9 there were substantial differences among the states that emerged,and Tilly attributes this to the paths they took to forming national states.He suggests that they followed three trajectories:capital intensive,coercion intensive,and capitalized coercion.Each created national states in the long term,but in adapting to different socio-economic organization the processes of extraction differed,and consequently the development of both state structure and state-society relations varied.Capital intensive states,like Venice and the Dutch Republic,with large cities and highly commercialized economies,tumned to indirect taxes on commerce administered by small bureaucracies.In times of crisis they could borrow heavily from their merchants.Second,coercion intensive states,like Russia,unable to extract what was necessary from commerce,looked to taxes on land and grain.Implementation was cumbersome,demanding the cooperation of a rural elite to help collect the taxes.Finally,capitalized coercion involved the use of both of the above approaches,as in the case of Great Britain.The nature of the tax system had dramatic effects on the relationship of state and society--a state dependent on indirect taxes and borrowing had to protect commercial activity and maintain the support of merchants and bankers.One dependent on land taxation needed to protect the elites who helped collect the tax,and when necessary use coercive means to put down tax rebellions and maintain the existing class structure.2 The state centered approach advocated by Tilly is open to a number of objections. First,as Tilly himself admits,not all states came into existence by the war making process--notably the new states of Asia and Africa created by the retrocession of 12 Tilly,Coercion,ch.5
9 there were substantial differences among the states that emerged, and Tilly attributes this to the paths they took to forming national states. He suggests that they followed three trajectories: capital intensive, coercion intensive, and capitalized coercion. Each created national states in the long terIn, but in adapting to different socio-economic organization the processes of extraction differed, and consequently the development of both state structure and state-society relations varied. Capital intensive states, like Venice and the Dutch Republic, with large cities and highly commercialized economies, turned to indirect taxes on commerce admjnistered by small bureaucracies. In times of crisis they could borrow heavily from their merchants. Second, coercion intensive states, like Russia, unable to extract what was necessary from commerce, looked to taxes on land and grain. Implementation was cumbersome, demanding the cooperation of a rural elite to help collect the taxes. Finally, capitaIized coercion involved the use of both of the above approaches, as in the case of Great Britain. The nature of the tax system had dramatic effects on the relationship of state and society - a state dependent on indirect taxes and borrowing had to protect commercial activity and maintain the support of merchants and bankers. One dependent on land taxation needed to protect the elites who helped collect the tax, and when necessary use coercive means to put down tax rebellions and maintain the existing class structure. 12 The state centered approach advocated by Tilly is open to a number of objections. First, as Tilly himself admits, not all states came into existence by the war making process - notably the new states of Asia and Africa created by the retrocession of 12 Tilly. Coercion, ch. S
10 European colonies.3 China was never colonized,and its state structures were more influenced by the threat of foreign invasion than the direct application of imperial pressure.The model of the military competition driving state making therefore remains the most relevant to China.Second,this model leaves out all reference to cultural influences on the formation of modern states,in particular to the role of nationalism. While cultural identities are certainly complex and malleable,and over time a national identity can be constructed to fit the needs of the state(as occurred in Great Britain, France,and Italy),there are limits to the construction of nationalism independent of a pre- existing sense of identity tying together a large proportion of the people-as the breakup of Yugoslavia makes clear.Again,in the case of China,this is not a particular concem. A strong sense of cultural unity among the Han populations(and to a lesser degree among the ruling Manchus as well)existed before the arrival of Western imperialism;and a lack of cultural unity does not seem to have been an obstacle to the state making process,aside from predominantly non-Han areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang.5 A third criticism of the state centered approach is that it takes the state to be a single unified entity,substantially distinct from and autonomous of the society it rules. In Tilly's case,this is a conscious heuristic device for getting at long term processes of change.As a consequence,it does not deal with the processes of policy making and the 5bid,181-l83. “Anthony D.Smith,"State-Making and Nation-Building,.”i血HalL,ed,States in History以228- 263. is Myron L.Cohen,"Being Chinese:The Peripheralization of Traditional Identity,"Daedalus 1202(1991):113-134
10 European colonies.13 China was never colonized. and its state structures were more influenced by the threat of foreign invasion than the direct application of imperial pressure. The model of the military competition driving state making therefore remains the most relevant to China. Second, this model leaves out all reference to cultural influences on the formation of modern states, in particular to the role of nationalism. While cultural identities are certainly complex and malleable, and over time a national identity can be constructed to fit the needs of the state (as occurred in Great Britain, France, and Italy), there are limits to the construction of nationalism independent of a preexisting sense of identity tying together a large proportion of the people - as the breakup of Yugoslavia makes clear.14 Again, in the case of China, this is not a particular concern.. A strong sense of cultural unity among the Han populations (and to a lesser degree among the ruling Manchus as well) existed before the arrival of Western imperialism; and a lack of cultural unity does not seem to have been an obstacle to the state making process, aside from predominantly non-Han areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang.ls A third criticism of the state centered approach is that it takes the state to be a single unified entity, substantially distinct from and autonomous of the society it rules. In Tilly's case, this is a conscious hemistic device for getting at long term processes of change. As a consequence, it does not deal with the processes of policy making and the Il Ibid.,ISI-IS3. 14 Anthony D. Smith. "State-Making and Nation-Building. .. in Hall, eel. States in History), 22S- 263. L5 Myron L. Coben, "Being Chinese: The Peripheralization of Traditional Identity,.. Daedalus 120.2 (1991):113-134
11 constraints on implementation.While providing a good sense of the pressures that state leaders faced,Tilly's model tells us nothing about the inevitable struggle over policies and power that would ultimately create stronger national states.Similarly,it largely ignores the problems of implementing policy at a local level.Joel Migdal,in an important study of post-colonial states,argues that the that the weakness of many third world states derives from their inability to control local notables who serve as the state's agents but are at the same time deeply embedded in the power structure of local society. These local notables are often more concerned with maintaining their local position than executing state policy.These are important criticisms,and in applying Tilly's schema to China in the following sections,I try to be sensitive to the cohesion and autonomy of the state,and to the institutional constraints on policy making and implementation. The State in Qing China The Qing empire was very different from the European states on which Tilly's analysis is based.It was much larger,was ruled by a bureaucratic-monarchical system and was explicitly multi-ethnic.Beneath the emperor stood a substantial bureaucracy, most of the members of which were selected from society at large by the famous civil service examination system.The civil bureaucracy administered the country on three levels:metropolitan,provincial and local.At the top was the metropolitan government consisting of the Emperor and the bureaucracy in Beijing.At the provincial level there were governors-general and governors responsible for each of the provinces who reported Joel Migdal,Strong Societies and Weak States:State-Sociely Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1978)
11 constraints on implementation. While providing a good sense of the pressures that state leaders faced, Tilly's model tells us nothing about the inevitable struggle over policies and power that would ultimately create stronger national states. Similarly, it largely ignores the problems of implementing policy at a local level. Joel Migdal, in an important study of post-colonial states, argues that the that the weakness of many third world states derives from their inability to control local notables who serve as the state's agents but are at the same time deeply embedded in the power structure of local society. These local notables are often more concerned with maintaining their local position than executing state policy.16 These are important criticisms, and in applying Tilly's schema to China in the following sections, I try to be sensitive to the cohesion and autonomy of the state, and to the institutional constraints on policy making and implementation. The State in Qing China The Qing empire was very different from the European states on which Tilly's analysis is based. It was much larger, was ruled by a bureaucratic-monarchical system and was explicitly multi-ethnic. Beneath the emperor stood a substantial bureaucracy, most of the members of which were selected from society at large by the famous civil service examination system. The civil bureaucracy administered the country on three levels: metropolitan, provincial and local. At the top was the metropolitan government consisting of the Emperor and the bureaucracy in Beijing. At the provincial level there were governors-general and governors responsible for each of the provinces who reported 16 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and Slate Capabilities in lhe Third World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
12 directly to the emperor.At the local level were magistrates responsible for administering the counties,departments,and prefectures.Power to appoint all regular civil(and military)government officials lay in the hands of the Throne;and the traditional rule of avoidance forbade the appointment of an official in close proximity to his native place. China was larger and more populous than its western European counterparts,and consequently the distance from top to bottom was much larger,both physically and mentally.Nevertheless,unlike the federal systems that emerged in the vast spaces of North America,it all remained part of a single integrated bureaucratic system that was ultimately responsible to the emperor. The Qing was a conquest dynasty,originating in Manchuria.The Manchus remained legally and socially distinct from the Han Chinese population.Organized into eight divisions called banners,the Manchus were supported by government stipend and received preferential treatment including separate examination quotas,and with senior positions in the major ministries of Beijing bureaucracy reserved for them.While the Manchus had steadily absorbed Chinese culture and lost their native language in their centuries in China,their sense of ethnic difference remained.Conversely,many in the Han Chinese population were frustrated with Manchu dominance of the highest political echelon.17 In spite of these differences,we see the Qing state performing precisely the same functions that Tilly describes:it extracted resources through taxation,and (increasingly Pamela Crossley,Orphan Warriors:Three Manchu Generations and the End ofthe Qing World,(Princeton:Princeton University Press,1990)
12 directly to the emperor. At the local level were magistrates responsible for administering the counties, departments, and prefectures. Power to appoint all regular civil (and military) government officials lay in the hands of the Throne; and the traditional rule of avoidance forbade the appointment of an official in close proximity to his native place. China was larger and more populous than its western European counterparts, and consequently the distance from top to bottom was much larger, both physically and mentally. Nevertheless, unlike the federal systems that emerged in the vast spaces of North America, it all remained part of a single integrated bureaucratic system that was ultimately responsible to the emperor. The Qing was a conquest dynasty, originating in Manchuria. The Manchus . remained legally and socially distinct from the Han Chinese population. Organized into eight divisions called banners, the Manchus were supported by government stipend and received preferential treatment including separate examination quotas, and with senior positions in the major ministries of Beijing bureaucracy reserved for them. While the Manchus had steadily absorbed Chinese culture and lost their native language in their centuries in China, their sense of ethnic difference remained. Conversely, many in the Han Chinese population were frustrated with Manchu dominance of the highest political echelon. 17 In spite of these differences, we see the Qing state performing precisely the ~ame functions that Tilly describes: it extracted resources through taxation, and (increasingly 17 Pamela Crossley. Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End o/the Qing World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)
13 infrequently)corvee labor.It protected its clients in various ways:by attempting to maintain peace in general,by aiding specific groups like protecting licensed salt merchants from competition,and by privileging elites who had passed the civil service examination system in their dealings with the state.The Qing state fought vigorously to suppress rivals to its rule within the empire's borders (Tilly's'state making'function)on many occasions,including the wars against the three feudatories in the seventeenth century,and suppressing White Lotus and Miao rebellions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.It also engaged in'war making'-fighting against those outside its territories,in conquering Xinjiang in the northwest and attempting to expand control of the troublesome border with Burma.Financial data suggests that like European states before the twentieth century,the bulk of state expenditures in the mid- eighteenth century went to fill military needs.The Qing state was also deeply involved in two of Tilly's lesser state functions:adjudication of disputes through the extensive Qing legal apparatus;and redistribution in its remarkable system of public granaries to provide for famine relief.Toa lesser extent the Qing state participated in production of goods,like firearms and other ordnance.It was also intensively involved in one area According to admittedly unreliable quotasfrom the Qing statutes,in QL31(1767)about59% of the central goverment expenditures went to the military;Guo Songyi,Li Xinda,Li Xiangying Qingchao Dianzhi,(Changchun:Jilin wenshi chubanshe,1993),402-3. On the Qing legal system see,Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris,Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases Translated From the Hsing-an hui-lan,(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press,1967)76-143.On grain distribution see Pierre Etiene Will &R.Bin Wong, Nourish the People(Ann Arbor:Center for Chinese Studies University of Michigan,1991)
13 infrequently) corvee labor. It protected its clients in various ways: by attempting to maintain peace in general, by aiding specific groups like protecting licensed salt merchants from competition, and by privileging elites who bad passed the civil service examination system in their dealings with the state. The Qing state fought vigorously to suppress rivals to its rule within the empire's borders (Tilly's 'state making' functio~) on many occasions, including the wars against the three feudatories in the seventeenth century, and suppressing White Lotus and Miao rebellions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It also engaged in 'war making' - fighting against those outside its territories, in conquering Xinjiang in the northwest and attempting to expand control of the troublesome border with Burma. Financial data suggests that like European states before the twentieth century, the bulk of state expenditures in the mideighteenth century went to fill military needs.ls The Qing state was also deeply involved in two of Tilly's lesser state functions: adjudication of disputes through the extensive Qing legal apparatus; and redistribution in its remarkable system of public granaries to provide for famine relief. 19 To a lesser extent the Qing state participated in production of goods, like firearms and other ordnance. It was also intensively involved in one area II According to admittedly unreliable quotas from the Qing statutes, in QL 31 (1767) about 59"/0 of the central government expenditures went to the military; Guo Songyi, Li Xinda , Li Xiangying Qingchao Dianzhi, (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1993),402-3. 19 On the Qing legal system see, Derlc Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by J 90 Ch 'ing Dynasty Cases Translated FI'om the Hsing-an hui-Ian, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967) 76-143. On grain distribution see Pierre Etiene Will & R. Bin Wong, Nourish the People (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies University of Michigan, 1991)