《近代中国对外关系史 The History of Modern China's Foreign Relations》课程教学资源（阅读材料）Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening（The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864——1873）

Modern Asian Studies,o,2(1976),pp.195-223.Printed in Great Britain. Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan,1864-1873 RICHARD J.SMITH Rice University,Houston,Texas ONE of the principal concerns of China's 'self-strengthening movement' in the T'ung-chih period (1862-1874)was the question of military reform.Organizational change was not a central issue,for the Ch'ing dynasty had already found in the innovative armies known as yung-ying (lit.,brave battalions')a comparatively effective military system com- patible with existing economic and administrative institutions.1 But changes in training methods-especially officer training-and weapons came to be viewed as essential to the self-strengthening effort.2 Ex- perience in the huge and devastating Taiping Rebellion(1850-1864), together with the repeated humiliations suffered by China at the hands of foreigners in the two decades following the Opium War of 1839-1842, had brought the Ch'ing government to a greater awareness of the need for introducing Western-style weapons and training in Chinese armies. Particularly convincing was the effective use of foreign troops and foreign-officered contingents (such as the vaunted Ever-Victorious Army)against the Taipings in the area of Shanghai during 1862.3 But in Chinese eyes,the employment of foreign troops and officers could never be anything more than a temporary expedient.Ch'ing policy- makers aimed at eliminating dependence on foreigners as soon as pos- sible,while building China's own military capabilities in order to contend with both internal and external challenges.These twin goals lay at the heart of self-strengthening. 1 On yung-ying,see my article,'Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,'forthcoming in the Journal of Asian History.Reorganization of Green Standard forces,notably the so-called Retrained Army (lien-chin)and Ting Jih- ch'ang's fu-piao,essentially went no further than 'yung-yingization.'See Wang Erh- min,'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yuan chi ch'i i-i,'(The origin and significance of the Retrained Army),Ta-lu tsa-chih (Mainland Miscellany),34.6-7,esp.221;also Lui Shih-ch'iang, Ting Jih-ch'ang yu tzu-ch'iang yun-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement;Taipei,1972),pp.186-90. 2 See,for example,Yang-wu yuin-tung (The foreign matters'movement;Shanghai, 1961),Vol.3,Pp.441,457,459,462-3,466. 3 Richard J.Smith,Barbarian Officers of Imperial China:Ward,Gordon and the Taiping Rebellion'(Ph.D.diss.,University of California,Davis,1972),esp.ch.4. I95

Modern Asian Studies, 10, 2 (1976), pp. I95-223. Printed in Great Britain. Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864--1873 RICHARD J. SMITH Rice University, Houston, Texas O NE of the principal concerns of China's 'self-strengthening movement' in the T'ung-chih period (I862-1874) was the question of military reform. Organizational change was not a central issue, for the Ch'ing dynasty had already found in the innovative armies known asyung-ying (lit., 'brave battalions') a comparatively effective military system com￾patible with existing economic and administrative institutions.1 But changes in training methods-especially officer training-and weapons came to be viewed as essential to the self-strengthening effort.2 Ex￾perience in the huge and devastating Taiping Rebellion (I850-1864), together with the repeated humiliations suffered by China at the hands of foreigners in the two decades following the Opium War of I839-I842, had brought the Ch'ing government to a greater awareness of the need for introducing Western-style weapons and training in Chinese armies. Particularly convincing was the effective use of foreign troops and foreign-officered contingents (such as the vaunted Ever-Victorious Army) against the Taipings in the area of Shanghai during I862.3 But in Chinese eyes, the employment of foreign troops and officers could never be anything more than a temporary expedient. Ch'ing policy￾makers aimed at eliminating dependence on foreigners as soon as pos￾sible, while building China's own military capabilities in order to contend with both internal and external challenges. These twin goals lay at the heart of self-strengthening. 1 Onyung-ying, see my article, 'Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,' forthcoming in the Journal of Asian History. Reorganization of Green Standard forces, notably the so-called Retrained Army (lien-chiin) and Ting Jih￾ch'ang'sfu-piao, essentially went no further than 'yung-yingization.' See Wang Erh￾min, 'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yiian chi ch'i i-i,' (The origin and significance of the 'Retrained Army'), Ta-lu tsa-chih (Mainland Miscellany), 34.6-7, esp. 221; also Lti Shih-ch'iang, Ting Jih-ch'ang yi tzu-ch'iang yiin-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement; Taipei, I972), pp. I86-90. 2 See, for example, Yang-wu yin-tung (The 'foreign matters' movement; Shanghai, I961), Vol. 3, pp. 44I, 457, 459, 462-3, 466. 3 Richard J. Smith, 'Barbarian Officers of Imperial China: Ward, Gordon and the Taiping Rebellion' (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, I972), esp. ch. 4. I95

I96 R.J.SMITH The decade from 1864 to 1874 seemed to offer an ideal opportunity for China's self-assertion in military affairs.By 1864 the Taipings had been suppressed,giving the Ch'ing government self-confidence and breathing-room to deal with less formidable but still threatening up- risings such as the Nien Rebellion(1853-1868).At the same time,the 'Cooperative Policy'of the foreign powers following the Peking Con- ventions of 186o gave indications that the West was prepared to assist China in the buildup of its military.4 Following the capture of Nanking in July,1864,the frantic search for a military means to contend with the rebels,which earlier had led to the development of ad hoc foreign- officered Chinese contingents,gave way to what seemed to be a con- certed effort to reform the Chinese military along Western lines through the systematic use of foreign-training.Surprisingly,very little scholarly attention has been given to this important reform effort. The training programs that replaced the Western-officered con- tingents in 1864 varied widely in origins,sponsorship,composition,size, financial resources,and administration.5 As in the Taiping period, Britain and France took the lead in promoting foreign-training,each vying for heightened influence in Chinese military affairs.Some pro- grams were founded with the avowed aim of training Chinese officers for the future;others,with more immediate military needs in mind. Men and officers for training programs were drawn from a variety of sources-Green Standard (usually piao or hsiek),Banner garrisons,or local yung forces-sometimes in combination.Customs revenue often financed foreign-training efforts,but likin,regular provincial funds,and the private resources of individuals might also be used.Head military bureaus(chuin-hsii tsung-chu),established in nearly every province during the Taiping period,frequently played a role in military administration. Most major training programs operated in accordance with specific regulations,but these were devised by local Ch'ing authorities rather than the central government.Moreover,drill procedures,arms,and even the language of instruction varied widely in the various programs.6 4 See Mary C.Wright,The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism:The T'ung-chih Restora- tion,1862-1874 (New York,1967),chas 3 and 9. s There are vast amounts of material on the various foreign-training programs, including diplomatic despatches,first-hand accounts from both Western and Chinese observers,and newspaper reports.Much of this material remains to be used.Yang-wu yin-tung,Vol.3,provides a wealth of information on the training programs at Tient- sin(Pp.443-58,475-7,479,483-4,491,493-44968,501-2),Canton(45966,468- 70,481,5o9-Io,519),Foochow(47i-3,477-8,482,597-6o5)andT'ang-chueh (Wuchang;492,494-6).Additional observations on the problem of foreign-training may be found in ibid.,pp.441-2,452-7,4668,482-7,499,5o1-5. 6 The above discussion is based largely on the rang-wu yun-tung documents cited in

The decade from I864 to I874 seemed to offer an ideal opportunity for China's self-assertion in military affairs. By 1864 the Taipings had been suppressed, giving the Ch'ing government self-confidence and breathing-room to deal with less formidable but still threatening up￾risings such as the Nien Rebellion (1853-1868). At the same time, the 'Cooperative Policy' of the foreign powers following the Peking Con￾ventions of I860 gave indications that the West was prepared to assist China in the buildup of its military.4 Following the capture of Nanking in July, 1864, the frantic search for a military means to contend with the rebels, which earlier had led to the development of ad hoc foreign￾officered Chinese contingents, gave way to what seemed to be a con￾certed effort to reform the Chinese military along Western lines through the systematic use-of foreign-training. Surprisingly, very little scholarly attention has been given to this important reform effort. The training programs that replaced the Western-officered con￾tingents in 1864 varied widely in origins, sponsorship, composition, size, financial resources, and administration.5 As in the Taiping period, Britain and France took the lead in promoting foreign-training, each vying for heightened influence in Chinese military affairs. Some pro￾grams were founded with the avowed aim of training Chinese officers for the future; others, with more immediate military needs in mind. Men and officers for training programs were drawn from a variety of sources-Green Standard (usually piao or hsieh), Banner garrisons, or local yung forces-sometimes in combination. Customs revenue often financed foreign-training efforts, but likin, regular provincial funds, and the private resources of individuals might also be used. Head military bureaus (chiin-hsii tsung-chii), established in nearly every province during the Taiping period, frequently played a role in military administration. Most major training programs operated in accordance with specific regulations, but these were devised by local Ch'ing authorities rather than the central government. Moreover, drill procedures, arms, and even the language of instruction varied widely in the various programs.6 4 See Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restora￾tion, I862-1874 (New York, I967), chas 3 and 9. 5 There are vast amounts of material on the various foreign-training programs, including diplomatic despatches, first-hand accounts from both Western and Chinese observers, and newspaper reports. Much of this material remains to be used. rang-wu yiin-tung, Vol. 3, provides a wealth of information on the training programs at Tient￾sin (pp. 443-58, 475-7, 479, 483-4, 49I, 493-4, 496-8, 501-2), Canton (459-66, 468- 70, 48I, 509-10, 519), Foochow (47I-3, 477-8, 482, 597-605) and T'ang-chiieh (Wuchang; 492, 494-6). Additional observations on the problem of foreign-training may be found in ibid., pp. 441-2, 452-7, 466-8, 482-7, 499, 501-5. 6 The above discussion is based largely on the Tang-wuyin-tung documents cited in I96 R. J. SMITH

FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA I97 Of the half-dozen or so major foreign-training programs initiated after the suppression of the Taipings,the training camp begun at Feng- huang-shan,near the thriving treaty port of Shanghai,seemed to offer the greatest chance for success.British officials wholeheartedly endorsed the program and pledged their support,while the Ch'ing government, through the Tsungli Yamen,gave assurances that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a bona fide institution.7 One British officer involved in the program wrote that Feng-huang-shan was to be the Aldershot of China.'s But Feng-huang-shan never lived up to his expectations.After nearly a decade of operation,the camp had little to show for an expenditure of perhaps 1.3 million taels.Instead of pro- ducing large numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers for the in- struction of other Chinese troops,the program succumbed to a variety of abuses and fell under heavy criticism from foreigner and Chinese alike.In mid-1873 the program was abruptly terminated,to the satis- faction of some and the displeasure of others.In all,the experiment was a failure.Yet the history of the training program at Feng-huang-shan is instructive,for it provides an illuminating perspective on the role of foreign assistance in China's early self-strengthening movement,and highlights some of the many problems confronting advocates of military reform in the T'ung-chih period.10 The Establishment of Foreign-Training at Feng-huang-shan The rise of Feng-huang-shan may be traced directly to the fall of the Ever-Victorious Army.For two years,from early 1862 to early 1864, the Ever-Victorious Army served Chinese and Western interests as a note 5,although selected Foreign Office documents and Western-language news- papers such as the North-China Herald and Hong Kong Daily Press have also been con- sulted. 7 British Consular and Embassy Archives (hereafter F.O.228),F.O.228/366, Wade to Parkes,December 31,1864. s Story's 'reminiscences'in A.E.Hake,Events in the Taeping Rebellion (London, 18g1),P.5I7. According to the North-China Herald's estimate (which the head drillmaster did not dispute),the camp cost 150,oo0 taels per year to maintain.North-China Herald, June 14,1873 and June 21,1873.Gordon estimated in 1864 that payment for a con- tingent of one thousand officers and men (including foreigners)would exceed ten thousand taels per month.F.O.228/368,Gordon to Brown,September(day missing), 1864.See also Ch'ou-pan i-wou shih-mo (A complete record of the management of barbarian affairs;Peiping,193o;hereafter I.W.S.M.)T'ung-chih 25:26b,which provides a similar estimate. 10 See the general discussion in Wright,The Last Stand,ch.9,esp.pp.200-17. Although I do not agree with all of the late Professor Wright's conclusions,I remain indebted to her stimulating and pioneering work

FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA Of the half-dozen or so major foreign-training programs initiated after the suppression of the Taipings, the training camp begun at Feng￾huang-shan, near the thriving treaty port of Shanghai, seemed to offer the greatest chance for success. British officials wholeheartedly endorsed the program and pledged their support, while the Ch'ing government, through the Tsungli Yamen, gave assurances that Feng-huang-shan would be maintained as a bona fide institution.7 One British officer involved in the program wrote that Feng-huang-shan was to be 'the Aldershot of China.'8 But Feng-huang-shan never lived up to his expectations. After nearly a decade of operation, the camp had little to show for an expenditure of perhaps I.3 million taels.9 Instead of pro￾ducing large numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers for the in￾struction of other Chinese troops, the program succumbed to a variety of abuses and fell under heavy criticism from foreigner and Chinese alike. In mid-I873 the program was abruptly terminated, to the satis￾faction of some and the displeasure of others. In all, the experiment was a failure. Yet the history of the training program at Feng-huang-shan is instructive, for it provides an illuminating perspective on the role of foreign assistance in China's early self-strengthening movement, and highlights some of the many problems confronting advocates of military reform in the T'ung-chih period.10 The Establishment of Foreign- Training at Feng-huang-shan The rise of Feng-huang-shan may be traced directly to the fall of the Ever-Victorious Army. For two years, from early I862 to early I864, the Ever-Victorious Army served Chinese and Western interests as a note 5, although selected Foreign Office documents and Western-language news￾papers such as the North-China Herald and Hong Kong Daily Press have also been con￾sulted. 7British Consular and Embassy Archives (hereafter F.O. 228), F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, December 31, I864. 8 Story's 'reminiscences' in A. E. Hake, Events in the Taeping Rebellion (London, 1891), p. 517. 9 According to the North-China Herald's estimate (which the head drillmaster did not dispute), the camp cost 50o,o000 taels per year to maintain. North-China Herald, June 14, 1873 and June 21, I873. Gordon estimated in I864 that payment for a con￾tingent of one thousand officers and men (including foreigners) would exceed ten thousand taels per month. F.O. 228/368, Gordon to Brown, September (day missing), I864. See also Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo (A complete record of the management of barbarian affairs; Peiping, 1930; hereafter I.W.S.M.) T'ung-chih 25: 26b, which provides a similar estimate. 10 See the general discussion in Wright, The Last Stand, ch. 9, esp. pp. 200-I7. Although I do not agree with all of the late Professor Wright's conclusions, I remain indebted to her stimulating and pioneering work. I97

198 R.J.SMITH defense force for the treaty port of Shanghai and a modernizing agent for the Ch'ing military.But by the spring of 1864 the contingent had clearly outlived its usefulness.According to reports by the commander of the force,Charles G.Gordon,and his superior as governor of Kiangsu,Li Hung-chang,the Ever-Victorious Army had become un- ruly,unpredictable,ineffective and even dangerous.12 It had failed to produce significant numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers,and had been a source of constant friction between Chinese and Western officials.13 In view of the contingent's obvious deficiencies,Gordon and Li hastened to disband the force in May,1864;but British officials at Shanghai-notably the strong-willed consul,Harry Parkes,and the British commander-in-chief,General W.G.Brown-vigorously op- posed the move on grounds that Shanghai would be left virtually un- protected in the event of a Taiping resurgence.14 Their opposition was largely unjustified in view of the imminent fall of Nanking and the presence of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army in the area.Nonetheless,Li was forced to strike a bargain with Parkes:Disbandment would take place,but portions of the Ever-Victorious Army were to be retained as the nucleus of a foreign-training program(and defense force)supervised by British drillmasters but now no longer under the direct control of British officers.15 Certain foreign observers perceived that the retention of a force 'officered by Englishmen-whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers'would promote rivalry among the other Western powers,but local British officials at Shanghai considered the move justifiable in the light of growing French influence in foreign- training programs.16 1 Smith,Barbarian Officers,'currently being revised for publication. 12 Gordon Papers (British Museum),Additional Manuscripts (Add.MSS.) 52,389,Gordon to Mother,June 2,1864:The Force is now completely disbanded, and I think a great danger removed both for Shanghai the Chinese.'See also Li Hung-chang's memorial in I.W.S.M.Tung-chih,25:23b-27b. 13 Smith,Barbarian Officers,'esp.chs 5,6,8,and 9. 14 Stanley Lane-Poole,The Life of Sir Harry Parkes(2 vols,London,1894),I,497-505. 1s Documentation on the negotiations leading to the compromise is voluminous in both Chinese and Western languages.See the correspondence in F.O.228/367 between Parkes and various Ch'ing and British officials;also I.W.S.M.T'ung-chih, 25:24b-26;Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (The complete papers of Li Hung-chang; Nanking,1908),Letters,5:16;Fu-Wu kung-tu (Official letters of the governor of Kiangsu [Ting Jih-ch'ang];Canton,1877),50:6b.I am grateful to Professor K.C. Liu,of the University of California,Davis,for making Ting's papers available to me. 16 Gordon Papers,Add.MSS.,52,387,Hart to Gordon,May 17,1864;Hong Kong Daily Press,July 29,1864.Anglo-French rivalry in the establishment of foreign- training programs emerged in 1862 and continued to be a prominent theme in the post-Taiping period.See,for example,Wang,'Lien-chiin,'34.7:222,note I1; Yang-wu yun-tung,Vol.3,p.464;Tong Ling Tch'ouang,'La politique francaise en

defense force for the treaty port of Shanghai and a modernizing agent for the Ch'ing military.11 But by the spring of I864 the contingent had clearly outlived its usefulness. According to reports by the commander of the force, Charles G. Gordon, and his superior as governor of Kiangsu, Li Hung-chang, the Ever-Victorious Army had become un￾ruly, unpredictable, ineffective and even dangerous.12 It had failed to produce significant numbers of Western-trained Chinese officers, and had been a source of constant friction between Chinese and Western officials.13 In view of the contingent's obvious deficiencies, Gordon and Li hastened to disband the force in May, I864; but British officials at Shanghai-notably the strong-willed consul, Harry Parkes, and the British commander-in-chief, General W. G. Brown-vigorously op￾posed the move on grounds that Shanghai would be left virtually un￾protected in the event of a Taiping resurgence.14 Their opposition was largely unjustified in view of the imminent fall of Nanking and the presence of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army in the area. Nonetheless, Li was forced to strike a bargain with Parkes: Disbandment would take place, but portions of the Ever-Victorious Army were to be retained as the nucleus of a foreign-training program (and defense force) supervised by British drillmasters but now no longer under the direct control of British officers.15 Certain foreign observers perceived that the retention of a force 'officered by Englishmen-whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers' would promote rivalry among the other Western powers, but local British officials at Shanghai considered the move justifiable in the light of growing French influence in foreign￾training programs.16 11 Smith, 'Barbarian Officers,' currently being revised for publication. 12 Gordon Papers (British Museum), Additional Manuscripts (Add. MSS.) 52,389, Gordon to Mother, June 2, I864: 'The Force is now completely disbanded, and I think a great danger removed both for Shanghai & the Chinese.' See also Li Hung-chang's memorial in I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 23b-27b. 13 Smith, 'Barbarian Officers,' esp. chs 5, 6, 8, and 9. 14 Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes (2 vols, London, 1894), 1,497-505. 15 Documentation on the negotiations leading to the compromise is voluminous in both Chinese and Western languages. See the correspondence in F.O. 228/367 between Parkes and various Ch'ing and British officials; also L.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 24b-26; Li Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi (The complete papers of Li Hung-chang; Nanking, I908), Letters, 5: I6; Fu-Wu kung-tu (Official letters of the governor of Kiangsu [Ting Jih-ch'ang]; Canton, I877), 50: 6b. I am grateful to Professor K. C. Liu, of the University of California, Davis, for making Ting's papers available to me. 16 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS., 52,387, Hart to Gordon, May I7, I864; Hong Kong Daily Press, July 29, I864. Anglo-French rivalry in the establishment of foreign￾training programs emerged in I862 and continued to be a prominent theme in the post-Taiping period. See, for example, Wang, 'Lien-chiin,' 34.7: 222, note I I; Tang-wuyiin-tung, Vol. 3, p. 464; Tong Ling Tch'ouang, 'La politique francaise en I98 R. J. SMITH

FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA I99 The compromise proposal agreed to by Li and Parkes reflected a mixture of motives.Local British officials at Shanghai,aggressive, chauvinistic,and,in the main,imbued with a strong sense of personal and national self-interest,evinced a clear desire to maintain competi- tive presence'with the French in foreign-training.Moreover,they- like virtually all of their countrymen-were vitally concerned with the security of Shanghai and felt that the Chinese should assume total responsibility for the protection of the treaty port.17 Other individuals, such as Gordon and the British minister at Peking,Frederick Bruce, were no less anxious to protect Britain's reputation and interests,but they also believed that foreign-training was essential to the moderniza- tion of China's military,and should be continued even after the danger to Shanghai had subsided.18 To be certain,these men saw the creation of a strong and self-sufficient China as beneficial to British as well as Chinese interests,but one senses that their reform proposals contained at least a measure of altruism.19 Chinese policymakers,for their part,were naturally anxious to assure the security of strategic areas,and to build up China's military capabilities.But their immediate concern was to eliminate the need for foreign assistance and minimize foreign interference in Chinese affairs. Li Hung-chang,from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army, had come to appreciate the value of Western arms and training,and had even begun to introduce these innovations into his own Anhwei Army.20 But he did not wholeheartedly endorse the idea of a foreign- training program under British sponsorship.Li greatly resented the Chine pendant les guerres des Taipings'(Ph.D.diss.,University of Paris,1950),p. 305;F.O.228/376,Robertson to Hammond,January 29,1862;P.R.O.(Public Record Office)30/22/49,Bruce to Russell,August 14,1862. 17F.O.228/367,Parkes to Gordon,May 19,1864;Lane-Poole,Parkes,I,498;Fu-Wu kung-tu,50:6b.F.O.228/367 Parkes to Wade,July 29,1864,highlights the concern of British officials over French foreign-training activity at the time. 18 F.O.228/366,Bruce to Parkes,June 7,1864;ibid.,Wade to Parkes,November 28,1864;see also note 24.Bruce had long been an advocate of Chinese military improvement. 19 See Jack Gerson,'Letter by Frederick Bruce',Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i,1.5 (April, 1967),13.Unfortunately,even such comparatively sympathetic individuals as Wade could be rather heavy-handed in pursuing what they believed to be China's best interests.Wade believed,for example,that Li Hung-chang should be made to adhere to 'the project of military organization'at Feng-huang-shan in return for Great Britain's willingness to allow British officers to serve in Li's Anhwei Army as gunners.Wade did acknowledge,however,that Li already seemed 'seriously dis- posed'to support the plan.F.O.228/366,Wade to Parkes,n.d.(July 6-July 27, 1864). 20 Wang Erh-min,Huai-chan chih (Treatise on the Anhwei Army;Taipei,1967), Pp.193-200

FOREIGN-TRAINING AND CHINA The compromise proposal agreed to by Li and Parkes reflected a mixture of motives. Local British officials at Shanghai, aggressive, chauvinistic, and, in the main, imbued with a strong sense of personal and national self-interest, evinced a clear desire to maintain 'competi￾tive presence' with the French in foreign-training. Moreover, they￾like virtually all of their countrymen--were vitally concerned with the security of Shanghai and felt that the Chinese should assume total responsibility for the protection of the treaty port.17 Other individuals, such as Gordon and the British minister at Peking, Frederick Bruce, were no less anxious to protect Britain's reputation and interests, but they also believed that foreign-training was essential to the moderniza￾tion of China's military, and should be continued even after the danger to Shanghai had subsided.18 To be certain, these men saw the creation of a strong and self-sufficient China as beneficial to British as well as Chinese interests, but one senses that their reform proposals contained at least a measure of altruism.19 Chinese policymakers, for their part, were naturally anxious to assure the security of strategic areas, and to build up China's military capabilities. But their immediate concern was to eliminate the need for foreign assistance and minimize foreign interference in Chinese affairs. Li Hung-chang, from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army, had come to appreciate the value of Western arms and training, and had even begun to introduce these innovations into his own Anhwei Army.20 But he did not wholeheartedly endorse the idea of a foreign￾training program under British sponsorship. Li greatly resented the Chine pendant les guerres des Taipings' (Ph.D. diss., University of Paris, I950), p. 305; F.O. 228/376, Robertson to Hammond, January 29, I862; P.R.O. (Public Record Office) 30/22/49, Bruce to Russell, August 14, 1862. 17 F.O. 228/367, Parkes to Gordon, May I9, i864; Lane-Poole, Parkes, I, 498;Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 6b. F.O. 228/367 Parkes to Wade, July 29, I864, highlights the concern of British officials over French foreign-training activity at the time. 18 F.O. 228/366, Bruce to Parkes, June 7, I864; ibid., Wade to Parkes, November 28, I864; see also note 24. Bruce had long been an advocate of Chinese military improvement. 19 See Jack Gerson, 'Letter by Frederick Bruce', Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i, 1.5 (April, 1967), 13. Unfortunately, even such comparatively sympathetic individuals as Wade could be rather heavy-handed in pursuing what they believed to be China's best interests. Wade believed, for example, that Li Hung-chang should be made to adhere to 'the project of military organization' at Feng-huang-shan in return for Great Britain's willingness to allow British officers to serve in Li's Anhwei Army as gunners. Wade did acknowledge, however, that Li already seemed 'seriously dis￾posed' to support the plan. F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, n.d. (July 6-July 27, I864). 20 Wang Erh-min, Huai-chiin chih (Treatise on the Anhwei Army; Taipei, I967), pp. I93-200. I99