SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND THE CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD N JUNE 1,1943 in Chungking,an Even before the Japanese campaign American citizen,L.K.Little,of 1937,Maze's position as inspector- was named acting inspector-gen-general had been a difficult one.The eral of the Chinese Maritime Customs, revolution of 1911 had seen an increase on the retirement of Sir Frederick Maze. of foreign control over the Customs rev- It was,as Maze pointed out,an event enues,and the administration of the "which may be said to close an epoch of Customs became,in the words of a Brit- quasi-British control of,and influence ish foreign office memorandum,"for a in,the Chinese Maritime Customs,"1 for time the paymaster and to some extent until then the inspector-general had been the master of the Chinese Government."2 British,and British citizens had domi-Yet,headed by Sir Francis Aglen,it had nated the important posts of the admin- held together in one piece,remaining istration.Under Maze's uncle,Sir Robert nominally at least under the control of Hart,inspector-general from 1863 until Peking in the years that followed.The 1908,the Customs,although interna-successes of the Nationalists under tional in composition,had been built up Chiang Kai-shek after 1924 had made largely along British lines.Hart left it Aglen's position a difficult one,how- an honest and efficient servant of the ever,and,caught between Peking and Chinese government,a body whose mem-the southern insurgents,he had been bers had a passionate belief in the bene-dismissed on January 31,1927,and Pek- ficial effects of foreign trade and in the ing had appointed A.H.F.Edwardes territorial integrity of China,and who as officiating inspector-general.The col- were opposed to both foreign spheres of lapse of the northern regime and the influence and native Chinese localism.establishment of the National govern- This was the position which his succes-ment in Nanking in 1928 in turn under- sors tried to maintain,in the years of mined Edwardes'position,and the Na- revolution and war which followed tionalists appointed Maze,who had been Hart's retirement. their adviser on Customs matters,as 1 Maze to Sir H.Seymour,May 25,1943,Con. inspector-general,thus ending a potential fidential letters,etc.,of Sir Frederick Maze (here- schism in the service.a after cited as "C.L.),XV (1941-43),434.I am Maze thus found himself as head of indebted to Lady Maze and to the Librarian of the School of Oriental African Studies of the the Customs during a time of political, University of London for permission to use the economic,and diplomatic turmoil.Not Maze papers,which are deposited there;twenty- seven bound volumes cover the years under 2 Great Britain,Foreign Office,Documents on consideration.I am also indebted to,among British foreign policy,1919-1939,ed.Rohan others,Mr.L.K.Little,who was customs com- Butler and J.P.T.Bury,2d ser.,Vol.VIII (Lon- missioner in Canton during these years and who don,1960),No.1. later became inspector-general,for information s Ibid.;Stanley F.Wright,China's struggle for and advice;and to Mr.Hugh M.Bradley,for. tarif autonomy,1843-1938 (Shanghai,1938),p. merly Sir Frederick's staff secretary. 618. 18
SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND THE CHINESE hIARITIME CUSTOMS, 1937-1941 0. N JUNE 1, 1943 in Chungking, an American citizen, L. K. Little, was named acting inspector-genera1 of the Chinese Maritime Customs, on the retirement of Sir Frederick Maze. It was, as Maze pointed out, an event "which may be said to close an epoch of quasi-British control of, and influence in, the Chinese Maritime Customs,"l for until then the inspector-general had been British, and British citizens had dominated the important posts of the administration. Under Maze's uncle, Sir Robert Hart, inspector-general from 1863 until 1908, the Customs, although international in composition, had been built up largely along British lines. Hart left it an honest and efficient servant of the Chinese government, a body whose members had a passionate belief in the beneficial effects of foreign trade and in the territorial integrity of China, and who were opposed to both foreign spheres of influence and native Chinese localism. This was the position which his successors tried to maintain, in the years of revolution and war which followed Hart's retirement. 1 hiaze to Sir H. Seymour, May 25, 1943, Confidential letters, etc.. of Sir Frederick Maze ihereafter cited as "C.L."), XV (1911-43), 434. 'I am indebted to Lady Maze and to the Librarian of the School of Oriental African Studies of the University of London for permission to use the Maze papers, which are deposited there; twentyseven bound volumes cover the years under consideration. I am also indebted to, among others, hlr. L. K. Little, who was customs commissioner in Canton during these years and who later became inspector-general, for information and advice; and to Mr. Hugh M. Bradley, formerly Sir Frederick's staff secretary. Even before the Japanese campaign of 1937, Maze's position as inspectorgeneral had been a difficult one. The revolution of 19 1 1 had seen an increase of foreign control over the Customs revenues, and the administration of the Customs became, in the words of a British foreign office memorandum, "for a time the paymaster and to some extent the master of the Chinese G~vernment."~ Yet, headed by Sir Francis Aglen, it had held together in one piece, remaining nominally at least under the control of Peking in the years that followed. The successes of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek after 1924 had made Aglen's position a difficult one, however, and, caught between Peking and the southern insurgents, he had been dismissed on January 31, 1927, and Peking had appointed A. H. F. Edwardes as ofliciating inspector-general. The collapse of the northern regime and the establishment of the National government in Nanking in 1928 in turn undermined Edwardes' position, and the Nationalists appointed Maze, who had been their adviser on Customs matters, as inspector-general, thus ending a potential schism in the service.3 Maze thus iound himself as head of the Customs during a time of political, economic, and diplomatic turmoil. Not 2 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British foreign policy, 1919-1939, ed. Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury, 2d ser., Vol. VIII (London, 1960), No. 1. 3 Ibid.; Stanley F. Wright, China's struggle for tariff autonomy, 1843-1938 (Shanghai, 1938). p. 618
SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 19 only did he have to deal with the difficul-approached full sovereignty in interna- ties consequent on the loss of Manchuria tional affairs,it became evident that the in 1931-32,but he found himself faced Customs administration would lose its immediately with the problems of serv-international complexion,and that Brit- ing a new government in a China whose ain would lose her predominant position unity was largely nominal,and a gov-therein.Maze realized that he was pre- ernment determined to achieve for China siding over the Customs in a time of the equality in international affairs transition;what neither he nor anyone denied her by the treaties of the nine-else could tell was the speed with which teenth century.A series of treaties,inau-that transition was to be effected,ac- gurated by the United States in 1928,celerated above all by the undeclared had given China tariff autonomy,and war with Japan which broke out at she had taken advantage of this to initi-Lukouchiao on July 7,1937.The story ate new duties on February 1,1929.The of the Customs in the years from 1937 raising of the tariffs (and there were to 1941 is part of the story of foreign further revisions from 1930 to 1934)had interests in China trying to cope with the effect of increasing Customs rev-the situation which was presented by enues;they went from a low of Ch.Japanese expansion running headlong $107,162,163 in 1927 to Ch.$385,002,673 into Chinese nationalism,and it is made in 1931 and,despite the fall in trade particularly interesting by the unique following the Depression and the loss of position which the Customs held in the Manchurian revenues,remained well period before the war became general, above the $300 million mark thereafter.with the entrance of the Western powers. Also,as part of an effort to stimulate The inspector-general was a servant of economic development,the National gov- the Chinese government,and as such was ernment abolished likin (the internal responsible to the ministry of finance in trade tax which had come into wide-Nanking.He was charged with oversee- spread use after the Taiping Rebellion ing what was the main source of Chinese of 1850-64)and various other internal revenue and the service of the loans, duties on January 1,1931.4 both foreign and domestic,which were The rise in Customs revenues helped secured on that revenue.He had to try to shore up China's falling credit abroad,to hold the service together under the and within China it had the effect of central government,in a China which making Maze the trustee of what hadhad to deal with splinter movements become the largest single source of gov-both in the north,where the Japanese ernment revenues since 1928 when the were the moving force in 1935-36,and land tax had been renounced by Nan-in the south,where the movements were king and turned over to the provincial led by a dissident faction of the Kuo- governments.5 At the same time,as China mintang.At the same time he was more than simply a servant of the Chinese Revenue figures from China,Maritime Cus- government,and he considered himself toms,The trade of China (Shanghai [published annually],1926-36);Wright,p.658. to be under international obligations as s For the economic effects of this situation on well.He summarized these aspects of his China as a whole see Douglas S.Paauw,"Chinese national expenditure during the Nanking pe- riod,"Far Eastern quarterly,XII (1952-53),3-26, nation,1928-1937,"Journal of Asian studies,XVI esp.6-7;"The Kuomintang and economic stag- (1956-57),213-20
SIR FREDERICK hlXZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOIMS, 1937-1941 19 only did he have to deal with the difficulties consequent on the loss of Manchuria in 1931-32, but he found himself faced immediately with the problems of serving a new government in a China whose unity was largely nominal, and a government determined to achieve for China the equality in international affairs denied her by the treaties of the nineteenth century. A series of treaties, inaugurated by the United States in 1928, had given China tariff autonomy, and she had taken advantage of this to initiate new duties on February 1, 1929. The raising of the tariffs (and there were further revisions from 1930 to 1934) had the effect of increasing Customs revenues; they went from a low of Ch. $107,162,163 in 1927 to Ch. $385,002,673 in 1931 and, despite the fall in trade following the Depression and the loss of Manchurian revenues, remained well above the $300 million mark thereafter. Also, as part of an effort to stimulate economic development, the National government abolished likin (the internal trade tax which had come into widespread use after the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-64) and various other internal duties on January 1, 1931.4 The rise in Customs revenues helped to shore up China's falling credit abroad, and within China it had the effect of making Maze the trustee of what had become the largest single source of government revenues since 1928 when the land tax had been renounced by Nanking and turned over to the provincial governments.5 At the same time, as China 4 Revenue figures from China, Maritime Customs, The trade of China (Shanghai published annuallvl, 1926-361: ,,. ,. Wright. P. . 658. " 5 For the economic effects of this situation on China as a whole see Douglas S. Paauw, "Chinese national expenditure during the Nanking period," Far Eastern quarterly, XI1 (1952-53), 3-26, esp. 6-7; "The Kuomintang and economic stagapproached full sovereignty in international affairs, it became evident that the Customs administration would lose its international complexion, and that Britain would lose her predominant position therein. Maze realized that he was presiding over the Customs in a time of transition; what neither he nor anyone else could tell was the speed with which that transition was to be effected, accelerated above all by the undeclared war with Japan which broke out at Lukouchiao on July 7, 1937. The story of the Customs in the years from 1937 to 1941 is part of the story of foreign interests in China trying to cope with the situation which was presented by Japanese expansion running headlong into Chinese nationalism, and it is made particularly interesting by the unique position which the Customs held in the period before the war became general, with the entrance of the Western powers. The inspector-general was a servant of the Chinese government, and as such was responsible to the ministry of finance in Nanking. He was charged with overseeing what was the main source of Chinese revenue and the service of the loans, both foreign and domestic, which were secured on that revenue. He had to try to hold the service together under the central government, in a China which had to deal with splinter movements both in the north, where the Japanese were the moving force in 1935-36, and in the south, where the movements were led by a dissident faction of the Kuomintang. At the same time he was more than sim~lv a servant of the Chinese A , government, and he considered himself to be under international obligations as well. He summarized these aspects of his nation, 1928-1937," Journal of Asian studies, XVI (1956-57), 213-20
20 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD position in a letter of 1939 to the Dutch could complain that British authorities consul-general in Shanghai. did nothing to raise the inspector-gen- eral's prestige,but instead "have fol- The Inspector-General acts as a sort of un- lowed a policy calculated to weaken and official international trustee for the execution of International interests concerned:(a)the lower it in the eyes of Chinese and for- collection of revenue on Chinese and foreign eigners....Nevertheless as a British trade;(b)the lighting of China's coast,mark- subject I consider it to be my duty to ing and lighting the Estuaries of the leading try to assist within limitations those Treaty ports,and the Yangtse,Pearl(Canton) who may endeavour to maintain British and West Rivers;(c)the administration of control in the Inspectorate,although... the principal Chinese harbours (Tientsin, Shanghai,Canton,etc.);and (d)the manage- I am under no obligation to do so as ment of the Debt Department.... far as British officialdom is concerned."8 It follows that International Trade,Ship-And later,looking back,he commented: ping and Finance is dependent upon the "After Sir John Simon left the F.O., Customs Service for its orderly supervision Tand furthermore]the Customs Service stands Eden,who knew little or nothing about for,and endeavours to secure the continu- the Orient,did,or seemed to do,every- ance of the "Open Door"policy;equality of thing possible to weaken the I.G.'s posi- fiscal treatment;the application of a uniform tion-ably seconded by Sir Alexander tariff;re-payment of foreign debts,and, Cadogan.I maintained my stand in spite finally,it represents the only administrative system in China that is based on Western of the F.O.,not because of its backing!" civil lines.... The consciousness that his position It is well known...that if Japan secures thus had three lines of force acting on control...foreign trading interests in China it-Chinese,international,and British- would be irretrievably jeopardized....Were was enough to keep him from becoming I to quit at the present juncture the Japa- nese Government would in that case secure simply an unreckoning instrument of the stronger (if not complete)control over the central government or of anyone else. Service to the detriment and perhaps ulti- Like Hart,he was an Ulsterman,and mate extinction of all foreign interests.8 had a flair for politics."We Irish absorb politics with our mother's milk,"he once And finally,Maze was a British citizen. told his staff secretary,and his political He held no official British position,and skills were needed during these years.10 despite his frequent private complaints Furthermore,during his earlier service about the shabby treatment which he in south China he had established con- and his staff received from Whitehall,he tacts with the Kuomintang,and his out- remained very much concerned with the look was more sympathetic to the south- maintenance of British influence in the ern leaders than had been those of his service and in China.To W.O.Law he predecessors.Another factor which helped described the inspectorate-general as determine his policy was the vulnerabil- "really a sort of unofficial 'outpost of Empire,'in view of the varied British 8 Maze to J.H.Macoun,Feb.10,1936,C.L., interests centered on the Cusoms."7 He XI(1935-36),221-22. s The notation is handwritten at the bottom e Maze to G.W.Boissevain,Aug.23,1939,In. of Maze's letter to Macoun,Oct.31,1989,In- spector-General's personal correspondence (here- spector-General's personal correspondence,non- after cited as "P.C."),May-Aug.1939. resident secretary (hereafter cited as "NRS"), 7 Maze to W.O.Law,Oct.17,1938,ibid., Sept.-Dec.1939,No.3. July-Dec.1938.See also Maze to Lord Lytton, 10 Mr.Hugh M.Bradley to the author,Sept. Jan.31,1940,bid,Aug.1939-Jan.1940. 4,1963
20 NICHOLAS R. , CLIFFORD position in a letter of 1939 to the Dutch consul-general in Shanghai. The Inspector-General acts as a sort of unofficial international trustee for the execution of International interests concerned: (a) the collection of revenue on Chinese and foreign trade; (b) the lighting of China's coast, marking and lighting the Estuaries of the leading Treaty ports, and the Yangtse, Pearl (Canton) and West Rivers; (c) the administration of the principal Chinese harbours (Tientsin, Shanghai, Canton, etc.); and (d) the management-of the Debt Department. . . . It follows that International Trade, Shipping and Finance is dependent upon the Customs Service for its orderly supervision [and furthermore] the Customs Service stands for, and endeavours to secure the continuance of the "Open Door" policy; equality of fiscal treatment; the application of a uniform tariff; re-payment of foreign debts, and, finally, it represents the only administrative system in China that is based on Western civil lines. . . . It is xvell known . . . that if Japan secures control . . . foreign trading interests in China wotild be irretrievably jeopardized. . . . Were I to quit at the present juncture the Japanese Go~ernment would in that case secure stronger (if not complete) control over the Service to the detriment and perhaps ultimate extinction of all foreign interest^.^ And finally, Maze was a British citizen. He held no official British position, and despite his frequent private complaints about the shabby treatment which he and his staff received from Tl'hitehall, he remained very much concerned with the maintenance of British influence in the service and in China. To W. 0. Law he described the inspectorate-general as "really a sort of unofficial 'outpost of Empire,' in view of the varied British interests centered on the Cu~oms."~ He 6 Maze to G. TV. Boissevain, Aug. 23, 1939, Inspector-General's personal correspondence (hereafter cited as "P.C."), May-Aug. 1939. 7 RIaze to IV. 0. Law, Oct. 17, 1938, ibid., July-Dec. 1938. See also Maze to Lord Lytton, Jan. 31, 1940, ibid.,Aug. 1939-Jan. 1940. could complain that British authorities did nothing to raise the inspector-general's prestige, but instead "have followed a policy calculated to weaken and lower it in the eyes of Chinese and foreigners. . . . Nevertheless as a British subject I consider it to be my duty to try to assist within limitations those who may endeavour to maintain British control in the Inspectorate, although . . . I am under no obligation to do so as far as British officialdom is concerned."S And later, looking back, he commented: "After Sir John Simon left the F.O., Eden, who knew little or nothing about the Orient, did, or seemed to do, everything possible to weaken the I.G.'s position-ably seconded by Sir Alexander Cadogan. I maintained my stand in spite of the F.O., not because of its ba~king!"~ The consciousness that his position thus had three lines of force acting on it-Chinese, international, and Britishwas enough to keep him from becoming simply an unreckoning instrument of the central government or of anyone else. Like Hart, he was an Ulsterman, and had a flair for politics. "We Irish absorb politics with our mother's milk," he once told his staff secretary, and his political skills were needed during these years.1° Furthermore, during his earlier service in south China he had established contacts with the Kuomintang, and his outlook was more sympathetic to the southern leaders than had been those of his predecessors. Another factor which helped determine his policy was the vulnerabil- 8 Maze to J. H. hfacoun, Feb. 10, 1936, C.L., XI (1935-36), 221-22. Q The notation is handwritten at the bottom of hfare's letter to Macoun, Oct. 31, 1939, Inspector-General's personal correspondence, nonresident secretary (hereafter cited as "NRS"), Sept.-Dec. 1939, No. 3. lo 11s. Hugh ;\I. Bradley to the author, Sept. 4, 1963
SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS,1937-1941 21 ity of his position;the inspectorate was occupied areas of China,where power located in Shanghai,and after the city lay with the Japanese and their collab- was occupied by the Japanese and the orators.By the end of January 1938 government had retreated up the river every important port north of Hangchow from Nanking,first to Hankow and then Bay had fallen,and,despite some diver- to Chungking,he had to depend upon sion of trade to the south,most of the his own skill and that of his commis-revenues were collected in the occupied sioners in dealing with the Japanese and ports.At first Nanking wanted to evacu- their puppets,helped by whatever sup-ate the northern Customs houses and port he could get from the three "in-open new ones in unoccupied territory, terested Powers,"Britain,America,and but Maze successfully argued against that France. on the ground that it would simply ease He had four chief problems.First and Japan's economic control of the area.12 always uppermost in his mind was the This meant that the Customs,while re- maintenance of the integrity of the serv-maining officially under the orders of ice,keeping it a single unit at least nomi-Minister of Finance H.H.Kung,would nally under his own and the central have to come to some sort of arrange- government's control.In 1932 the Man-ment with the de facto authorities in the churian Customs had broken away (un-occupied regions,and it also raised ques- necessarily,he thought),and in 1935 tions about the disposition of Customs and 1936 a split had again been threat-revenues and the control of Customs ened by the establishment of Japanese-personnel.Maze was convinced that com- sponsored regimes in the northern prov-promise on what he regarded as nones- inces.Second,there was the maintenance sentials was necessary to preserve the of Customs functions:preventive work unity of the service,and he had to argue against smuggling,and the collection and his case against both the Chinese and disposition of the revenues.Here,too,Japanese,while trying to win the support the problem was one which had existed of the neutrals for his position.13 before 1937,with Japanese interference At the end of August 1937 the Japa- in the north and in the Formosa Straits,nese consul-general in Tientsin ap- but again it was aggravated by the war proached W.R.Myers,the British com- after 1937.11 Third,he had to preserve missioner of customs,with a set of the service's international aspect and pre- demands for that city and for Chin- vent the Japanese from taking it over by wangtao.They were chiefly concerned placing their nationals in the key posi-with ensuring that the revenues were not tions.And,finally,there was the broader 12 Maze to Loy Chang,Sept.3,1937,P.C., problem of the place of the Customs in Mar.-Dec.1937:J.W.Ting to Maze,Sept.15, the Chinese war effort. 1937,ibid.,Sept.-Dec.1937. These problems raised the question 13 Sec,for general statements of his position, the letters of Maze to Boissevain and Lord Lyt- of the Customs'role in the undeclared ton (cited in nn.6 and 7,respectively);Maze to war,and above all of their status in the Sir A.Clark Kerr,Mar.4,1938,Inspector Gen- eral's personal correspondence,British embassy 11 Maze to Macoun,Nov.14,1935,C.L.,XI,(hereafter cited as "Br.Emb."),Vol.I,No.54; 126;"Precis of certain confidential correspond- same to G.Miskin,Mar.3,1938,P.C.,Jan.- ence,”May10,1936,ibid.,XIⅡ(1936,03-8： June 1938:same to H.H.Kung,Feb.19,1938, Maze to L.A.Lyall,May 28,1936,ibid.,XII, Br.Emb.,Vol.I,No.47;same to Clark Kerr,Oct. 155-57;Maze to P.E.Naggiar,June 20,1936,25,1938,enclosing a letter to the commissioners bd.,XII,276-81. of southern ports,Br.Emb.,Vol.II.No.238
SIR FREDERICK MAZE AND CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOhZS, 1937-1941 21 ity of his position; the inspectorate was located in Shanghai, and after the city was occupied by the Japanese and the government had retreated up the river from Nanking, first to Hankow and then to Chungking, he had to depend upon his own skill and that of his commissioners in dealing with the Japanese and their puppets, helped by whatever support he could get from the three "interested Powers," Britain, America, and France. He had four chief problems. First and always uppermost in his mind was the maintenance of the integrity of the service, keeping it a single unit at least nominally under his own and the central government's control. In 1932 the Manchurian Customs had broken away (unnecessarily, he thought), and in 1935 and 1936 a split had again been threatened by the establishment of Japanesesponsored regimes in the northern provinces. Second, there was the maintenance of Customs functions: preventive work against smuggling, and the collection and disposition of the revenues. Here, too, the problem was one which had existed before 1937, with Japanese interference in the north and in the Formosa Straits, but again it was aggravated by the war after 1937.11 Third, he had to preserve the service's international aspect and prevent the Japanese from taking it over by placing their nationals in the key posithere was the broader problem of the place of the Customs in the Chinese war effort. These problems raised the question of the Customs' role in the undeclared war, and above all of their status in the 11 Maze to Macoun, Nov. 14, 1935, C.L., XI, 126; "Precis of certain confidential correspondence," May 10, 1936, ibid., XI1 (1936), 103-8; Maze to L. A. Lyall, May 28, 1936, ibid., XII, 155-5;; hfaze to P. E. Naggiar, June 20, 1936, ibid., SII, 276-81. occupied areas of China, where power lay with the Japanese and their collaborators. By the end of January 1938 every important port north of Hangchow Bay had fallen, and, despite some diversion of trade to the south, most of the revenues were collected in the occupied ports. At first Nanking wanted to evacuate the northern Customs houses and open new ones in unoccupied territory, but Maze successfully argued against that on the ground that it would simply ease Japan's economic control of the area.12 This meant that the Customs, while remaining officially under the orders of Minister of Finance H. H. Kung, would have to come to some sort of arrangement with the de facto authorities in the occupied regions, and it also raised questions about the disposition of Customs revenues and the control of Customs personnel. Maze was convinced that compromise on what he regarded as nonessentials was necessary to preserve the unity of the service, and he had to argue his case agains't both the Chinese and Japanese, while trying to win the support of the neutrals for his position.13 At the end of August 1937 the Japanese consul-general in Tientsin approached IV. R. Myers, the British commissioner of customs, with a set of demands for that city and for Chinwangtao. They were chiefly concerned with ensuring that the revenues were not 12 Maze to Lay Chang, Sept. 3, 1937, P.C., ,?.far.-~ec. 1937; J. IV. Ting to Maze, Sept. 15, 1937, ibid., Sept.-Dcc. 1937. 13 See, for general statements of his position, the letters of Maze to Boisscvain and Lord Lytton (cited in nn. G and 7, respectively); Maze to Sir A. Clark Kerr, Mar. 4, 1938, Inspector General's personal correspondence, British embassy (hereafter cited as "Br.Emb."), Vol. I, No. 54; same to C. Xiiskin, Mar. 3, 1938, P.C., Jan.- June 1938: same to H. H. Kung, Feb. 19, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, No. 47; same to Clark Kerr, Oct. 25, 1938, cnclosing a letter to the commissioners of southern ports, Br.Emb., Vol. 11. No. 238
22 NICHOLAS R.CLIFFORD "improperly administered"-that is,used Myers had exceeded his instructions,and, to help the Chinese-and proposed to while he wrote the commissioner on De- that end that,after deductions had been cember 20 that "your general attitude is made for local administrative expenses approved,"he sent his personal secre- and for the quotas for foreign loans and tary,K.E.Jordan,to the north at the indemnities due from the two ports,the end of the year,ostensibly on routine surplus should be deposited in an"accep- business,but chiefly to investigate the table bank"(the Yokohama Specie Bank)situation in Tientsin.Myers explained rather than in the Central Bank of that he had acted in the best interests China.14 Nanking vacillated,trying to of the service,and that the Japanese de- postpone the issue,despite British,Amer- mands had grown stiffer until they had ican,and French recommendations that demanded the cessation of remittances to Myers be allowed to come to terms,but Shanghai:"To save the situation I delay stiffened the Japanese position,agreed;but I knew if I put this before and,when in mid-October the Chinese you in black and white hell would be let had evolved what was to them a suitable loose.So I kept a diplomatic silence and compromise,it was too late.15 Myers,trusted to time and an opportunity to feeling himself under heavy pressure,was let you know how things stood."18 Maze forced to give in,and agreed to bank accepted this-there was no choice-but the revenues in the Yokohama bank.privately he felt that Myers had acted Furthermore,while his right to remit to with "precipitate haste"in dropping the the inspectorate the local quotas for Chinese requirements,and had given in foreign loans and indemnities was rec-to the Japanese demands"with what may ognized,he gave the Japanese a promise appear to be undue complacency and in writing that this right would not be celerity."19 The telegram embodying the exercised "pending settlement of ques- Chinese compromise of October had been tions arising out of local hostilities."He somewhat ambiguously worded,and,al- explained to Maze that this would mean though this enabled Myers's actions to be only "a certain amount of unavoidable explained both to the central govern- delay"and said that if his arrangement ment and to the Americans as a misun- were repudiated,the customs houses derstanding,in fact there seems to have would be seized and the service wrecked.16 been but little misunderstanding.20 The inspector-general,however,felt that Maze characterized the Tientsin set- tlement as "unsatisfactory,unilateral, 14 W.R.Myers to Maze,Aug.30,P.C..Sept.- and entirely in favour of Japan,"when Dec.1937;United States,Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States:diplomatic he first heard of it,and it created an papers (hereafter cited as "FRUS"),1937,III unfortunate precedent,seriously weak- (Washington,D.C.,1954).858-59. ening the whole position of the Cus- 15"Japanese demands regarding the Tientsin and Chinwangtao customs,"Sept.9,1937;Ting to Maze,Sept.9,1937;draft memorandum,Sept. 14,1987;and Maze to Myers,Oct.13 and 19, 17 Maze to Myers,Dec.20,1937,P.C.,Mar.-Dec. 1937,enclosed in Maze to L.H.Lawford,Nov. 1937. 30,1987,P.C,Mar.-Dec.1937;FRUS,1937,IIL, 1s Myers to Maze,Dec.29,1937,ibid.,Sept.- 859-60,863-64,873-74. Dec.1937. 16 Myers to Japanese consul-general,Tientsin, 19 Maze to E.I.Hall-Patch,Feb.19,1938, Oct.22,1937 (extract);and same to Maze,Oct. Br.Emb.,Vol.I,No.45;FRUS,1938,III,663-64. 29,1937,P.C,Sept.-Dec.1937;FRUS,1937,IIL, 20 Hall-Patch to J.H.Cubbon,Feb.11,1938, 877-78:FRUS,1938,III.654-55. Br.Emb.,Vol.I,No.45
22 ATICHOLAS R. CLIFFORD "improperly administered3'-that is, used to help the Chinese-and proposed to that end that, after deductions had been made for local administrative expenses and for the quotas for foreign loans and indemnities due from the two ports, the surplus should be deposited in an "acceptable bank" (the Yokohama Specie Bank) rather than in the Central Bank of China.lWanking vacillated, trying to postpone the issue, despite British, American, and French recommendations that Myers be allo~ved to come to terms, but delay stiffened the Japanese position, and, when in mid-October the Chinese had evolved what was to them a suitable compromise, it was too late.l5 Myers, feeling himself under heavy pressure, was forced to give in, and agreed to bank the revenues in the Yokohama bank. Furthermore, while his right to remit to the inspectorate the local quotas for foreign loans and indemnities was recognized, he gave the Japanese a promise in writing that this right would not be exercised "pending settlement of questions arising out of local hostilities." He explained to Maze that this would mean only "a certain amount of unavoidable delay" and said that if his arrangement were repudiated, the customs houses would be seized and the service wrecked.16 The inspector-general, however, felt that 14TV. R. Myers to Maze, Au~. 30, P.C., Sept.- Dec. 1937; TJnited States, Department of State, Foreiqn relatfons of the LTnited Slates: diplonialzc papers (hereafter cited as "FRUS"), 1937, I11 (XVashington, D. C., 1934), 858-59. 15 "Japanese demands regarding the Tientsin and Chinwangtao customs," Sept. 9, 1937; Ting to Ma7e, Sept. 9, 1937; draft memorandum, Sept. 14, 1937; and Maze to Myers, Oct. 13 and i9, 1937, enclosed in Maze to L. H. Lawford, Nov. 30, 1937, P.C., Mar.-Dec. 1937; FRUS, 1937, 111, 839-60, 863-64,873-74. 16 hf.rers to Japanese consul-general, Tientsin, Oct. 22, 1937 (extract); and same to Maze, Oct. 29, 1937, P.C., Sept.-Dec. 1937; FRUS, 1937, 111, 877-78; FRUS, 1938, 111, 634-55. Myers had exceeded his instructions, and, while he wrote the commissioner on December 20 that "your general attitude is approved,"l7 he sent his personal secretary, K. E. Jordan, to the north at the end of the year, ostensibly on routine business, but chiefly to investigate the situation in Tientsin. Myers explained that he had acted in the best interests of the service, and that the Japanese demands had grown stiffer until they had demanded the cessation of remittances to Shanghai: "To save the situation I agreed; but I knew if I put this before you in black and white hell would be let loose. So I kept a diplomatic silence and trusted to time and an opportunity to let you know how things stood."18 Maze accepted this-there was no choice-but privately he felt that hfyers had acted with "precipitate haste" in dropping the Chinese requirements, and had given in to the Japanese demands "with what may appear to be undue complacency and celerity."lQ The telegram embodying the Chinese compromise of October had been somewhat ambiguously worded, and, although this enabled Myers's actions to be explained both to the central government and to the Americans as a misunderstanding, in fact there seems to have been but little mis~nderstanding.~O hlaze characterized the Tientsin settlement as "unsatisfactory, unilateral, and entirely in favour of Japan," when he first heard of it, and it created an unfortunate precedent, seriously weakening the whole position of the Cus- 17 Maze to Myers, Dec. 20, 1937, P.C., &far.-Dec. 1937. 18 Myers to Maze, Dec. 29, 1937, ibid., Sept.- Dec. 1937. lo &faze to E. I. Hall-Patch, Feb. 19, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, No. 45; FRC'S, 1938, 111, 66344. 20 Hall-Patch to J. H. Cubbon, Feb. 11, 1938, Br.Emb., Vol. I, No. 43