Article ology Review "Because I Am Worth It":A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Review of a Justification-Based Account of Self- Regulation Failure SAGE Jessie C.De Witt Huberts,Catharine Evers', and Denise T.D.De Ridder Abstract Sef-regulation failure is ofen explained as being overwhelmed by impulse.The present article proposes a novel pathwa mework an empiri eview of a justificati d account of self-regulatio failure.With n w ng pa ng a se on of the oa they endorse.Accordingly rather than inhibiti the reflective system can also facilitate them,leading to self-regulation failure.We bring together empirical evidenc e from ins de ng that regul lure and rule out alt ative accounts Having fuel the effect.finally s for future arch and ons of these self-regulation are discussed. Ciregrionsheaionproceses.sefregthionfhilre,eficening rds Meet Sally mark and marey The unable The newly wed c best man Mark will propose a toast and the real gest that an impulsive breakdown of the self-control system an b d by the we dding cake,but only route to self Despite ving in d ies. oes not s-r avert ind ingly nervous about the speech he is about to give.not sure on a justification.These examples ilustrate that sometime whether his jokes are indeed funny.The nerves make him people actively relent their tha crave n cotine is off-limits since he qui e sel g on justif tions to permit them all night.While she 、her friends ntheir drinks While this notior has a al to many of u she regrets her offer to be the designated driver surprisingly,the role of justifications has been afforded rdly any attention as an explanation for self-regulation piece:I ure on that he is allo to have cigarettes in er cies and h sires as an nlanation for Finally,when everybody abandoning long-term goals.While we acknowledge the raises the as falls o he ban t having 'Utrecht University.the Netherlands Most contemporary self-regulation theories would explain ity.Heidelberglaan I.P.O.Box failure to act in accordance with one's long-term goals as the esult of our impulses taking precedence ove reflective Emwitthubuni-potsdam.de 304
Personality and Social Psychology Review 2014, Vol. 18(2) 119–138 © 2013 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1088868313507533 pspr.sagepub.com Article Meet Sally, Mark, and Marcy. They are at a wedding party. The newly wed couple is about to cut the cake after which best man Mark will propose a toast and the real celebrations can begin. Sally is mesmerized by the wedding cake, but is in doubt as she is on a weight-loss diet that does not allow such tasty but unhealthy delicacies. Mark is getting increasingly nervous about the speech he is about to give, not sure whether his jokes are indeed funny. The nerves make him crave nicotine, but a cigarette is off-limits since he quit smoking 6 weeks ago. Marcy has been sipping soda water all night. While she sees her friends enjoying their drinks, she regrets her offer to be the designated driver. When the cake is cut, Sally decides that she will have a piece: It is a celebratory occasion after all. Mark also finally caves in and asks his friend for a cigarette, telling himself that he is allowed to have cigarettes in emergencies and, according to Mark, this is one. Finally, when everybody raises their glass for the toast, Marcy also falls of the bandwagon and has a glass of champagne, reasoning that having just one glass will not interfere with her ability to drive. Most contemporary self-regulation theories would explain failure to act in accordance with one’s long-term goals as the result of our impulses taking precedence over reflective considerations, rendering us unable to resist the lure of immediate temptations. However, the above examples suggest that an impulsive breakdown of the self-control system is not the only route to self-regulation failure. Despite having the self-regulation capacity to avert indulgence, Marcy, Sally, and Mark abandoned their long-term goals by relying on a justification. These examples illustrate that sometimes people actively relent their self-regulation efforts, rather than lose self-control, by relying on justifications to permit themselves an otherwise forbidden pleasure. While this notion has a familiar appeal to many of us, surprisingly, the role of justifications has been afforded hardly any attention as an explanation for self-regulation failure. Instead, research on self-regulation failure has, to date, mainly focused on the relative strength of impulses for the gratification of immediate desires as an explanation for abandoning long-term goals. While we acknowledge the 507533 PSRXXX10.1177/1088868313507533Personality and Social Psychology ReviewDe Witt Huberts et al. research-article2013 1 Utrecht University, the Netherlands Corresponding Author: Jessie C. de Witt Huberts, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 1, P.O. Box 80140, Utrecht, 3508 TC, the Netherlands. Email: witthub@uni-potsdam.de “Because I Am Worth It”: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Review of a Justification-Based Account of SelfRegulation Failure Jessie C. De Witt Huberts1 , Catharine Evers1 , and Denise T. D. De Ridder1 Abstract Self-regulation failure is often explained as being overwhelmed by impulse. The present article proposes a novel pathway, presenting a theoretical framework and empirical review of a justification-based account of self-regulation failure. With justification we refer to making excuses for one’s discrepant behavior, so that when experiencing a self-regulation dilemma between immediate impulses and long-term intentions, people resolve the conflict by developing and employing justifications that allow violations of the goal they endorse. Accordingly, rather than inhibiting motivations from the impulsive system, the reflective system can also facilitate them, leading to self-regulation failure. We bring together empirical evidence from various domains demonstrating that justifications can instigate self-regulation failure and rule out alternative accounts. Having established that justification processes contribute to self-regulation failure, we then propose several mechanisms that may fuel the effect. Finally, routes for future research and the conceptual and practical implications of these novel insights for self-regulation are discussed. Keywords self-regulation, justification processes, self-regulation failure, self-licensing Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
120 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) our self-contr (Strack De sch.2004)These labels char izo the cesses underlving self-regulatory success or failure in terms of a deliberate,slow,and rational system and an impulsive, throug fast,and emotion system (Metcalfe Mischel.1999 theyorTherefore determined by the interplay of ahot"system and a we postulate that reflective processes,in addition to impu system.The hot system is activated in response to hedon sive forees,can play a su antial role in s With cally appealing d.unless counteracte d by the co ve refer to the str s for self-reo active long-term considerations will have room to facilitate ulation failure before actual enactment so that the failure is esistance of temptations.Along the same lines,the refle made tive-impulsiv Deutsch,200 n neg 24 Verth odel of behavior(Strack ngu d in othat int In the present article.we present a theoretical analysis and resources are limited.behaviorill be predomi- empirical review of justific ation processes in self-regulation mantly guided by the impulsive system which relies on failure exploring deeper r the observation that failre is mplicit automat However vell We will fir owing for and short overview of the conventional frameworks of self-reg Although these models do not have explicit predictions ation and specify the roe of reflective processe s in them.I for the outc me of the processes in terms of self-regulator v the nom that fuel the effect.Finally,we will discuss important issues raised by this novel perspective and sketch directions for 0 ,whereas the】 reflective system hol des an Self-Regulation as We Know It failure while the reflective system mainly guides behavior in ine with one's (e.g. At the he self-regulat tion lies long-goals 2005 e such self n din th vat the rty to ch between incompatible motivations, where on one hand the soda water (followngher intention)over the champagn on the The 20 to cont ofhis intention to quit smoking.As such.self-regulation fail this is reflected by the inc sing prevalence of societal prob ure is commonly conceptualized as resulting from an inabil 02 such as obesity(Fl Carroll,Ogde ty of the system t ula the echsler,Lee edomi the like.To explain why people so frequently seem unable to determinants of failure stemming either from an veractive act as they intend,many models of self gulation hav impulsive system (e.g.. ,emotional and visceral influ nces al-p ew t as gained prom cy, Chaike of indicator &To 100G in 1994:Smith Decoster 20001 ive load Although each dual-pro ess model has its own unique con For example,the limited resource model (Muraven& tentions they share that self-regulation is neister, 000)postulates that our self by pro ted,the imp have been desc ibed ue a variety of term such as reflex state ter d eo ive versus reflective (Lieberman,2007).hot versus reflective system to successfully divert the detrimental influ (Metcalfe&Mischel,1999),and impulsive versus reflective ence of impulses,effort and control are needed.As a result
120 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) power of impulses in impairing our self-control capacities, we contend that the implicit assumption that the impulsive system is solely responsible for failing to carry through longterm goals is incomplete. People often fail to follow through on their long-term goals not merely because of lack of willpower or being overwhelmed by impulse, but rather because they generate reasons for giving in to temptations. Therefore, we postulate that reflective processes, in addition to impulsive forces, can play a substantial role in self-regulation failure by relying on justification processes. With justification, we refer to the strategic employment of reasons for self-regulation failure before actual enactment so that the failure is made acceptable to oneself. Thus far, this route to self-regulation failure has been neglected in both the self-regulation literature and in dual-process theories. In the present article, we present a theoretical analysis and empirical review of justification processes in self-regulation failure, exploring deeper the observation that failure is not solely the consequence of impulsive factors, but that reflective processes can contribute as well. We will first give a short overview of the conventional frameworks of self-regulation and specify the role of reflective processes in them. In the following section, we review the empirical evidence for justification processes in self-regulation and kindred phenomena, followed by an analysis of potential mechanisms that fuel the effect. Finally, we will discuss important issues raised by this novel perspective and sketch directions for future research. Self-Regulation as We Know It At the heart of self-regulation lies the ability to transcend immediate temptations in the service of long-term goals. As such, self-regulation dilemmas typically involve a conflict between incompatible motivations, where on one hand hedonic attraction pulls toward indulgence, while on the other hand rational norms concerning the conflicting longterm goal dictate to resist the hedonic urge (e.g., Fujita, 2011; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). That people often fail at this is reflected by the increasing prevalence of societal problems such as obesity (Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, & Johnson, 2002), credit card debt (Bird, Hagstrom, & Wild, 1999), binge drinking (Wechsler, Lee, Nelson, & Kuo, 2002), and the like. To explain why people so frequently seem unable to act as they intend, many models of self-regulation have adopted the dual-process view that has gained prominence in explaining all types of psychological processes (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Although each dual-process model has its own unique contentions, they share the postulation that self-regulation is determined by two fundamentally different processes that compete for control over behavior. These differing processes have been described using a variety of terms, such as reflexive versus reflective (Lieberman, 2007), hot versus cool (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), and impulsive versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). These labels characterize the processes underlying self-regulatory success or failure in terms of a deliberate, slow, and rational system and an impulsive, fast, and emotional system. To illustrate, the hot/cool systems theory (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) proposes that self-regulatory behavior is determined by the interplay of a “hot” system and a “cool” system. The hot system is activated in response to hedonically appealing stimuli, and, unless counteracted by the cool system, will stimulate indulgence. When the cool system is active, long-term considerations will have room to facilitate resistance of temptations. Along the same lines, the reflective-impulsive model of behavior (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006) distinguishes a rational and an impulsive route that interact to determine behavior; when cognitive resources are limited, behavior will be predominantly guided by the impulsive system which relies on implicit automatic preferences. However, when cognitive resources are available, the reflective system will take over, allowing for rational choices and explicit intentions. Although these models do not have explicit predictions for the outcome of the processes in terms of self-regulatory success or failure, and thus leave open the possibility of a reflective pathway to self-regulation failure, this has hardly been followed up in the literature. Instead, the contention that the impulsive system hosts automatic affective reactions, whereas the reflective system holds a person’s explicit attitudes and standards, has led to the interpretation that the impulsive system is mainly responsible for self-regulation failure while the reflective system mainly guides behavior in line with one’s long-term goals (e.g., Bechara, 2005; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Hofmann et al., 2009; Hofmann, Friese, & Wiers, 2008). Accordingly, the reflective system would lead Marcy at the wedding party to choose the soda water (following her intention) over the champagne (what she longs for at that moment). The impulsive system on the other hand would leave Mark unable to control his cigarette craving before his speech (his impulse), losing sight of his intention to quit smoking. As such, self-regulation failure is commonly conceptualized as resulting from an inability of the reflective system to modulate the effects of impulsive processes. Consequently, the extensive literature on self-regulation failure now consists predominantly of determinants of failure stemming either from an overactive impulsive system (e.g., emotional and visceral influences, reward saliency, habitualness), or of indicators of a deficient reflective system (e.g., after alcohol consumption or under high cognitive load). For example, the limited resource model (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) postulates that our self-control resources are limited and when those resources are depleted, the impulsive system takes over leaving us unable to control our impulses, a state termed ego-depletion. Conversely, for the reflective system to successfully divert the detrimental influence of impulses, effort and control are needed. As a result, Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
De Witt Huberts et al 121 the reflective system can only operate when sufficient Acknowledging the limits of reason puts the assumption resources are availab an idea that is supported by findings that reflective processes would lead to the enact ment of our demonstrating that higher working memory another perspective.Although chm and in 2004)it has not h &Wiers.2009:Wiers.Beckers.Houben.&Hofmann.2009) tematically incorporated into models of self-regulation or weaken the impact ofimpulsive process d thus strengthen reflected in the self-regulation lite ture (see Kivetz elf-control (s ofmann, g,200 oulsive and reflective proc sses the metanhor of a horse failure in re ition of the idea that rather than reig ino in and rider is often used to describe self-regulation,where the the horse,the rider sometimes encourages it to steer us away horse symbolizes t impulsive system that has to be reignec from our long-term goals in by a reflectve rally inferred fom dual process models bet reen the impulsive system being mainly Introducing a Justification-Based Mechanism of Self-Regulation Failure avior,is bog cha industrilized society are pres ehe adant ive to the s behavior may produce bad outcomes.For example,counter ously faced with temntations thre ning thes theory (Fishba ch,Friedman,Kruglansk Sally for example experiences a conflict bet en what sh ）rg of te wants at th ent(the ad).st-term failure but instead can bo st self-regulation by automatically ing to resist her urge to indulge in the cake.an effortful pr aw Vohs (01 cess that leads to effective self-regulation.Altematively,she the t ct h he ed out as a strategie means of reaching a goal for s tha hy their slow a teenager nave to self-control to over- lytical and strategic nature would be considered a product of the s of ni the reflective system in the tradition dual-pre ess model In othe wh dua for one's diserenant behavior hefore actual enactment such e routet that the prospective failure is made acceptable for oneself.In we will othe words regulatio dilemma goal defving hehs Sne that by relying on justifications to set a side long-term Afte can play asu al role all,wanting to do something is a prerequisite but not es to self ulation filur tification 11 could contribute to a more compreher sive picture of the he one's de e to act on one's imnulses is in nflict with ous ways people fail to act as they intend. one's desire to achieve a long-term goal.iustifications can can contribu .o gger action by liberating people toact on their short-term Not only is our rationality bounded (Simon.1982)but rea self-regulation dilemma is crucial to trigger ustification oning suboptima esse Without motivations arising from our impulsive ).Mo (e.g.,W Sch system that interfere with ou by our motivations and desires (Hsee.1995:Kunda.1990) she ted h ch As such,reflective processes can also contribute to"irratic decorated wedding cake,removing the need for justifica tions. Likewise,if Sally would not have a long-term weight-loss goal,she has no reason to try to resist the urge
De Witt Huberts et al. 121 the reflective system can only operate when sufficient resources are available, an idea that is supported by findings demonstrating that higher working memory capacity (Grenard et al., 2008; Hofmann, Gschwender, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008), and interference control capacity (Houben & Wiers, 2009; Wiers, Beckers, Houben, & Hofmann, 2009) weaken the impact of impulsive processes and thus strengthen self-control (see Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012, for an overview). To describe this delicate interplay between impulsive and reflective processes the metaphor of a horse and rider is often used to describe self-regulation, where the horse symbolizes the impulsive system that has to be reigned in by a reflective rider. However, the distinction generally inferred from dualprocess models between the impulsive system being mainly responsible for bad behavior and the reflective system being the producer of good behavior, is increasingly being challenged. Recent theorizing suggests that impulsive behavior can sometimes be adaptive to the same extent that reflective behavior may produce bad outcomes. For example, counteractive control theory (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003) argues that resistance of temptations can be the result of automatic processes, demonstrating that confrontation with a temptation does not impulsively lead to self-regulation failure but instead can boost self-regulation by automatically activating long-term goals. Likewise, Rawn and Vohs (2011) recently argued that some actions commonly labeled as selfregulation failure such as smoking and drinking alcohol may be carried out as a strategic means of reaching a goal. For instance, a teenager may have to exert self-control to overcome the initial aversive effects of nicotine in order to belong to his peers, in which case smoking can be defined as an act of self-regulation. In other words, whereas dual-process models of self-regulation mostly focus on a reflective route toward effective self-regulation and an impulsive route to failure, alternative routes are possible. In this article, we will focus on the role of the reflective system in facilitating longterm goal defying behavior more closely. Specifically, we posit that by relying on justifications to set aside long-term goals, reflective processes can play a substantial role in selfregulation failure. Together with the already established routes to self-regulation failure, justifications processes could contribute to a more comprehensive picture of the various ways people fail to act as they intend. The observation that the reflective system can contribute to self-regulation failure is in fact not surprising when the limitations of our reasoning capacities are taken into account. Not only is our rationality bounded (Simon, 1982) but reasoning can even lead to suboptimal outcomes or outcomes not in line with our self-interests (e.g., Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Moreover, our reasoning processes are often guided by our motivations and desires (Hsee, 1995; Kunda, 1990). As such, reflective processes can also contribute to “irrational” choices (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Simon, 1990, 1992). Acknowledging the limits of reason puts the assumption that reflective processes would lead to the enactment of our explicit goals in another perspective. Although this notion has been recognized in some dual-process models of selfregulation (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004), it has not been systematically incorporated into models of self-regulation or reflected in the self-regulation literature (see Kivetz & Zheng, 2006, for an exception). In this article, we will consider the evidence for this additional route to self-regulation failure, in recognition of the idea that rather than reigning in the horse, the rider sometimes encourages it to steer us away from our long-term goals. Introducing a Justification-Based Mechanism of Self-Regulation Failure More than ever, people in Western industrialized society are confronted with conflicting motivational pressures. People hold goals to be thin, athletic, productive or successful but are continuously faced with temptations threatening these goals. Sally for example experiences a conflict between what she wants at that moment (the wedding cake) and what she should do to reach her long-term aims (skip the cake and go for the crudités instead). She could resolve this conflict by attempting to resist her urge to indulge in the cake, an effortful process that leads to effective self-regulation. Alternatively, she could resolve the motivational conflict by creating or activating justifications that allow her to indulge in the chocolate cake. As such, justification processes that by their slow, analytical and strategic nature would be considered a product of the reflective system in the traditional dual-process model distinction, can contribute to self-regulation failure. With justification, we refer to the act of making excuses for one’s discrepant behavior before actual enactment, such that the prospective failure is made acceptable for oneself. In other words, when experiencing a self-regulation dilemma between immediate impulses and long-term intentions, people resolve the conflict by developing and employing justifications that allow violations of the goal they endorse. After all, wanting to do something is a prerequisite but not sufficient for action; “one must also feel licensed to do it” (Miller & Effron, 2010, p. 115). As such, in self-regulation conflicts where one’s desire to act on one’s impulses is in conflict with one’s desire to achieve a long-term goal, justifications can trigger action by liberating people to act on their short-term motivations (Miller & Effron, 2010). Please note that in the present account, the involvement of a self-regulation dilemma is crucial to trigger justification processes. Without motivations arising from our impulsive system that interfere with our long-term goals, justification processes are unnecessary. After all, if Sally would dislike chocolate, she is unlikely to be tempted by the chocolatedecorated wedding cake, removing the need for justifications. Likewise, if Sally would not have a long-term weight-loss goal, she has no reason to try to resist the urge Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
122 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) elicited by the r nect of tasting the delicious looking Evidence for iustification as a facilitator of behavic ding cake.making the need for justifications obsolete. ginates in the iudgment and decision-making literature ndicating that people are more likely to choose the option failure self-regulation hat they can justify (S 1993).As the need to and reflective p ons in order ve the the reflective system was limited to protecting one's long- choice (es Kivetz 1999:Shafir et al.1993:Simonsor term goals from our impulses,the current account propose 1989).As the typical self-regulation dilemma of gratifying jus the pursuit of long-term contribute to failure particularly relevant for underst Consequently,a justification is not a fixed belief that ing self-regulation failure.Applying these principles to the leads people to i lulge.In the absence of a motivationa ns ar ster rely on the criteria of that person in that moment to allov oals should be a compelling justification.However. oneself to relent self-control and resolve the self-control noted by Shafir t al.(1993).having a rease seems to b that is experienced.As nore important th hat is,dec to the se and the g end to be d experiencing.In that sense,anything can count as a justifi- "shallow but nice soundn cation and the number of justifications can be infinite,as people eem to focus ons th the term goal stify feelings fe g M rcier&Sperber 2011 Nishett To date,the use of justifications for discordant behavior Wilson ,1977). such,a justification-based mechanisn has mainly been stud in th contex of cognitive diss vhe confronted with -regulat 0 ger, or the pos ing for how ople rely on justifications to ationalize p that will allow them to iustify it Thi In this review mplies that when people find the nselves in a situat justificati ot gnitive of go out of capacity to reason can become a liability when it comes to agne realiz on the e of justificatio ifies her past behavior by reasoning tha t.for example cannot he beneficial to self-regula oeglhswoatinterteewihherabiliytodieanvayAs ion as well.In fact, most dual-process models of self sgre pro yst 1004hH izing that she is the designated driver. To this sses may be less explicit or novel in successful self ision nflict,she ger r wish to joi explanation n lin with ou is already a valid rms and triggers self-regulation failure Thus while in and consequently one does not need to rely on other justifica- both Marcy was ted to have glass of char Therefore,while acknov ging the importance of and the J used wer d p is on th ome other factor s in xplaining self-tegulation failure the current account the iustifications generate transgressive Isolated illustrations of justifications facilitating behavior behavior. that is not in line with one's explicit standards come from a
122 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) elicited by the prospect of tasting the delicious looking wedding cake, making the need for justifications obsolete. Therefore, a justification-based pathway of self-regulation failure, like other accounts of self-regulation failure, is assumed to be the result of an interplay between impulsive and reflective processes. However, while hitherto the role of the reflective system was limited to protecting one’s longterm goals from our impulses, the current account proposes that the reflective system, by seeking and constructing justifications for one’s impulsive inclinations, can also actively contribute to failure. Consequently, a justification is not a fixed belief that leads people to indulge. In the absence of a motivational conflict, justifications are not needed to foster indulgence and may not even arise. Instead, a justification seems to rely on the criteria of that person in that moment to allow oneself to relent self-control and resolve the self-control dilemma that is experienced. As a result, justifications are most likely to be idiosyncratically determined and may vary according to the self-regulation dilemma a person is experiencing. In that sense, anything can count as a justification and the number of justifications can be infinite, as long as it is generated during a self-regulation dilemma and as long as it forms an allowance to violate one’s longterm goal. To date, the use of justifications for discordant behavior has mainly been studied in the context of cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957). However, because of the post hoc etiology, cognitive dissonance is not useful in accounting for how people rely on justifications to rationalize prospective deviances of goal-directed behavior. In this review, we focus on situations in which justifications are the cause rather than the consequence of goal transgressions. To illustrate, whereas a cognitive dissonance account would predict that when Marcy, after joining everybody in the toast out of habit and is enjoying her glass of champagne realizes that she has inadvertently violated her own norms, will feel uncomfortable. To get rid of this uncomfortable state, she justifies her past behavior by reasoning that, for example, one glass won’t interfere with her ability to drive anyway. As such, transgressive behaviors can fuel justification processes. In the present account, however, Marcy may have anticipated the upcoming toast and her desire to join in while realizing that she is the designated driver. To resolve this predecisional conflict, she generates arguments beforehand that allow her to act on her wish to join her friends, telling herself that one glass of champagne won’t hurt. As such, the generation of justifications leads her to violate her own norms and triggers self-regulation failure. Thus, while in both cases Marcy was motivated to have a glass of champagne and the justifications she used were similar, in cognitive dissonance, the dissonant behavior, which was elicited by some other factor, generated the justifications, whereas in the current account the justifications generate transgressive behavior. Evidence for justifications as a facilitator of behavior originates in the judgment and decision-making literature, indicating that people are more likely to choose the option that they can justify (Shafir et al., 1993). As the need to choose often creates conflict, decision makers seek and construct reasons in order to resolve the conflict and justify their choice (e.g., Kivetz, 1999; Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson, 1989). As the typical self-regulation dilemma of gratifying immediate desires versus the pursuit of long-term benefits by definition entails a conflict between opposing goals, justification processes seem particularly relevant for understanding self-regulation failure. Applying these principles to the context of self-regulation, one would assume that a justification-based mechanism will favor behavior in line with our intentions simply because corresponding with our long-term goals should be a compelling justification. However, as noted by Shafir et al. (1993), having a reason seems to be more important than the quality of the reason. That is, decisions are based on the mere availability of reasons, the nature and the quality of the reason tend to be disregarded: People appear to prefer “shallow but nice sounding” justifications (Simonson, 1989, p. 170). Moreover, people seem to focus on justifications that are consistent with their initial attitude to justify how they feel, constructing reasons for their present feelings (e.g., Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As such, a justification-based mechanism would predict that when confronted with a self-regulation dilemma where people might be more inclined to pursue the hedonic option (cf. Elliot, 2006), people will seek or construct justifications that will allow them to justify it. This implies that when people find themselves in a situation where they are tempted by something they know they really should not do, they might be successful in constraining themselves, unless they find a reason, any reason, to give in. As such our capacity to reason can become a liability when it comes to self-regulation failure. While the focus of this article is on the role of justification processes in self-regulation failure, this is not to suggest that reasoned processes cannot be very beneficial to self-regulation as well. In fact, most dual-process models of self-regulation assume that the reflective system is responsible for effective goal striving because of its reliance on rule-based reasoning (cf. Epstein, 1994). However, the role of reasoned processes may be less explicit or novel in successful selfregulation. After all, acting in line with one’s intentions does not require reasoned explanations as much as breaching one’s intentions: The fact that a certain choice or behavior is in line with our intention is already a valid reason in itself and consequently one does not need to rely on other justifications. Therefore, while acknowledging the importance of reasoned processes in successful self-regulation, the focus in this article is on the lesser known role of justifications in explaining self-regulation failure. Isolated illustrations of justifications facilitating behavior that is not in line with one’s explicit standards come from a Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
De Witt Huberts et al 123 variety of fields.such as health behavior.moral behavior and eral.the purchase or consumption of such luxury goods is consumer choice.Yet,these various empirical demonstra- harder to justify than the consumption of utilitarian products tons have never led to should incre the likel 0a0 tification-based echa the backbo of the con sumer loyalty programs.Kivetz and Simonson (2002) ducted within this frame ork but that nevertheless seems to demonstrated that participants preferred a luxury award over rely on justific To he included as ey orting a iustification greater effort presumably served as a justification for the purchase of luxuries.A justification-based mechanism is ence of justifications on be cision making ed yngheavalabiyofa es. (1008)den post hoc iustification n esses:(b)including a control group more effective in promoting luxury than utilitarian consumr that was not provide The donation to charity tha e to f a justif s is th ought to re dile such that 's im impulses interfere with one's long-term intentions,as in the justifications on consumer indulgence. Typically partici of a motivational conflict,Justi cation were pres on afte llegedly in d-(d il istently de rated that articip nts with justification (e.g..effort,excellence feedback contributing Empirical Evidence for Justification hoice of cesses in Self-Re lation faily (e.g The role of justifications was first studied in the context of roduct (e.g.. cleaner.Khan Dhar.2006:healthy Zheng.2006)compared with partic ate s mo as exh an Ha 2010.for a revi nle Mor nd1er/2001 e but als showed that choosing an African American who was the ing unealthy snacks (De Witt Huberts,Evers&De Ridde the dc vers.& De Ridder at p yne 2011 gge with narticinan who hased on similar des tions. ses that are under the influence of visceral drives tially chose a White applicant as best suited for the job hunger)and that involve actively regulating one's desires This and simila g were attribut the fac er tha me kind of orthat countera can facilitat it inte dentials"that licensed them to subsequently behave in a and values,with empirical evidence demonstrating that justi way that violated these principles (e.g., fications play a subs antial role in the self-regulation contex Effro and Mille 0 moral self-licensing loyed the 9) gratifying immediate needs versus pursuing long-term Having established that iustifications play a role in self Further evidence for a justification-based mechanism regulation failure,the question rises what kind of justifica- underlying beha vior disc pant with one's long-term goals othe As m ny pur the ev liet of functional considerations,such as spending on luxuries ver- would like to note that the cate izations are ours.and lim sus saving up or spending on necessary items,they often ited only to the justifications that have actually been studied encompass Se regulation dilemm bet e rely on may ons and lo 304
De Witt Huberts et al. 123 variety of fields, such as health behavior, moral behavior and consumer choice. Yet, these various empirical demonstrations have never been assembled to substantiate a justificationbased account of self-regulation failure. In the following section, we aggregate evidence for a justification-based mechanism. This includes work that was not explicitly conducted within this framework but that nevertheless seems to capture the phenomenon that we sometimes rely on justifications to allow oneself a forbidden pleasure. To be included as evidence supporting a justificationbased account the studies had to establish the causal influence of justifications on behavior, including decision making, by (a) manipulating the availability of a justification before self-regulatory behavior was measured in order to rule out post hoc justification processes; (b) including a control group that was not provided with a justification before the outcome measure to establish whether the availability of a justification systematically influenced subsequent behavior; (c) entailing a self-control dilemma, such that one’s immediate impulses interfere with one’s long-term intentions, as in the absence of a motivational conflict, justifications are not needed to foster indulgence and consequently are unlikely to affect behavior and; (d) having ruled out most prominent alternative explanations for the observed findings. Empirical Evidence for Justification Processes in Self-Regulation Failure The role of justifications was first studied in the context of moral behavior where justifications could lead one to violate one’s moral principles such as exhibiting prejudiced, sexist, or selfish behavior (see Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010, for a review). For example, Monin and Miller (2001) showed that choosing an African American—who was the most qualified applicant—for a hypothetical job, increased the likelihood that participants would describe a subsequent job as better suited for White applicants compared with participants who, based on similar descriptions, initially chose a White applicant as best suited for the job. This and similar findings were attributed to the fact that people whose past behavior (e.g., acting in a non-prejudiced way) provided them with some kind of “moral credentials” that licensed them to subsequently behave in a way that violated these principles (e.g., voicing prejudiced opinions; Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). To describe this phenomenon, Monin and Miller employed the term moral self-licensing. Further evidence for a justification-based mechanism underlying behavior discrepant with one’s long-term goals comes from studies on consumer choice. As many purchasing decisions are tinged with a conflict between hedonic and functional considerations, such as spending on luxuries versus saving up or spending on necessary items, they often encompass a typical self-regulation dilemma between immediate gratifications and long-term considerations. As in general, the purchase or consumption of such luxury goods is harder to justify than the consumption of utilitarian products, having a justification should increase the likelihood of indulging in luxury consumption. Indeed, a justificationbased mechanism appears to be the backbone of the popular consumer loyalty programs. Kivetz and Simonson (2002) demonstrated that participants preferred a luxury award over a utilitarian reward of equal value when the program requirements (e.g., frequency of purchase) were high (vs. low). The greater effort presumably served as a justification for the purchase of luxuries. A justification-based mechanism is also thought to underlie charity incentives where people can contribute to charity by purchasing luxuries. Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) demonstrated that such charity incentives are more effective in promoting luxury than utilitarian consumption. The donation to charity that the luxury consumption encompasses is thought to reduce the guilt normally associated with the purchase of luxury items. Other studies further demonstrated the facilitating role of justifications on consumer indulgence. Typically, participants in these studies were presented with a justification after which, allegedly in the context of another study, they could choose between a utilitarian and a luxury item. These studies consistently demonstrated that providing participants with a justification (e.g., effort, excellence feedback, contributing to charity or volunteering) increased choice of a luxury product (e.g., designer jeans, Khan & Dhar, 2006; indulgent chocolate cake, Kivetz & Zheng, 2006) over a utilitarian product (e.g., vacuum cleaner, Khan & Dhar, 2006; healthy fruit salad, Kivetz & Zheng, 2006) compared with participants not provided with a justification. Having a justification not only increases preference for hedonic over functional choice but also increases hedonic consumption, such as eating unhealthy snacks (De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012a; De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012c; Werle, Wansink, & Payne, 2011), suggesting that justification processes also play an important role in self-regulatory processes that are under the influence of visceral drives (e.g., hunger) and that involve actively regulating one’s desires rather than choosing. As outlined above, having a justification can facilitate behavior that counteracts one’s explicit intentions, norms, and values, with empirical evidence demonstrating that justifications play a substantial role in the self-regulation context of gratifying immediate needs versus pursuing long-term goals. Having established that justifications play a role in selfregulation failure, the question rises what kind of justifications people rely on to allow themselves an otherwise forbidden pleasure. A review of the empirical evidence reveals the following list of common justifications. We would like to note that the categorizations are ours, and limited only to the justifications that have actually been studied. As the justifications people rely on may be idiosyncratically determined and influenced by situational factors, the list of Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015