Article Evil Acts and Malicious Gossip: 214.V Review A Multiagent Model of the Effects of Gossip in Socially Distributed Person Perception SAGE Eliot R.Smith Abstract Although person perception is central to virtually all human social behavior,it is ordinarily studied in isolated individua onceptuali zing it as a sc whic h have been address d li distributed process s.Pees m targetswho perform rare neative behaviors The model susts that they cansmutaousy protect themseves against being influenced by malicious gossip intended to defame specific targets.They can balance these potentially conflicting goals by sing specn c strategies including disregarding g gossip that m a personally obtaine further research and thepretical development out gossi ords erson perce ption munication,ossip,multiagent modeling The process of ral to virtually all This inf月 and rele whether we will cooperate with them.fall in love with them processes.Fuller reviews ear in aggress against the seek the advice,or trust persuasive Foster's (200 and Smith an Collins 2009 me a resu choption h Schneid.in press:Gilbert.1998)Most such research has sin which has heen considered in the liter had a conceptual focus on cognitive and affective processes mostly in areas far distant from social psychology (especially the individu f,and has advance his focu cal b .Finally,the arti le pre nts a multiage hasized fun tion of ale n g isolated and given carefully controlled stimulus materials or violators.while not allowing them to be influenced by false the basis of which they make judgments and decisions,often or malicious gossip. h response m sure it omits an imnortant aspeet of nerse Gossip:Theoretical Background day life,per son perception is ordinarily performed not by Definition isolated indivi torm of socially distrib cognition (Sn 09). Perceivers share In the research literature,gossip is generally defined as informal talk about absent third parties (Foster,2004).The by others,as well as directly observing and interacting with social targets.The result is not simply an impression 'Indiana University,Bloomington.USA represented n one per eiver's mind,but an impression tha and is ofen (d In short people gossip. 0
Personality and Social Psychology Review 2014, Vol. 18(4) 311–325 © 2014 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1088868314530515 pspr.sagepub.com Article The process of person perception is central to virtually all human social behaviors. Our impressions of others influence whether we will cooperate with them, fall in love with them, aggress against them, seek their advice, or trust persuasive messages from them. As a result, person perception has been a major focus of research within social psychology (Carlston & Schneid, in press; Gilbert, 1998). Most such research has had a conceptual focus on cognitive and affective processes within the individual perceiver, and has advanced this focus by applying methodologies drawn from the cognitive psychological laboratory tradition. Thus, participants are usually isolated and given carefully controlled stimulus materials, on the basis of which they make judgments and decisions, often with response times being measured. Despite the evident successes of this research approach, it omits an important aspect of person perception: In everyday life, person perception is ordinarily performed not by isolated individuals but as a form of socially distributed cognition (Smith & Collins, 2009). Perceivers share their impressions with others and draw on information provided by others, as well as directly observing and interacting with social targets. The result is not simply an impression represented in one perceiver’s mind, but an impression that is socially shared and consensual (to a greater or lesser extent) and is often explicitly communicated. In short, people gossip. This article first reviews prior theoretical discussion of gossip, including its definition, functions, and relevant social-psychological processes. Fuller reviews appear in Foster’s (2004) and Smith and Collins’ (2009) works and there is no intention to reiterate them here, but simply to give an overview. The article then focuses on the possibility of false gossip, which has been considered in the literature mostly in areas far distant from social psychology (especially theoretical biology). Finally, the article presents a multiagent model examining the extent to which gossip can serve the oft-emphasized function of alerting group members to norm violators, while not allowing them to be influenced by false or malicious gossip. Gossip: Theoretical Background Definition In the research literature, gossip is generally defined as informal talk about absent third parties (Foster, 2004).1 The 530515 PSRXXX10.1177/1088868314530515Personality and Social Psychology ReviewSmith research-article2014 1 Indiana University, Bloomington, USA Corresponding Author: Eliot R. Smith, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, 1101 E. Tenth St., Bloomington, IN 47405, USA. Email: esmith4@indiana.edu. Evil Acts and Malicious Gossip: A Multiagent Model of the Effects of Gossip in Socially Distributed Person Perception Eliot R. Smith1 Abstract Although person perception is central to virtually all human social behavior, it is ordinarily studied in isolated individual perceivers. Conceptualizing it as a socially distributed process opens up a variety of novel issues, which have been addressed in scattered literatures mostly outside of social psychology. This article examines some of these issues using a series of multiagent models. Perceivers can use gossip (information from others about social targets) to improve their ability to detect targets who perform rare negative behaviors. The model suggests that they can simultaneously protect themselves against being influenced by malicious gossip intended to defame specific targets. They can balance these potentially conflicting goals by using specific strategies including disregarding gossip that differs from a personally obtained impression. Multiagent modeling demonstrates the outcomes produced by different combinations of assumptions about gossip, and suggests directions for further research and theoretical development. Keywords person perception, communication, gossip, multiagent modeling Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
312 Personality and Social Psychology Review 1(4) qualification "informal"is intended to exclude for by transmittin ositive information about friends and nega munications such as letters of reference (although like ordi- tive information about enemies (Farley.2011:McAndrew Bell,&Garcia,2007).Finally,gossip serves functions of ence t recipient's).Although gossip has and entertainmen (De Sousa,1994).All o plicit definitions includ well as 20041 Gossip has also been addressed from perspectives more Ellward,L distant from the social and behavioral sciences,including ona ry biology,espe ally w role in th If gossip is defined as malicious and harmful talk about the es of the sits moral worth tion partner can choose to benefit the other(cooperate)at a not preiudge questions of value at the stage of cost to itself.The benefit is assumed to be 30 an n ne initial definition of the subject matter.(p.26 cooperate A close narallel is the term stereotyne which also has a (you if you cooperate with me) for cooperation to evolve and become established in a popu negative connotation to the lay person but has invariably self-inter been def at age positiveas well res organisms(Axelrod s pop e elative hal an empirical question). is insufficient.Indirect reciprocity isasolution to this issue ooper I yo Perspectives on Gossip ration is based on your reputation,spr Mathematical analysesand multiagent that this process can indeed lead to generalized cooperatio n a popu ne which gossip flows,what types of individuals (e.g..high-vs are frequ t participants in ets c acooperative reputation will cause them to be re Burt 2005:Eder Enke 199 et al.2012 the Kniffin Wilson.2005:Wittek Wielers.1998). iewed in L the ean with in nom hold cooperation from them.In this case,the norm is a very specific one saying"cooperate with other cooperators. that allows other g up members to avoid or sanction them thereby increasing the costs and diminishing the likelihooc is clear (Beersma Possibility of False Gossip Van KI tus or pow sin abou people's contribution to a groupefort the pe ssihility of fals n has tarely hee (i.edecreasing freeriding,a vioation of a considered (e.g..it is hardly mentioned in Foster's influential te).O sip are als ly recog 2004 review).Giardini(2012)makes the important point tha sip also serves to teach member the co ely reports direct kn ge or of n (Baumeister et al.,2004).Gossip allows individuals to bet either by the ssip recipient or by the target)if they leam (e er themselves by comparing mselves of its falsity.But gossipers may attribute the information to or"They say. ·to avo which may prepare them for coordinated action with regar tial fo to the gossip target and also increas overall cohesion in exist at all,and to serve its functions (see also Giardini unbar,20 2004 Conte,2012) How ercise of p ing the d th mis sed by false
312 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(4) qualification “informal” is intended to exclude formal communications such as letters of reference (although like ordinary gossip, those let the communicator’s impression of the target influence the recipient’s). Although gossip has a negative connotation in most people’s mind, virtually all explicit definitions include positive as well as negative information (e.g., Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Ellwardt, Labianca, & Wittek, 2012; Foster, 2004; Giardini, 2012). As De Sousa (1994) observed, If gossip is defined as malicious and harmful talk about the private lives of others, . . . then to discuss its moral worth is superfluous. . . . Clearly, the methodologically superior approach is that which does not prejudge questions of value at the stage of initial definition of the subject matter. (p. 26) A close parallel is the term stereotype, which also has a negative connotation to the lay person but has invariably been defined in research usage to include positive as well as negative beliefs about a social group’s characteristics (making the relative balance of positive and negative valence an empirical question). Perspectives on Gossip Gossip has been studied from many disciplinary and conceptual perspectives. Sociologists have frequently examined questions about the structure of the social network through which gossip flows, what types of individuals (e.g., high- vs. low-status people) are frequent participants in or targets of gossip, and the role of gossip in organizational functioning (e.g., Burt, 2005; Eder & Enke, 1991; Ellwardt et al., 2012; Kniffin & Wilson, 2005; Wittek & Wielers, 1998). Sociological and social-psychological perspectives typically emphasize gossip’s role in norm enforcement or social control. Gossip can spread information about norm violators that allows other group members to avoid or sanction them, thereby increasing the costs and diminishing the likelihood of such violations. Evidence is clear (Beersma & Van Kleef, 2011; Piazza & Bering, 2008) that recognizing that others may gossip about them does have a deterrent effect, for example, increasing people’s contribution to a group effort (i.e., decreasing free riding, a violation of a group norm to contribute). Other functions of gossip are also widely recognized. In spreading information about norm violations, gossip also serves to teach members the content of norms (Baumeister et al., 2004). Gossip allows individuals to better understand themselves by comparing themselves with others (Wert & Salovey, 2004). Gossip has also been shown to promote bonding among individuals who share gossip, which may prepare them for coordinated action with regard to the gossip target and also increases overall cohesion in the group (Dunbar, 2004; Foster, 2004; Peters & Kashima, 2007). In addition, gossip has been seen as a vehicle for the exercise of power, increasing the gossiper’s status perhaps by transmitting positive information about friends and negative information about enemies (Farley, 2011; McAndrew, Bell, & Garcia, 2007). Finally, gossip serves functions of sheer relaxation and entertainment (De Sousa, 1994). All of these important functions help explain why gossip is so frequent, estimated at up to 70% of all talk (Foster, 2004). Gossip has also been addressed from perspectives more distant from the social and behavioral sciences, including evolutionary biology, especially with regard to its role in the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006). Typically, agents are assumed to interact in pairs over time, and each interaction partner can choose to benefit the other (cooperate) at a cost to itself. The benefit is assumed to be greater than the cost, so if both cooperate, both are better off than if neither cooperates. It is well established that reciprocal cooperation (I’ll cooperate with you if you cooperate with me) is one way for cooperation to evolve and become established in a population of self-interested organisms (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). But as populations become larger, one-shot interactions among strangers are more prevalent than repeated interactions with neighbors or known others, so reciprocity alone is insufficient. Indirect reciprocity is a solution to this issue: I’ll cooperate with you if you cooperate with others (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). My knowledge about your general cooperation is based on your reputation, spread through gossip. Mathematical analyses and multiagent simulations establish that this process can indeed lead to generalized cooperation in a population, with agents cooperating not on the basis of reciprocity with this specific interaction partner, but because a cooperative reputation will cause them to be rewarded by other agents (Giardini & Conte, 2012; Savarimuthu, Purvis, Purvis, & Savarimuthu, 2013; Takahashi, 2000). Viewed in a different light, this is another way of saying that gossip is useful for identifying norm violators so that others can withhold cooperation from them. In this case, the norm is a very specific one saying “cooperate with other cooperators.” Possibility of False Gossip As noted earlier, status or power enhancement is one of the potential functions of gossip (McAndrew et al., 2007). Yet the possibility of false, manipulated gossip has rarely been considered (e.g., it is hardly mentioned in Foster’s influential 2004 review). Giardini (2012) makes the important point that a gossiper who falsely reports direct knowledge of a target’s norm-violating behavior may be exposed to punishment (either by the gossip recipient or by the target) if they learn of its falsity. But gossipers may attribute the information to other sources (“I hear that . . . ” or “They say . . .”) to avoid such punishment. Giardini argues that the possibility of escaping responsibility in this way is essential for gossip to exist at all, and to serve its functions (see also Giardini & Conte, 2012). How can recipients avoid being misled by false gossip? Scattered studies have addressed this issue. Hess and Hagen Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
Smith 3引3 (2006)assumed that go sip can be intentionally manipulated and cost compared with experiencing such behaviors first and used scenario studies to examine the conditions under hand.In effect,a social network is a distributed surveillance which p people may its truth value (e.g.,when th system,mon ing the behavior of n nbers of th ind nle h n to rely on in ence to target's direct self-reports.in a context where a games with different par ners,and receive gossip about the ve self-report might be exaggerated (Stiff Van levels of 8).t p ab d when sip from multiples of that behavior (Sommerfeld.Krambeck.Semmann.& Milinski,2007).People evidently recognize the group-serv ing and norm-de functions of gossip,passing gossip ong to pulation of artificial agents (software programs)can Stellar.Keltner.2012). blish cooperation and exclude free riders (e.g Potential Unreliability of Gossip nication about Despite its usefulness.gossip has weaknesses as well.Most cooperation)a key part of their system.In contrast to prev obviously,information from others may be less reliable than work on the topic,they consider the potential impa e sev ntly Ifa target isp viduals with nle hut hath false but breaks d n as the aches strong dislike for a specific individual,gossip from others Laidre,Lamb,Shultz and Olsen (2013)show that agents will be questionably useful in allowing the individual topre through ormation the target rception (e.Mohr Ken y 2006)As a result However they assum that messages are corrunted by rar ven if the target beha s consistently,Perceiver A's impre noise,rather than by agents who intentionally send s10 through go ma pr nto the nd e hioloay the when information communicated from on the positive functions of gossin.especially the detection becomes more stereotypic (Lyons 2003).An .g.,n0 coop rators). mm gets ma e po me im s sometimes mentioned as a fiumction When maninulated of bi ses involve intentional distortion gossip is considered,proposed solutions usually involve can also biased,as opl 2006.3id 013 6plesourc 2008 college students whoy ecially likely to nas tive information about their romantic rivals,or positive items friends behind suc Social-Psychological Considerations thin Utility of Gossip diseussed earlier ould be ed MosCbeopedO m the fun onal b enefits disct Avoiding Influence From False Gossip into targets that would be difficult or impossible for the per. How can people avoid being influenced either by uninten as knowledge tionally biase rare negative b 10 n othe entify in the individual to avoid this target.at 30
Smith 313 (2006) assumed that gossip can be intentionally manipulated, and used scenario studies to examine the conditions under which people may discount its truth value (e.g., when they receive the same message from only one source versus multiple independent sources). Sommerfeld, Krambeck, and Milinski (2008) had participants play a series of cooperation games with different partners, and receive gossip about the partners’ levels of cooperativeness. Like Hess and Hagen, they also proposed that effects of false gossip can be mitigated when perceivers receive gossip from multiple sources. However, most detailed analyses of ways to deal with false gossip come from well outside social psychology, from theoretical biology or computer science perspectives. Savarimuthu et al. (2013) advance a technical model of how a population of artificial agents (software programs) can establish cooperation and exclude free riders. Drawing on work on the evolution of cooperation (e.g., Nowak & Sigmund, 2005, as reviewed earlier), they make gossip (i.e., inter-agent communication about other agents’ levels of cooperation) a key part of their system. In contrast to previous work on the topic, they consider the potential impact of false gossip and show that their proposed system is robust when only a small proportion of gossip is assumed to be false, but breaks down as the proportion approaches 50%. Laidre, Lamb, Shultz, and Olsen (2013) show that agents connected in a network through which information flows can use a specific decision rule that involves comparing multiple messages, to attempt to correct false information. However, they assume that messages are corrupted by random noise, rather than by agents who intentionally send false information. In summary, from most perspectives including sociology, psychology, and evolutionary biology, the primary focus is on the positive functions of gossip, especially the detection of norm violators or free riders (e.g., non-cooperators). Little work has addressed the possibility of false and manipulated gossip, although the strategic use of gossip to increase power is sometimes mentioned as a function. When manipulated gossip is considered, proposed solutions usually involve trusting gossip only when it is received from multiple sources (e.g., Hess & Hagen, 2006; Laidre et al., 2013; Sommerfeld et al., 2008). Social-Psychological Considerations Utility of Gossip As would be expected from the functional benefits discussed earlier, people do frequently engage in gossip (Foster, 2004). Most obviously, information from others may reveal insights into targets that would be difficult or impossible for the perceiver himself or herself to obtain, such as knowledge about rare negative behaviors. For example, learning from others that a target occasionally flies into an aggressive rage allows the individual to avoid this target, at considerably less risk and cost compared with experiencing such behaviors firsthand. In effect, a social network is a distributed surveillance system, monitoring the behavior of members of the network more effectively than a perceiver could alone (Craik, 2008). Indeed, people have been shown to rely on gossip in preference to target’s direct self-reports, in a context where a positive self-report might be exaggerated (Stiff & Van Vugt, 2008). Other studies likewise show that gossip about targets’ behaviors can be even more influential than direct observations of that behavior (Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, & Milinski, 2007). People evidently recognize the group-serving and norm-defense functions of gossip, passing gossip along to benefit others even when there is no possibility of reciprocal or other benefit to the self (Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012). Potential Unreliability of Gossip Despite its usefulness, gossip has weaknesses as well. Most obviously, information from others may be less reliable than information observed firsthand. There are several reasons for this. First, targets may actually treat different individuals differently. If a target is pleasant with most people but harbors a strong dislike for a specific individual, gossip from others will be questionably useful in allowing the individual to predict the target’s behavior. Second, different perceivers apply different biases, stereotypes, and schemas in the process of person perception (e.g., Mohr & Kenny, 2006). As a result, even if the target behaves consistently, Perceiver A’s impression (communicated through gossip) may differ from Perceiver B’s impression, rendering it less useful to B. Third, biases may enter into the communication process itself, as when information communicated from person to person becomes more stereotypic (Lyons & Kashima, 2003). And communicated information about a target’s behavior may leave out important situational information, producing more extreme impressions (Gilovich, 1987). None of these types of biases involve intentional distortion. Of course, gossip can also be intentionally biased, as when people praise their allies and bad-mouth their enemies. McAndrew et al. (2007) found just such patterns in a study of college students, who were especially likely to pass on negative information about their romantic rivals, or positive items about friends or romantic partners. Motives behind such biased gossip obviously include the desire to increase one’s own status or power within a group (see Farley, 2011), as discussed earlier. Avoiding Influence From False Gossip How can people avoid being influenced either by unintentionally biased or intentionally manipulated gossip? One approach is to identify individuals who transmit false gossip and tag them as unreliable, avoiding incorporating their reports into one’s own impressions of targets. However, I Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
314 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(4) that such stratevies hased on the Sammerfald at al 2008)In the m messages are received over a period of time and perceivers update their impression of the target as each message i his.First,the co tor might lie a ece d,this tegy will yield similar resu p(e.g. saying s to the strat frequently do this to ed th responsibility for making false statements.or because they impression will likely already reflect the impact of other do not wish to reveal the actual source (e.g..if they leame earlier arriving messages,and the differing message can be in a di manne such as throug tten the source of a ecific item of information.Third even if communicators know who they learned an item from, distortions of interpretation,memory,or communication,or they generally will not know who conveyed it to who hrough intent onal manipulation.I have argued that strate ation cou an I sip ar ikely seful ng the tells you false gossip may have heard it in exactly that form source information can be falsified (Giardini.2012) from others,and in such a case the communicator should not and because the complete path of information across many be blamed,punis shed,r have future vork is difficult to de the full links in the social net rmine.Inste information that is toodi nt fron unknown,even hearing the same gossip from two or more urrent beliefs or from other contemporancously available communicators does no establish its validity, information.Can such a strategy succeed,both allowing a s 8. d Hager Its valua e function able to reliabl ny tag spec Goals of This Article mma hased strategy involves di garding ssin that is 2007).Multiagent modeling offers a way to understand the cantly repant from cipient ing know edge esults that emerge when multiple pro es operate interde of cours ck at le ntly and a H 196 ing into a itud. one's own belief or attitude vould not be accepted.With able than when a small number of processes operate within 20 when peo sa set o gents they did not t expect the cet to be that negati ions and co nitive pro of imn ssion formation and ey might have told selveshe/she can't be that bac updating).The model is run on the computer. to g lated other it th ying the re esult,a nents (Railsback&Grimm.2012)mapping out the cons ved inform s,Percy, e20 nd th ted with and directly observed information although their studies are dating their impressions (representing simply valence not in a gossip context I on their be rvations of targets.Perceive based strategy for a sing the rel wit and trust them if they agree rather than dis heir current imn essions finally ivers exchanged thei this is easier if the messages are received simultaneously s gossip,and used others'impressions to update that they can be compared side by side (as assumed by their own.While the model may appear overly simple
314 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(4) propose that such strategies based on the source of the gossip are likely to be ineffective, compared with strategies based on the content of the information. There are several reasons for this. First, the communicator might lie about the source of the gossip (e.g., saying “I hear that . . .”). Giardini (2012) argued that communicators frequently do this to avoid responsibility for making false statements, or because they do not wish to reveal the actual source (e.g., if they learned the information in a discreditable manner such as through eavesdropping). Second, communicators might simply have forgotten the source of a specific item of information. Third, even if communicators know who they learned an item from, they generally will not know who conveyed it to whom before that point—and corruption or manipulation could have taken place at any of those exchanges. Someone who tells you false gossip may have heard it in exactly that form from others, and in such a case the communicator should not be blamed, punished, or have future communications viewed with suspicion. Fourth, also because the full path of gossip information from its originator to one’s own ear is generally unknown, even hearing the same gossip from two or more distinct communicators does not establish its validity, as some have suggested (e.g., Hess & Hagen, 2006; Sommerfeld et al., 2008). This is because the multiple communicators could have obtained the information from a common source. All these considerations mean that people are unlikely to be able to reliably tag specific communicators as purveyors of false gossip. This forces them to rely on the content rather than the source of the information. The essence of a contentbased strategy involves disregarding gossip that is significantly discrepant from the recipient’s existing knowledge. This idea has a long history, of course, dating back at least to Sherif and Hovland’s (1961) proposal that information falling into a “latitude of rejection”—overly discrepant from one’s own belief or attitude—would not be accepted. With regard to gossip specifically, there is evidence that people do this. Sommerfeld et al. (2008) found that when people receive three consistently negative gossip statements about a target, they did not expect the target to be that negative: “They might have told themselves ‘he/she can’t be that bad’” (p. 2534), in other words disregarding gossip whose content violated their expectations—even though the three sources agreed. Conversely, some research suggests that people give extra attention and weight to information communicated from others when it agrees with directly observed information. Collins, Percy, Smith, and Kruschke (2011) found this pattern and suggested that people are especially influenced when they perceive agreement between socially transmitted and directly observed information, although their studies are not in a gossip context. A different content-based strategy for assessing the reliability of gossip is to compare two or more gossip messages and trust them if they agree rather than disagree. Obviously this is easier if the messages are received simultaneously so that they can be compared side by side (as assumed by Sommerfeld et al., 2008). In the more realistic case where messages are received over a period of time and perceivers update their impression of the target as each message is received, this strategy will yield similar results to the strategy of disregarding discrepant messages. This is because when a message that differs from others is received, the impression will likely already reflect the impact of other, earlier arriving messages, and the differing message can be disregarded. In summary, social-psychological processes sometimes create false or biased gossip, whether through unintentional distortions of interpretation, memory, or communication, or through intentional manipulation. I have argued that strategies based on identifying the source of an item of gossip are unlikely to be useful for avoiding influence by false gossip, because source information can be falsified (Giardini, 2012) and because the complete path of information across many links in the social network is difficult to determine. Instead, perceivers are more likely to use a content-based strategy, ignoring information that is too discrepant from their own current beliefs or from other contemporaneously available information. Can such a strategy succeed, both allowing a perceiver to make use of gossip for its valuable functions while avoiding being influenced by false gossip? Goals of This Article This article explores this dilemma and possible perceiver responses to it, using multiagent modeling (Smith & Conrey, 2007). Multiagent modeling offers a way to understand the results that emerge when multiple processes operate interdependently and simultaneously, as many autonomous agents (such as person perceivers and targets) interact over time. The outcomes of such interactions may be much less predictable than when a small number of processes operate within a single agent. As laid out by Smith and Conrey (2007), a multiagent model is a set of simulated agents representing people who follow specific behavioral rules (such as dyadic interactions and cognitive processes of impression formation and updating). The model is run on the computer, to generate predictions about the patterns of impressions that result, and to examine effects of varying the basic rules. The overall goal is to conduct rigorous, reproducible thought experiments (Railsback & Grimm, 2012) mapping out the consequences of different assumptions. Smith and Collins (2009), in the most direct forerunner to the current article, built a multiagent model that incorporated three general processes. Perceivers interacted with targets, updating their impressions (representing simply valence) based on their behavioral observations of targets. Perceivers could also actively decide whether or not to interact with specific targets, based on the positive or negative valence of their current impressions. Finally, perceivers exchanged their impressions as gossip, and used others’ impressions to update their own. While the model may appear overly simple, Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
Smith 3引5 modelers generally hold that seeking to incorporate all the In so doing.though.you may obtain information that has complexity of real-world behavior risks making the re been distorted or manipulated.For example,one of your fel or a mod el's b lows may ascribe negative be haviors to a perf nocen n)I imiting the model to small numbe obtain the basic processes is essential to generate insights. derived from gossip,while avoiding In this article,this model is adapted to incorporate three being manipulated by false reports? srelevant to the goss a d social targets are evil,displaying rare but extr Overview of the Model ely neo tive behaviors.This is a situation in which we might expect The multiagent model is a modification of the model gossip tobe fun hem ibed in th and Collin (2009)wo1 k.Its assumption (see r erg et a the situ targets.to see whether perceivers can avoid being misled. Details (ODD)protocol (RailsbackGrimm,201:see the Although the functionality of gossip is ofen discussed n appendix).Funda helitcrature,asnoiecag h ide of the coin has r nber）)who exhibit vai ed to ess the effa h ld bea d to he the same individualsa including whether to use gossip at all,whether to solicit go in Smith and Collins,with each observer also a target,but for sip about specific targets o to allow communicators to talk separate sets of people. 1 e nun er. h The hy are the positive valucs indicate liking. ASSU Hypothesis 1:In The core of the model involves wed by Hypothesis 2:Receiving gossip abo communicators Smith and Collins from Denrell(2005),who presents empir more adaptve ev e spe ultiple trials on each trial the Hypothesis3:The content-based strategy of disregarding with a va ncedrawn from a normal distribution mea(+0.5 nc mon assumption that positive (kind.moral acts are To make the issues addressed in the model concrete more frequent than negative (cruel,immoral)ones The magine that you are of a numb I newly hired employ rve e es the new behav an number gp二（odi tion)/2.0.This may seem to be overly recency weig heir interpersonal behavior may be friendly or cold,an Denrell (2005)shows that it is the best fit to empirical data heir may t or less will na agine that a few of these individuals.although ocial iudgn offering useful advice,on occasion fly into a rage,berating Vohs,2001),this model's integration rule does not weight orasking stupi questions ve information more heavily than posit This is your se d like 1 out having to experience it yourself.so that you can avoid eration to be discussed below Denrell (2005)as well as Smith and Collins (2009)fur ello ther heir current impre er to a target on a future 304
Smith 315 modelers generally hold that seeking to incorporate all the complexity of real-world behavior risks making the reasons for a model’s behavior opaque, undermining the objective of understanding the phenomena (see Smith & Conrey, 2007, for an elaboration). Limiting the model to a small number of basic processes is essential to generate insights. In this article, this model is adapted to incorporate three factors relevant to the gossiper’s dilemma described above. First, I examine what happens when a small number of social targets are evil, displaying rare but extremely negative behaviors. This is a situation in which we might expect gossip to be functional by helping perceivers identify them (see Feinberg et al., 2012). Second, I examine the situation where some gossip is malicious, intended to defame specific targets, to see whether perceivers can avoid being misled. Although the functionality of gossip is often discussed in the literature, as noted above, this side of the coin has rarely been examined. Third, in both of these situations, the model is used to assess the effects of various perceiver strategies, including whether to use gossip at all, whether to solicit gossip about specific targets or to allow communicators to talk about a target about whom they have an especially negative impression, and whether to intentionally disregard gossip that appears to be inaccurate. The hypotheses are the following: Hypothesis 1: Incorporating gossip into their impressions will allow agents to be more successful in identifying evil targets. Hypothesis 2: Receiving gossip about communicators’ especially negative impressions will be more adaptive than asking communicators to report their impressions of specific targets (who might not be particularly negative). Hypothesis 3: The content-based strategy of disregarding gossip that differs too much from a perceiver’s current impression should allow avoiding influence from maliciously manipulated gossip. To make the issues addressed in the model concrete, imagine that you are one of a number of newly hired employees in an organization. As you seek to learn the ropes, you may approach a number of more senior employees for information and advice. Each time you interact with one of them, their interpersonal behavior may be friendly or cold, and their advice may be more or less useful; you will naturally form and update evaluative impressions of these individuals. Imagine that a few of these individuals, although generally offering useful advice, on occasion fly into a rage, berating you as an ignoramus for asking stupid questions, thoroughly shredding your self-esteem. Naturally you would like to know who is prone to such negative behavior, ideally without having to experience it yourself, so that you can avoid being assigned to future projects with them. Thus, you may ask your fellow newbies for their impressions of the old hands, hoping to benefit from their hard-earned experiences. In so doing, though, you may obtain information that has been distorted or manipulated. For example, one of your fellows may ascribe negative behaviors to a perfectly innocent senior employee, motivated by a past misunderstanding or personality conflict. How can you obtain the benefits of valuable information derived from gossip, while avoiding being manipulated by false reports? Overview of the Model The multiagent model is a modification of the model described in Smith and Collins’ (2009) work. Its assumptions will be described under several headings and are summarized using the standardized Overview, Design concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol (Railsback & Grimm, 2012; see the appendix). Fundamentally, it involves 20 targets (an arbitrary number) who exhibit various behaviors, and 20 observers who form impressions of the targets based on those behaviors. (These could be assumed to be the same individuals as in Smith and Collins, with each observer also a target, but for simplicity we treat them here as two separate sets of people.) An impression in this model is a single number, representing valence. Zero is neutral, negative values indicate dislike, and positive values indicate liking. Assumptions About the Basic Person Perception Process The core of the model involves assumptions borrowed by Smith and Collins from Denrell (2005), who presents empirical evidence supporting these specific assumptions and parameter values. Observers and targets interact in dyads on multiple trials. On each trial, the target produces a behavior with a valence drawn from a normal distribution with a fixed mean (+0.5 for “normal” targets but a different value for the evil targets described below), and a standard deviation of 1.0. The slightly positive mean value is intended to represent the common assumption that positive (kind, moral) acts are more frequent than negative (cruel, immoral) ones. The observer averages the new behavioral observation with the observer’s existing impression, using an equally weighted average, new impression = (old impression + new observation) / 2.0. This may seem to be overly recency weighted, but Denrell (2005) shows that it is the best fit to empirical data on impression formation with sequential observations. Although negativity biases have frequently been documented in social judgments (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), this model’s integration rule does not weight negative information more heavily than positive. This is mainly because of Denrell’s evidence supporting this simple, unbiased integration rule, but it also reflects another consideration to be discussed below. Denrell (2005) as well as Smith and Collins (2009) further assume that observers may use their current impression to decide whether to interact with a target on a future Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015