/China, Volume / /: Late Ch·ing. /800-/9//. Part 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 32 Luo Yudong, Zhongguo lijin shi, (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936); Edwin George BeaI, Jr., The Origin o/Lildn, /853-/864, (Cambridge Mass.: Chinese Economic and Political Studies, Harvard University, 1958)
20 treaty tariffs by the British and French after the Treaty of Tianjin(1858)and the Convention of Beijing (1860),a new,foreign manned imperial maritime customs service emerged out of the final treaty settlement of the Arrow War.The new service was efficient and loyal to the Qing state,and enabled the Qing state to generate revenue from what Yen-ping Hao describes as a"commercial revolution"that foreign trade had stimulated.33 By the late nineteenth century,revenues from commercial taxes had surpassed those from the land tax.Furthermore,foreign loans secured with the customs revenues were crucial means by which the Qing financed military and other expenditures between 1867 and 1894.In Tilly's terms,the Qing state had shifted from a coercion intensive mode of extraction,to a mixed capitalized coercion approach,like that of Britain. Inevitably these new state activities demanded new organizations and technical personnel.One major bureaucratic innovation was the creation of the Zongli Yamen created in 1861,the subject of this study.In 1885 a Navy bureau (haijun yamen)was also created.Schools were created in Beijing and elsewhere to train personnel with the language and technical skills necessary to handle what was called foreign matters vangwu),meaning anything to do with foreigners,their activities and their techniques. Foreign experts were hired to aid in military training,the establishment of arsenals,and Yen-P'ing Hao,The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China:The Rise of Sino- Western Mercantile Capitalism (Berkeley:University of California Press,1986).A standard history of the customs service is Stanley Fowler Wright,Hart and the Chinese Customs,(Belfast:Queens University Press,1950). Knight Biggerstaff,The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China,(Ithaca:Comell University Press,1961)
20 treaty tariffs by the British and French after the Treaty ofTianjin (1858) and the . Convention of Beijing (1860), a new, foreign manned imperial maritime customs service emerged out of the final treaty settlement of the Arrow War. The new service was efficient and loyal to the Qing state, and enabled the Qing state to generate revenue from what Yen-ping Hao describes as a "commercial revolution" that foreign trade had stimulated.33 By the late nineteenth century, revenues from commercial taxes had surpassed those from the land tax. Furthermore, foreign loans secured with the customs revenues were crucial means by which the Qing financed military and other expenditures between 1867 and 1894. In Tilly's terms, the Qing state had shifted from a coercion intensive mode of extraction, to a mixed capitalized coercion approach, like that of Britain. Inevitably these new state activities demanded new organizations and technical personnel. One major bureaucratic innovation was the creation of the Zongli Yamen created in 1861, the subject of this study. In 1885 a Navy bureau (haijunyamen) was also created. Schools were created in Beijing and elsewhere to train personnel with the language and technical skills necessary to handle what was called foreign matters (yangwu), meaning anything to do with foreigners, their activities and their techniques.34 Foreign experts were hired to aid in military training, the establishment of arsenals, and lJ Yen-P'ing Hao, The Commercial Revolution in Nineleenlh-Century China: The Rise of SinoWestern Mercantile Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). A standard history· of the customs service is Stanley Fowler Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, (Belfast Queens University Press, 1950). 34 Knight Biggerstatt The Earliest Modem Government Schools in China, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961)
21 most notably to operate the Imperial Maritime Customs service.In the provinces, govemors-general,charged with suppressing rebellion and preparing maritime defenses, were provided with only minimal official staff.They created large ramified semi-official personal staff offices(mufi).To support his campaigns in the Northwest,Zuo Zongtang even created special purchase and forwarding offices in Shanghai and Hankou,hundreds of miles from his headquarters. This discussion suggests that Tilly's approach offers a plausible way to analyze the self-strengthening efforts.To be sure,these efforts did not constitute a highly systematic program of state building.But consciously or otherwise,Qing officials were responding to the military pressures they faced in a manner appropriate to Tilly's model. Nevertheless,there are important limitations to this analysis.First,we must consider the some of the constraints on the state making process in China.Second,there are important gaps in the scholarly literature,in particular,there has been little scholarship on the central govemnment in Beijing. The Limits of Self-Strengthening Tilly's analysis of state making does not help us to answer the main question that has baffled Chinese patriots:why did the self-strengthening efforts fail to create a state sufficiently strong to deal with the external threats of the 1890s?The question is not 35 On Zeng Guofan's mufiu see Jonathan Porter,Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy,(Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies,1972);On Li Hongzhang's see Kenneth Folsom,Friends,Guests and Colleagues:The Mufu System in the Late Ch'ing Period,(Berkeley:University of California Press,1968); on Zuo Zongtang's see C.John Stanley,Late Ch'ing Finance:Hu Kuang-yung as an Innovator, (Cambridge,Mass.:East Asian Research Center,1961),14-18
21 most notably to operate the Imperial Maritime Customs service. In the provinces, governors-genera!, charged with suppressing rebellion and preparing maritime defenses, were provided with only minimal official staff. They created large ramified semi-official personal staff offices (mufu). To support his campaigns in the Northwest, Zuo Zongtang even created special purchase and forwarding offices in Shanghai and Hankou, hundreds of miles from his headquarters.35 This discussion suggests that Tilly's approach offers a plausible way to analyze the self-strengthening efforts. To be sure, these efforts did not constitute a highly systematic program of state building. But consciously or otherwise, Qing officials were responding to the military pressures they faced in a manner appropriate to Tilly's model. Nevertheless, there are important limitations to this analysis. First, we must consider the some of the constraints on the state making process in China. Second, there are important gaps in the scholarly literature, in particular, there has been little scholarship on the central government in Beijing. The Limits of Se/f-Strengthening Tilly's analysis of state making does not help us to answer the main question that has bafiled Chinese patriots: why did the self-strengthening efforts fail to create a state sufficiently strong to deal with the external threats of the 1890s? The question is not 35 On Zeng Guofan's mufu sec Jonathan Porter, Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy, (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1972); On Li Hongzbang's sec Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues: The Mufu System in the Late Ch'ing Period, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); on Zuo Zongtang's see C.lohn Stanley, Late Ch 'ing Finance: Hu Kuang-yung as an Innovator, (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, 1961), 14-18
22 unique to China.As Tilly's count of the number of European states indicates,very few states (about 12 per cent)survived as independent units from 1500 to 1918.Most were absorbed by others in what is seen retrospectively as national unification.But Tilly is concerned with the ingredients that enabled states to survive,not the causes of failure. Those that did survive were able to destroy interal rivals for power,protect themselves militarily,and at times conquer and absorb their neighbors.The Qing state's self- strengthening was by no means a complete failure:it was sufficient to enable it to destroy its major internal rivals,but fell short in dealing with those outside.Scholars have proposed a number of explanations. Marxist scholarship has focused on the deleterious effects of Western imperialism.On one hand,earlier studies of the "Western matters movement"suggest that the dominant landlord class allied itself with foreign imperialists,and adopted western methods primarily to suppress the popular uprisings of the day.The efforts of the self-strengtheners were focused on their class interests,not the interests of the Chinese nation.36 Sociologist Frances Moulder,approaching Chinafrom a world systems perspective,argues that the constraints European imperial power placed on the activities of the Qing state(what she calls"political incorporation")prevented it from responding effectively.37 Both approaches are flawed.A wealth of scholarship,including some more recent work from the Peoples Republic of China,has shown that the reforms of the 1861- The classic account is Mou Anshi,Yangwu Yundong,(Shanghai:Renmin Chubanshe,1954): see also Chen Jiang"Recent Chinese Historiography." Frances Moulder,China,Japan,and the Modern World Economy,(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1977)
22 unique to China. As Tilly's count of the number of European states indicates, very few states (about 12 per cent) survived as independent units from 1500 to 1918. Most were absorbed by others in what is seen retrospectively as national unification. But Tilly is concerned with the ingredients that enabled states to survive, not the causes offailure. Those that did survive were able to destroy internal rivals for power, protect themselves militarily, and at times conquer and absorb their neighbors. The Qing state's selfstrengthening was by no means a complete failure: it was sufficient to enable it to destroy its major internal rivals, but fell short in dealing with those outside. Scholars have proposed a number of explanations. Marxist scholarship has focused on the deleterious effects of Western imperialism. On one hand, earlier studies of the "Western matters movement" suggest that the dominant landlord class allied itselfwith foreign imperialists, and adopted western methods primarily to suppress the popular uprisings of the day. The efforts of the self-strengtheners were focused on their class interests, not the interests of the Chinese nation.36 Sociologist Frances Moulder, approaching China from a world systems perspective, argues that the constraints European imperial power placed on the activities of the Qing state (what she calls "political incorporation'') prevented it from responding effectively.37 Both approaches are flawed. A wealth ofscholarsbip, including some more recent work from the Peoples Republic of China, has shown that the reforms of the 1861- 36 The classic account is Mou Anshi, Yangwu Yundong, (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe, (954); see also Chen Jiang "Recent Chinese Historiography." 37 Frances Moulder, China, Japan. and the Modem World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (977)
23 1894 were concerned with both internal and external enemies.Before 1895 Western imperialism limited the policies of the Qing state in certain areas where foreigners had a strong stake-for example in restricting the taxation of foreign trade,and preventing the prosecution of foreigners(and sometimes their Chinese clients)in Qing courts -but it did not restrict the state's autonomy in most respects.During the 1860s,the foreign powers-and most importantly Britain-engaged in a"cooperative policy"refraining from placing excessive pressure on the Qing regime and supporting it in its efforts to suppress rebellion.It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that(especially after 1870)the Wester diplomatic involvement in China was quite hostile,and foreign envoys rarely missed an opportunity to use minor incidents to extract further concessions,and that as a consequence not offending foreign sensibilities was an important concern for Qing statesmen. One of the earliest and most influential explanations of the Qing failure argues that the central Qing state,in the course of fighting off the Taiping rebellion,ceded most of its authority over provincial officials and never regained it.Officials like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang had created their own armies,funded by the lijin revenues they. controlled,and they were able to create regional satrapies that the central goverment had little capacity to control-they were therefore direct antecedents of the warlords who controlled China after the Qing demise.Consequently,modernization could only occur Franz Michael,"Military Organization and Power Structure of China During the Taiping Rebellion,"Pacific Historical Review 18.4(1949):469-483,and "Regionalism in Nineteenth Century China,"introduction to Stanley Spector,Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle:University of Washington Press,1964);Luo Ergang,"Qingji bingwei jiangyou de qiyuan"Zhongguo shehui jingji shi jikan,,52(1937):235-250
23 1894 were concerned with both internal and external enemies. Before 1895 Western imperialism limited the policies of the Qing state in certain areas where foreigners had a strong stake - for example in restricting the taxation of foreign trade, and preventing the prosecution of foreigners (and sometimes their Chinese clients) in Qing courts - but it did not restrict the state's autonomy in most respects. During the 1860s, the foreign powers - and most importantly Britain - engaged in a "cooperative policy" refraining from placing excessive pressure on the Qing regime and supporting it in its efforts to suppress rebellion. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that (especially after 1870) the Western diplomatic involvement in China was quite hostile, and foreign envoys rarely missed an opportunity to use minor incidents to extract further concessions, and that as a consequence not offending foreign sensibilities was an important concern for Qing statesmen. One of the earliest and most influential explanations of the Qing failure argues that the central Qing state, in the course offighting off the Taiping rebellion, ceded most of its authority over provincial officials and never regained it. Officials like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang had created their own armies, funded by the [yin revenues they . controlled, and they were able to create regional satrapies that the central government had little capacity to control - they were therefore direct antecedents of the warlords who controlled China after the Qing demise.38 Consequently, modernization could only occur 31 Franz Michael, "Military Organization and Power Structure of China During the Taiping Rebellion," Pacific Historical Review 18.4 (1949):469-483, and "Regionalism in Nineteenth Century China," introduction to Stanley Spector, Li Hung~hang and the Huai Army (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964); Luo &gang, "Qingji bingweijiangyou de qiyuan" Zhongguo sheltuijingji shi jikan, 5.2 (1937): 235-250