14 PEKING POLITICS,I9I8-1923 CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS FAILURE I5 Bankers'associations (yin-hang kung-hui)were established in each banking the equivalent of today's press conference or policy statement,the addressees center under a government order of August 1915.31 While the government did always included not only the"high civil and military officials of the provinces" not require journalists to form professional associations,it did backhandedly but the"various professional associations"(ko fa-t'san)as well. recognize their professional and political status by promulgating a series of laws The new professional strata,in short,enjoyed a relationship of formal and setting qualifications for,and requiring the registration of,editors,writers, informal cooperation with the national government analogous to that tradi- publishers and printers,and setting limits on what could be printed.The quasi- tionally enjoyed by the gentry.Indeed,to some degree they gradually replaced official role of the press was also institutionalized in the subsidies which most local landholding elites as the major recruitment pool and "public opinion" newspapers received from government organs or political groups.National and backdrop for twentieth-century Chinese national governments.The traditional local journalists'associations were formed,in part to handle relations between examination system had demarcated the "gentry"as a monolithic national the press and the government.32 ruling class,which fused landed and commercial wealth,scholarship and office- The political role of the fat'an was even greater than suggested by their holding,and whose members shuttled continuously between local and national legal duties.At times of disorder and stress,they often exercised additional political arenas.After the abolition of the classics-based examinations in 1905, political functions,such as raising troops and keeping order(chambers of com- wealth and status could best be translated into a national career through new- merce)and imposing fiscal policies on the government(bankers'associations).33 style or foreign education.But such education produced professionals and quasi- They worked closely with government ministries in their areas of interest to professionals,urbanites less likely to return for extended stays in the local com- define and carry out policy.34 Chambers of commerce often served as the munity as landholders,local capitalists,and local influentials.At the same time, representatives of local communities in dealing with warlords,sometimes rais- the increasing autonomy of local power centers,ultimately taking the form of ing money to bribe warlords not to enter their citics.From time to time, warlordism,ended the ability of the center to control the appointment of most chambers of commerce and other fa-t'uan issued public telegrams calling for local officials or to validate local elites.National and local levels were increas- civil peace or supporting certain stands on foreign relations,fiscal policy,and ingly distinct,the former dominated by specialist bureaucrats and professionals the like.35 And when politicians or warlords issued public telegrams(t'ung-tien), and the latter still to some extent the bailiwick of traditional landholders.In this 31.Kojima Shotaro,Daiji nempyo,p.415.Although the order was published in 1915, way,the professionalization of the national elite went hand-in-hand with the bankers'associations in Shanghai and Peking were not formed until 1918.Ibid.,p.444. growing alienation of the national political level from the rural hinterland. 32.Ko Kung-chen,Pao-lisueh shih,pp.372,395,409-47;Roswell S.Britton,The Chinese While arriviste landholding and military elites rivaled the old gentry on the local Periodical Press,1800-1912 (Taipei,1966),p.128. level,the professional strata succeeded to its position at the national level. 33.On chambers of commerce,see John Fincher,"Political Provincialism and the Because the new professional strata were so easily seen as a reincarnation of National Revolution,"in Mary Clabaugh Wright,ed.,China in Revolution:The First Phase, the gentry-educationally qualified to serve in government,literate and wealthy, 1900-1913 (New Haven,Conn.,1968),p.216;Burgess,Guilds,p.221;Marie-Claire Ber- most of them from gentry family backgrounds-the dominant bureaucrats gere,"The Role of the Bourgeoisie,"in Wright,cd.,China in Revolution,pp.249,268; Albert Feuerwerker,China's Early Industrialization:Sheng Hsuan-Imai (1844-1916)and were able to make a painless conceptual transition from the tradition of gentry Mandarin Enterprise(Cambridge,Mass.,1958).p.71.On bankers'associations,see Shina participation in government to the potentially revolutionary idea of a"public kin'yii jijo(Tokyo,1925),p.729(hereafter abbreviated SK);F.O.371/6650,F1188/1188/10, opinion"of the urban professional classes.Less wealthy and educated sectors of Enclosure in Peking Despatch 70:"Memorandum by Mr.A.Rose,Commercial Secretary the newly emerging urban "middle"classes-small and medium merchants, to the British Legation,respecting the Financial Situation in China,"February 8.1921. artisans,students-were rigorously excluded from the elite's conception of the confidential print.See also discussion of banks in Chapter III. 34.See citations on bankers'associations in preceding footnote.Also see newspaper re- legitimate public.Thus,although the early republican political elite was new in ports on the September 1924 National Industrial Conference in Peking:Ching pao 1924.9.2 content-Confucian generalists had been replaced by specialists and profes- in GSK 1924.9.17-27 and elsewhere.Also see report of the tenth annual meeting of the sionals-it was not new in form:a bureaucracy and small surrounding public National Association of Education Associations:I-shih pao 1924.10.3 in GSK 1924.10. were knit together by common educational experiences and career qualifica- 275-78. tions but excluded participation not only by the masses but even by the other 35.For examples from the period covered in this study,see Lai-chiang cho-wu,Anfu middle strata of society.The only innovation in the shape of political society was -s n(Peking,1920),chiian 3,pp.1-32(hereafter abbreviated ATTA);also see,in F.O. 228/2990,the translation of a telegram from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to the in the increased isolation of the central political arena from the nation as a whole. ministers of Great Britain,the United States of America,France,and Japan,May 30,1921. Like the traditional gentry,the new professionals were able to participate in
16 PEKING POLITICS,I918-1923 CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS FAILURE I7 politics not only as members of organizations but also as individuals.Many Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen,knocking at the door of government,finding of the 5,105 lawyers who achieved certification in China between 1912 and it barred,and finding in the West and Japan alternate models for ways to in- 191736 played prominent roles in republican politics:examples in the present fuence the national polity,were late nineteenth-century pioneers and harbin- study include Chu Shen,37 minister of justice from 1918 to 1920,and Yao gers.Fromabout 1900 on,the Tokyo Chinese student community proved a fruit- Chen,38 an Anfu Club (An-fu chii-le-pu)leader.The role of big businessmen in ful recruiting ground.Here students were exposed to notions of constitution- politics is illustrated by the career of Pien Yin-ch'ang,a prominent Tientsin alism,nationalism and revolution,and to living examples of professional party millionaire who was chairman of the National Chamber of Commerce,a men and revolutionaries,and some of them chose to forego bureaucratic careers member of the House from Chihli in the 1918-20 parliament,and a member to imitate these new patterns of political action.They chose between Liang's of the Anfu Club.Pien's political connections were useful from a business path of agitation and propaganda for establishment of a constitution under the standpoint(during his tenure in parliament,he steered through the ministries Ch'ing and Sun's program of secret organization for a revolution to establish of Finance and Agriculture and Commerce the formalities for establishing a republic. the National Commercial Bank [Ch'uan-kuo shang-yeh yin-hang]for which The door on which the young political professionals were knocking was he raised capital among various merchant colleagues39),and his Chamber of partially opened by the regime itself,pursuing its program of reform.The Commerce position was useful for his political activities (on May 17,1918, convening of the provincial assemblies in 1909 and of the National Assembly the National Chamber of Commerce issued a public telegram implicitly laying in 1910 provided an opportunity for many politicians to pursue their careers the blame for national disunity on the rebel southwestern provinces40).K'ang within the establishment.The typical late Ch'ing provincial assemblyman was Shih-to was an example of a prominent journalist in politics.According young (average age,41),wealthy,of gentry class origin;one-third had received to a biographer,"In 1909,newspapers were beginning to develop in new-style or overseas education.43 Although these assemblies,like those in the Peking...and K'ang became a hanger-on of several leading editors. republic,included bureaucrats,professionals,businessmen,landholders,and the Rushing between the National Assembly,the Board of Laws,and the Admini- like,it was the professional politicians who dominated and set the tone.44 strative Court,he sought news from fellow natives of Chihli.It was with The fact that the professional politicians had not served in the bureaucracy K'ang that the Peking newspapers began the practice of openly seeking tended to relegate them permanently to peripheral positions in early republican news....Using his status as a reporter,he became familiar with many officials politics.The pinnacles of power in the republic could be scaled only by bureau- and politicians,and rapidly became more self-assertive."41 K'ang was an Anfu crats and ex-burcaucrats.Few cabinet ministers and no presidents(with the brief Club leader in the 1918-20 parliament.Professional bankers often served as exception of Sun Yat-sen)were professional politicians in our sense.Between members of parliament or government officials.Examples in this study include parliamentary sessions,the politicians were forced to play the roles of inter- Chou Tso-min,Feng Keng-kuang,Wang Yu-ling,and Wu Ting-ch'ang. mediaries,brokers,and allies of the major bureaucratic factions.Their highest Among the new professionals,one type played a particularly prominent role glory was reached when parliament was in session and the struggle to expand in republican politics-the professional politician,that type of professional who, its powers could be pursued.In this struggle,the professional politicians,like in Max Weber's definition,.lives both“for”and“of”politics..4 2 Men like their opposite numbers,the party politicians of Taisho Japan,often engaged in 36.Tung-chi yueh-k'an 3(September 15,1918).pp.32-35. disruptive,obstructionist tactics and in blatant political opportunism.A con- 37.MJTC,chiiau:8,p.32;ATTA,chiian 2,pp.10-11;GJMK,1932.pp.150-51. temporary writer described and criticized this behavior in the following terms: 38.GJMK,1924,P.581:GJMK,1937,p.497:ATTA,dman2,p.17. 39.GIMK,1932,p.330;The China Year Book 1926-7,p.1191;Nan-hai yin-tzu,An-fit As soon as you M.P.'s came to Peking in 1912,you started playing with party funds, ho-echi(n-p.,1920),1:58 (hereafter abbreviated AHKC);STSP 1918.9.5.2. scheming and plotting...joining as many as two or three parties each!Later,you 40.Ta yin-chi-shih,Cheng-aen chi-yao (in special issue no.1 of Chin-tai sh tzu-ino, demanded money to elect the president,money to elect the vice-president,money to Peking,1962),p.416 (hereafter abbreviated CWCY). confirm the cabinet-you even required money to declare war on a foreign country! 41.ATTA,citia:2,pp.19-20. 42.Max Weber,"Politics as a Vocation,"From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology,translated 43.Chang P'eng-yuan,"Ch'ing-chi tzu-i-chi i-yuan ti hsuan-chu chi ch'i ch'u-shen chih and edited by H.H.Gerth and C.Wright Mills (New York,1958),p.84.The distinctions fen-hsi,"Sst yil yen 5,no.6 (March 1968):1439-42.Also see P'eng-yuan Chang,"The developed here among specialized bureaucrats,professional politicians,and other profes- Constitutionalists,"in Wright,ed.China in Revolution,pp.149-53. sionals are not hard and fast.Some careers,e.g.,those of Chang Chien,Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 44.Cf.Cameron,Reform Movement,p.122;also see Chang P'eng-yuan,"Ch'ing-chi and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei,combined elements of all three. tz'u-chi,”p.1442
18 PEKING POLITICS,I918-1923 CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS FAILURE I9 After Yuan Shih-k'ai dissolved parliament,you gentlemen served as ofcials or advisors bowed before the politicians'insistent campaign for the latter.)Furthermore,a until parliament was restored,upon which you returned to serving as M.P.'s.After [the constitutional regime was consistent with the new-style elite's modernizing dissolution of parliament in]1917 it was even worse:one day,you would run down to values and Western orientation.This point must now be examined more Kwangtung to serve as M.P.'s in the extraordinary session [convened by Sun Yat-sen]: closely. the next,run back to Peking to serve as special appointees on the Economic Investigation Bureau (Ching-chi tiao-ch'a chil)[appointed by Sun's enemies].Several of you served as Granted that the notion of saving China through adoption of a constitution special advisors in the Yuan Shih-k'ai period and as Anfu clique M.P.'s in the Tuan Ch'i was consistent with the interests and training of members of this elite,what jui period,were elected after the Anfu-Chihli war to the"New-New Parliament"(Hsin- precisely did constitutional republicanism mean to them?Of course,not every hsin kuo-)[which never met],and now [that the original parliament has been recalled early republican political figure accepted the constitutional faith,nor did those once again],with the qualification of having been elected ten years ago,you come to who did so accept it with equal commitment./But constitutionalism,as sub- serve as"elders of the sixth Imperial reign"[persons who have transferred their loyalty to sequent chapters will repeatedly illustrate,was the dominant set of assumptions a series of new masters].45 to which the defense of political action had to be referred,That some may have appealed to constitutionalism half-heartedly or cynically does not alter the fact In addition to suggesting the length to which the parliamentarians would go in seeking to expand their precarious political toehold,the quotation also sug- that it made sufficient sense to enough people in Peking in the years around 1920 to serve as the touchstone of political discussion.In what way did such an idea gests how seats in parliament came to be considered almost as prebends,analo- make intellectual sense?48 gous to official appointments in old China.46 Just as the republican notion of public"was treated as an extension of the traditional concept of"gentry,"so "The trust which men repose in the power of words engrossed on parchment the office of"representative"in the republic was seen bifocally as"representa- to keep a government in order,"4 although rooted in Greece and Rome,swept all before it in the West from about the time of Montesquieu's The Spirit of Laws tive"and"office,"with the latter perspective,defined by tradition,remaining (1748)and the American revolution (1776).The "foodgates of constitutional dominant.47 If the traditional hsien magistrate had made a living by attaching change"were opened,and the next century and a half saw scores of constitu- part of the revenue of his office,which consisted partly of fees for the per- tions adopted throughout Europe and the Americas,and then Asia.5 At the time formance of official duties,so the republican M.P.made a living by accepting gratuities (chin-t'ieh)for the performance of such official duties as voting on of the early republic,the Chinese consulted with western experts,who con- firmed the importance of a properly drafted constitution for nation-building. presidential and cabinet appointments and even on declarations of war.Such "The political troubles with which the Chinese have...been afflicted,"wrote behavior persisted although more and more seen as corrupt,as contradictory standards were applied by simultaneous traditional and Western frameworks to W.W.Willoughby,professor of political science at Johns Hopkins and for years a constitutional advisor to the Chinese government,"have been due not so a newly emerging role. much to a general lack of capacity to maintain a self-governing or represen- tative scheme of political control as that they have been attempting to govern Intellectual Sources themselves under an essentially defective constitution."1 An earlier consultant,Frank I.Goodnow,Eaton Professor of Public Law and Late Ch'ing modernization,we have argued,produced a new political elite dominated by new-style bureaucrats and professionals,including professional 48.This section by no means constitutes a study of the theories and positions taken in politicians.Constitutionalism served the interests of these groups because it constitutional discussion in China over the years.Such a study would be of considerable offered each a legitimate political role without opening the political arena to the interest and the materials are abundant,but the purpose here is only to sketch some common groups below them.(It was secondary whether the constitution should be themes that underlay the vitality of the constitutional notion as such. 49.Walton H.Hamilton,"Constitutionalism,"in Edwin R.A.Seligman,ed.,Encyclopedia monarchical or republican;the bureaucrats'lukewarm preference for the former ofthe Social Sciences(New York,1931),4:255. 50.John A.Hawgood,Modern Constitutions Since 1787 (London,1939).p.4;Carl J. 45.Ts'ung Yen,"Ch'ung-kao chiu kuo-hui i-yuan,"Nu-li chou-pao 9 (July 2,1922).p.3. Friedrich,"Constitutions and Constitutionalism,"in David L.Sills,ed.,Infernationel En- 46.For the idea of prebendalism in China,see Max Weber,The Religion of Chine:Co- eycopedia of the Social Sciences,(New York,1968),3:323;Hamilton,"Constitutionalism," fucianism and Taoism,trans.and ed.by Hans H Gerth(Glencoe,Il,1951),p.56 and passim. P.255. 47.Cf.Fincher,"Political Provincialism,"p.208,and P'eng-yuan Chang,"Constitution- 51.W.W.Willoughby,Constitutional Govermnent in China:Present Conditions and alists,"p.147,note 12. Prospects (Washington,D.C.,1922),p.33
20 PEKING POLITICS,I918-1923 CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS FAILURE 2I Municipal Science at Columbia University,returning in disillusionment to the becoming more like the Western nations,and the evident success of constitu- United States when the draft constitution he had prepared was not adopted,had tional regimes in becoming world powers,were only the more obvious motives remarked,"The Chinese wanted me to teach them politics.But I was not a for imitation.There was also the vogue of scientism in Chinese thought-the politician.I was just interested in the scientific and theoretical side of adminis- belief in the efficacy of a mechanistic version of modern science to solve human trative law."This was a pregnant distinction."It is by no means accidental," problems.Just as part of the attraction of"scientific"Marxism in both the West Karl Loewenstein notes,"that the climate for the birth of the written constitu- and China was its claimed linkage with the nature-mastering powers of science, tion was the eighteenth century,fascinated not only by what were believed to so modern "political science"laid claim to the same secondhand charisma.Like be the imperatives of natural law but also by the application of the laws of nature Marxism a few years later,constitutionalism seemed to link what Ch'en Tu- to social dynamics.The science of mechanics was transferred to the science of hsiu was to call Mr.Te (democracy)and Mr.Sai (science)by providing for government."3 Western constitutional thinkers assumed that constitutions democracy to be scientifically engineered.5 could be"engineered"to put predictable human forces in a balance that would Even more fundamentally,the faith in constitutions fell in with a deep- be self-regulating.There could,therefore,be a "science"of politics,which seated Chinese belief in the dominant role of the conscious mind in the process specialized in such constitutional engineering.How to achieve the obedience of of action.Confucius had traced the ordering of the state to the ordering of the political actors to the written rules-the problem of legitimacy-was not mind:"The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the recognized as a problem in this science."We look in vain for any theory of empire,first ordered well their own States.Wishing to order well their States, political education,of political leadership,or,until recently,of social con- they first regulated their families.Wishing to regulate their families,they sensus."54 As with Willoughby,the answer to the failure of constitutions was first cultivated their persons.Wishing to cultivate their persons,they first better engineering. rectified their hearts.Wishing to rectify their hearts,they first sought to This view,dominant in Western political science until after World War Is5, be sincere in their thoughts."57 Mao Tse-tung has frequently expressed the fell on fertile Chinese intellectual soil.'The sheer prestige and self-confidence same idea:"Whether one is correct or not in the ideological and political of the West,the desire in some Chinese circles to achieve world acceptance by line determines everything.With a correct Party linc,we will have everything. 52.Baltimnore News,1928.1.16(made available to me by Professor Y.C.Wang).More If we do not have people,we will get them;if we do not have guns,we will get than most of his contemporaries,Goodnow stressed the adaptation of constitutional provi- them;if we do not have political power,we will get it.However,if the sions to social and cultural realities(a belief that helped get him into the position of backing political line is not correct,we will lose everything we have.The line is the key Yuan Shih-k'ai's ill-fated attempt to restore the emperorship;see Nocl Pugach,"Embar- link;once the key link is grasped,every problem will be solved."s8 Sun Yat- rassed Monarchist:Frank J.Goodnow and Constitutional Development in China,1913- sen formulated the belief most succinctly:"Whatever can be known can cer- 1915,"Pacific Historical Review 42,no.4 (November 1973:499-517).But he shared the key tainly be carried out."59 The common thread is the notion that if the conscious assumption that a constitution properly adapted to variations in the human material could serve as a blueprint for political stability.For example,his Peking University lectures(pub- mind can be set straight as to how to do a thing,the actual doing of it will be lished as Principles of Constitutionl Goverment [New York,19161)affirm briefly that the relatively unproblematical.Correlatively,if a thing is being done wrong,the constitution does not necessarily tell how the political game is really played but move solution lies in correcting the conscious thoughts of the doer.60 immediately to detailed descriptions of the constitutional systems of various countrics, reprinting in an appendix the American,French,German,Belgian,and Japanese constitu- 56.Cf.D.W.Y.Kwok,Scientismn in Chinese Thought,1900-1950(New Haven,1965). tions. 57.The Great Leaming,paragraph 4.as translated by James Legge,The Chinese Classics: 53.Karl Loewenstein,"Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary With a Translation,Critical and Exegetical Notes,Prolegomtena,and Copious Indexes (London, Age,"in Eckstein and Apter.eds.,Comparative Politics,p.150. 1861),1:221-22 54.Sheldon S.Wolin,Politics and Vision:Continuity and Innovation in Westeru Political 58."Document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,Chmgfa Thought (Boston,1960).p.390. (1972)No.12",in Issues and Studies8,no.12 (September 1972):65. 55.See further Harry Eckstein,"A Perspective on Comparative Politics,Past and Pres- 59.Quoted in Teng and Fairbank,China's Response,p.264. ent,"in Eckstein and Apter,eds.,Comparative Politics,pp.3-32;Albert Somit and Joseph 60.Cf.Robert and Ai-li S.Chin,Psychological Research in Commmmist China,1949-1966 Tanenhaus,The Development of American Political Science:From Burgess to Behavioralism (Cambridge,Mass.,1969),esp.pp.13-15,76-82,87-91;David S.Nivison,"The Problem of (Boston,1967),pp.68-69.For a book as recent as 1963,which stresses constitutional engi- Knowledge'and 'Action'in Chinese Thought Since Wang Yang-ming,"in Arthur F. neering,see C.F.Strong,A History of Modem Politicel Constitutions (New York,1964). Wright,ed.Smdies in Chinese Thought (Chicago,1967).pp.112-45;Donald J.Munro
22 PEKING POLITICS,I9I8-1923 CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS FAILURE 23 Such a belief can lead in quite a different direction from constitutionalism- technology,then educational institutions,then political institutions,and finally it can lead to the authoritarianism that says that rules and regulations are power- social institutions have been transformed by successive generations of leaders less to enforce good government in the absence of indoctrination or"thought secking national power to throw off the yoke of imperialism.The adoption of a reform,"i and such that indoctrination makes constitutions superfuous.Indeed, republican constitution was one step in this process.As noted,a constitution one might argue that this is the more consistent deduction from such a"vol- seemed conducive to national strength simply because the strong nations had untarist"position;certainly,it is the one more frequently arrived at in Chinese constitutions;the Japanese experience in particular seemed to show how quickly history,by both Confucianists and Maoists.Yet the voluntarist assumption was a constitution could produce strength.But there was more than an empirical also capable of being turned to a defense of constitutionalism.As Sun Yat-sen correlation in the republican leaders'belief in the strengthening effect of con- says,"A race is an aggregation of human beings;a human being is ruled by the stitutions;there was also an analysis of the reasons for this effect. mind;and the nation and the government are the manifestations of the psychol- Constitutionalism had achieved its late eighteenth-century political impor- ogy of a group.Therefore the foundation of a nation is first based on the work- tance in the West in the context of the struggle for power between aristocracies ing of the mind."6 Let the provisions of the constitution be regarded as the and monarchs.64 For kings (e.g.Gustavus II of Sweden),promulgation of a thing"known"by the conscious national mind,and there is no reason a con- constitution was a way of seizing power from an aristocratic diet.By extending stitutional republic should not work.If it fails,the reason must be either imper- individual "rights"beyond the aristocracy to the masses,the monarch dis- fect mastery of and commitment to its principles,or flaws in the constitutional solved the special rights of the aristocracy into the general rights of the people, instrument itself. at the same time gaining popular support for the regime.For aristocracies(e.g.. Thus,early republican politicians endlessly debated the adaptation of con- the French parlements),a constitution was a way of limiting the monarch's stitutional provisions to Chinese conditions and searched constantly for that power with such notions as the legal basis of authority,individual rights,and fixed institutional order suited to command the national mind.What they did representation.With the monarch's powers defined and limited,the aristocracy not debate was the assumption that a set of correct govermmental procedures for could play a larger role. China was discoverable and that once known those procedures would almost 'Although seeking opposite goals,the two sides shared a common ground of magically solve China's problems-the assumption,in short,that effort to solve controversy.Arguments on either side were couched in terms of the same philo- China's problems could profitably be invested in debating alternative constitu- sophical problem:on individualistic assumptions,what can justify authority? tional provisions.63 In the midst of upheaval,the search for the proper constitu- As Hobbes put it,what is"the final cause,end,or design of men,who naturally tion was carried out in the public prints,in parliament,and in a succession of love liberty...,in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves,in councils and conventions.The call for some kind of constitutional restoration which we see them live in commonwealth"?65 Or,in Rousseau's phrase,"Man or revision was the typical riposte to deepening chaos,and it flowed from the is born free,and everywhere he is in chains....What can render [this] belief that if the nation were"sincere in its thoughts,"the state would become legitimate?66 In constituting the state,the theoretical source of obedience and “well ordered.” citizen commitment lay in the solution of the paradox between the individual's But if consistency with the voluntarist tradition helped make constitutional- interest in selfish freedom and his need for government.The solution,for ism plausible,its expected contribution to national wealth and power made it Hobbes,Locke,Rousseau and others,was to prove a (more or less limited) positively attractive.From the self-strengtheners of the 1860s to Mao Tse-tung, identity of interests between the individual and the state? modern Chinese leaders have sought to transform China to make it strong.First, This solution caught the eye of early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers. "The Malleability of Man in Chinese Marxism,"The China Quarterly,no.48 (October- The original problem-justifying authority-was not a Chinese philosophical December 1971)pp.609-40 (hereafier abbreviated CQ). problem;the Chinese lacked the individualistic assumptions that made it prob- 61.Nivison,"The Problem of 'Knowledge'and'Action',"p.141. 62.Teng and Fairbank,China's Response,p.264. 64.The analysis here follows R.R.Palmer,The Age of the Democratic Revolution,A 63.On the strand of traditional belief,which argued that the state must be founded on Political History of Europe and America:The Challenge (Princeton,N.],1959). some fixed,unchanging order,and on the related"cuphoric idea that good government is 65.Thomas Hobbes,Leviathan,or the Matter,Forme and Power of a Commonwealth,Ec- easy if the ruler will simply adopt the right policies,"see Thomas A.Metzger.The Intemal clesiastical and Civil (New York,1962),p.129(Chapter 17). Organization ofCh'ing Bureaucracy:Legal,Normative,and Communication Aspects(Cambridge, 66.Jean-Jacques Rousseau,The Social Contract,or Principles of Political Right in Frederick M1s5,1973),Pp.28-42,74-80. Watkins,trans.and ed.,Rousseau:Political Writings(Edinburgh,1953),pp.3-4(Chapter 10)