recorded history.3 They have taken many forms,including city states,empires, theocracies,feudal domains and so on.In modern times (the last 300 years or so)one kind of state has come to predominate,what Charles Tilly calls the national state.A national state is a state which controls a well defined and continuous territory,is relatively centralized and differentiated from other organizations,and reinforces its claims by attempting to acquire a monopoly of coercive means in that territory.In other words,this is the kind of state with which we are all familiar:substantial in size,with clearly defined borders,and ruled by a visible central governing authority.The national state must be distinguished from the more common term of nation-state,which implies a state whose people share a strong common identity -by no means all national states are nation-states.4 Beyond this rather simple organizational definition,modern national states are distinct from their predecessors in an important respect:the state has far greater power over the society it rules.Some caution is necessary here.The sociologist Michael Mann makes a valuable distinction between two different aspects of state power:despotic power and infrastructural power.Despotic power refers to the range of actions the state can undertake without routine negotiation with groups in civil society.If despotic power is high,civil society groups have little established ability to stop arbitrary actions by state elites.Infrastructural power refers to the ability of the state to penetrate society,to This definition is based on Max Weber,"Politics as a Vocation"in H.H.Gerth and C.Wright Mills,eds,From Ma:Weber:Essays in Sociology (New York:Oxford University Press,1946),78. A Charles Tilly,"Introduction"in Charles Tilly,ed.,The Formation ofNational States in Western Europe,(Princeton,1975),p.27.On the distinction between the nation-state and the national state,see Tilly,Coercion,Capital,and European States,AD 990-1992,(Oxford:Blackwell,1992),pp.2-3
4 recorded history.3 They have taken many forms, including city states, empires, theocracies, feudal domains and so on. In modem times (the last 300 years or so) one kind of state has come to predominate, what Charles Tilly calls the national state. A national state is a state which controls a well defined and continuous territory, is relatively centralized and differentiated from other organizations, and reinforces its claims by attempting to acquire a monopoly of coercive means in that territory. In other words, this is the kind of state with which we are all familiar: substantial in size, with clearly defined borders, and ruled by a visible central governing authority. The national state must be distinguished from the more common term of nation-state, which implies a state whose people share a strong common identity - by no means all national states are nation-states.4 Beyond this rather simple organizational definition, modem national states are distinct from their predecessors in an important respect: the state has far greater power over the society it rules. Some caution is necessary here. The sociologist Michael Mann makes a valuable distinction between two different aspects of state power: despotic power and infrastructural power. Despotic power refers to the range of actions the state can undertake without routine negotiation with groups in civil society. If despotic power is high, civil society groups have little established ability to stop arbitrary actions by state elites. Infrastructural power refers to the ability of the state to penetrate society, to 3 This definition is based on Max Weber. "Politics as a Vocation" in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. cds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press. 1946). 78. 4 Charles Tilly. "Introduction" in Charles Tilly. cd .• The Formation o/National States in Western Europe, (Princeton. 1975), p. 27. On the distinction between the nation-state and the national state, see Tilly. Coercion, Capital. and European States. AD 990-1992, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 2-3
5 implement its political decisions throughout its territory.The two kinds of state power do not necessarily coincide.The state in late imperial China was despotically strong but infrastructurally very weak:there was no limit to the arbitrary power of the emperor,but the capacity of the state to actually implement decisions routinely throughout the empire was quite limited.By contrast,modern democracies are despotically weak and infrastructurally very strong.The state has a very high degree of infrastructural power- for example the ability to deduct taxes directly from our salaries--but law courts and elected legislatures(themselves part of the state)severely restrict the ability of the state's officers to act arbitrarily.There has been a trade off:to get infrastructural power,states need to get the cooperation or at least acquiescence of key classes and segments in society,and in order to get that they accept limitations on their despotic power. Generally speaking modemn national states,ranging in form from liberal democracies to fascist dictatorships to communist one party states,have all demonstrated a high level of infrastructural power,but the degree of despotic power has varied widely. One of the characteristics of modern times is that virtually all people live in national states.Where just a few centuries ago a great variety of state formations existed,now virtually all other forms of political organization have gone into eclipse. The national state first came to predominate in Europe in the eighteenth century,a product of the competitive state system.As Europe began to expand outward,old states s Michael Mann,Sources of Social Power.,Volume Two,The Rise ofClasses and Nation States (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993)pp.59-63.See also Mann,"The Autonomous Power of the State:its Origins,Mechanisms,and Results,"in John A.Hall,ed.,States in Fistory (Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1986),113-119
5 implement its political decisions throughout its territory. The two kinds of state power do not necessarily coincide. The state in late imperial China was despotically strong but inftastructurally very weak: there was no limit to the arbitrary power of the emperor, but the capacity of the state to actually implement decisions routinely throughout the empire was quite limited. By contrast, modem democracies are despotically weak and inftastructurally very strong. The state has a very high degree of infi'astructural power - for example the ability to deduct taxes directly from our salaries - but law courts and elected legislatures (themselves part of the state) severely restrict the ability of the state's officers to act arbitrarily. There has been a trade off: to get infrastructural power, states need to get the cooperation or at least acquiescence of key classes and segments in society, and in order to get that they accept limitations on their despotic power. Generally speaking modem national states, ranging in form from liberal democracies to fascist dictatorships to communist one party states, have all demonstrated a high level of inftastructural power, but the degree of despotic power has varied widely.s One of the characteristics of modem times is that virtually all people live in national states. Where just a few centuries ago a great variety of state formations existed, now virtually all other forms of political organization have gone into eclipse. The national state first came to predominate in Europe in the eighteenth century, a product of the competitive state system. As Europe began to expand outward, old states 5 Michael Mann, Sources o/Social Power., Volume 1Wo, The Rise o/Classes and Nation States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 59-63. See also Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results," in lohn A. Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 113-119
6 were wiped out and tribal groups incorporated into new colonial structures in some areas; European emigrants created the core of new states in others.In the twentieth century, European empires contracted and former colonies were turned into new"nations"remade in Europe's image-the national state.For those areas of the non-Westem world that avoided colonialism,like Japan,China,and Turkey,there was little choice but to accept western standards,and rebuild their polities and conduct their foreign relations in conformance with European standards;again national states were formed. State Making To get at the puzzle of why state making has been such a problem in modern China,it is worth considering the European experience in some detail.The emergence of the national state is one of the basic transformations in the history of modern Europe.In 1500 there were roughly 200 political entities in Europe-city states,dynastic empires, feudal principalities-by 1918 there were just 25,virtually all national states.How did a profusion of different political forms all tum into moder states with centralized governments,capable of penetrating society and mobilizing massive quantities of money,material and labor for its own purposes?Charles Tilly in Coercion,Capital,and In this dissertation I use the term state making(following Tilly)to mean the process by which a state's capacities to mobilize and distribute resources are increased."State building,"another term commonly used,seems to me denote a more conscious process than is apparent in either early moder Europe or China in the 1860s and 1870s.Tilly,it should be noted,uses state making in two senses--as I define it above,and to describe a state's efforts to destroy internal rivals. Tilly,Coercion,Capital,and European States,pp.45-46
6 were wiped out and tribal groups incorporated into new colonial structures in some areas; European emigrants created the core of new states in others. In the twentieth century, European empires contracted and former colonies were turned into new "nations" remade in Europe's image - the national state. For those areas of the non-Western world that avoided colonialism, like Japan, China, and Turkey, there was little choice but to accept western standards, and rebuild their polities and conduct their foreign relations in conformance with European standards; again national states were formed. State Making To get at the puzzle of why state making6 has been such a problem in modem China, it is worth considering the European experience in some detail. The emergence of the national state is one of the basic transformations in the history of modem Europe. In 1500 there were roughly 200 political entities in Europe - city states, dynastic empires, feudal principalities - by 1918 there were just 25, virtually all national states. 7 How did a profusion of different political forms all tum into modem states with centralized governments, capable of penetrating society and mobilizing massive quantities of money, material and labor for its own purposes? Charles Tilly in Coercion, Capital, and 6 In this dissertation I use the tcnn state making (following Tilly) to mean the process by which a state's capacities to mobilize and distribute resources are increased. "State building," another term commonly used, seems to me denote a more conscious process than is apparent in either early modern Europe or China in the 18605 and 18705. Tilly, it should be noted, uses state making in two senses - as I define it above, and to describe a state's efforts to destroy internal rivals. 7 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European Slates, pp. 45-46
7 European States proposes a sophisticated and historically informed model for understanding this process. Tilly's analysis is based on a rather simple functional model of what states do.He argues that there are four basic state functions: state making:eliminating or neutralizing challengers within the territory claimed by the state; war making:eliminating or neutralizing rivals outside of the territory claimed by the state; protection:attacking and checking the rivals of the ruler's principal allies both inside and outside of the state's territory;and extraction:obtaining the material means for carrying on the other functions through taxation,etc. Tilly acknowledges that states do get involved in three other functions,adjudication (resolving disputes among its subjects),distribution (of economic goods among its subjects),and production (state monopolies and the manufacture of weaponry,etc.).But he argues that because they used only a small fraction of the state's resources,these are relatively unimportant until the twentieth century when "they went from trivial to tremendous,"as states took a growing interest in social welfare and economic activity. Geopolitics was crucial in driving the creation of national states.Put simply, states in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe faced intense external pressure; It should be noted that Tilly draws on a long tradition of statist analyses going back to early twentieth century scholars like Joseph Schumpeter and Otto Hintze,and also draws heavily on the contributions to Formation ofNational States.See my longer review of Tilly and Mann's recent work in Richard S.Horowitz,"State Making Theory and Modern Chinese History,"Jindai zhongguo shi yanjiu tongxun,19(1995):84-98.For a summary discussion of the theoretical background see John A.Hall, "Introduction"in Hall,ed.,States in History,1-11. Tilly,Coercion,pp.96-97.The quote is taken from page 97. This paragraph,except when otherwise noted,is drawn from Tilly,Coercion,chs.3-4
European States proposes a sophisticated and historically informed model for understanding this process. 8 7 Tilly's analysis is based on a rather simple functional model of what states do. He argues that there are four basic state functions: state making: eliminating or neutralizing challengers within the territory claimed by the state; war making: eliminating or neutralizing rivals outside of the territory claimed by the state; protection: attacking and checking the rivals of the ruler's principal allies both inside and outside of the state's territory; and extraction: obtaining the material means for carrying on the other functions through taxation, etc. Tilly acknowledges that states do get involved in three other functions, adjudication (resolving disputes among its subjects), distribution (of economic goods among its subjects), and production (state monopolies and the manufacture of weaponry, etc.). But he argues that because they used only a small fraction of the state's resources, these are relatively unimportant until the twentieth century when ''they went from trivial to . tremendous," as states took a growing interest in social welfare and economic activity. 9 Geopolitics was crucial in driving the creation of national states. IO Put simply, states in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe faced intense external pressure; I It should be noted that Tilly draws on a long tradition of statist analyses going back to early twentieth century scholars like 10seph Schumpeter and Otto Hintze, and also draws heavily on the contributions to Formation of Nation a! States. See my longer review of Tilly and Mann's recent work in Richard S. Horowitz, "State Making Theory and Modem Chinese History." Jindai zhongguo shi yanjiu tongxun, 19 (1995): 84-98. For a summary discussion of the theoretical background see 10hn A. Hall. "Introduction" in Hall, ed., States in History, 1-11. 9 Tilly, Coercion. pp. 96-97. The quote is taken from page 97. 10 This paragraph. except when otherwise noted, is drawn from Tilly. Coercion. cbs. 3-4
.8 warfare among them was almost constant.To finance war making,states had to find new sources of revenue.In 1700 major European states absorbed about 5%of the GNP in peacetime and 10%in wartime;by 1760 this had risen to between 15%-25%;by 1810 it had risen to between 25 and 35%of the GNP.In 1810--at the height of the Napoleonic Wars armies comprised about 5%of the total population of major European states.These extraction rates are identical to those of the two world wars of this century.The demand for both increased revenue and the support of a war machine forced the creation of larger and more elaborate bureaucracies.Inevitably these demands of the growing fiscal- military state generated opposition from within society.To implement its policies a state either had to crush its opposition by force,or compromise and buy the support of key classes or segments of society by making concessions and allowing them greater say in the processes of government.Individual concessions,like a largely powerless parliament, might seem minor,but over time as the process was repeated,states were increasingly constrained in their activities.In other words,constitutional development (i.e.the evolution of the usually unwritten understanding of the rights and powers of various groups in society)was a product of the struggle for control of the resources needed to make war. National states were formed out of necessity:no other kind of political structure could survive in the environment of the European system.States that were unable to do this disappeared,defeated in battle or forced to become part of larger states.Of course Michael Mann,"Nation States in Europe and Other Continents:Diversifying,Developing,Not Dying,"Daedalus,122.3(1993):117;based on Austria-Hungary,France,Great Britain,Prussia/Germany, and the United States
8 warfare among them was almost constant. To finance war making, states had to find new sources of revenue. In 1700 major European states absorbed about 5% of the GNP in peacetime and 10% in wartime; by 1760 this had risen to between 150/0-25%; by 1810 it had risen to between 25 and 35% of the GNP. In 1810 - at the height of the Napoleonic Wars armies comprised about 5% of the total population of major European states. These extraction rates are identical to those of the two world wars of this century.11 The demand for both increased revenue and the support of a war machine forced the creation of larger and more elaborate bureaucracies. Inevitably these demands of the growing tiscalmilitary state generated opposition from within society. To implement its policies ~ state either had to crush its opposition by force, or compromise and buy the support of key classes or segments of society by making concessions and allowing them greater say in the processes of government. Individual concessions, like a largely powerless parliament, might seem minor, but over time as the process was repeated, states were increasingly constrained in their activities. In other words, constitutional development (Le. the evolution of the usually unwritten understanding of the rights and powers of various groups in society) was a product of the struggle for control of the resources needed to make war. National states were formed out of necessity: no other kind of political structure could survive in the environment of the European system. States that were unable to do this disappeared, defeated in battle or forced to become part of larger states. Of course II Michael Mann. "Nation States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying. Developing. Not Dying." Daedalus. 122.3 (1993):117; based on Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, PrussialGennany. and the United States