《社会心理学》课程教学资源（文献资料）conformity——Words Speak Louder - Conforming to Preferences More Than Actions

ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Words Speak Louder:Conforming to Preferences More Than Actions Uayd e, choices of household y 2) adict)what o Kevwords:conformity,social influence,mental sharing,preference,action ople like and do is readily whether a m to t ople fashion choices mayin ntional wis one's adherence to that new fashion,and others preferences.Similarly,theory assumes that revealed s say they lik uide to one's owr m hoice predict holding -lower conformity to others'ac hoice framing rather than the obje ation.For instanc We base our prediction on the notic n that indivi ess preferences similar to explore which type of inform on on other erence or actio attenuates this tendency.We ask.for example People make their choices within a social cone in which a0 ishh K00.201i Latane&Darley.1968).Rese was supported by a grant from the Templeton Foundation ch in psychology Ayelet Fishba busines that information on that is behavioral matching hac ence 1715. 19

ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Words Speak Louder: Conforming to Preferences More Than Actions Yanping Tu University of Florida Ayelet Fishbach University of Chicago Whereas people generally conform to others’ choices, this research documents that conformity decreases once others have acted on their chosen options. It suggests words speak louder than actions—people are more likely to conform to others’ preferences than their actions. Specifically, people are less likely to follow another person’s food choice if that person has already eaten his or her selected food (Study 1), and are less likely to follow others’ choices of household items if these choices are framed in terms of action (others “want to have it”) rather than preference (others “like it”; Study 2). People’s tendency to mentally share others’ actions causes the decrease in conformity. Indeed, people recall greater past consumption of items that others have had (Study 3), choose differently only when they can complement (vs. contradict) what others have (Study 4), and are more strongly affected by the choices of those close to them (vs. strangers; Study 5). Finally, even when information about others’ actions and preferences are simultaneously available (e.g., in online shopping and the consumption of social media), people are more likely to follow what others prefer, rather than what others have (Study 6). Keywords: conformity, social influence, mental sharing, preference, action Information on what other people like and do is readily available across many situations, and tends to engender conformity (Asch, 1956; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Milgram, Bickman, & Berkow￾itz, 1969). For example, other people’s fashion choices may in￾crease one’s adherence to that new fashion, and others’ endorse￾ment of a new policy may increase one’s support for that policy. Information on others’ choices generally comes in (or is implied by) one of two forms: stated preference (what others say they like) and action (what others do or have). Whereas these two types of information can truly differ—for example, when only a handful of those who choose to buy something report their liking for it—they can also only appear to differ, such that the difference is in the choice framing rather than the objective information. For instance, the same popular item can be described as the “majority favorite,” thus emphasizing others’ preferences, or as a “best seller,” thus emphasizing others’ actions. Given the general tendency to conform, this research seeks to explore which type of information on other people—stated pref￾erence or action—attenuates this tendency. We ask, for example, whether a shopper would be less likely to conform to another shopper’s choice upon learning that the other shopper bought a product (i.e., the action aspect of choice) versus said she liked that product (i.e., the preference aspect of choice). Conventional wis￾dom suggests actions speak louder than words, implying that the actions of others should engender greater conformity than stated preferences. Similarly, economic theory assumes that revealed preference (i.e., action) is closer to the “true preference” than stated preference; therefore, others’ actions should be a better guide to one’s own choices. By contrast, we predict— holding information on quality constant—lower conformity to others’ ac￾tions than to their preferences. We base our prediction on the notion that individuals mentally share (i.e., see as their own) others’ preferences and actions. As a result, individuals feel compelled to express preferences similar to others’, yet feel that they can enrich their experience by selecting different, complementary actions. When People Conform Versus Make Complementary Choices People make their choices within a social context in which information on others is readily available and highly influential (Bearden & Etzel, 1982; Cohen, 2003; Fishbach, Henderson, & Koo, 2011; Latane & Darley, 1968). Research in psychology, economics, business, and public policy show that information on others’ behaviors and attitudes usually engenders conformity— that is, behavioral matching—such that actions and preferences positively reinforce each other (Asch, 1956; Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008; Hornstein, Fisch, & Holmes, 1968; Milgram et al., 1969; Sherif, 1936). For example, people conform to others’ food choices (Cai, Chen, & Fang, 2009; McFerran, Dahl, Fitzsi￾Yanping Tu, Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida; Ayelet Fishbach, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago. This research was supported by a grant from the Templeton Foundation to Ayelet Fishbach. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Yanping Tu, Department of Marketing, Warrington College of Business Administration, 267 Stuzin Hall, Box 117155, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, or Ayelet Fishbach, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Wood￾lawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637. E-mail: yanping.tu@warrington.ufl.edu or ayelet.fishbach@chicagobooth.edu This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2015, Vol. 109, No. 2, 193–209 © 2015 American Psychological Association 0022-3514/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000031 193

TU AND FISHBACH 004:Ger &Rogers.2009).Whereas conformity is c ce cogn itive di ce from othe n frends,peop orm to in-group m oper.&Hogg.200 oal completion (MeCulloch,Fit ns.Chu he pproval and social affiliation.Lakin Chartrand.2003 the world.For example,people inc orate their close other mory of anv such that the confo heir close es and actions provide so uggest that people mentally share both othersprefere nce 2005)Individua lopt inderlying preference es for the acti while als actions g what others own ( furniture),have on the tru le of options(Bron andello &B 1 or li to (e.g ter ell as feel they have had s with them 、they will like the How influence does not always take the form of bout thers' actions.they ill feel less compelled to pe might actually signal a l sponse cial s the expre on of di ytactionsresults actions defined as actions that add ad p le to do en less likely rdina xperienced (e.g. eaten In other words.whe ct (i. are m o take the yinformation (Wegne Erber.Ra mentary decisions. Research Hypotheses motivated o pursue dif erent actions,con mpani Wey action than when th only conve Mentally Sharing Others'Preferences and Actions nce (i.e.no mand Revond normative and informational influen others be use Ve study situations in which minimal objective differenceex Burger.Mes ource of 1978)and individuals can experience others emotions.evalua information could cover a large sample (esales data),wherea of thes 004).For exampl eel lonely upon seeing the who rate cts tend toh ve extr ews: I(ie..vicarious ostracism:Wesselmanr

mons, & Morales, 2010), environmental decisions (Allcott, 2011; Goldstein et al., 2008), and prosocial behaviors (Frey & Meier, 2004; Gerber & Rogers, 2009). Whereas conformity is common between friends, people also conform to in-group members in large settings; for example, those in an online community (Chen, Wang, & Xie, 2011; Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006). Part of the reason that conformity is ubiquitous is that others’ judgments and behaviors bear normative and informational social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Normative social influence results from the benefits that conforming to others engenders (e.g., social approval and social affiliation, Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) and the penalties (e.g., disapproval) that not conforming engenders (Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006). Because conforming is normatively desirable, it is often a mind￾less, automatic response that requires minimal deliberation (Char￾trand & Bargh, 1999). Informational social influence results from the perception that others’ preferences and actions provide social proof to an individual that others’ preferences and actions are the most appropriate ones (e.g., the wisdom of the crowd; Simmons, Nelson, Galak, & Frederick, 2011; Surowiecki, 2005). Individuals believe they can improve their decision accuracy by relying on information from others because others presumably have informa￾tion on the true value of options (Baron, Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996; Levine, Higgins, & Choi, 2000). Indeed, cross-cultural re￾search documented conformity as a dominant coordination pattern, in particular in collectivistic (vs. individualistic) societies (Bond & Smith, 1996; Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). However, social influence does not always take the form of conformity, and under some circumstances, conformity— or more generally, behavioral matching—might actually signal a lack of response to social influence (e.g., simultaneous speech or mutual periods of silence). In fact, social influence could result in different yet complementary actions, defined as actions that add to, rather than follow (mimic), what another person chooses (Fiske, 2000). Such motivation for complementarity in actions is evident, for example, when teammates coordinate to work on different seg￾ments of a project (i.e., the division of labor; Becker & Murphy, 1992; Sinha & Cusumano, 1991), couples coordinate by mastering complementary information (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991), and group members coordinate regulatory modes (Mauro, Pierro, Mannetti, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2009). Beyond these examples, individuals are often motivated to pursue different actions, con￾sume different products, or acquire different knowledge because they want to complement what others already do, possess, or know. Mentally Sharing Others’ Preferences and Actions Beyond normative and informational influence, people are in￾fluenced by others because they mentally share what close others say and do. Indeed, the self– other boundary is often less than clear-cut (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004; Cial￾dini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), and individuals can experience others’ emotions, evalua￾tions, and actions, as well as the consequences of these actions, as their own (Maner et al., 2002; Monin, Norton, Cooper, & Hogg, 2004). For example, people feel lonely upon seeing another person being socially excluded (i.e., vicarious ostracism; Wesselmann, Bagg, & Williams, 2009), and fall prey to others’ sunk costs (i.e., vicarious entrapment; Gunia, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). Fur￾ther, people experience cognitive dissonance from others’ incon￾sistencies (Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003), feel depleted by others’ efforts (Ackerman, Goldstein, Shapiro, & Bargh, 2009), satiated by others’ goal completion (McCulloch, Fitzsimons, Chua, & Albarracín, 2011), and experience others’ moral credentials as their own (Kouchaki, 2011). In addition, another form of mental sharing refers to “shared-reality”; people are motivated to share their reality with close others, by taking on close others’ views of the world. For example, people incorporate their close others’ perspective when forming a memory of an event such that they remember what they said about the event to their close others (i.e., their close others’ memory of the event) more than what actually happened (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009; Thompson & Fine, 1999). We suggest that people mentally share both others’ preferences and actions. When sharing a preference, individuals adopt others’ preferences as their own. When sharing an action, individuals adopt others’ underlying preferences for the action, while also feeling they, in a way, acted, too. For example, information on others’ actions, including what others own (e.g., furniture), have eaten (e.g., food), viewed (e.g., online videos), or listened to (e.g., music), leads individuals to develop a preference for these items, as well as feel they have had some vicarious experience with them. Mental sharing implies that when people learn about others’ preferences, they will like the target items more, but when they learn about others’ actions, they will feel less compelled to per￾form the same actions “again.” This response occurs because the expression of different preferences results in (undesirable) internal inconsistency, whereas the expression of different actions results in (desirable) variety. Consequently, mentally sharing others’ ac￾tions would lead people to do something different to complement and enrich their own experiences; they would be less likely to conform to what others have materially consumed (e.g., owned) and experienced (e.g., watched, eaten). In other words, when others’ actions are mentally shared, social influence is less likely to take the form of conformity and more likely to induce comple￾mentary decisions. Research Hypotheses Our main hypothesis is that individuals conform less to infor￾mation on others’ choices when these choices convey action, or are accompanied by action, than when these choices only convey preference. We limit our investigation to freely chosen actions, such that an action always implies a preference (i.e., no mandatory, imposed actions). In essence, we compare a choice that implies preference with a choice that implies preference plus action. We study situations in which minimal objective difference ex￾ists between a choice to express a preference and a choice to act. In addition, neither preferences nor actions are normatively a better source of information, because neither provides a more reliable measure of the “wisdom of the crowd.” For example, action information could cover a large sample (e.g., sales data), whereas preference information could come from a small and potentially biased sample of people who expressed their evaluation (e.g., people who rate products tend to have extreme views; Anderson, 1998; Bowman & Narayandas, 2001), and action could involve This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 194 TU AND FISHBACH

CONFORMING TO PREEERENCES MORE THAN ACTIONS 195 7 ce:henc (friends,in-group members)compared with distant others.We next report six s udies that test these hypotheses more infom native.for Study 1:I Will Eat What You Like o te whether people e to another person'actio hc ptions either beca se these are two framings of the sam eat the elected option (action)or not (preferer icted they would be less likelyto he person they observed selected)if the person ate his or her nd selection versus no oth peoplewil reca nption of Method memorie are likel ume (vs.strongly like) studies.and inc sing this n emember consuming this food more recently and more fr For St second we predict that people will only choc on in a com universit area:70 M ran the a binary depende implies that rich he if the 66 dyads (61 males,68 females.and 3 missing)that volunteered to m to other ctions as much as she orm to others pre Ve thus pred that individual tence ys action)bety leted when the ontions in the set complement (ys.con dict)each ewing gun Ve randomly ed participants in each dyad to move firs our effect in terms tha 191 Snyde experimenter verbally repeated the first mover's response ("So you they thought this In th among those who d the n 009 Whe ceking and mental sharing could.a experimente verbally repeated the first m like xx b ad ct ach other.I cause cho ing differently from a contr articipa nd the similar across conditions xcent the fir which cho ng gum his study partner ind the s more tha ndition The second mover then indicated the flayo raits of their ignificant others.in embers.or those with .first on the survey and then to th the s (Aro asted before answer Smith.Coats,&Walling.1999:Smith&Henry.1996).Be ing some questions on various product features (sof.sweet the second mover's choice,we did not analyze the product form less to the actions than the preferences of close others evaluation measures

higher personal cost than expressing preference; hence, action information could at times be objectively a stronger signal of value. On the other hand, situations exist in which preference could be more informative, for example, if people provide this information after they have had more experience with their choice compared with those expressing preference only. To provide a clean test of our theory, we address situations in which preference and action convey similar objective information on the options, either because these are two framings of the same choice, or because respondents learn about a preference in both conditions and we vary whether it is followed by action (e.g., the chooser further consumed her choice). We provide three types of evidence for mental sharing as the underlying cause for the words-speak-louder effect. First, we hy￾pothesize that people will recall greater past consumption of items that others have had versus items that others have indicated they prefer. This hypothesis requires that the items are frequently con￾sumed (e.g., breakfast foods) such that biased memories are likely. We predict, for example, that upon learning that others frequently consume (vs. strongly like) a specific breakfast food, individuals will remember consuming this food more recently and more fre￾quently. Second, we predict that people will only choose something different if the new option complements the option that others selected. Mental sharing implies that a person can enrich her experience by choosing differently; however, if the options con￾tradict each other, she gains little from “owning” them both, and will choose to conform to others’ actions as much as she would conform to others’ preferences. We thus predict that individuals will conform less to others’ actions than to others’ preferences only when the options in the set complement (vs. contradict) each other. Comparing conformity in complementary versus contradictory choice sets further helps us address a potential alternative expla￾nation for our effect in terms of uniqueness seeking (i.e., that people choose differently to signal their unique identity, Brewer, 1991; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977). According to this alternative perspective, behavioral appeals (“everyone is doing it”) are less effective than attitudinal appeals (“everyone is talking about it”) among those who seek uniqueness, because conformity to actions is a stronger signal of a lack of uniqueness (Griskevicius et al., 2009). Whereas uniqueness seeking and mental sharing could, at times, produce a similar effect, uniqueness seeking implies less conformity to others’ actions than words when the items in a set contradict each other, because choosing differently from a contra￾dicting set provides a greater signal of uniqueness. By contrast, the perspective of mental sharing predicts less conformity to actions than words when the items complement each other, because indi￾viduals choose differently whenever they can achieve a comple￾mentary experience. Finally, people mentally share close others’ actions more than distant others’ actions; for example, people feel they share the traits of their significant others, in-group members, or those with whom they identify, more than distant others (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007; Norton et al., 2003; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996). Because mental sharing underlies our effect, we predict a stronger effect for closer friends. We therefore hypothesize that individuals will con￾form less to the actions than the preferences of close others (friends, in-group members) compared with distant others. We next report six studies that test these hypotheses. Study 1: I Will Eat What You Like To test whether people conform less to another person’s action versus preference, we had the participants in Study 1 watch an￾other person choose between two flavors of chewing gum and either eat the selected option (action) or not (preference). Partici￾pants then made their choice among the same options. We pre￾dicted they would be less likely to conform (i.e., choose the option the person they observed selected) if the person ate his or her selection versus not. Method Participants. Our general rule of predetermining sample sizes in all studies was at least 20 participants per condition for lab studies, and increasing this number in noisier—field and online— settings. For Study 1, we predetermined a sample size of 35 natural dyadic groups (i.e., undergraduate students who sat with another person in a common university area; 70 people) per condition, because we ran the study in a field setting with a binary dependent variable. We ran the study throughout 1 week, returning a total of 66 dyads (61 males, 68 females, and 3 missing) that volunteered to participate in the study. Procedure. The study employed a 2 (other’s response: pref￾erence vs. action) between-subjects design. Participants completed a survey on an evaluation of chewing gums. We used two flavors of Orbit gum (Wintermint and Sweetmint) that participants had, in past experiments, deemed similarly appealing. We randomly assigned participants in each dyad to move first versus second. In the preference condition, the experimenter asked the first mover to indicate which flavor he or she liked better. The experimenter verbally repeated the first mover’s response (“So you like xx better”) and handed him/her a survey on which the partic￾ipant evaluated the selected chewing gum without tasting it (how soft, sweet, refreshing, and delightful they thought this was). In the action condition, the experimenter asked the first mover to indicate which flavor he or she liked better and wanted to taste in this study. The experimenter verbally repeated the first mover’s response (“So you like xx better and want to taste it”) and handed him/her a different survey along with the selected chewing gum. The participants first tasted the chewing gum and then evaluated it (how soft, sweet, refreshing, and delightful it was). Next, the experimenter handed the second mover a survey, which was similar across conditions, except the first question asked which chewing gum his or her study partner indicated they liked (preference condition) or liked and was currently having (action condition). The second mover then indicated the flavor he or she wanted to taste, first on the survey and then to the experimenter. The experimenter handed the second mover his or her selected flavor, which participants tasted before answer￾ing some questions on various product features (soft, sweet, refreshing, and delightful). Because we were only interested in the second mover’s choice, we did not analyze the product evaluation measures. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. CONFORMING TO PREFERENCES MORE THAN ACTIONS 195

196 TU AND FISHBACH Results and Discussion The choic categories (a)hange s.(b)drinking glasses.(c)b (d) .(des ating that the options were simi (bookends.(h) 1)chair We ed only low-co that wer pair.the d tw onditions.which we attribute to the exteral featu e of the 7-2 ( the ta for futur choose differently to help"the choice an action versusa preference digm,all partici ants ind ted their choices,which we framed ir p one version of the Study 2:I Will Get What You Like ad Upon completion. Ve find that conform less over'sresp ction) In addition moving bevond actual us prefer. mity.weo the umber of time the cond respo ders led with d s ike) action (cho ubtle ng mar eople to co utur score ranged from 0to 6. their own future consump ius et al. 2009.for Results and Discussion conformity compared to preference ony fram a friend.with whom on s.will already have the 1 vs.2)ANOVA led the product in the future.We further predicted no effect for second Method bles ( Participants.We predetermined a sample size of 50 natural dyadic groups per condition (i.eundergraduate students who sat hu when we framed second responders'choices as actions (i.e. ed a smaller effect com- nga total of 190 dyads(1 males.194 females).Participants framed second res nders'choices as preferences Gie "Which 2 (other's action)2 =3.85,SD=1 .57 (see Figure 1)

Results and Discussion The choice share of both flavors was similar among the first movers (32 chose the Wintermint and 34 chose the Sweetmint), indicating that the options were similarly attractive. In support of our hypothesis, second movers were less likely to conform (i.e., choose similarly to their study partner) when their study partner tasted the gum (24%; 8/34) than when he or she merely indicated preference for a flavor (53%; 17/32), 2 (1) 6.14, p .013. Using action (i.e., tasting the chewing gum) versus preference (i.e., indicating a preference for the chewing gum), Study 1 con￾firmed our basic hypothesis that people conform less to an ac￾quaintance’s actions than preferences. Interestingly, in this study (unlike the following ones), we find an overall low conformity across conditions, which we attribute to the external feature of the task. Because the task involved two people experiencing two flavors, it may have induced a perceived experimental demand to choose differently to “help” the experimenter cover all options in the experiment. We next test whether the difference in conformity level further depends on the second mover’s response, and whether merely framing the choice as an action versus a preference is sufficient to induce different levels of conformity. Study 2: I Will Get What You Like We find that people conform less to information on others’ actions versus preferences. A related question is whether people also conform less when they themselves act versus state their preferences in response to others. To test this possibility, Study 2 fully crossed the second mover’s response (preference vs. action) with the information on the first mover (preference vs. action). In addition, moving beyond actual consumption versus prefer￾ence information as sources of social influence, Study 2 manipu￾lated the framing of product choice as preference (choose what you like) versus action (choose what you want to have). This subtle framing manipulation encourages people to consider others’ future consumption (in addition to existing preference) when deciding on their own future consumption (see Griskevicius et al., 2009, for a similar subtle manipulation). We predicted that an action framing of others’ choice, in terms of future purchase intentions, would generate lower conformity compared to preference-only framing of others’ choice because it activates the consideration that one’s friend, with whom one mentally shares, will already have the product in the future. We further predicted no effect for second movers’ responses. Method Participants. We predetermined a sample size of 50 natural dyadic groups per condition (i.e., undergraduate students who sat with another person in a common university area; 100 people). Because we ran the study in a field setting and used a subtle manipulation, we suspected it could yield a smaller effect com￾pared with Study 1. We ran this study throughout 1 week, return￾ing a total of 190 dyads (186 males, 194 females). Participants completed the study for candy prizes. Procedure. The study employed a 2 (other’s response: pref￾erence vs. action)  2 (participant’s response: preference vs. action) between-subjects design. Dyadic groups completed a study on products. The experimental survey presented 12 pairs of household items for each of the following categories: (a) hangers, (b) drinking glasses, (c) book￾shelves, (d) laptop sleeves, (e) clocks, (f) desks, (g) bookends, (h) side tables, (i) office lamps, (j) water bottles, (k) photo frames, and (l) chairs. We used only low-cost, affordable items that were within reach of our participants’ budgets. A stated interest in high-cost products can imply wishful thinking rather than actual purchase intention (e.g., “I’d like to have a Lexus if I could afford it”). Thus, using products our participants could presumably afford to purchase was important. For each product pair, the survey displayed photos of the two products. We created two versions of surveys, one for products 1– 6 (Version 1) and one for products 7–12 (Version 2). Each survey had space for two responders under each product (Responder 1 and Responder 2). We manipulated the question for Responder 1: “Which one do you like?” (i.e., prefer￾ence) or “Which one do you want to have?” (i.e., desire for future action). We independently manipulated the question for Responder 2 (again, based on either preference or action). Using this para￾digm, all participants indicated their choices, which we framed in the survey as preference or desire for action. We gave one person in each dyadic group one version of the survey with product sets 1– 6; the other person received a survey with product sets 7–12. Both participants completed their part of the survey as Responder 1. Upon completion, participants switched their surveys. At that point, each participant could see the first responder’s responses under Responder 1, and completed the second part of the survey as Responder 2. We did not allow any verbal interaction within the dyad. Using this paradigm, we were interested in each participant’s responses when they went second, which we coded as either “the same as” or “different from” Responder 1’s choices. As a measure of confor￾mity, we counted the number of times the second responders’ answers coincided with the first responders’. Because we used six pairs of products on each version of the survey, the conformity score ranged from 0 to 6. Results and Discussion A 2 (other’s response framing: preference vs. action)  2 (target participant’s response framing: preference vs. action)  2 (survey version: 1 vs. 2) ANOVA yielded the predicted main effect of others’ response framing, F(1, 182) 11.77, p .001, indicating greater conformity to others’ choices when they were framed as preferences versus actions. We found no effect for participants’ responses, the survey version, or interactions involving these vari￾ables (Fs  1.02). Specifically, regardless of their own response mode, participants followed the first responders’ preferences more than their actions. Thus, when we framed second responders’ choices as actions (i.e., “Which one do you want to have?”), second responders followed first responders’ choices more when these choices were framed as preferences (M 3.76, SD .77) versus actions (M 3.32, SD 1.24), t(94) 2.08, p .04, Cohen’s d .43. Similarly, when we framed second responders’ choices as preferences (i.e., “Which one do you like better?”), second responders followed first re￾sponders’ choices more when we framed these choices as prefer￾ences (M 3.85, SD 1.10) versus actions (M 3.19, SD 1.20), t(92) 2.79, p .006, Cohen’s d .57 (see Figure 1). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 196 TU AND FISHBACH

CONFORMING TO PREFERENCES MORE THAN ACTIONS 197 45 376 22 ODY Method 05 Participants. on-checku Fiure Confomity own pr Results of Study 2 suggest that people follow others'prefer- bout some gro up of people and tha this surve ords,it was not the s of eigh case that a NeVa时B(b) (c)R e's Dar ffctforinlcndtedcon umptio which suggests people mentall acher Popcorn.They further about the sam ceehckodlhcep s that they liked ecked the items tha hem with the eight most-likedor depending on ondition. son's exne their own experience. definitely ves) ving studies we test for i hethe )and ecall w hether the products they had evaluated were(a)the mos Study 3:Mediation by Recalled Recent Consumption t-liked items veyed r did no In Study 3.we moved from conformity to an individual acquain ance to conformity to in-group memb and we used freo the analyses.Finally.to assess mental sharing (i.e.recalled recen a marker of These changes cion(vs.prefe d a purchase-intention scale to assess conformity to food item Results and Discussion on le eight grocery ite ed that. all would e e has ntion of the item condition:M 348SD 1.11)than for Speci We further collapsed participants'responses to the questions on

Results of Study 2 suggest that people follow others’ prefer￾ences more than others’ actions, even if the objective information is identical and the difference is only in the framing of the choice. In other words, it was not the case that a subset of those who preferred an item further purchased it, or that the purchase is subject to budgeting consideration. Moreover, we document the effect for intended consumption, which suggests people mentally share others’ intended actions. Interestingly, people conform at about the same rate when stating their own preferences versus their own intended actions; thus, people do not experience their own actions as something others would mentally share (i.e., second responders do not expect their behavior will influence first re￾sponders’ experience), which would lead them to conform less when indicating action in order to enrich the other person’s expe￾rience. Instead, people experience others’ actions as something they share, and therefore conform less to others’ actions to enrich their own experience. We predict that the underlying mechanism for the decrease in conformity in the first two studies is mental sharing. Hence, in the following studies we test for indicators of mental sharing (i.e., whether people vicariously share actions and preferences) and whether such mental sharing underlies our effect. Study 3: Mediation by Recalled Recent Consumption In Study 3, we moved from conformity to an individual acquain￾tance to conformity to in-group members, and we used frequently consumed low-cost grocery items. These changes allowed us to test a marker of mental sharing: whether information on others’ actions (vs. preferences) makes people recall having these items (i.e., acting) more recently and frequently. In this experiment, we used a purchase-intention scale to assess conformity to food items that we framed as items the majority of people “frequently con￾sume” or “like.” We predicted that participants would recall hav￾ing some items more recently and frequently upon learning others have had them, compared with learning that others like them. We predicted that, in turn, this difference in recall would lead to lower purchase intention of the items. Specifically, participants in Study 3 received information on several grocery items (e.g., granola bars) that the majority of people presumably either “consume” (action) or “like” (prefer￾ence). Participants then indicated their purchase intentions along with how recently and frequently they had the products. We predicted that those who learned about others’ actions would recall having the grocery items more recently and frequently, and would therefore report lower purchase intentions than those who learned about others’ preferences. Method Participants. We predetermined a sample size of 40 MTurk workers per condition. We ran this study on 1 day, returning a total of 160 completed responses. Fifteen participants failed the attention-check question and, therefore, quit the experiment early (see Procedure for details), leaving us 145 valid responses (63 males, 82 females; mean age 33). Procedure. This study employed a 2 (information type: ma￾jority’s preference vs. majority’s action) between-subjects design. Participants read that the study was part of a large consumer research project, that we had previously gathered information about some grocery items from a large group of people, and that this survey was interested in collecting the participants’ purchase intentions. Participants viewed images of eight grocery items: (a) Nature Valley Granola Bars, (b) Quaker Oatmeal, (c) Reese’s Dark Chocolate, (d) Swiss Miss Hot Chocolate, (e) Old Dutch Pretzels, (f) Special K Cereals, (g) Lay’s Chips, and (h) Orville Reden￾bacher Popcorn. They further read that these items were selected based on a previous survey in which a large sample of consumers indicated either their preference (“checked the items that they liked best”) or, depending on condition, action (“checked the items that they had consumed”). They also read that the survey presented them with the eight “most-liked” or, depending on condition, “most-consumed” products. The participants’ task was to indicate their purchase intentions with regard to each of the eight previously “most-liked” or “most￾consumed” items. Specifically, they rated whether they would buy each of these items on a grocery trip (1 definitely no, 9 definitely yes). Because we ran the study online, in order to ensure that partic￾ipants paid attention to the manipulation, we next asked them to recall whether the products they had evaluated were (a) the most frequently consumed items among surveyed consumers, (b) the most-liked items among surveyed consumers, or (c) they did not know. Participants who answered this question incorrectly (n 15) ended the study there, and we excluded their partial data from the analyses. Finally, to assess mental sharing (i.e., recalled recent consumption), we asked participants to rate each item on (a) how often they consumed it (1 never, 7 very often) and (b) how recently they consumed it (1 a long time ago, 7 very recently). Results and Discussion We averaged participants’ purchase intentions for each of the eight grocery items. Consistent with our prediction, participants reported higher purchase intention for products described as most liked (preference condition; M 3.48, SD 1.11) than for products described as most frequently consumed (action condition; M 3.03, SD 1.17), t(143) 2.35, p .020, Cohen’s d .39. We further collapsed participants’ responses to the questions on 3.85 3.76 3.19 3.32 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 One's Own Preference ("Which One Do You Like?") One's Own Action ("Which one Do You Want to Have?") Conformity Score Other's Preference ("Which One Do You Like?") Other's Action ("Which One Do You Want to Have?") Figure 1. Conformity to a study partner’s stated preference versus action intentions among participants stating their own preference versus action intentions (Study 2). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. CONFORMING TO PREFERENCES MORE THAN ACTIONS 197