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On the Social Influence of Emotions in Groups: Interpersonal Effects of Anger and Happiness on Conformity Versus Deviance Marc W. Heerdink, Gerben A. van Kleef, Astrid C. Homan, and Agneta H. Fischer University of Amsterdam How do emotional expressions of group members shape conformity versus deviance in groups? We hypothesized that angry and happy responses to a group member’s deviating opinion are interpreted as signals of imminent rejection versus acceptance. In 5 studies, the majority’s expressions of anger led the deviant individual to feel rejected, whereas expressions of happiness made the deviant feel accepted. Because conformity can be seen as strategic behavior aimed at gaining (re)acceptance, the effects of emotional expressions on conformity should be moderated by social-contextual factors that determine the motivation to be accepted by the group and by the extent to which conformity is a means to this end. Accordingly, in Study 2, the availability of alternative groups determined whether a deviant conformed to the current group or abandoned the group after an angry reaction. In Study 3, anger and happiness were only associated with conformity pressure in situations that were perceived as cooperative (rather than competitive). Employing an interactive group task in Study 4, we showed that individuals who received an angry reaction contributed less in a cooperative group task than did those who received a neutral or happy reaction. Finally, in Study 5, peripheral group members conformed more after an angry reaction than after a happy reaction, but prototypical group members did not. Moreover, conformity was still manifest 3 weeks after the experiment, and this effect was mediated by feelings of rejection. We discuss implications of these findings for theorizing about social functions of emotions and the role of emotions in groups. Keywords: conformity, deviance, social influence, emotions, interpersonal effects At a conference, you and several colleagues decide to go out for dinner together. After some discussion, the group decides on finding a pizzeria. After wandering around fruitlessly for a while, you propose to change plans and go to a nearby Asian restaurant instead. Unexpectedly, your colleagues react as if annoyed— even a little angry. Does this negative emotional reaction of your colleagues lead you to abandon your new plan and conform to the rest of the group? Or do you decide to leave the group and go to a place that you like? As this example illustrates, emotions are an integral part of group life. Many events that take place in or outside groups trigger emotions in group members by affecting individual or group-based concerns or goals (Smith, 1993)—such as finding a restaurant. Oftentimes, the emotions that are elicited in a group context do not remain private. Rather, they tend to be expressed, deliberately or not, through facial displays, verbal expressions, bodily postures, and tone of voice (Ekman, 1982). Thus, when a group member elicits an emotion in other group members, the expression of this emotion may inform him or her about how others feel about the situation (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Given how much time most of us spend in groups, it stands to reason that we be influenced by the emotions of our fellow group members. Surprisingly, however, past research has largely neglected the question of how an individual group member’s behavior is influenced by the emotional expressions of other group members. In the present research, we examined one important manifestation of such social influence of emotions (van Kleef, van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011), namely, the effects of a majority’s emotional expressions on a deviant group member’s behavior. In doing so, we focus on two emotions that have the potential to affect a group member who deviates from a consensually shared opinion or behavior in opposing ways: happiness and anger. Emotions in Groups Our theorizing is informed by a social–functional perspective on emotion. According to this perspective, emotions serve social functions in dyads, in groups, and between groups alike (e.g., Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fridlund, 1994; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 1996; van Kleef, 2009). Emotions expressed by individuals or (factions within) groups may affect the behavior of other individuals or groups via affective processes (e.g., emotional contagion or liking; van Kleef, 2009) or through inferential processes, whereby individuals use others’ emotional expressions to infer information about their motives and This article was published Online First June 17, 2013. Marc W. Heerdink, Gerben A. van Kleef, Astrid C. Homan, and Agneta H. Fischer, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. This research was facilitated by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO 452-09-010) awarded to the second author. We would like to thank Marwan Sinaceur for his helpful guidance in developing the emotion instructions used in Study 4; Stephanie Mertens, Rosa Mulder, and Pomme Woltman for their assistance in setting up and conducting parts of this research; and Verlin Hinsz for valuable suggestions for improving this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marc W. Heerdink, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Weesperplein 4, 1018 XA Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail: m.w.heerdink@uva.nl This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2013 American Psychological Association 2013, Vol. 105, No. 2, 262–284 0022-3514/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0033362 262

intentions (van Kleef, 2009; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). Previous research on the functionality of emotions in groups has mainly been concerned with how affect spreads in groups, for instance via “primitive” emotional contagion (i.e., contagion via mimicry and afferent feedback; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Much research in this domain has focused on the interplay between individual-level and group-level affect (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Barsade & Gibson, 1998; Kelly & Barsade, 2001; Smith, 1993; Spoor & Kelly, 2004; Totterdell, 2000; Totterdell, Kellett, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) and how group affect and affective variability within groups shape group outcomes (e.g., George, 1995; Tiedens, Sutton, & Fong, 2004). For instance, Barsade (2002) found that a confederate’s affective state influenced the mood of the other group members and that contagion of positive affect increased cooperation and group performance. Similarly, Sy, Côté, and Saavedra (2005) showed that teams with a leader who expressed positive affect developed a more positive “group affective tone” (George, 1995) and exhibited better coordination, whereas teams with a leader who expressed negative affect expended more effort on the task. Focusing on the communicative aspects of emotion instead of how affect spreads within groups, another study showed that expressions of anger (as opposed to happiness) on the part of a leader can increase team performance when team members are motivated to consider the implications of the leader’s emotions. When such motivation was high, team members inferred from the leader’s anger that their performance was unsatisfactory, which led them to increase their efforts. The leader’s happiness, on the other hand, was interpreted as a sign that performance was satisfactory, and this inference led to a decrease in effort (van Kleef, Homan, Beersma, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & Damen, 2009). This brief overview of prior research on emotions in groups is far from comprehensive, but it suffices to demonstrate that emotional expressions of group members have the potential to influence the emotions, inferences, and behaviors of fellow group members. It also reveals that previous research has not considered the perspective of the individual within the group, and how other group members’ emotional expressions that are contingent on one group member’s behavior influence this individual. More specifically, we are interested in how deviant group members’ behavior is influenced by the majority’s emotional expressions in response to their behavior. Thus, we take a communicative approach to the interpersonal effects of emotions within groups to explain how happiness and anger, when expressed by a majority within a group, may influence a deviant individual’s tendency to persist in deviance or to yield to this majority by conforming. Before theorizing about the process underlying these effects, we first review literature on the role of deviance in group goal attainment, along with evidence regarding naturally occurring emotional responses to deviance. Deviance and Group Goals Although group members have a general tendency to maintain their similarity to others by conforming to the opinion and behavior of other group members (e.g., Asch, 1956), deviance is an integral part of group life (Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Hayes, 2007; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Ridgeway, 1978). We define deviance broadly as any behavior or expression of an opinion or idea that is intentionally or unintentionally different from other group members’ behaviors or opinions. Thus, for instance, in the opening example, the suggestion to go to a nearby Asian restaurant could be construed as an act of deviance. Unintentional deviance is likely to surface frequently within groups, as an individual’s preferences, ideas, intentions, beliefs, and behavior are not necessarily in line with those of the group. In addition, group members may intentionally seek out different roles or diversifying positions to maintain a sense of uniqueness while still belonging to the group (Brewer, 1991; Homan, Greer, Jehn, & Koning, 2010; Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Mullen & Hu, 1989). In many situations, deviance is important for attaining group goals. These include situations that require creativity and divergent thinking to find the optimal solution to a problem (see, e.g., Kruglanski & Webster, 1991). Work on hidden profiles, diversity, groupthink, and the common knowledge effect show that group performance may indeed suffer when group members suppress deviance by being too critical of new information and converging too much (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 2003; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). To avoid this situation, deviance is required. For instance, an expert individual may seek (minority) influence through deviance to change a group decision for the better (Moscovici, MucchiFaina, & Maass, 1994). Similarly, work on constructive conflict shows that deviance can indeed stimulate group performance (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986). Thus, because deviance can be crucial for obtaining good group outcomes, groups that are aware of the value of deviance may encourage it (for similar arguments, see de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012; Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Tjosvold, Wedley, & Field, 1986) and respond to it with happiness or enthusiasm. On the other hand, deviance may constitute a threat to the group’s goals, because it violates the shared reality in the group, thereby endangering the harmony and trust in the group (Mannetti, Levine, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2010; Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998; Sani, 2005). Furthermore, deviance threatens effective goal pursuit when coordinated action is required or when one course of action should be decided upon (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991). For instance, in the restaurant example, one person’s deviating dinner preference may undermine or slow down group decision making. Indeed, in naturally occurring contexts, deviance is often severely socially sanctioned by passively (e.g., ignoring, ostracizing) or actively (e.g., rejecting, bullying, see Molden, Lucas, Gardner, Dean, & Knowles, 2009) excluding the deviant individual. People holding a deviant opinion may be metaphorically ostracized from their group by placing them outside what is an “acceptable” opinion for members of their group (Eidelman, Silvia, & Biernat, 2006; Marques et al., 1998; see also Williams, 2007). Group members may even be physically excluded from the group by voting them out (Schachter, 1951). Deviance in groups usually does not lead to immediate social exclusion, however (Levine, 1989). Instead of ignoring and disengaging from a deviant group member, groups may attempt to resocialize the deviant member (Levin & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1989) by increasing their communication to the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. ON THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONS IN GROUPS 263

deviant group member (Schachter, 1951). This increase in communication may be motivated by anger, as studies show that group members feel anger toward a deviant group member (e.g., Juvonen, 1992; Phillips, 2003; see also Festinger, 1950). Anecdotal reports indeed illustrate how the majority’s reactions to deviance may escalate into strong hostility and aggression. For instance, Nemeth (2010) described the reactions of naive subjects in the group to a confederate advocating a deviant position in her Nemeth and Wachtler (1974, p. 10) study: “The case was hypothetical— but the anger was so evident that subjects were pounding their fists on the table next to the confederate’s face (the one who argued a minority position on compensation).” Thus, attempts to force a deviant individual to conform may be accompanied by expressions of anger. In short, depending on the context and the situation the group is facing, deviance may be welcomed or not. To effectively pursue group goals, groups therefore need to be able to regulate deviance. We argue that the majority’s expressions of anger and happiness in response to deviance can be functional in this respect, as happiness may incite further deviance, and anger may motivate the individual to conform. Anger, Happiness, and Inclusionary Status We propose that deviant individuals interpret the majority’s emotional reaction to their behavior to estimate their position in the group, which may motivate them to change their behavior. More specifically, we argue that happiness and anger, if expressed toward a deviant individual in a group, may be interpreted as information about the deviant individual’s inclusionary status. In other words, these emotional expressions influence the degree to which a deviant feels accepted or rejected by the group. Happiness is elicited by events that an individual perceives as goal congruent (Lazarus, 1991). In a dyadic context, expressions of happiness are interpreted as a signal that the environment is safe (Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield, & Campos, 1986; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985) and expressing happiness (i.e., smiling) is considered a strategy for affiliation (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Fridlund, 1991, 1994; Kraut & Johnston, 1979). Indeed, positive emotions such as happiness serve affiliative functions (van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2010), as they help build social relationships when shared (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001). Similarly, in the group context, positive affect is linked to the development of trust and harmonious intragroup relations (e.g., Walter & Bruch, 2008). Thus, happiness may implicate that one’s belonging in the group is secure. We therefore expected to find that a deviant individual would feel relatively accepted if the majority responds with happiness to his or her deviance. Anger, on the other hand, is often expressed in an attempt to get other people to change their behavior (cf. Averill, 1982; Clark et al., 1996; Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fischer & Roseman, 2007), which implies that one’s opinion or behavior is currently unacceptable to the expressers (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). In a group setting, expressions of anger may therefore draw attention to the social distance between the deviant and the rest of the group. Furthermore, the evidence discussed suggests that expressions of anger precede or accompany social exclusion in groups. Given that humans are highly sensitive to the safety of their belonging in groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Kerr & Levine, 2008; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009; Williams, 2007; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000), the majority’s expressions of anger may therefore create the perception that one’s belonging in the group is under threat. Hence, we predicted that a majority’s expression of anger would cause the deviant individual to feel rejected by the group. Conformity in Response to the Majority’s Emotional Expressions By affecting the extent to which a deviant individual feels accepted or rejected, the majority’s emotional reaction may allow the deviant individual to remain deviant or motivate the individual to conform. When the majority expresses happiness in response to deviance, and the deviant individual feels accepted in turn, the deviant is not likely to change his or her behavior and can therefore be expected to persist in deviance. In the case of an angry reaction, however, the deviant will feel rejected, and the deviant will therefore be motivated to restore the sense of belonging. One way to do restore this sense is by conforming to the majority’s position. Conformity can be defined as the act of adjusting one’s overt behavior in such a way that it becomes more in line with the apparent group norm (for a similar definition, see Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000). Although conformity may be attributed to various motives (e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), the resulting overt behavior is similar: Conformity involves movement toward the group norm. From the group’s point of view, the most important consequence of behavioral conformity is that a deviant’s challenge to the group’s position is removed. Thus, by conforming, a person can show a commitment to the group’s identity (i.e., identity performance; Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007) and group goals, which may increase acceptance from the group (cf. Hollander, 1960; Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1989). Conformity can therefore be seen as strategic behavior aimed at gaining acceptance in a group. This idea is illustrated by prior research. For instance, Asch (1956), in an experiment in which participants had to choose which of three lines was the shortest, showed that even if people are really certain of their own judgment, they conform to the clearly erroneous opinion of a majority. Similarly, in her theory of the spiral of silence, Noelle-Neumann (1974, p. 43) observed that “to the individual, not isolating himself is more important than his own judgment.” This may lead individuals holding deviant opinions to be reluctant to speak out in anticipation of negative reactions (i.e., conformity by omission; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Several studies have suggested that conformity is especially likely if an individual feels motivated to seek acceptance from a group and if conformity can be observed by this group. For instance, Dittes and Kelley (1956) showed that participants who felt rejected by their group publicly conformed more to the judgments of their groups than did participants who felt less rejected. In another study, peripheral group members (who experienced insecure status within their group) strategically exhibited greater conformity when their responses were made public to an ingroup audience than when their responses remained private (Jetten, Hornsey, & Adarves-Yorno, 2006). Similarly, DeWall (2010) showed that people who were led to expect that they would have a lonely future (Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003) changed their attitudes to be congruent with the opinions of their peers (see also Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Thus, conformity is likely if a This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 264 HEERDINK, VAN KLEEF, HOMAN, AND FISCHER

person feels rejected, is motivated to seek acceptance in a given group, and if conformity is likely to elicit acceptance because it will be both perceived and appreciated by the group. The Present Research The theoretical model guiding this research is depicted in Figure 1. The first path in the model represents our hypothesis that a deviant individual would feel rejected if the majority expresses anger about his or her deviance, whereas the deviant individual would feel accepted if the majority expresses happiness. The second path shows how this subjective sense of acceptance or rejection, in turn, affects the behavior of the deviant individual. We expected that a happy reaction would not motivate behavioral change or would elicit further deviance, as it makes the deviant feel that his or her deviant behavior is acceptable. Feeling rejected after an angry reaction, on the other hand, might motivate the individual to seek ways to restore the sense of belonging. In light of the view of conformity as strategic behavior aimed at gaining acceptance in a group (e.g., Asch, 1956; Noelle-Neumann, 1974), we proposed that whether a deviant individual conforms to the majority position after an angry reaction from the group depends on the extent to which (a) the deviant is motivated to (re)gain acceptance in the group, and (b) conformity is a possible means to this end. We examined these ideas in five studies. In Study 1, we tested the basic idea that emotional expressions are interpreted as signals of an individual’s inclusionary status using a vignette approach. Then, we tested the influence of the motive to be reaccepted by manipulating the availability of alternative groups in another vignette study, Study 2. Next, we used a critical incidents paradigm to test whether happiness and anger are associated with differences in the perceived pressure to conform and whether this association is affected by the extent to which the situation is perceived as cooperative or competitive, as this determines whether conformity is an effective means to gain acceptance. We also tested if felt acceptance or rejection could account for this association (Study 3). In Study 4, we extended and replicated these findings in a cooperative group task involving real interaction and a behavioral outcome measure. Finally, we tested the influence of the extent to which one’s status as a group member is secure, as another factor determining the motive to be reaccepted, using a simulated group interaction, and we tested whether emotional expressions produce conformity that lasts over time (Study 5). The specific hypotheses concerning these moderators will be developed in the introductions to the respective studies. On a statistical note, we use variants of regression analysis (in the statistical computing software R Version 2.15.1; R Core Team, 2012) for all of our analyses. There are two reasons for this choice. First, regression analysis can accommodate both dichotomous (Studies 2 and 5) and continuous (Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5) dependent variables and allowed us to do multilevel analysis (Study 4), thereby providing statistical consistency across studies. Second, regression coefficients were necessary for conducting the (moderated) mediation analyses that were required to test our theoretical model (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). By focusing on regression output from the outset, we avoid reporting redundant statistical analyses. To facilitate interpretation, we also reported means and standard deviations wherever comparisons between groups are made. Finally, with regards to hypothesis testing, we used onetailed tests to test directional hypotheses and two-tailed tests in all other cases. Whenever a one-tailed test is used, we noted it explicitly in the text. Study 1 In Study 1, our aim was to establish the hypothesized relation between majority emotions and felt acceptance and rejection by a deviant group member. Participants imagined themselves in a group in which a majority reacted with anger, happiness, disappointment, or no emotion to their own deviant opinion. We measured the extent to which participants would feel accepted or rejected from the group as a result of this emotional expression. We expected that participants would report feeling more rejected after an angry reaction than after a neutral reaction, whereas participants were expected to feel more accepted after a happy reaction than after a neutral reaction. We included the disappointment condition to rule out the possibility that any effects of majority anger on feeling rejected could be attributed to the reaction being generally negative in nature, and we expected participants to feel less rejected after a disappointed reaction than after an angry reaction. Method Participants and design. One hundred and fifteen individuals (26 men, 88 women, one individual missing demographic information, Mage 21.03, range 17–54 years)1 took part in the experiment, which was part of a test battery in which first-year psychology students participated to fulfill a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of four emotional reactions from the majority: anger, happiness, disappointment, or neutral (i.e., no emotion). Materials and procedure. Vignette. Participants first read a short vignette that described a group situation in which the majority’s emotion was manipulated. The protagonist (same sex as the participant) had come together with three same-sex friends to discuss and decide on their vacation destination. All three friends shared a preference for one destination, while the protagonist had picked a different destination. Thus, the situation resembled a standard conformity paradigm (e.g., Asch, 1956) with a majority of modal size (Bond, 2005). The story ended with “When it’s your turn, you tell the others where you’d like to go. Your friends don’t immediately agree with you . . .,” followed by “. . . and react with anger” (anger condition), “. . . but react with enthusiasm” (happiness condition), “. . . and react with disappointment” (disappointment condition), or “. . . and react neutral” (control condition). We used the word enthusiasm (enthousiasme in Dutch) instead of happiness (blij) because it was more ecologically valid in this situation. Although enthusiasm may imply slightly more arousal than happiness according to intrapersonal affect circumplex models (e.g., Russell & Barrett, 1 In all experiments reported in this article, we checked whether the genders were balanced over condition as a precondition to running our analyses. Although the low number of males in all studies did not permit us to conduct analyses using participant gender reliably, explorative inclusion of this factor in the discussed models revealed only isolated indications of effects of participant gender, none of which challenged our main conclusions. We therefore do not discuss this variable in any of our studies. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. ON THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONS IN GROUPS 265

1999), they can be grouped into the same affiliative family of emotions based on their comparable interpersonal effects (van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2010; we return to this issue in the General Discussion). Acceptance/rejection scale. After participants had imagined themselves in the situation, we measured the extent to which they felt accepted or rejected using a four-item scale that was similar to other scales developed for this purpose (e.g., Wesselman, Butler, Williams, & Pickett, 2010; Williams et al., 2000; Williams & Sommer, 1997). The items were as follows: “Due to the group’s reaction, I feel rejected,” “The group’s reaction makes me feel alone against the rest,” “The group’s reaction makes me feel accepted,” and “Due to the group’s reaction, I feel supported” (the latter two items being reverse-scored). Items were answered on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 not at all to 7 very much). Reflecting our bipolar conceptualization of this dimension, scores above the midpoint of the scale (4) indicate rejection and scores below the midpoint of the scale indicate acceptance. A principal factor analysis confirmed the unidimensionality of the scale (all factor loadings on the first factor above .69) and the reliability of the scale was good (Cronbach’s .84). The aggregate score was calculated by averaging the items. Manipulation checks. To check whether the manipulation of majority emotion had been successful, at the end of the experiment, participants indicated to what extent the group had reacted with enthusiasm, anger, and disappointment to their proposal (from 1 not at all to 7 very much). Results Manipulation check. Manipulation checks confirmed that the majority reaction was perceived as more angry when it had been described as angry (M 5.48, SD 1.96) compared with when it had been described as neutral (M 2.60, SD 1.48, 1.39), enthusiastic (M 1.90, SD 1.21, 1.73), or disappointed (M 2.77, SD 1.50, 1.31), all |t|s 6.4, all ps .001 (1-tailed). Similarly, the majority reaction was perceived as more enthusiastic when it had been described as enthusiastic (M 5.53, SD 1.59) than when it had been described as neutral (M 2.73, SD 1.57, 1.41), angry (M 2.34, SD 1.56, 1.61), or disappointed (M 2.50, SD 1.10, 1.53), all |t|s 7.3, ps .001 (one-tailed). Finally, the majority reaction was perceived as more disappointed when it had been described as disappointed (M 4.92, SD 2.15) compared with when it had been described as neutral (M 2.60, SD 1.45, 1.20), enthusiastic (M 2.17, SD 1.49, 1.43), or angry (M 3.31, SD 1.49, 0.84), all |t|s 3.6, ps .001 (one-tailed). Hence, the manipulation was successful. Acceptance/rejection. To test whether the majority emotion had affected the extent to which participants felt accepted or rejected, we tested the effects of the emotion manipulations against the neutral control condition. As expected, after an angry reaction, participants reported feeling more rejected (M 4.65, SD 1.14) than after a neutral reaction (M 3.84, SD 1.04), 0.66, t 2.95, p .002 (one-tailed). Also as predicted, after an enthusiastic reaction, participants felt less rejected (i.e., more accepted, M 2.91, SD 1.03), 0.77, t 3.45, p .001 (one-tailed) than after a neutral reaction. Finally, a disappointed reaction (M 4.06, SD 0.95) did not arouse stronger feelings of rejection than a neutral reaction, 0.18, t 0.77, p .44. Additional independent t tests revealed that, as expected, participants in the disappointed condition reported feeling less rejected than participants in the angry condition, t(53) 2.06, p .02 (one-tailed). They also felt more rejected than participants in the happy condition, t(54) 4.31, p .001. Discussion In Study 1, we showed that in a situation in which one disagrees with the majority, one feels less accepted (i.e., more rejected) if the majority expresses anger, whereas one feels more accepted if the majority expresses happiness. Furthermore, the finding that one does not feel more rejected if the majority expresses disappointment compared with a neutral reaction, and feels less rejected after a disappointed reaction compared with an angry reaction, suggests that not all negative emotional reactions lead to feelings of rejection. These findings support the basic assumption underlying the present research, namely, that happiness and anger are signals of one’s inclusionary status. Now that this basic effect is established, the question is how expressions of anger versus happiness influence the deviant individual’s behavior. Study 2 Being rejected is a painful experience, which may fuel two very different behavioral tendencies. On the one hand, feelings of rejection may inspire negative views of the group, undermine identification, and lead people to leave their group (Williams, 2007; see also Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1989). On the other hand, being rejected also constitutes a threat to the sense of belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), which motivates people to look for ways to restore belonging (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007), for instance by conforming to the majority position. Whether people leave the group or conform to the group in such cases likely depends on whether membership in an alternative group is readily available. Consistent Figure 1. General theoretical model. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 266 HEERDINK, VAN KLEEF, HOMAN, AND FISCHER