7 Intervention (1862-64) FEW NOW ARGUE,as most Western writers on the subject once did,that foreign intervention was the decisive factor in the defeat of the Taipings.Nevertheless,it continues to be recog- nized as of considerable importance,and it is often assumed that,being important,it was also quite extensive aid.Thus Lo Erh-kang,after suggesting that the English and French forces which had been retained in China to enforce the new treaties were reinforced by additional troops from India following the defeat of the Mutiny there,states that 'in the Spring of 1862 England began big scale military action against the Taiping state and a new phase in her interference began'.1 It is certainly correct to suggest that a new phase in British policy began at this time,but in so far as Lo's argument infers that the British government was prepared to make a heavy commitment of its forces to the struggle it is quite contrary to the evidence.A primary objective of British policy during these years was to keep the scale of direct foreign involvement as small as possible, to the minimum necessary to ensure a Manchu victory. Bruce in particular urged strictly limited intervention,for he was thinking far beyond the immediate question of the sup- pression of the rebellion,major problem though that was.His grand design,while British minister at Peking,was to win the adherence of the Manchu government to the new treaty settle- ment in spirit as well as letter.His approach,as he defined it to 111
王nterⅤention (1862ˉ 64) 鞲 tha△ Erhˉkang,after suggesting that t【 bCing important,it was a1sO quite extellsiⅤ le EngⅡ 鹦 sh and Frenc11forces 骥 c aid。 Thus Lo 瀚 w⒒ich had been retained in China to enf0rce the new treaties were reinforced by additiona1troops frOln India fo11ovving thc defeat of the Ⅸ赝utiny there,states tl△ at‘in the Spring of1862 Eng1and began big scale lnⅡ itary邑ct至on against the Taiping state and a new phase in her intcrferencc bcgan’ ,廴 It is certainly correct to suggest that a rlew phase in British poⅡcy began at this t虹ne,but in so far as Lo’ s argu11△ cnt in】i￡)rs that the British goⅤernment was prepared to make a heavy comⅡ 1itnlent of its forces to the strugglc it is quitc contrary to the eVidcnce. A primary o妫cCtive of BⅡ tish poIicy during these ycars w皮 s to keep the scale of dircct foreign inⅤ olvement as sma1l as possible, to the Ⅱ1iniFnum necessary to ensure a ⅣIanchu victory。 Bruce in particular urged strict1y1i【nited intervention,for he was t缸 hking far beyond tlle inunediate question of the suppres蕊on of the rebellion,m耐 or problem though that was.H必 grand design,、,孓 `hⅡ e British Ⅱ蛀nister at Peking,讯λs to win the ad⒒ere且 ce oft⒒e卜Ιa血c匕ug。vernment to the new treaty settleˉ me狃tin spirit as we11as Ietter。 FⅡs approach,as he denned itt。 1】 1
Intervention a Foreign Office official shortly before he moved to the Chinese capital,was to convince that government 'that our objects are essentially pacific,that our demands are reasonable and that we are inclined to be moderate and conciliatory if we are met in a corresponding spirit'.2In this way he hoped gradually to create a situation in which the treaties would be fulfilled not under the constant threat of superior Western force,though he recognized that for a long time to come this must remain their ultimate sanction,but under a Chinese government able and willing to co-operate to this end.3 It needed to be a reasonably efficient as well as a reasonably willing government.Bruce certainly did not wish to see preserved in Peking a weak and incapable government which could be easily browbeaten into giving way to every Western demand. Such a government would simply invite rebellion from its own subjects and,ultimately perhaps,partition by ambitious Western powers.China would then become a second Turkey,a field for imperial rivalries of the most dangerous kind rather than a field for peaceful and mutually profitable trade.He told Russell in March 1862 that he was 'fully convinced that we,who neither seek territory nor promote by arms religious conversion, have little to apprehend from any success that may attend our efforts to raise the Chinese Executive out of its present helpless condition.Nor do I consider that it will be a matter of regret or hostile to our interests,that China should be encouraged by a consciousness of her strength,to use bolder language in defence of her just rights.The weakness of China,rather than her strength,is likely to create a fresh Eastern Question in these seas.'4 The basic object of Bruce's policy was simply to provide for the future security of British interests in China with as little trouble and expense to the British home government as possible. He wanted to see Great Britain relieved of the need to maintain large naval forces in Chinese waters,in fact to end the era of gunboat diplomacy.Any aid given the Manchu government against its domestic enemies should therefore contribute to its regeneration,not to its mere survival.It was an enlightened,far- sighted and humane policy,even if inspired by fundamentally self-interested motives.5 As the later history of China sufficiently shows,Bruce failed 112
米 Frfr召 rvc刀 r莎ε刀 a Foreign OⅢ cc O皿 cial short1y before he rnoved to the Chhese cap⒒ al,was to con诫 nce th乩 governmcnt‘ that our o△ ects are essentiaIly paof△ c,that Our demands are reasonable and伍 at we are inc1ined to be lnoderate and co且 CⅡiatory r we are1met in a corresponding spirit’ 。2In this way he hoped gradua11y tO create a situation in which the treaties wou1d be fulfiⅡed not uⅡder the Constant threat of superior Wcstern forGe,though he recognized that】or a1ong ti【ne to come this must remain their u1timate sanction,but under a Chinese goⅤ er⒑meRlt able a蛋 1d wi1Ⅱ ng to coˉ operate to this end。 3 l口、'ii丨 i!i蘑 {∶l:∶ }∶丨{∶∶1i丨 |∶|}l||∶ ∶∶丨1导 |默黢 搔i百黯 榇 黯 抵 营畚 找 h Pekhg a weak and incapable governme芏 lt which cou1d be easⅡy brOwbeaten into givhg way to every Westerm deInand。 Such a government wou1ds血 ply i11Ⅴ 扭e rebellion from扯 s Own sul∶:jects and, ulthnately perhaps, partition by amb⒒ ious WesterIl powers。 Ch血a would then become a second Turkey,a field for impe蛀 al rivalries of the血 0st dangerous kind ratlaer 伍an a neld f。 r peacefu1and mutual1y prontable grade.He told Russelh蛀 March1862that he was‘ ful1y co殂 诚nced that we,who neither scek territO.ˉ y nor promote by arms reⅡ giOus conversion, haⅤe Ⅱttle to apprehend from any success that Fnay attend our er。rts t。 r缸se the Chhese Execut卜 e out of its present helpless cond⒈ ion.Nor do I consider thatit v汀11be a【 natter ofregret or hostⅡe to our interests,tllat ChiΙ 1a shou1d be encouraged by a Consciousness ofher strength,to use bo1der language in defe狃 Ce of her Just r1ghts. The weakness of China, rather than her stFength,is likely to cmate a fresh Eastern Question in these seas。 ’∠ The bas⒗ ouect of:rucσ s poⅡcy was simply to pro说 de for the future secuⅡty of B五硅sh interests in China w妃 h as Ⅱttle trouble and expense to the British home government as possible. He wanted to see Great Britain re1ievcd of the殂eed to maintain 1arge nava1forces in Chinese waters,in fact to end咖 黟 蚰 咖 迦 蛆 № 珊 迥 r Any缸d ghen the Manchu gover111nent against its domestic eneⅡ Ⅱes shou1d therefOre co纽tⅡbute to its regeneration,not to its rnere surviⅤ al。 It was an e殂 1ightened,farsighted a狃d humane po1icy,even if inspired by fundamentaⅡ y ser~interested motives,5 As the Iater history of China su盅 cienuy sh。 ws,Bruce failed 112
Intervention in his main objective.The Manchu government was neither effectively reformed in itself nor greatly reconciled to the presence of the West.The 'break-up of China'remained a constant possibility throughout the later nineteenth century, and the maintenance of British treaty rights there was always ultimately dependent upon the presence of British gunboats. The difficulties in the way of success for Bruce's plans were indeed formidable,as was the opposition he aroused.British merchants and missionaries who looked for quick returns under the new treaty settlement were critical of a policy which seemed to them more concerned to protect Chinese interests and sen- sibilities than their own.He had also to curb consuls brought up under the old dispensation,who were quick to call upon the nearest gunboat to force satisfaction from the local Chinese authorities when faced with what they considered an infringe- ment of the treaties.If grievances were to be handled in this way,Bruce objected,not only might it lead to general hostilities, as in 1856,but there was little point in having a diplomatic representative to the central government in Peking. There was also little point in having such a representative if the Peking government itself was incapable of enforcing its authority upon its own subordinate officials in the provinces. Bruce wanted to strengthen the hand of the central government and to help make it the sole effective military and political power in the Chinese state.?His attempts to do this ran quite counter to the realities of the political situation in China by 1860,a fact of which he was not completely unaware.The failure of the regular Imperial armies to crush the Taiping rebellion during the eighteen-fifties meant that effective military and political power in central China and,through the new likin tax,s a great measure of independent financial power also was passing into the hands of the great provincial officials.Chief among these were Tseng Kuo-fan and his nominees,Li Hung- chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang,who became governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang respectively in 1862.These were the men who actually created the armies and devised the strategies which defeated the rebellion.Given their growing power and authority,any attempt to bring about changes in the govern- ment of China which did not win their support and co-operation was bound to fail.Indeed,it could be said that it might have GBAT I 113
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Intervention served Bruce's long-term plans better had the final campaign against the rebellion organized by these provincial governors failed,like the earlier campaigns of Hsiang Jung and Chang Kuo-liang,for then the central government might have mounted another and more efficient campaign with Western help,and have emerged from the rebellion militarily and politically stronger,at least in relation to its own provincial officers.Thus late in 1863 he could argue,against all the apparent aims of British intervention,that 'every consideration of sound policy indicates that Nanking is the last place we wish to see taken,as while in the hands of the Taipings it gives us a hold both on them and on this recalcitrant government'.Such statements make no sense at all unless one remembers the larger objectives of Bruce's policy while British minister at Peking. There was perhaps little sense in making them in any case,at least at that late stage,for the protraction of the rebellion could equally well have led to the actual partitioning of China by the Western powers as to the effective regeneration of the central Manchu administration.It is difficult to see that there was ever much prospect of success for Bruce's plans,especially since they ignored the deep-seated socialorigins of revolt in nineteenth- century China. But however unsuccessful in the long run,this major objective of reforming and strengthening the government in Peking con- ditioned Bruce's approach to the question of aid against the rebels and made him the chief spokesman in British counsels for limited rather than extensive intervention.The problem,he told Russell in February 1862,was to render assistance 'in a shape which will strengthen and not weaken the authority of the government'.10 To this end the approach he recommended was indirect aid which helped organize the resources available to the Manchus.Thus foreign assistance in the organization of the Imperial customs and the training of Imperial forces by European officers was desirable,but the direct use of Western forces against the rebels was not,at least beyond the defence of the treaty ports themselves.In April 1862 he told Brigadier General Staveley,the commander of British forces at Shanghai, that whatever the risk to our trade it had better be incurred than that we should fight the battles of this Government for it,or afford it more than casual and temporary assistance,which is 114
姒rcrv召 P9莎 :o刀 serVed Bruce’ s1ongˉ term plano better had伍e flna1campaign against the rebe11ion organized by these proⅤ inoa1goⅤernors n吐led,1ike the earlier campaigns of Hsiang Jung and Chang KuoˉⅡang,for then the centra1gover【 ltnent mi￡ 查tRt have motI【 lted another and more e盥 cient campaign Ⅵ砬u1`a`estern he1p, and have emerged from the rebellon mil⒒ arily and po1it妃 aⅡy stronger,at least in re1ation to its own provincial o￡ I1cers。 Thus late in 1863he could argue,against aI1the apparent ahⅡ s of BⅡtish L1tervention,that‘ every consideration of sound po1icy indicates that Nankij〔 1g is the`砑 s莎 place we、〃ish to see taken,as whⅡc in the hands of the Taipings it gives us a hold both on them and on this recalcitrant government’ 。9 Such statements make no sense at a1l uⅡ less one remembers the1arger o砀 eCt加es of Bruce’ s poⅡcy wh⒒e Briush nⅡ nister at Peking. There、Ⅴas perhaps1ittle sense in rnaking the狃 in any case,at 1east at that late stage,for the protraGu。 n。f the rebe11ion could equally weⅡ have led to the actual part止 ionhg of C妯 na by the Western powers as to the efFective regeneration of the central Manchu admirlistration.It is di】 11cu1t to see that there was ever mu0h prospect of success for Bruce’ s p1ans, espeoa11y since theyignored thedeepˉ scatedsocIaloriginsofreⅤ o1tin nineteenthˉ century Cbina。 But howevcr unsucGessfL11h the1ong run,th恕 m苟or o旬ect卜e of refor1r1i11g and strengthening the government in Peking cO【 l~ d⒒ioned Bruce’s approaGh t。 the question of aid agahst the rebe1s and made hi1n the c⒒ ief spokes1nan in British counse1s for liInited rather than extensiⅤ e intervention。 The proble【 n,he to1d Russe11in February 1862,was to render assistance‘ in a shape which Ⅵ泛11strengthen and not weaken the authority of 伍e government’ ,10To this end the approach he recomlnended was indirect aid which heIped organize the resources availabIe to 伍e Manchus。 Thus foreign assista且 Ge in the organizatio【 l of the Imperial customs and the traⅡ 1iⅡ g of Imperial forces by European o扭 cers was desirable,but the direct use of Western forces against the rebe1s llzas no△ at least beyond the defence of the treaty ports themseIves。 In AprⅡ I862hc to1d Brigadier General staveley,the cO1n1nander of B茧 tish forces at Shanghai, that‘whatever the risk to our tradc it had better be incurred than that we should nght the battles of tⅡ s Government for⒒ ,or aford it more than casua1and temporary assistance,which is 114
Intervention all that will be required to enable the Imperialists to triumph,if they can be induced to turn their own resources to proper account...'.1 The aid actually rendered to the Imperialist cause by Britain over the next two years cannot be accurately described as'casual and temporary',but the phrase accurately reflects Bruce's own approach to the question. Such an approach is not altogether what one would expect from Bruce's earlier reports on the rebellion and his scepticism during 1861 as to the possibility of making effective arrange- ments with the rebels.It must be said that Bruce was not remark- able for the steadiness and consistency of his views on the ques- tion of aid,for despite his general objection to British forces fighting the battles of the Manchu government,he showed a recurrent urge to deal the rebels a 'deadly blow'at Nanking, while at other times he became so exasperated with the Manchu government as to threaten to withdraw aid altogether and even, on certain conditions,to hand over Shanghai to the rebels. But basically he did hold to a policy of limited and indirect aid, to be applied through the central government,not the provincial authorities.Bruce found his post at Peking a wearying and frustrating one,1 but he brought to it a breadth of vision and a sensitivity of outlook which is worthy of respect,even though it sometimes led him into inconsistencies of attitude and uncer- tainties of policy. The Foreign Office approved Bruce's moderate and con- ciliatory approach to the Manchu government.1s It agreed also that direct British intervention against the rebellion should be strictly limited in extent,though it showed itself readier than Bruce to approve the tendency of service officers to go beyond the limits set.The rational course for Britain to pursue,Russell told Bruce in July 1862,was to avoid any extensive engagements, to protect the treaty ports and to encourage the government to improve its armed forces so that it could itself reduce the rebels to subjection.14 The British government did 'not propose to give to the Chinese government the whole force of the British Empire for their support',he assured the House of Lords,after quoting this despatch.15 The motives which made the home government insist on the limits of the commitment it was prepared to make on this issue were somewhat different from those uppermost in Bruce's 115
r勿 r召 rv纟刀rjo刀 aⅡ that、汛 `i1l be requked to enab1e the Imperia1ists to triumph,r they can be induced 笔0 tum their own resources to proper acoount 。。 '。 1工 :Γhe aid actua11y rendered to the ImperiaⅡ st cause by BⅡtah over the next two years cannot be accurately described as‘ casua1and temporary’ ,but the phrase accurateIy reⅡects Bmcρ ’s Own approach to the question。 Such an approach is not aItogether what one would expect fFOm Bruce’s earⅡer reports on the rebe1Ⅱ on and his scepticism durjhg I861 as to the possibiⅡ ty of1nakhg efFective arrangeˉ ments with the rebeIs。 ItFnust be said that Bruce、vas notren△arkable for thc steadiness and c°nsistency ofhis vie、 vs O11the quesˉ tion of aid,for despite蚯 s gcneral o旬 ecton to British forces fighting the battles of the 卜Ιan0hu govem1△ ent,he showcd a recurrent urge to deal the rebe1sa‘ deadly b1ov'at Nankhg, whⅡe at other tⅡ nes he became so exasperated、 vith the bⅠ anohu government as to threaten to、Ⅳit廴drⅡv aid aItoge伍 er and even, on certain conditions, to hand over Shanghai to the rebels。 But basicaⅡ y he did hold to a poⅡ cy of Ⅱm⒒ed and indirect aid, to be appⅡed through the central governmen△ notthe provinoal authorities, Bruce found his post at Pekji∶I∶】1g a wearyji∶If】 1g and frustrating one,12but he brought to it a breadth of vision and a sensitivity of oudook、Ⅴhich is ll/orthy of respect,even though it somethnes Ied hhn into inconsistenoes of attitude and uncerˉ ta血ties of policy。 The Fore迦羿1 C冫flce approⅤ ed Bruce’s moderate and conˉ cⅡiat。 ry approach to the`Ⅰ anchu goⅤ ernment。 1a It agreed a1so that direct British i11ter、 冫cntion against the rebeIⅡ on shou1d be st蛀ctly Ⅱmited in extent,though it showed itser read始 r than Bruce to approve tlle tendency of service ofF△ cers to go beyond the1iInits set.The rational course for B蛀 tah to pursue,Russe11 told Brucein Ju1y1862,was to aⅤ oid any extensive eRagagements, to protect the treaty ports and to encourage thc government to hmprove its armcd forces so that it couId itser reduce the rebe1s to su凵ec旺on。 1么 The BⅡtish government did‘not propose to giVe to the Chinese governmentthc who1ef° rce ofthe Br⒒ ish Empire for their support’ ,he assured the I-【 ouse of Lords,afCer quoting this despatch,15 The rnotives which made the home government insist on the 1白mits ofthe comm迁 ment it was prepared to make on this issue were somewhat df℃rent ffom those uppermost in Bruce’ s 1I5