Fee-Taking,Salary Reform,and the Structure of State Power in Late Qing China,1909-1911 Paul C.Hickey Franklin and Marshall College The inadequacy of salaries for government officials was one of the defining characteristics of the bureaucratic system of late imperial times.Because salaries failed to cover the real costs of obtaining and holding office,officials,as a matter of course,resorted to collecting fees(guifei or lougui)from their subordinates or the people in their jurisdictions.Such fees were not prescribed in legal statutes and thus were not incorporated into the accounting procedures of the central state.Accordingly,fees constituted an informal sector of state finance that was beyond the control of the central government's financial organs.On occasions when the central state sought to strengthen its control over public finance,it was natural for fee-taking and the system of bureaucratic salaries to become the target of reform efforts. This article examines fee-taking and salary reform in the context of the Qing dynasty's financial centralization efforts between 1909 and 1911.Because salary reform was a key component of this financial centralization process,a study of salary reform can help us understand the nature of the late Qing financial reforms and their results.At the same time,an examination of fee-taking and salary reform will reveal some fundamental characteristics of the late imperial state on the eve of its demise,and will show why it posed such great obstacles to the creation of a modern,centralized state. MODERN CHINA,Vol.17 No.3,July 1991 389-417 1991 Sage Publications,Inc. 389
Fee-Taking, Salary Reform, and the Structure of State Power in Late Qing China, 1909-1911 Paul C. Hickey Franklin and Marshall College The inadequacy of salaries for government officials was one of the defining characteristics of the bureaucratic system of late imperial times. Because salaries failed to cover the real costs of obtaining and holding office, officials, as a matter of course, resorted to collecting fees (guifei or lougui) from their subordinates or the people in their jurisdictions. Such fees were not prescribed in legal statutes and thus were not incorporated into the accounting procedures of the central state. Accordingly, fees constituted an informal sector of state finance that was beyond the control of the central government's financial organs. On occasions when the central state sought to strengthen its control over public finance, it was natural for fee-taking and the system of bureaucratic salaries to become the target of reform efforts. This article examines fee-taking and salary reform in the context of the Qing dynasty's financial centralization efforts between 1909 and 1911. Because salary reform was a key component of this financial centralization process, a study of salary reform can help us understand the nature of the late Qing financial reforms and their results. At the same time, an examination of fee-taking and salary reform will reveal some fundamental characteristics of the late imperial state on the eve of its demise, and will show why it posed such great obstacles to the creation of a modern, centralized state. MODERN CHINA, Vol. 17 No. 3, July 1991 389-417 ? 1991 Sage Publications, Inc. 389
390 MODERN CHINA /JULY 1991 THE 1909 FINANCIAL REFORMS In January 1909,the Qing court authorized a series of centralizing financial reforms that had been proposed by the Finance Ministry (duzhibu).These reforms were part of the Qing government's ongoing effort to modernize through adoption of a system of constitutional government,a formula for modernization that entailed the creation of a centralized state.The part of this formula that was being addressed in 1909 was the development of a budgetary process for government finance.A budgetary system was intended to replace the old system of public finance that,mostly in accord with long-standing precedents, allocated specific sources of revenue for specific expenditures,creat- ing a patchwork of intra-bureaucratic transfers of funds that the central state could not easily monitor.With the development of a budgetary process,the central state sought a complete and accurate knowledge of government finance throughout China.Such knowledge would enable the Beijing government to plan for the best use of its revenues and strengthen its control over the financial resources needed to pay for indemnities and modernizing reforms,particularly the establish- ment of new armies and schools,which had been a top priority since the turn of the century. The centralized budgetary system planned by reformers entailed institutional changes to guarantee that the true state of public finance would be uncovered and the budget would have a basis in fact. Accordingly,in each provincial capital,the Finance Ministry estab- lished Financial Reform Bureaus (qingli caizhengju),which were responsible for investigating provincial finances and reporting their findings to the Finance Ministry.Each bureau was staffed by a mixture of officials already serving in the provincial capital,including the provincial treasurer,and two financial supervisors (jianli guan),who were appointed by the Finance Ministry.These financial supervisors were the key to the effectiveness of the Financial Reform Bureaus,for presumably they were independent of existing bureaucratic interests in the provinces and could be counted on to report truthfully to the Finance Ministry in cases where provincial officials might otherwise be inclined to withhold data
390 MODERN CHINA /JULY 1991 THE 1909 FINANCIAL REFORMS In January 1909, the Qing court authorized a series of centralizing financial reforms that had been proposed by the Finance Ministry (duzhibu). These reforms were part of the Qing government's ongoing effort to modernize through adoption of a system of constitutional government, a formula for modernization that entailed the creation of a centralized state. The part of this formula that was being addressed in 1909 was the development of a budgetary process for government finance. A budgetary system was intended to replace the old system of public finance that, mostly in accord with long-standing precedents, allocated specific sources of revenue for specific expenditures, creating a patchwork of intra-bureaucratic transfers of funds that the central state could not easily monitor. With the development of a budgetary process, the central state sought a complete and accurate knowledge of government finance throughout China. Such knowledge would enable the Beijing government to plan for the best use of its revenues and strengthen its control over the financial resources needed to pay for indemnities and modernizing reforms, particularly the establishment of new armies and schools, which had been a top priority since the turn of the century. The centralized budgetary system planned by reformers entailed institutional changes to guarantee that the true state of public finance would be uncovered and the budget would have a basis in fact. Accordingly, in each provincial capital, the Finance Ministry established Financial Reform Bureaus (qingli caizhengju), which were responsible for investigating provincial finances and reporting their findings to the Finance Ministry. Each bureau was staffed by a mixture of officials already serving in the provincial capital, including the provincial treasurer, and two financial supervisors (jianli guan), who were appointed by the Finance Ministry. These financial supervisors were the key to the effectiveness of the Financial Reform Bureaus, for presumably they were independent of existing bureaucratic interests in the provinces and could be counted on to report truthfully to the Finance Ministry in cases where provincial officials might otherwise be inclined to withhold data
Hickey FEE-TAKING AND SALARY REFORM 391 A crucial component of this centralization of state finance,and the focus of this article,was a reform of the system of bureaucratic salaries,whose inadequacy had led to fee-taking and other practices that were incompatible with a budgetary system.The essence of salary reform was that fee-taking was to be abolished and officials were to receive large increases in a payment known as gongfei;with formal incomes greatly enhanced,officials would then be in a position to dispense with fee-taking.In order to make these new payments reflect the real costs of officeholding,allotments of gongfei were to be based on the pattern of fee-taking revealed by the Financial Reform Bureaus. In practice,as we shall see,this procedure was equivalent to making gongfei payments equal to the sum of customary fees that were already being collected for purposes deemed legitimate;all other fees would be prohibited.As an inducement for officials to reveal fees and other hitherto unreported funds,the new regulations promised that officials would not be punished for past financial practices that were not in accord with statute(Gugong bowuyuan Ming Qing dang'an bu,1979: 2/1027-1033). The decision to adopt these reforms in January 1909 owed much to changes in court politics following the deaths of the Empress Dowager and the Guangxu emperor in late 1908.From that time on,the court was dominated by a group of Manchu princes that included Zaize,the head of the Finance Ministry.Zaize was patron to a group of young Finance Ministry officials(including Liu Zexi and Zhang Zongyuan) who were promoting the centralization of state finance.Zaize and his followers found support in reformist circles of officials and gentry in the provinces-support that,in part,manifested itself within the Provisional National Assembly (zizhengyuan,first convened in late 1910),which endorsed the Finance Ministry's proposed budget for 1911(Shibao,.1Dec.1910:2;2Dec.1910:2;6Jan.1911:1). Zaize and his followers were responsible for the particular form that centralizing financial reform assumed;this group of reformers included officials who viewed the 1909 reforms as both centralizing and modernizing in character.Such a perspective appears in the views of Xiong Xiling,a financial supervisor in Manchuria who,in 1907, wrote a letter to Zaize proposing financial reforms similar to those
Hickey / FEE-TAKING AND SALARY REFORM 391 A crucial component of this centralization of state finance, and the focus of this article, was a reform of the system of bureaucratic salaries, whose inadequacy had led to fee-taking and other practices that were incompatible with a budgetary system. The essence of salary reform was that fee-taking was to be abolished and officials were to receive large increases in a payment known as gongfei; with formal incomes greatly enhanced, officials would then be in a position to dispense with fee-taking. In order to make these new payments reflect the real costs of officeholding, allotments of gongfei were to be based on the pattern of fee-taking revealed by the Financial Reform Bureaus. In practice, as we shall see, this procedure was equivalent to making gongfei payments equal to the sum of customary fees that were already being collected for purposes deemed legitimate; all other fees would be prohibited. As an inducement for officials to reveal fees and other hitherto unreported funds, the new regulations promised that officials would not be punished for past financial practices that were not in accord with statute (Gugong bowuyuan Ming Qing dang'an bu, 1979: 2/1027-1033). The decision to adopt these reforms in January 1909 owed much to changes in court politics following the deaths of the Empress Dowager and the Guangxu emperor in late 1908. From that time on, the court was dominated by a group of Manchu princes that included Zaize, the head of the Finance Ministry. Zaize was patron to a group of young Finance Ministry officials (including Liu Zexi and Zhang Zongyuan) who were promoting the centralization of state finance. Zaize and his followers found support in reformist circles of officials and gentry in the provinces--support that, in part, manifested itself within the Provisional National Assembly (zizhengyuan, first convened in late 1910), which endorsed the Finance Ministry's proposed budget for 1911 (Shibao, 1 Dec. 1910: 2; 2 Dec. 1910: 2; 6 Jan. 1911: 1). Zaize and his followers were responsible for the particular form that centralizing financial reform assumed; this group of reformers included officials who viewed the 1909 reforms as both centralizing and modernizing in character. Such a perspective appears in the views of Xiong Xiling, a financial supervisor in Manchuria who, in 1907, wrote a letter to Zaize proposing financial reforms similar to those
392 MODERN CHINA /JULY 1991 enacted in 1909.In explaining his proposals,Xiong equated central- ized finance with a modern state and argued that the Chinese system was flawed in its decentralization.Significantly,Xiong's call for reform abandoned traditional Confucian notions of a static econ- omy,insisting instead that increased financial power for the central state would be matched by simultaneous growth in financial power at the local level.Economic growth,Xiong argued,would make it possible for all levels of the state to expand the volume of financial resources under their control(Lin Zengping and Zhou Qiuguang, 1985:133-141). It is unclear to what extent financial reformers as a group shared Xiong's"modern"ideas linking centralization to economic expansion. Unquestionably,advocacy of a budgetary process and strengthened central control over state finance could coexist with the Confucian belief that frugality was a virtue in government;a budget could facilitate limitations on state expenditure and centralization could entail redistribution of a fixed amount of resources rather than an absolute increase in the financial powers of the state.However strong "modernizing"impulses may have been among advocates of financial reform,it is clear that such impulses did not extend to all aspects of the 1909 reforms,including,as we shall see,the approach to salary reform and the problem of fee-taking. THE SCALE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FEE-TAKING From the early eighteenth century there were three major forms of state-authorized remuneration for provincial officials:salaries(feng), "nourishing honesty funds"(yanglianyin)and gongfei(literally"pub- lic expenses").The latter two items originated in the fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng period(1723-1735)as supplemental funds for provin- cial officials;nourishing honesty funds were to assist with the costs of operating a yamen,while gongfei helped cover local services and projects undertaken outside the yamen (Zelin,1984:119-121).Al- though the provision of nourishing honesty funds and gongfei had originated in response to problems stemming from the inadequacy of bureaucratic salaries,the principle of adjusting the size of these salary
392 MODERN CHINA IJULY 1991 enacted in 1909. In explaining his proposals, Xiong equated centralized finance with a modem state and argued that the Chinese system was flawed in its decentralization. Significantly, Xiong's call for reform abandoned traditional Confucian notions of a static economy, insisting instead that increased financial power for the central state would be matched by simultaneous growth in financial power at the local level. Economic growth, Xiong argued, would make it possible for all levels of the state to expand the volume of financial resources under their control (Lin Zengping and Zhou Qiuguang, 1985: 133-141). It is unclear to what extent financial reformers as a group shared Xiong's "modern" ideas linking centralization to economic expansion. Unquestionably, advocacy of a budgetary process and strengthened central control over state finance could coexist with the Confucian belief that frugality was a virtue in government; a budget could facilitate limitations on state expenditure and centralization could entail redistribution of a fixed amount of resources rather than an absolute increase in the financial powers of the state. However strong "modernizing" impulses may have been among advocates of financial reform, it is clear that such impulses did not extend to all aspects of the 1909 reforms, including, as we shall see, the approach to salary reform and the problem of fee-taking. THE SCALE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FEE-TAKING From the early eighteenth century there were three major forms of state-authorized remuneration for provincial officials: salaries (feng), "nourishing honesty funds" (yanglianyin) and gongfei (literally "public expenses"). The latter two items originated in the fiscal reforms of the Yongzheng period (1723-1735) as supplemental funds for provincial officials; nourishing honesty funds were to assist with the costs of operating a yamen, while gongfei helped cover local services and projects undertaken outside the yamen (Zelin, 1984: 119-121). Although the provision of nourishing honesty funds and gongfei had originated in response to problems stemming from the inadequacy of bureaucratic salaries, the principle of adjusting the size of these salary
Hickey FEE-TAKING AND SALARY REFORM 393 supplements to match the rising costs of holding office was never established in the eighteenth century (Zelin,1984:264-301). Thus,by the last decade of the Qing,the sum of these three forms of remuneration had long been small in comparison with the costs of holding office,particularly at the lowest level of the bureaucracy. Local magistrates were supposed to receive an annual salary of forty-five taels,between 400 and 2,000 taels in nourishing honesty funds,and in most cases not more than a few hundred taels of gongfei (Chang,1962:11-15).In practice,formal compensation for late Qing magistrates was even smaller,for,throughout the last century of Qing rule,nourishing honesty funds were partially withheld from local officials and used instead to cover expenses at the provincial level.In Hunan in 1908,for example,county magistrates received an average of only 675 taels of nourishing honesty funds(Jingji xuehui,1915b: suiru bu,xingzheng zongfei lei,10-16). Qing administrative law maintained the fiction that state-sanctioned remuneration was sufficient for officials to meet the heavy financial demands of holding office-demands that included the costs of main- taining a yamen and conducting public business,not to mention the personal expenses concomitant with high social standing and being an official.Despite repeated prohibitions,officials covered their ex- penses by collecting fees.'At the lowest level of the bureaucracy,local magistrates collected these fees from the people in the course of performing routine government functions such as collecting taxes or judging legal cases.At higher levels of the bureaucracy,officials met expenses by taking fees from subordinates whenever public business was transacted.Moreover,subordinate officials were routinely ex- pected to furnish their superiors with gifts of money on occasions such as the superior's assumption of office or the superior's birthday.Such fees and gifts,of course,ultimately came from the ordinary taxpayer. In collecting fees,officials normally needed assistance from people who were not part of the formal bureaucracy.Some of that assistance came from yamen functionaries who managed the details of govern- ment business and collected the fees,which were then shared with the official in charge.Involvement in local government and tax collection also brought some members of the gentry into bureaucratic fee-taking networks.The proliferation of gentry bureaus at the local level in the
Hickey / FEE-TAKING AND SALARY REFORM 393 supplements to match the rising costs of holding office was never established in the eighteenth century (Zelin, 1984: 264-301). Thus, by the last decade of the Qing, the sum of these three forms of remuneration had long been small in comparison with the costs of holding office, particularly at the lowest level of the bureaucracy. Local magistrates were supposed to receive an annual salary of forty-five taels, between 400 and 2,000 taels in nourishing honesty funds, and in most cases not more than a few hundred taels of gongfei (Chang, 1962:11-15). In practice, formal compensation for late Qing magistrates was even smaller, for, throughout the last century of Qing rule, nourishing honesty funds were partially withheld from local officials and used instead to cover expenses at the provincial level. In Hunan in 1908, for example, county magistrates received an average of only 675 taels of nourishing honesty funds (Jingji xuehui, 1915b: suiru bu, xingzheng zongfei lei, 10-16). Qing administrative law maintained the fiction that state-sanctioned remuneration was sufficient for officials to meet the heavy financial demands of holding office - demands that included the costs of maintaining a yamen and conducting public business, not to mention the personal expenses concomitant with high social standing and being an official. Despite repeated prohibitions, officials covered their expenses by collecting fees.' At the lowest level of the bureaucracy, local magistrates collected these fees from the people in the course of performing routine government functions such as collecting taxes or judging legal cases. At higher levels of the bureaucracy, officials met expenses by taking fees from subordinates whenever public business was transacted. Moreover, subordinate officials were routinely expected to furnish their superiors with gifts of money on occasions such as the superior's assumption of office or the superior's birthday. Such fees and gifts, of course, ultimately came from the ordinary taxpayer. In collecting fees, officials normally needed assistance from people who were not part of the formal bureaucracy. Some of that assistance came from yamen functionaries who managed the details of government business and collected the fees, which were then shared with the official in charge. Involvement in local government and tax collection also brought some members of the gentry into bureaucratic fee-taking networks. The proliferation of gentry bureaus at the local level in the