12 THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT 2 what extent was Chinese diplomacy influenced by domestic considera- The China Problem tions? Another interesting issue was the relationship between the Foreign Office and the business communities.What were the attitudes of the business communities towards Chinese nationalism?Was business opinion in England the same as that in the treaty ports?Did their opinions have any real bearing on the policy of the British government? A third set of questions concerns international co-operation in the THE origins of Britain's retreat from south China can be traced back Far East,which meant practically Anglo-American-Japanese diplomacy to the end of the First World War when the China problem surfaced over China.Was British policy in the 1920s determined essentially by at the Versailles peace conference.The problem was brought into in- London's own perception of the China problem in so far as it affected ternational limelight by the Chinese delegates,a new generation of British interests?To what extent was it influenced by how the problem Western-educated diplomats who were encouraged by the most celebrated was perceived in Washington or in Tokyo?Why was Britain able and principles of democracy and national self-determination to seek redress willing to break the ranks,as it were,in 1926 in an attempt to establish of their country's long-standing grievances.But what was the China a better and more constructive relationship with the Chinese?Did Britain problem?The answer depends on how it was looked at and from whose try to go it alone?Or did she seek co-operation with the other powers? point of view.Chinese politicians in the immediate post-war period Finally,questions will be raised about the outcome of Britain's rear- tended to reduce it to one simple dimension-the presence in China guard action.Did the retreat succeed in winning Chinese goodwill and, of the foreign powers whose position was maintained by force and above all,in expanding trade and protecting the most important of secured by a whole range of special rights and privileges.From the Britain's interests in China?Did the Chinese gain substantial conces- Chinese standpoint the root of the problem was more external than sions?If not,was it because the British government was grudging?Or internal:it was foreign imperialism which had stripped China of her was it due to the unsatisfactory internal conditions in China?In trying independence,disrupted the Chinese way of life,dislocated the Chinese to answer these questions,the author hopes to provide a better under- economy,and caused the country and the people untold misery.To standing of the internal and external forces that determined the ways resolve the problem it was necessary first to abolish the unequal treaties, in which the British conducted the retreat and the ways in which the hence the anti-treaty thrust of post-war Chinese nationalism. Chinese responded at various stages. From the point of view of the foreign powers the problem was much more complex than that.While the treaty powers could be seen as responsible for China's domestic and external difficulties in so far as they had jointly or otherwise inflicted upon China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities by force of arms,the Chinese malaise was essentially China's own,stemming as it did from inherent weaknesses which were aggravated,but not primarily caused,by foreign imperi- alism.The most unfortunate thing about China was the seemingly endless chaos brought about by internal political forces.Since 1917 China had been in a state of civil war and perpetual flux and without a government that exercised effective control over the country.To deal with the China problem was like dealing with the kaleidoscopic conditions of a country in disintegration. The problem was therefore two-dimensional.Internationally,it af- fected China's status as an independent sovereign state and involved the question of the unequal treaties.Internally,it was a problem of
THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT THE CHINA PROBLEM 15 restoring a semblance of national unity,of evolving a modern nation- the Great War.Yet in February 1917,owing to the exigencies of war, state out of the ruins of an ancient empire and years of military rule, Britain agreed to support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of and of undertaking the formidable task of national reconstruction under the German rights in Shandong and possessions on the islands north an orderly government. of the Equator,a secret agreement which corresponded to the assur- ances given to Tokyo at about the same time by the French,Russian, The International Setting and Italian governments.At Versailles the British delegation acquiesced in the Japanese pledge ultimately to hand back Shandong peninsula to China's participation in the First World War had been motivated by a China,retaining only the economic privileges formerly enjoyed by desire to find herself a place among the allied powers and thereby gain Germany and the right to establish a settlement in Qingdao.Foreign a voice later at the peace conference.When the Chinese delegates went Secretary Arthur Balfour was contemptuous of the Chinese over the to Versailles in 1919 they had four objectives in mind:to demand the way in which they tried to regain Shandong as 'the legitimate spoils' return of the German interests in Shandong province which Japan had of a war in which China had done little.3 Nevertheless,suspecting seized during the war;to effect the abrogation,either in whole or in Tokyo's ulterior motives,Britain regarded Japan's position in China as part,of the agreements resulting from the notorious Twenty-one De- the key issue that would determine the future of the Far East.Already mands imposed on the Yuan Shikai government by Japan in 1915;to in December 1918 Sir John Jordan,the British minister in Peking,had liquidate the interests which Germany and Austria had possessed in warned:'The Far Eastern problem may now be deemed as the problem China before the war;and,finally,to press for the abolition of the of Japan's position in China.'6 What concerned Whitehall was the special rights and privileges enjoyed by the powers under the treaty continued Japanese economic penetration through commercial monopoly system.The Chinese delegation realized that the treaty question did and control of Chinese railways,which threatened Britain's overall pre- not come within the purview of the conference,but considered it the dominant position in China.It was in Britain's interest to restrain the right time and the right place to bring it up in the hope of paving the Japanese by upholding the 'open door',the principle of equal opportunity, way for a future Chinese initiative.2 and regulating Chinese finances through a new international consortium, As is well known,the Chinese lost their fight against Japan's claims as had been proposed by President Woodrow Wilson of the United to the German interests in Shandong,which immediately touched off States.? the May Fourth movement.For the first time in modern Chinese history, The Anglo-Japanese alliance,which would lapse in July 1921 unless student demonstrations and public opinion exerted considerable influence renewed,was singled out by critics as 'the origin of all ills in East on Chinese diplomats abroad.By unanimously refusing to sign the Asia'.The Chinese attacked it as the underpinning of the Shandong Treaty of Versailles,the Chinese delegates displayed with crystal clarity settlement,arguing that its existence had hindered Britain from exer- that whatever differences they might have over domestic issues,they cising a restraining influence on Japan in an impartial way.They wanted were united on the question of recovering China's sovereign rights.3 Britain to be free from the alliance so that she could become the 'impartial None of the powers at Versailles was concerned about China's arbiter of the East'.s The alliance was opposed,too,by anti-British and grievances.British policy in the Far East,for example,was influenced anti-Japanese groups in the United States.At this time there were mutual by the Anglo-Japanese alliance.Concluded in 1902 and renewed in 1905 suspicions,if not antagonisms,between the United States and Japan. and 1911,the alliance had enabled Britain to concentrate on European Though the United States never challenged the foundations of the affairs and thereby to leave the defence against Russian intentions of Japanese empire in Korea,Taiwan,and south Manchuria,American- her interests in the Far East to Japan.Naval considerations had played Japanese relations since the Russo-Japanese War had been complicated an important part in its renewal in 1911,as Britain wanted to withdraw by a combination of ideological,moral,and psychological factors.After some of her naval forces from the Far East to strengthen her position the Great War the growth of Japan as a naval power in the Pacific was in home waters vis-a-vis Germany.In the ensuing years the alliance a concern to Washington,and a renewal of the alliance could only add began to run into difficulties because of Japan's expansionist policy in to the uneasiness of the American naval authorities. China,which alarmed officials in both London and Washington during There was a divergence of view among the Dominions at the Imperial
16 THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT THE CHINA PROBLEM 17 Conference (June-August 1921).Canada,which had warmly supported maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of renewal in 1911,was now vehemently opposed to it.The Australian all nations throughout the territory of China. prime minister,Billy'Hughes,took a different attitude,regarding the iv.To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek alliance as Australia's best means of defence.He would vote against special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of renewal only if the United States would give Australia an assurance of such States. the security he wanted.New Zealand,too,felt that she must be on the side of the United States in any future Japanese-American dispute. This was not so much a self-denying proclamation as a statement Eventually the British prime minister,David Lloyd George,decided to of principles.The 'open door',equal opportunity,the independence and integrity of China,and so on were reaffirmed.But,as Bertrand Russell seek a tripartite arrangement to which the United States would be a party. bemoaned,'these are merely empty phrases devoid of meaning'.4There At the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, was nothing new in the first three of the resolutions,which had been which met in 1921-2,the Anglo-Japanese alliance was,as a result of enunciated many times before,and the fourth contained some sort of American influence,merged into a quadruple treaty,including France, a 'security clause'intended to assure Japan that her 'special interests' rather than a tripartite arrangement as had been intended.The treaty in Manchuria would not be threatened.'5 Indeed,Japan and Britain still recognized the respective rights in the Pacific of the signatories who maintained their respective spheres of influence in China,and the United undertook to 'communicate with one another fully and frankly'if those States,for all its appearance of benevolence,was interested in expanding rights were threatened by the aggressive action of any other power'. American control of China's resources and finances in the years ahead.6 A separate Five-Power Naval Treaty laid down the ratio for the chief None of them wished to deal with China's specific claims or undertook naval powers (Britain,the United States,Japan,France,and Italy)of to re-examine the treaties which provided for foreign rights and 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for the construction of capital ships.Japan acquiesced privileges;all expected the Chinese to accept foreign tutelage indefinitely. in the ratio after securing the provision that the Pacific islands within Naturally,the Chinese delegates were bitterly disappointed at the failure striking distance of the main Japanese islands should not be fortified of the great powers to provide international guarantees for China's by Britain and the United States. security or international recognition of her equal status in the family The prime objective of the Washington Conference was to reduce of nations.7 As one of them put it,the powers '[clung]desperately to the likelihood of future international conflicts in the Pacific and the Far their vested interests regardless of the rights and interests of China.' East.The Far Eastern situation was stabilized on the basis of the in- China's only notable gain at Washington was Japan's consent to terests of the great powers,including Japan,over the head of China, give up Shandong and to make further concessions amounting to the as their central concem was to redefine their relations with one another, surrender of 17 of the Twenty-one Demands.An undertaking was also to which the problem of China was a subordinate consideration.2 secured from Britain,as a deal with Japan over Shandong,that the Consequently,the results of the conference were unsatisfactory to the leased territory of Weihaiwei,also in Shandong,would be given up, Chinese delegation,whose head,Alfred Sze(Shi Zhaoji),had put forward but not unconditionally.The port of Weihaiwei,acquired under the a 10-point programme for the restoration of equality and independence Convention of 1898 to counter Russia's occupation of Port Arthur, to China.The powers'answer was the so-called Root resolutions (pre- should have been returned to China as soon as Russia lost Port Arthur sented by the American delegate,Elihu Root),incorporated into the in 1905.The lease had only two more years to run.Besides,Weihaiwei Nine-Power Treaty (Britain,the United States,Japan,France,Italy, had proved costly to maintain and had been of little economic or strategic Belgium,the Netherlands,Portugal,and China),whereby the signatories value to Britain.9 It could therefore be bartered away as part of a big other than China agreed: solution of the Chinese problem in a multilateral context,but not as i.To respect the sovereignty,the independence and the territorial and a give-away to China.20(The difficulty of negotiating with the rapidly administrative integrity of China. changing government in Peking in 1924 gave Britain a pretext for not ii.To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to carrying out her pledge to return Weihaiwei until 1930,as will be seen develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable goverment. in Chapter 9.) iii.To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and On tariff matters,China gained little.The powers promised the grant
18 THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT THE CHINA PROBLEM 19 of what became known as the Washington surtaxes which,however, The Washington powers had no desire to demolish the treaty regime were not to be levied immediately or unconditionally.A resolution was or to alter the status quo in any significant way.The framework of passed to the effect that a Special Tariff Conference was to be held in international co-operation,even if practicable,would have served to Peking three months after the Washington treaties had been ratified by extend foreign control and economic exploitation of China,thereby all the governments concerned to discuss ways of raising the rates from crippling rather than helping China's struggle for independence.2 5 per cent ad valoremn to 10 per cent on luxury goods and 7.5 per cent Japanese imperialism after 1921 had changed its form,not its nature, on other imports.The levy of the surtaxes was to commence from such in that China was still regarded as Japan's natural area of expansion, date,for such purposes,and subject to such conditions as the confer- whether by economic penetration or by armed aggression.In these ence might determine,the most important of these being the speedy circumstances neither the Nationalist movement nor the Communist abolition of lijin (the provincial transit duty).The resolution made no revolution would have been checked,nor would China's long-standing mention of Chinese tariff autonomy.Finally,on the question of extra- grievances have made peace in the Far East possible.On the contrary, territoriality,an international commission of inquiry was set up with Manchuria would have become a Japanese colony,formally or in- a view to recommending legal and judicial reforms which,if under- formally,with the tacit understanding of the other powers.And that taken by the Chinese government,would induce the powers to relinquish would have been a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and a permanent their extraterritorial rights either progressively or otherwise.Each of the source of Sino-Japanese conflict. powers,however,was to be left 'free to accept or to reject all or any The Washington Conference did not represent a real search for a portion of the recommendations of the Commission.'21 new order of international relations in East Asia.The old order had not Akira Iriye has argued that the Washington Conference marked the been entirely dismantled,the break with the pre-war past was by no end of an era in Far Eastern politics by destroying the pre-war order means complete,and a new order worthy of the name was yet to emerge. of the 'diplomacy of imperialism',which was characterized by a While the China problem impinged on the consciousness of the great mechanism of maintaining balance among the great powers,and replac- powers,it was not sufficient to cause a fundamental change in their ing it with a new framework of international relations.He refers to the approaches to Asia which were still based on the paramountcy of 'spirit of the Washington Conference'(or'Washington spirit')in which Realpolitik.As Phillip Darby argues: the great powers agreed to renounce 'particularistic arrangements'in favour of 'multinational agreements repudiating expansionism'in China. The liberal ideas of a new international order had limited meaning and made Iriye further argues that the powers pledged neither to interfere in China's little headway outside Europe,because its presuppositions were almost ex- internal affairs nor to exploit her domestic difficulties for their own clusively Western and its purpose was to secure the stability of the Western selfish ends and that it was in this spirit and on the basis of a series world.Ideas about self-determination and open diplomacy spilled over to Asia of treaties signed at the conference that a 'Washington system'was set and Africa,undermining elements of the old diplomacy;but they failed to hold up to achieve international co-operation in the Far East.However,the out any coherent alternative design.* conference in fact provided no machinery for enforcing such co-opera- In other words,a coherent frame of reference with which the great tion which was prevented by the divergence of interest among the great powers could approach the Far East did not come into being,and the powers as well as by the revolutionary influence of the Soviet Union problem of China was too complex to allow a tidy reformulation of the and China's burgeoning nationalism.In Iriye's view the great powers, pre-war diplomacy of imperialism.The events of the 1920s do not if they had co-operated,could have jointly effected changes in China wholly support Eto Shinkichi's view that Anglo-American-Japanese di- which in turn would have secured peace in the Far East and averted plomacy in China was one of informal entente'.25 the wars of the following decades.22 The United States,though anxious to prevent Japan's embarking on In retrospect it is difficult to see how Iriye's conception of the a course of independent action in China,was more interested in de- 'Washington system'could have secured permanent peace in the Far molishing the old structure of imperialist diplomacy and secret East.One wonders if such a system ever existed.Even if it did,it was agreements than in setting up a new framework of co-operative di- not intended to meet the demands of China's burgeoning nationalism. plomacy.Moreover,Japan's commitment to great power co-operation
30 THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIAL RETREAT THE CHINA PROBLEM 21 was conditional upon international recognition of her special position in Manchuria.Although the policy of special rights and spheres of co-operation was by no means easy either,though for different reasons. influence was abandoned nominally at Washington,and the Lansing- While some British statesmen seemed committed to the doctrine of a Ishii notes of 1917 whereby the United States acknowledged Japan's special relationship between the two countries,Foreign Office officials special interests in China were cancelled in April 1923,throughout the approached the United States with distrust because of a number of 1920s no Japanese foreign minister or statesman,whatever his political Anglo-American differences.2s Consequently,there was very little ef- complexion,ever compromised Japan's position in Manchuria.The 'open fort to develop a co-operative approach.Instead,the principal powers, door'meant one thing to the United States and quite another to Japan, as Marius Jansen has pointed out,'showed a tendency toward individual and its maintenance in north-east China depended largely on Tokyo, positions and bilateral diplomacy that would emphasize their goodwill not on Washington or London. toward the "Chinese people".' Britain's China policy was not formulated on the premise of a From the conference emerged what Dorothy Borg called the 'Wash- 'Washington system'.As Ian Nish has pointed out,the British delega- ington formula'-that is,reforms prior to the revision of treaties.Borg tion negotiated the treaties at Washington through the same process of argued that the Nine-Power Treaty virtually gave China a breathing space of an unspecified period in which to undertake the long-deferred compromise adopted for the many other treaties concluded in Europe task of improving her internal conditions without foreign threat and since 1919.British policy-makers did not expect the consultative that,if China failed in this task,the powers would maintain and defend provisions in the Four-Power Treaty to prevent Japan from taking in- their treaty position for as long as necessary.This argument ignored dependent action in China.They appreciated the 'Washington spirit'in the fact that the Chinese would not stop perceiving a foreign threat as so far as it meant a renunciation of aggression and interference in China's long as the status quo was maintained and that substantial reforms internal affairs,as well as consultation with the other powers on matters would be extremely difficult in a situation where China was under of common interest,but they were far from clear as to ways of co- foreign control.The Nine-Power Treaty did not represent a break with operating in China that would make the Chinese the chief beneficiar- the assumption that China should remain under foreign tutelage for a ies.26 One must not equate 'consultation'with 'co-operation'.There was long time to come,for the powers remained convinced that the Chinese nothing under the terms of the Washington treaties that could prevent were incapable of running their own affairs.While they expected China any of the signatories from doing what they liked in China. sooner or later to establish a government capable of negotiating and In fact,there was a divergence of view between London and Tokyo executing new treaties,none believed that China,left alone,was able as regards the China problem.As far as Japan was concerned,the to put her house in order within a reasonable period of time.All believed, problem was bound up in the question of her national security and rather,that they were the best judge of when China could be said to economic necessity.But Britain had different interests in China which, have accomplished reforms along Western lines.They were apt to argue though important,were not vital.As a Foreign Office clerk wrote in that the internal conditions which had led to the nineteenth-century I925: restrictions on China's sovereign rights still applied. The idea of a united China does not appeal to Japan,nor does the idea of international foreign guidance [as far as Manchuria is concerned].Even the The Domestic Setting and Foreign Interference prospect of China's prosperity is less attractive to the Japanese than to us,for it means the development of China as a powerful competitor-especially in The international problem of China was bound up with her internal cotton goods,which is one of Japan's staple lines of export.It is unlikely then weakness.Political instability,civil war,official corruption,factionalism, that Japan will willingly co-operate with us except in a direction which will and the breakdown of law and order had all contributed to China's strengthen her own policy.Her attitude at Washington was an unwilling ac- failure to establish an orderly administration and to foster economic quiescence to British and American pressures."7 growth.In the absence of good government,any attempts at reform In the post-Washington era Britain was not inclined to co-operate were doomed to failure.Yet it was only through internal reforms that with Japan without roping in the United States.Yet Anglo-American China's problems could be resolved in a fundamental sense. Since the death of Yuan Shikai in June 1916,China had lapsed into