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CHAPTER 1 Hills,Valleys,and States An Introduction to Zomia open with three diagnostic expressions of frustration.The first two are from would-be conquering administrators,determined to subdue a re- calcitrant landscape and its fugitive,resistant inhabitants.The third, from a different continent,is from a would-be conqueror of souls,in some despair at the irreligion and heterodoxy that the landscape appears to encourage: Making maps is hard,but mapping Guizhou province especially so.The land in southern Guizhou has fragmented and confused boundaries.A de- partment or a county may be split into several subsections,in many instances separated by other departments or counties.There are also regions of no man's land where the Miao live intermixed with the Chinese. Southern Guizhou has a multitude of mountain peaks.They are jumbled together,without any plains or marshes to space them out,or rivers or water courses to put limits to them.They are vexingly numerous and ill-disciplined. .Very few people dwell among them,and generally the peaks do not have names.Their configurations are difficult to discern clearly,ridges and summits seeming to be the same.Those who give an account of the arterial pattern of the mountains are thus obliged to speak at length.In some cases,to describe a few kilometers of ramifications needs a pile of documentation,and dealing with the main line of a day's march takes a sequence of chapters. Asto the confusion of the local patois,in the space of fifty kilometers river may have fifty names and an encampment covering a kilometer and a half may have three designations.Such is the unreliability of the nomenclature.!
C H A P T E R 1 Hills, Valleys, and States An Introduction to Zomia I open with three diagnostic expressions of frustration. The first two are from would-be conquering administrators, determined to subdue a recalcitrant landscape and its fugitive, resistant inhabitants. The third, from a different continent, is from a would-be conqueror of souls, in some despair at the irreligion and heterodoxy that the landscape appears to encourage: Making maps is hard, but mapping Guizhou province especially so. . . . The land in southern Guizhou has fragmented and confused boundaries. . . . A department or a county may be split into several subsections, in many instances separated by other departments or counties. . . . There are also regions of no man’s land where the Miao live intermixed with the Chinese. . . . Southern Guizhou has a multitude of mountain peaks. They are jumbled together, without any plains or marshes to space them out, or rivers or water courses to put limits to them. They are vexingly numerous and ill-disciplined. . . . Very few people dwell among them, and generally the peaks do not have names. Their configurations are difficult to discern clearly, ridges and summits seeming to be the same. Those who give an account of the arterial pattern of the mountains are thus obliged to speak at length. In some cases, to describe a few kilometers of ramifications needs a pile of documentation, and dealing with the main line of a day’s march takes a sequence of chapters. As to the confusion of the local patois, in the space of fifty kilometers a river may have fifty names and an encampment covering a kilometer and a half may have three designations. Such is the unreliability of the nomenclature.1
2 HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES TThe hilly and iungly tracts were those in which the dacoits held out long- est.Such were [sic]the country between Minbu and Thayetmyo and the terai [swampy lowland belt]at the foot of the Shan Hills and the Arakan and Chin Hills.Here pursuit was impossible.'The tracts are narrow and tortuous and ad mirably suited for ambuscades.Except by the regular paths there were hardly any means of approach;the jungle malaria was fatal to our troops;a column could only penetrate the jungle and move on.The villages are small and far between;they are generally compact and surrounded by dense,impenetrable jungle.The paths wereeither just broad enough fora cart,or verynarrow,and where they led through the jungle were overhung with brambles and thorny creepers.A good deal of the dry grass is burned in March,but as soon as the rains recommence the whole once more becomes impassible. TThe surface has been minutely trenched by winding streams.so numerous are the creeks that the topographical map of a single representative county of 373 square miles indicated 330 named streams.that is.nine streams for each ten square miles.The valleys are for the most part"V"-shaped,with rarely more level space along the banks of a stream fora cabin and perhapsa garden patch .The isolation occasioned by methods of travel so slow and difficult is in- tensified by several circumstances.For one thing,the routes are round-about. Travel is either down one branch along a creek and up another branch,or up a stream to a divide and down another stream on the further side of the ridge. This being the case,married women living within ten miles of their parents have passed a dozen years without going back to see them. Behind each lament lies a particular project of rule:Han rule under the Qing,British rule within the Empire,and finally,the rule of orthodox Protestant Christianity in Appalachia.All would style themselves,unself- consciously,as bearers of order,progress,enlightenment,and civilization.All wished to extend the advantages of administrative discipline,associated with the state or organized religion,to areas previously ungoverned How might we best understand the fraught dialectical relations between such projects of rule and their agents,on the one hand,and zones of relative autonomy and their inhabitants,on the other?This relationship is particu- larly salient in mainland Southeast Asia,where it demarcates the greatest social cleavage that shapes much of the region's history:that between hill peoples and valley peoples or between upstream (hulu in the Malay world) and downstream (hilir)peoples.+In tracing this dialectic with some care,I believe it also traces a path to a novel historical understanding of the global process of state formation in the valleys and the peopling of the hills
Hills, Valleys, and States The hilly and jungly tracts were those in which the dacoits held out longest. Such were [sic] the country between Minbu and Thayetmyo and the terai [swampy lowland belt] at the foot of the Shan Hills and the Arakan and Chin Hills. Here pursuit was impossible. The tracts are narrow and tortuous and admirably suited for ambuscades. Except by the regular paths there were hardly any means of approach; the jungle malaria was fatal to our troops; a column could only penetrate the jungle and move on. The villages are small and far between; they are generally compact and surrounded by dense, impenetrable jungle. The paths were either just broad enough for a cart, or very narrow, and, where they led through the jungle were overhung with brambles and thorny creepers. A good deal of the dry grass is burned in March, but as soon as the rains recommence the whole once more becomes impassible.2 The surface has been minutely trenched by winding streams. So numerous are the creeks that the topographical map of a single representative county of 373 square miles indicated 339 named streams, that is, nine streams for each ten square miles. The valleys are for the most part “V”-shaped, with rarely more level space along the banks of a stream for a cabin and perhaps a garden patch. . . . The isolation occasioned by methods of travel so slow and difficult is intensified by several circumstances. For one thing, the routes are round-about. Travel is either down one branch along a creek and up another branch, or up a stream to a divide and down another stream on the further side of the ridge. This being the case, married women living within ten miles of their parents have passed a dozen years without going back to see them.3 Behind each lament lies a particular project of rule: Han rule under the Qing, British rule within the Empire, and finally, the rule of orthodox Protestant Christianity in Appalachia. All would style themselves, unselfconsciously, as bearers of order, progress, enlightenment, and civilization. All wished to extend the advantages of administrative discipline, associated with the state or organized religion, to areas previously ungoverned. How might we best understand the fraught dialectical relations between such projects of rule and their agents, on the one hand, and zones of relative autonomy and their inhabitants, on the other? This relationship is particularly salient in mainland Southeast Asia, where it demarcates the greatest social cleavage that shapes much of the region’s history: that between hill peoples and valley peoples or between upstream (hulu in the Malay world) and downstream (hilir) peoples.4 In tracing this dialectic with some care, I believe it also traces a path to a novel historical understanding of the global process of state formation in the valleys and the peopling of the hills
HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES 3 The encounter between expansionary states and self-governing peoples is hardly confined to Southeast Asia.It is echoed in the cultural and admin- istrative process of"internal colonialism"that characterizes the formation of most modern Western nation-states;in the imperial projects of the Romans the Hapsburgs,the Ottomans,the Han,and the British;in the subjugation of indigenous peoples in "white-settler"colonies such as the United States, Canada.south africa.australia.and algeria:in the dialectic between seden- tary,town-dwelling Arabs and nomadic pastoralists that have characterized much of Middle Eastern history.5 The precise shape of the encounters is, to be sure,unique to each case.Nevertheless,the ubiquity of the encounter between self-governing and state-governed peoples-variously styled as the raw and the cooked,the wild and the tamed,the hill/forest people and the valley/cleared-land people,upstream and downstream,the barbarian and the civilized,the backward and the modern,the free and the bound,the people without history and the people with history-provides us with many possibilities for comparative triangulation.We shall take advantage of these opportunities where we can. A World of Peripheries In the written record-that is to say,from the beginning of grain-based, agrarian civilizations-the encounter we are examining can fairly be said to preoccupy rulers.But if we stand back and widen the historical lens still further,seeing the encounter in human rather than state-civilization terms, it is astonishing how recent and rapid the encounter has been.Homo sapien sapiens has been around for something like two hundred thousand years,and only about sixty thousand,at the outside,in Southeast Asia.There the re- gion's first small concentrations of sedentary populations appear not earlier than the first millennium before the common era(CE)and represent a mere smudge in the historical landscape-localized,tenuous,and evanescent. Until shortly before the common era,the very last I percent of human his tory,the social landscape consisted of elementary,self-governing,kinship units that might,occasionally,cooperate in hunting,feasting,skirmishing, trading,and peacemaking.It did not contain anything one could call a state.6 In other words,living in the absence of state structures has been the standard human condition. The founding of agrarian states,then,was the contingent event that created a distinction,hence a dialectic,between a settled,state-governed
Hills, Valleys, and States The encounter between expansionary states and self-governing peoples is hardly confined to Southeast Asia. It is echoed in the cultural and administrative process of “internal colonialism” that characterizes the formation of most modern Western nation-states; in the imperial projects of the Romans, the Hapsburgs, the Ottomans, the Han, and the British; in the subjugation of indigenous peoples in “white-settler” colonies such as the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and Algeria; in the dialectic between sedentary, town-dwelling Arabs and nomadic pastoralists that have characterized much of Middle Eastern history.5 The precise shape of the encounters is, to be sure, unique to each case. Nevertheless, the ubiquity of the encounter between self-governing and state-governed peoples—variously styled as the raw and the cooked, the wild and the tamed, the hill/forest people and the valley/cleared-land people, upstream and downstream, the barbarian and the civilized, the backward and the modern, the free and the bound, the people without history and the people with history—provides us with many possibilities for comparative triangulation. We shall take advantage of these opportunities where we can. A World of Peripheries In the written record—that is to say, from the beginning of grain-based, agrarian civilizations—the encounter we are examining can fairly be said to preoccupy rulers. But if we stand back and widen the historical lens still further, seeing the encounter in human rather than state-civilization terms, it is astonishing how recent and rapid the encounter has been. Homo sapiens sapiens has been around for something like two hundred thousand years, and only about sixty thousand, at the outside, in Southeast Asia. There the region’s first small concentrations of sedentary populations appear not earlier than the first millennium before the common era (CE) and represent a mere smudge in the historical landscape—localized, tenuous, and evanescent. Until shortly before the common era, the very last 1 percent of human history, the social landscape consisted of elementary, self-governing, kinship units that might, occasionally, cooperate in hunting, feasting, skirmishing, trading, and peacemaking. It did not contain anything one could call a state.6 In other words, living in the absence of state structures has been the standard human condition. The founding of agrarian states, then, was the contingent event that created a distinction, hence a dialectic, between a settled, state-governed
4 HILLS,VALLEYS,AND STATES population and a frontier penumbra of less governed or virtually autono- mous peoples.Until at least the early nineteenth century,the difficulties of transportation,the state of military technology,and,above all,demographic realities placed sharp limits on the reach of even the most ambitious states Operating in a population density of only 5.5 persons per square kilometer in 16o0(compared with roughly 35 for India and China),a ruler's subjects in Southeast Asia had relatively easy access to a vast,land-rich frontier.7 That frontier operated as a rough and ready homeostatic device;the more a state pressed its subjects,the fewer subjects it had.The frontier underwrote popu- lar freedom.Richard O'Connor captures this dialectic nicely:"Once states appeared,adaptive conditions changed yet again-at least for farmers.At that moment,mobility allowed farmers to escape the impositions of states and their wars.I call this tertiary dispersion.The other two revolutions- agriculture and complex society-were secure but the state's domination of its peasantry was not,and so we find a strategy of 'collecting people.and establishing villages.s The Last Enclosure Only the modern state,in both its colonial and its independent guises,has had the resources to realize a project of rule that was a mere glint in the eye of its precolonial ancestor:namely to bring nonstate spaces and people to heel.This project in its broadest sense represents the last great enclosure movement in Southeast Asia.It has been pursued-albeit clumsily and with setbacks-consistently for at least the past century.Governments,whether colonial or independent,communist or neoliberal,populist or authoritarian, have embraced it fully.The headlong pursuit of this end by regimes otherwise starkly different suggests that such projects of administrative,economic,and cultural standardization are hard-wired into the architecture of the modern state itself. Seen from the state center,this enclosure movement is,in part,an effort to integrate and monetize the people,lands,and resources of the periphery so that they become,to use the French term,rentable-auditable contributors to the gross national product and to foreign exchange.In truth,peripheral peoples had always been firmly linked economically to the lowlands and to world trade.In some cases,they appear to have provided most of the products valued in international commerce.Nevertheless,the attempt to fully incor- porate them has been culturally styled as development,economic progress
Hills, Valleys, and States population and a frontier penumbra of less governed or virtually autonomous peoples. Until at least the early nineteenth century, the difficulties of transportation, the state of military technology, and, above all, demographic realities placed sharp limits on the reach of even the most ambitious states. Operating in a population density of only 5.5 persons per square kilometer in 1600 (compared with roughly 35 for India and China), a ruler’s subjects in Southeast Asia had relatively easy access to a vast, land-rich frontier.7 That frontier operated as a rough and ready homeostatic device; the more a state pressed its subjects, the fewer subjects it had. The frontier underwrote popular freedom. Richard O’Connor captures this dialectic nicely: “Once states appeared, adaptive conditions changed yet again—at least for farmers. At that moment, mobility allowed farmers to escape the impositions of states and their wars. I call this tertiary dispersion. The other two revolutions— agriculture and complex society—were secure but the state’s domination of its peasantry was not, and so we find a strategy of ‘collecting people . . . and establishing villages.’”8 The Last Enclosure Only the modern state, in both its colonial and its independent guises, has had the resources to realize a project of rule that was a mere glint in the eye of its precolonial ancestor: namely to bring nonstate spaces and people to heel. This project in its broadest sense represents the last great enclosure movement in Southeast Asia. It has been pursued—albeit clumsily and with setbacks—consistently for at least the past century. Governments, whether colonial or independent, communist or neoliberal, populist or authoritarian, have embraced it fully. The headlong pursuit of this end by regimes otherwise starkly different suggests that such projects of administrative, economic, and cultural standardization are hard-wired into the architecture of the modern state itself. Seen from the state center, this enclosure movement is, in part, an effort to integrate and monetize the people, lands, and resources of the periphery so that they become, to use the French term, rentable—auditable contributors to the gross national product and to foreign exchange. In truth, peripheral peoples had always been firmly linked economically to the lowlands and to world trade. In some cases, they appear to have provided most of the products valued in international commerce. Nevertheless, the attempt to fully incorporate them has been culturally styled as development, economic progress