124 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) reality nevertheless focus group studies and the recent evidence for self-gener- ask steered participants preference toward the more indul ated justifications indicate that the justifications that partici ent options in subsequent choices,favoring low-brow ove pants came up witl were lated to one of the igh idy 1b);indulgent chocolate cake ove litical m dy 2)and ine ed the 2009). likelihood of subsequent participation in a fun study with no smen Altruistic and Laudable Acts tudy with id not par In a series of studies by Khan and Dhar(2006).imagining Zheng.2006).Similar results were obtained in a study oneself having contributed to a charitable cause,such as from our lab that demonstrated that not actual effort but pe teac hing children in a homeles center or improving the envi ceived effort increased hedonic con e) ent indu had aste test tael to people who did not have to think of benevolent deeds (Study 1).In the same line of studies,participants who imag way that they had to do the task again(thus doing the task fo ined having donated a part of ther tax refunds to min);in the control conditi were me ctical le sunglasses (Study 2).Likewise,when participants were asked to indicate their willingness to help a foreign studen with unders nding a cture,they were dona nes more in a tin d span of 10 ght they had only co mpleted a single task. pants in the control condition,who did an unrelated task In a recent study,it was demonstrat ted that actually exert being asked to donate money to c anty (Study 3). ing effort is not necessary to induce similar effects:Simply y by nay and aig ab by buving a chocolate bar.they preferred cake yho were instructed to think of that same 30-min walk as a er fruit salad in a sub ent choice tas (Study 3).The read about a te that 11 tim and effor or ind.. What is notable is that in most studiesin this contet participants did Prior Restraint 20 participants not intended to buy and either ended up buyin Effort and Achievement it or had resisted buying it.Those who had to remind them nce where they ha sed r n the role of justific in self-control fail nded ded t prefe stifications entailed either hard work or excellence feed hoice task,their prior restraint presumably serving as a jus vem ent can serve as a tion for thei indulgent choice.Along the same lin hopadhyay, gupta,and R an(20( dea that entitled to the ither had nhed to ed a food related t (Weber.1958)which is also reflected in findings from qual ation.Particinants who were instructed to think of p tative stu es wher re people indicate to only alloy resistance,ate more COO kies in a subsequent tas 00- Xu so they rene succu Empirical evidence for this notion comes from a line of ce exnressed weaker intentions to ther weight-os studies demonstrating that ustifications such as having goals and a week later indicated to have actually done less exerted (relatively)more effort in an unrelated task or and intended to do less to pursue their weight-loss goals
124 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) justifications may be more exhaustive in reality. Nevertheless, focus group studies and the recent evidence for self-generated justifications indicate that the justifications that participants came up with were mostly related to one of the categories outlined below (De Witt Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012d; Mick & Demoss, 1990; Xu & Schwarz, 2009). Altruistic and Laudable Acts In a series of studies by Khan and Dhar (2006), imagining oneself having contributed to a charitable cause, such as teaching children in a homeless center or improving the environment, increased choice of a luxury product (designer jeans) over a utilitarian product (vacuum cleaner) compared to people who did not have to think of benevolent deeds (Study 1). In the same line of studies, participants who imagined having donated a part of their tax refunds to a charity were more likely to subsequently choose a pair of luxurious expensive sunglasses over a pair of practical, less expensive sunglasses (Study 2). Likewise, when participants were asked to indicate their willingness to help a foreign student with understanding a lecture, they were less likely to donate the money they earned by participating to a local charity and preferred to keep it for themselves, as compared to participants in the control condition, who did an unrelated task before being asked to donate money to charity (Study 3). In another study by Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009), it was found that if participants thought they contributed to charity by buying a chocolate bar, they preferred chocolate cake over fruit salad in a subsequent choice task (Study 3). These examples indicate that good behavior can be used to justify indulgent behavior regardless if the laudable behavior entails investing time and effort or indulging. What is particularly notable is that in most studies in this context participants did not actually have to perform the behavior. Even imagining laudable behavior in a vignette study or intending to help produced these results (Khan & Dhar, 2006). Effort and Achievement In a review on the role of justifications in self-control failure, Kivetz and Zheng (2006) concluded that the most common justifications entailed either hard work or excellence feedback, suggesting that effort and achievement can serve as a justification to allow oneself a forbidden pleasure. This phenomenon can presumably be traced back to the puritanical idea that one is entitled to the good life only after hard work (Weber, 1958), which is also reflected in findings from qualitative studies where people indicate to only allow themselves a pleasure when they feel they earned it (Mick & Demoss, 1990; Xu & Schwarz, 2009). Empirical evidence for this notion comes from a line of studies demonstrating that justifications such as having exerted (relatively) more effort in an unrelated task or receiving excellence feedback on an unrelated performance task steered participants’ preference toward the more indulgent options in subsequent choices, favoring low-brow over high-brow movies (Study 1b); indulgent chocolate cake over healthy fresh fruit salad (Study 1c); an entertainment magazine over a political magazine (Study 2); and increased the likelihood of subsequent participation in a fun study with no delayed benefits rather than in a painful self-assessment study with long-term benefits (Study 1a) compared with participants who did not dispose of these justifications (Kivetz & Zheng, 2006). Similar results were obtained in a study from our lab that demonstrated that not actual effort but perceived effort increased hedonic consumption in a subsequent indulgent taste test (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012c). Participants had to complete a non-involving task on the computer. In the effort condition, participants were told halfway that they had to do the task again (thus doing the task for 2 × 5 min); in the control condition, participants received no such instruction (and thus completed the task as if it were a single task of 10 min), thereby manipulating perceived effort while keeping actual effort constant. Participants who were led to believe that they had completed two tasks consumed on average 130 calories more in a time span of 10 min than participants who actually performed the same task but thought they had only completed a single task. In a recent study, it was demonstrated that actually exerting effort is not necessary to induce similar effects: Simply reading about a 30-min walk as an exercise activity increased consumption of indulgent snacks compared to participants who were instructed to think of that same 30-min walk as a leisurely activity or a control group who had read about a non-exercise related activity (Werle et al., 2011). Prior Restraint Prior restraint can also justify subsequent indulgent choice. Mukhopadhyay and Johar (2009) asked participants to remember an instance where they had seen a product on sale that they had not intended to buy and either ended up buying it or had resisted buying it. Those who had to remind themselves of a prior instance where they had exercised restraint by not buying an attractive product, tended to prefer the chocolate cake over the healthier fruit salad in a subsequent choice task, their prior restraint presumably serving as a justification for their indulgent choice. Along the same lines, Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ramanathan (2008) asked participants to recall an instance of past behavior where they either had succumbed to or had resisted a food-related temptation. Participants who were instructed to think of prior resistance, ate more cookies in a subsequent taste test than participants who recalled having succumbed. Similarly, dieters who were instructed to reflect on prior foregone indulgence expressed weaker intentions to pursue their weight-loss goals and a week later indicated to have actually done less and intended to do less to pursue their weight-loss goals Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015
De Witt Huberts et al 125 compared to dieters who did not reflect on prior restraint a later time presumably iustified peonle to act indulgently (Study 1;Effron,Monin,Miller,2013).Similar mecha- as the possibility to act in line with one's intentions in the nismshave beer bserved in the context of mo future served as a justification to break their rules in the ould ha related demonstration of how future plans and choices performed but did not,increased subsequent immoral behav can endanger current self-regulation is the evidence that forming particular justifications about undoing the negatiy gent behavior.car ing abo such ind Prior Success or Failure 26).when the weddin Sally may form compensatory intentions such as A justification relate will gox ing tomorro or"I will eat less tomorro progre As many egu (2010rev caled that part ticinants who were instructed to y from the other goal. mor e goa quent taste test than participar ted that actual h nle of the one domain led to more indulgence in the opposing domair future intentions on current self-regulation that could be (e.g.losing weight vs.choosing a hedonic snack:studying explained by a justification-based account is the finding oing o cate died in a i tion context,having failed to attain one's oal could also oon-to-be forbidden food while they still can (Urbszat Herman.Polivy.2002). the e hell effec Negative Emotional Events food intake to reach a certain weight.do not show a physio That negative emotional events and the ensuing negative ally ne rmal com pens tion effect after consuming a pre fect c also ve as justification to temporarily a ad (c an d ck,1975 regu 2012w demo ated in ou ab (I a to their n nal bodily signals r ving th their food intake after having the milkshake.Having broken pictures.The duration of exposure to the negative picture heir diet by consu or t as it is also kr having ereas found within other self regulation domains as well such as of having seen the negative nictures and thus could use the in abstinent alcoholics,s kers,and illicit drug users (e.g. tive affect as both g ed feel Future Choices and Intentions ing equally negative Similar findings have been observed in the context of s are future onal moral ling wrongee and Dhar (2007)parti nts had to cho a rela Leach 2010)Parti nts who w ucted to recall ar tively healthy or indulgent snack.Whereas the choice was occasion in which they were treated unfair were more likel framed as a single cho e opportunity for half ot the parti to refuse to help the experimenter ith a supplem tary tas pants,the f cipants w om snacks again in the following week.Participants believing lost a computer game due to an unfair reason (a glitch that they could choose again next week were more likely to in the program),they requested a more unfair money alloca anowingthatomewol avor the indulgent o choice.Me lon in tha 21 who lost the game ave again a reason(Study 3
De Witt Huberts et al. 125 compared to dieters who did not reflect on prior restraint (Study 1; Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2013). Similar mechanisms have been observed in the context of moral behavior, with recent evidence demonstrating that thoughts of foregone misdeeds by thinking of bad deeds that one could have performed but did not, increased subsequent immoral behavior compared with participants whose foregone misdeeds had not been made salient (Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012). Prior Success or Failure A justification related to prior restraint is perceived goal progress. As many self-regulation dilemmas often involve trade-off between two opposing goals (e.g., Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Stroebe, Papies, & Aarts, 2008), progress toward one goal often implies moving away from the other goal. A series of studies in the context of the goal progress model (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007) demonstrated that actual or perceived goal progress in one domain led to more indulgence in the opposing domain (e.g., losing weight vs. choosing a hedonic snack; studying vs. going out with friends). Conversely, although not explicitly studied in a justification context, having failed to attain one’s goal could also serve as a justification to even further abandon one’s goal. Notorious in this regard is the “what the hell effect” in restrained eaters. Numerous studies demonstrated that restrained eaters, people who have the goal of restricting food intake to reach a certain weight, do not show a physiologically normal compensation effect after consuming a preload (cf. Herman & Mack, 1975). Whereas normal eaters decrease their food intake after a preload milkshake, listening to their normal bodily signals, restrained eaters increased their food intake after having the milkshake. Having broken their diet by consuming a milkshake apparently serves as a reason to completely abandon their diet for the day. This abstinence violation effect, as it is also known by, has been found within other self-regulation domains as well, such as in abstinent alcoholics, smokers, and illicit drug users (e.g., Collins & Lapp, 1991; Shiffman et al., 1996; Stephens & Curtin, 1994). Future Choices and Intentions Another type of frequently studied justifications are future choices and intentions. For example, in a study by Khan and Dhar (2007) participants had to choose between a relatively healthy or indulgent snack. Whereas the choice was framed as a single choice opportunity for half of the participants, the other half of the participants were informed that they would have the possibility to choose between the two snacks again in the following week. Participants believing that they could choose again next week were more likely to favor the indulgent option in the present choice. Merely knowing that one would have the option to choose again at a later time presumably justified people to act indulgently, as the possibility to act in line with one’s intentions in the future served as a justification to break their rules in the present. A related demonstration of how future plans and choices can endanger current self-regulation is the evidence that forming particular justifications about undoing the negative effect of the indulgent behavior, can bring about such indulgent behavior (also see Rabiau, Knäuper, & Miquelon, 2006). In other words, when confronted with the wedding cake, Sally may form compensatory intentions such as “I will go exercising tomorrow” or “I will eat less tomorrow,” which will allow her to violate her dieting rules now and indulge in the cake. Indeed, a study by Kronick and Knäuper (2010) revealed that participants who were instructed to make plans to exercise later that day consumed more M&Ms in a subsequent taste test than participants who had not been asked to make concrete plans for physical activity. Another compelling example of the detrimental effect of future intentions on current self-regulation that could be explained by a justification-based account is the finding that restrained eaters who plan to start a weight-loss diet will use that future intention as justification to indulge in the soon-to-be forbidden food while they still can (Urbszat, Herman, & Polivy, 2002). Negative Emotional Events That negative emotional events and the ensuing negative affect can also serve as justification to temporarily abandon self-regulatory goals was demonstrated in our lab (De Witt Huberts et al., 2012a). In three studies, a negative affective state was induced in participants by showing them aversive pictures. The duration of exposure to the negative pictures was manipulated such that one group was highly aware of having seen the pictures whereas the other group was only minimally aware. Only participants who were highly aware of having seen the negative pictures, and thus could use the negative affective triggers as justification, consumed more hedonic snack foods in a subsequent taste test. Importantly, the increase in hedonic consumption could not be attributed to differences in negative affect as both groups reported feeling equally negative. Similar findings have been observed in the context of emotional moral events, demonstrating that feeling wronged leads to more selfish behavior (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). Participants who were instructed to recall an occasion in which they were treated unfair were more likely to refuse to help the experimenter with a supplementary task than participants who had to recall a time when they were bored (Study 1; Zitek et al., 2010). Likewise, when participants lost a computer game due to an unfair reason (a glitch in the program), they requested a more unfair money allocation in a future task than did participants who lost the game for a fair reason (Study 3; Zitek et al., 2010). Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015