Modern Asian Studies 40,3(2006)pp.549-581.2006 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S0026749X06002113 Printed in the United Kingdom Politics,Power and the Chinese Maritime Customs:the Oing Restoration and the Ascent of Robert Hart RICHARD S.HOROWITZ California State University,Northridge On 6 November 1865,Robert Hart,the 3o-year-old Inspector General (I.G.)of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service,presented to his supervisors in the Zongli Yamen,the Qing Empire's new foreign office, a long memorandum critiquing Chinese administrative practices and offering suggestions for improvement.He criticized corruption and inefficiency at all levels of government,called for tax reform,greater specialization and better technical education of officials,improving contacts with the outside world,and promoting foreign methods and technology.The memorandum,written in Chinese,was entitled the Bystander's View'(juwai pangguan lun).A few months later it was submitted by the Zongli Yamen to the throne,and together with a similar tract by British diplomat Thomas Wade,distributed to senior Qing officials for comment.It had little impact at the time.But forty years later,when the Empress Dowager Cixi reportedly told the author that she wished she had followed his advice,it became a foundation stone of the mythology of Robert Hart,a symbol of the failure of the Qing court to take full advantage of the Portadown native's wisdom. Hart's premise,encapsulated in the title,was that as an outsider to the Qing system he could see problems that insiders could not.The true face of Mount Lu can only be seen in its entirety by one who Juliet Bredon,Sir Robert Hart:The Romance of a Great Career (London:Hutchinson, gog),111.This paper was presented at the Workshop on Sir Robert Hart,Queens University Belfast,September 2003.I am grateful to the organizers and the participants at the workshop for their comments,to my colleagues in the History Department,California State University,Northridge for ideas and encouragement at an early stage,and to Hans van de Ven for many concrete suggestions on how to improve this essay. 0026-749X/o6/S7-50+$o.10 549
Modern Asian Studies 40, 3 (2006) pp. 549–581. C 2006 Cambridge University Press doi:10.1017/S0026749X06002113 Printed in the United Kingdom Politics, Power and the Chinese Maritime Customs: the Qing Restoration and the Ascent of Robert Hart RICHARD S. HOROWITZ California State University, Northridge On 6 November 1865, Robert Hart, the 30-year-old Inspector General (I.G.) of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, presented to his supervisors in the Zongli Yamen, the Qing Empire’s new foreign office, a long memorandum critiquing Chinese administrative practices and offering suggestions for improvement. He criticized corruption and inefficiency at all levels of government, called for tax reform, greater specialization and better technical education of officials, improving contacts with the outside world, and promoting foreign methods and technology. The memorandum, written in Chinese, was entitled the ‘Bystander’s View’ (juwai pangguan lun). A few months later it was submitted by the Zongli Yamen to the throne, and together with a similar tract by British diplomat Thomas Wade, distributed to senior Qing officials for comment. It had little impact at the time. But forty years later, when the Empress Dowager Cixi reportedly told the author that she wished she had followed his advice, it became a foundation stone of the mythology of Robert Hart, a symbol of the failure of the Qing court to take full advantage of the Portadown native’s wisdom.1 Hart’s premise, encapsulated in the title, was that as an outsider to the Qing system he could see problems that insiders could not. ‘The true face of Mount Lu can only be seen in its entirety by one who 1 Juliet Bredon, Sir Robert Hart: The Romance of a Great Career (London: Hutchinson, 1909), 111. This paper was presented at the Workshop on Sir Robert Hart, Queens University Belfast, September 2003. I am grateful to the organizers and the participants at the workshop for their comments, to my colleagues in the History Department, California State University, Northridge for ideas and encouragement at an early stage, and to Hans van de Ven for many concrete suggestions on how to improve this essay. 0026–749X/06/$7.50+$0.10 549
550 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ stands away from it.2 But the memorandum,for all of its notoriety, was uncharacteristic of Hart.It was too blunt for a man admired for his diplomacy,and too broadly conceived and rhetorical for a man whose successes-at least until the end of the century-were built on quiet actions within the bureaucratic system.Moreover,when Hart identified himself as bystander,he was striking a pose.By the mid 186os he was deeply enmeshed in the politics of the time,and his skill at managing political alliances was a key ingredient to his rise from a minor consular functionary to the figure often described at the turn of the century as the most influential foreigner in China. In what is now close to a century since Robert Hart's death,there has been an impressive amount written about the I.G.But Hart is presented in a limited set of roles.The first was perhaps the most unlikely:Juliet Bredon's paean to her uncle presented him as a romantic figure who had led a life 'as useful as varied,as romantic as successful',a questionable description of a man who spent 47 years running a tax agency-even one as diverse in its activities as the Customs Service.3 H.B.Morse who worked for Hart for 35 years emphasized his role as a wise and discreet advisor to the Qing government and as a diplomatic intermediary settling disputes.4 Stanley Wright wrote Hart's life as expressed in the methodical development of the Customs Service into an efficient modern tax bureaucracy,declaring thatAs an administrative genius Hart stands high in the ranks of the great British administrators'5 In their superbly edited editions of Hart's early journals,John K.Fairbank, Richard Smith and Katherine Bruner opened up Hart's private life to examination,and emphasized Hart's bicultural achievement'in adapting to Chinese cultural and behavioral expectations to win 2 Chouban yiwu shimo,tongzhi chao (Taipei reprint,n.d.)40:13b [hereafter YWSM- TZ]For a more detailed discussion of the memorandum see Richard J.Smith,John K.Fairbank,Katherine F.Bruner,Robert Hart and China's Early Modernization:His Journals,1863-1866 (Cambridge MA:Council on East Asian Studies,Harvard University,1991),284-92,and Mary Clabaugh Wright,Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism:The T'ung-chih Restoration,1862-1874 (Stanford:Stanford University Press,1957),263-8. 3 Bredon,5 and passim. Hosea Ballou Morse,International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London: Longmans,Green&co,1910-1918)2:138-41,190-1,364-7. 5 Stanley F.Wright,Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast:Wm.Mullan,1950), 855.See also a similar account by the last foreign Inspector General L.K.Little Introduction'in The I.G.in Peking:Letters of Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907,ed.John King Fairbank,Katherine Frost Bruner,Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson (Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press,1975)Vol.1,1-34
550 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ stands away from it.’2 But the memorandum, for all of its notoriety, was uncharacteristic of Hart. It was too blunt for a man admired for his diplomacy, and too broadly conceived and rhetorical for a man whose successes—at least until the end of the century—were built on quiet actions within the bureaucratic system. Moreover, when Hart identified himself as bystander, he was striking a pose. By the mid 1860s he was deeply enmeshed in the politics of the time, and his skill at managing political alliances was a key ingredient to his rise from a minor consular functionary to the figure often described at the turn of the century as the most influential foreigner in China. In what is now close to a century since Robert Hart’s death, there has been an impressive amount written about the I. G. But Hart is presented in a limited set of roles. The first was perhaps the most unlikely: Juliet Bredon’s paean to her uncle presented him as a romantic figure who had led a life ‘as useful as varied, as romantic as successful’, a questionable description of a man who spent 47 years running a tax agency—even one as diverse in its activities as the Customs Service.3 H. B. Morse who worked for Hart for 35 years emphasized his role as a wise and discreet advisor to the Qing government and as a diplomatic intermediary settling disputes.4 Stanley Wright wrote Hart’s life as expressed in the methodical development of the Customs Service into an efficient modern tax bureaucracy, declaring that ‘As an administrative genius Hart stands high in the ranks of the great British administrators’5 In their superbly edited editions of Hart’s early journals, John K. Fairbank, Richard Smith and Katherine Bruner opened up Hart’s private life to examination, and emphasized Hart’s ‘bicultural achievement’ in adapting to Chinese cultural and behavioral expectations to win 2 Chouban yiwu shimo, tongzhi chao (Taipei reprint, n.d.) 40:13b [hereafter YWSMTZ] For a more detailed discussion of the memorandum see Richard J. Smith, John K. Fairbank, Katherine F. Bruner, Robert Hart and China’s Early Modernization: His Journals, 1863–1866 (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), 284–92, and Mary Clabaugh Wright, Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 263–8. 3 Bredon, 5 and passim. 4 Hosea Ballou Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London: Longmans, Green & co., 1910–1918) 2:138–41, 190–1, 364–7. 5 Stanley F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: Wm. Mullan, 1950), 855. See also a similar account by the last foreign Inspector General L. K. Little ‘Introduction’ in The I. G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868–1907, ed. John King Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975) Vol. 1, 1–34
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 551 the confidence of his Chinese overseers.5 These works share a basic assumption that Hart was largely apolitical:he served his Chinese masters by running the Customs with efficiency and providing useful advice,and periodically stepped into international disputes as a trusted honest broker.To do this,Hart remained above the fray of political struggles and the aggressive diplomacy of the day. This paper will present a different angle on Hart's career in the 186os and early 187os.Hart was a political man who leavened his principled arguments for an independent Customs service and administrative honesty with an ample concern for his own selfinterest. While the I.G.avoided taking overtly political positions,he adroitly adapted to the political circumstances and used them to his advantage. Hart aligned himself with a group of Beijing officials lead by Prince Gong (Yixin),a member of the imperial family,and the Manchu statesman Wenxiang who were the leaders of Zongli Yamen.He organized and managed the Customs Service to maximize the Yamen's authority vis-a-vis provincial officials,finance pet projects,and provide confidential advice.Their sponsorship enabled Hart to set up the Customs in a manner that gave him extraordinary and unchecked authority.He would wield this power to the very end,and this would allow for many of the administrative peculiarities of the service. Just as he smoothly adapted to the Qing political situation,Hart took advantage of unusually moderate British diplomacy in China during the 186os.Led by the first Minister to Beijing,Frederick Bruce,British diplomacy demanded from the Qing government strict adherence to the treaties and the establishment of free trade.But Bruce also supported the Qing government's efforts to suppress rebellion,and pursued policies aimed at strengthening the authority of the central government in Beijing.Hart created an organization that served the interests of British free trade policies,and which conspicuously supported authorities in Beijing-a close fit for Bruce's vision.But Hart's Customs also remained sufficiently international in its personnel and free of direct British influence to avoid becoming a target for other powers.In a semi-colonial realm in which the power of the Qing state was precariously balanced against British hegemony 6 Katherine Bruner,John K.Fairbank,Richard J.Smith,Entering China's Service: Robert Hart's Journals,1854-1863 (Cambridge MA:Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University,1986),324-32. Mary Clabaugh Wright,21-42;Britten Dean,China and Great Britain:The Diplomacy of Commercial Relations,1860-1864 (Cambridge,Mass:East Asian Research Center,.1974),128-36
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 551 the confidence of his Chinese overseers.6 These works share a basic assumption that Hart was largely apolitical: he served his Chinese masters by running the Customs with efficiency and providing useful advice, and periodically stepped into international disputes as a trusted honest broker. To do this, Hart remained above the fray of political struggles and the aggressive diplomacy of the day. This paper will present a different angle on Hart’s career in the 1860s and early 1870s. Hart was a political man who leavened his principled arguments for an independent Customs service and administrative honesty with an ample concern for his own self interest. While the I. G. avoided taking overtly political positions, he adroitly adapted to the political circumstances and used them to his advantage. Hart aligned himself with a group of Beijing officials lead by Prince Gong (Yixin), a member of the imperial family, and the Manchu statesman Wenxiang who were the leaders of Zongli Yamen. He organized and managed the Customs Service to maximize the Yamen’s authority vis-`a-vis provincial officials, finance pet projects, and provide confidential advice. Their sponsorship enabled Hart to set up the Customs in a manner that gave him extraordinary and unchecked authority. He would wield this power to the very end, and this would allow for many of the administrative peculiarities of the service. Just as he smoothly adapted to the Qing political situation, Hart took advantage of unusually moderate British diplomacy in China during the 1860s. Led by the first Minister to Beijing, Frederick Bruce, British diplomacy demanded from the Qing government strict adherence to the treaties and the establishment of free trade. But Bruce also supported the Qing government’s efforts to suppress rebellion, and pursued policies aimed at strengthening the authority of the central government in Beijing.7 Hart created an organization that served the interests of British free trade policies, and which conspicuously supported authorities in Beijing—a close fit for Bruce’s vision. But Hart’s Customs also remained sufficiently international in its personnel and free of direct British influence to avoid becoming a target for other powers. In a semi-colonial realm in which the power of the Qing state was precariously balanced against British hegemony 6 Katherine Bruner, John K. Fairbank, Richard J. Smith, Entering China’s Service: Robert Hart’s Journals, 1854–1863 (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986), 324–32. 7 Mary Clabaugh Wright, 21–42; Britten Dean, China and Great Britain: The Diplomacy of Commercial Relations, 1860–1864 (Cambridge, Mass: East Asian Research Center, 1974), 128–36
552 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ and threats from other powers,deft political maneuvering maximized Hart's autonomy and authority.8 I In the summer of 1861 Robert Hart made his first important political alliances.He traveled to Beijing in place of his boss,H.N.Lay,who had departed on leave to England.Hart stayed at the new British Legation as the guest of British Minister Frederick Bruce,whose support would later be crucial to Hart's promotion to the position of Inspector General.Even more importantly he had numerous meetings with Wenxiang,a Grand Councilor and the working leader of the new Zongli Yamen,and briefer sessions with Prince Gong,which gave Hart a chance to explain the operations of the Customs Service and discuss plans for its expansion to new treaty ports.9 The evidence available suggests that they hit it off exceptionally well.Although Hart probably did not realize it at the time,he had happened into ideal sponsors:for the pair were a rising force in Qing politics. Less than a year earlier,in the August and September of 1860, the Qing dynasty had been in the midst of its greatest crisis.After four years of off and on fighting,the Arrow War(also known as the second Opium War)was approaching a denouement,as a combined British and French force seized the Dagu fortresses,which protected the seaborne approaches to Tianjin,and in early September marched towards Beijing repeatedly defeating Qing armies on the battlefield. The foreign invasion of the north coincided with a resurgence of the Taiping rebellion in the lower Yangzi region,with major rebellions festering on the north China plain and in the Southwest.For anyone remotely familiar with history,the eerie combination of domestic uprising and foreign invasion,bore all of the characteristics of a dynastic collapse. 8 The concept of semi-colonialism(and its alter ego informal empire)is system- atically developed in Jurgen Osterhammel,Semi-Colonalism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China:Towards a Framework of Analysis'in Imperialism and After:Continuities and Discontinuities,ed.Wolfgang Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel (London:1986);see also Osterhammel,Britain and China 1842-1914'in The Oxford History ofthe British Empire,Volume III:The Nineteenth Century,ed.Andrew Porter(Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999),146-69. 9 Bruner et al.,240-4;Richard S.Horowitz,Mandarins and Customs Inspectors,' Papers on Chinese History,7 (1998):43-4-
552 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ and threats from other powers, deft political maneuvering maximized Hart’s autonomy and authority.8 I In the summer of 1861 Robert Hart made his first important political alliances. He traveled to Beijing in place of his boss, H. N. Lay, who had departed on leave to England. Hart stayed at the new British Legation as the guest of British Minister Frederick Bruce, whose support would later be crucial to Hart’s promotion to the position of Inspector General. Even more importantly he had numerous meetings with Wenxiang, a Grand Councilor and the working leader of the new Zongli Yamen, and briefer sessions with Prince Gong, which gave Hart a chance to explain the operations of the Customs Service and discuss plans for its expansion to new treaty ports.9 The evidence available suggests that they hit it off exceptionally well. Although Hart probably did not realize it at the time, he had happened into ideal sponsors: for the pair were a rising force in Qing politics. Less than a year earlier, in the August and September of 1860, the Qing dynasty had been in the midst of its greatest crisis. After four years of off and on fighting, the Arrow War (also known as the second Opium War) was approaching a denouement, as a combined British and French force seized the Dagu fortresses, which protected the seaborne approaches to Tianjin, and in early September marched towards Beijing repeatedly defeating Qing armies on the battlefield. The foreign invasion of the north coincided with a resurgence of the Taiping rebellion in the lower Yangzi region, with major rebellions festering on the north China plain and in the Southwest. For anyone remotely familiar with history, the eerie combination of domestic uprising and foreign invasion, bore all of the characteristics of a dynastic collapse. 8 The concept of semi-colonialism (and its alter ego informal empire) is systematically developed in Jurgen Osterhammel, ‘Semi-Colonalism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis’ in Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel (London: 1986); see also Osterhammel, ‘Britain and China 1842–1914’ in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 146–69. 9 Bruner et al., 240–4; Richard S. Horowitz, ‘Mandarins and Customs Inspectors,’ Papers on Chinese History, 7 (1998): 43–4
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 553 As the situation deteriorated at the end of the summer,a fierce debate broke out at court over whether the emperor should remain in Beijing,or flee to the Imperial hunting retreat at Rehe.Proponents of the retreat,including the leading Grand Councilor Sushun,and the General Senggelinqin,insisted that such an approach would get the emperor out of harm's way and avoid humiliation.Opponents, including Wenxiang,then an obscure Manchu official who had been appointed to the Emperor's chief advisory body,the Grand Council,two years earlier,feared that the emperor's departure would induce panic and government authority might disintegrate-and by implication would induce a dynastic collapse.10 And,as Wenxiang would later recall,with no easily defensible passes between Beijing and Rehe,where we could go,they could go.Our strength was utterly inadequate.'After vacillating briefly,the Xianfeng Emperor decided to flee accompanied by the bulk of his senior officials.A disappointed Wenxiang asked for permission to remain in the capital to keep order. The Emperor assented,placing Wenxiang in charge of the Beijing Gendarmerie,and assigned him,together with Prince Gong (the Emperor's younger brother),and a veteran official Guiliang(Prince Gong's father-in-law)to negotiate a settlement with the invading forces. This was a precarious assignment to say the least.Following the Emperor's departure Wenxiang returned to the city and found that the troops had not received rations for days,and 'I could hear the sound of people seething with insurrection from among the small lanes [of the city],and already there was looting.'Wenxiang opened the granaries and issued rations,and ordered the gendarmes to arrest looters and execute them on the spot.12 Order was gradually restored within the walled city,although banditry persisted outside.Prince Gong, Wenxiang and Guiliang established an ad hoc Peace Commission office,drafting into service middle and lower ranking officials who had remained in Beijing.The Peace Commission negotiated on one hand with the British and French,and on the other with the Russians, who had taken advantage of the situation to press their demands for redefining the northern boundaries.The negotiations went reasonably 10 The documents for this debate are in Chouban yiwu shimo,xianfeng (Chengdu Zhonghua shuju,1980)[hereafter YWSM-XF]7:2269-2301. Wenxiang,Wen wenzhong gong ziding nianpu'in idem.,Wen wenzhong gong shilue (-3ah
CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS 553 As the situation deteriorated at the end of the summer, a fierce debate broke out at court over whether the emperor should remain in Beijing, or flee to the Imperial hunting retreat at Rehe. Proponents of the retreat, including the leading Grand Councilor Sushun, and the General Senggelinqin, insisted that such an approach would get the emperor out of harm’s way and avoid humiliation. Opponents, including Wenxiang, then an obscure Manchu official who had been appointed to the Emperor’s chief advisory body, the Grand Council, two years earlier, feared that the emperor’s departure would induce panic and government authority might disintegrate—and by implication would induce a dynastic collapse.10 And, as Wenxiang would later recall, with no easily defensible passes between Beijing and Rehe, ‘where we could go, they could go. Our strength was utterly inadequate.’11 After vacillating briefly, the Xianfeng Emperor decided to flee accompanied by the bulk of his senior officials. A disappointed Wenxiang asked for permission to remain in the capital to keep order. The Emperor assented, placing Wenxiang in charge of the Beijing Gendarmerie, and assigned him, together with Prince Gong (the Emperor’s younger brother), and a veteran official Guiliang (Prince Gong’s father-in-law) to negotiate a settlement with the invading forces. This was a precarious assignment to say the least. Following the Emperor’s departure Wenxiang returned to the city and found that the troops had not received rations for days, and ‘I could hear the sound of people seething with insurrection from among the small lanes [of the city], and already there was looting.’ Wenxiang opened the granaries and issued rations, and ordered the gendarmes to arrest looters and execute them on the spot.12 Order was gradually restored within the walled city, although banditry persisted outside. Prince Gong, Wenxiang and Guiliang established an ad hoc Peace Commission office, drafting into service middle and lower ranking officials who had remained in Beijing. The Peace Commission negotiated on one hand with the British and French, and on the other with the Russians, who had taken advantage of the situation to press their demands for redefining the northern boundaries. The negotiations went reasonably 10 The documents for this debate are in Chouban yiwu shimo, xianfeng (Chengdu Zhonghua shuju, 1980) [hereafter YWSM-XF] 7:2269–2301. 11 Wenxiang, ‘Wen wenzhong gong ziding nianpu’ in idem., Wen wenzhong gong shilue (n.p. 1882), 2:32–32b. 12 Ibid., 2:33