CHAPTER 4 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE: THE NORTH-WEST AND THE COAST CH'ING ARMIES OF THE POST-TAIPING ERA By the end of the Nien War in 1868,a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security.Often referred to by historians as regional armies,these forces were generally described at the time as yung-ying (lit.brave battalions').In the late 186os,such forces throughout all the empire totalled more than 3o0,oo0 men.They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chuin)founded by Tseng Kuo-fan,the resuscitated Hunan Army(usually called Ch'u-chun)under Tso Tsung-t'ang,and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chun)coordinated by Li Hung-chang.There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yu-chun),Shantung (Tung-chun),Yunnan (Tien-chun)and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chun).1 These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain.More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society.Both the strength and the weakness of the ygying were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between higher and lower officers and between officers and men.In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies-both the banner forces and the Green Standard Army. The original Ch'ing banners had been composed of companies of 3oo men supported by imperial stipends and grants of land.But to prevent Manchu princes and imperial officials from developing personal military power,the Ch'ing emperors had arranged in the early eighteenth century On the banner and Green Standard forces,see Wei Yuan,Sheng-ws cbi(Chronicle of the sacred dynasty's military campaigns)and Lo Erh-kang,Liying ping-chib(A treatise on the Green Standard Army).The yung-ying figure is from a memorial dated Jan.1866 in Tseng Kuo-fan,Treng Wen-cbeng erng cb'an-cbi (Complete collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's papers; hereafter TCKCC),Trou-ao (Memorials),23.35.On the Shantung Army see Sban-fuong chiin-bring cbi-lueb (Brief record of military campaigns in Shantung),4a.8,and Ting Pao-chen, Ting Wen-cb'eng erng i-cbi(Collected papers of the late Ting Pao-chen),1.4,37b;4.9,16.On the Honan Army,see Yin Keng-yun et al.Yi-cbiin cbi lueh (A concise history of the Honan Army), 1.3.11;5.10.IobI;12.22.5-6.The Yunnan Army originated with Ts'en Yu-ying's cam- paigns against Muslim revolts in that province;see Wang Shu-huai,Hsien-T'ang Yaon-man bui-min sbib-pien (Muslim revolts in Yunnan during the Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih reigns), 224-8. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CHAPTER 4 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE: THE NORTH-WEST AND THE COAST CH'IN G ARMIES OF THE POST-TAIPING ERA By the end of the Nien War in 1868, a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security. Often referred to by historians as regional armies, these forces were generally described at the time n&yung-ying (lit. 'brave battalions'). In the late 1860s, such forces throughout all the empire totalled more than 300,000 men. They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chiin) founded by Tseng Kuo-fan, the resuscitated Hunan Army (usually called Ch'u-chiin) under Tso Tsung-t'ang, and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chiin) coordinated by Li Hung-chang. There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yii-chun), Shantung (Tung-chun), Yunnan (Tien-chun) and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chiin). > These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain. More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society. Both the strength and the weakness of thejuftg-ji/jg were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between higher and lower officers and between officers and men. In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies - both the banner forces and rhe Green Standard Army. The original Ch'ing banners had been composed of companies of 300 men supported by imperial stipends and grants of land. But to prevent Manchu princes and imperial officials from developing personal military power, the Ch'ing emperors had arranged in the early eighteenth century 1 On the banner and Green Standard forces, see Wei Yuan, Sbeng-wu cbi (Chronicle of the sacred dynasty's military campaigns) and Lo Erh-kang, h.u-ying ping-chih (A treatise on the Green Standard Army). The yung-ying figure is from a memorial dated Jan. 1866 in Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Wen-cbeng kung cVuan-chi (Complete collection of Tseng Kuo-fan's papers; hereafter TWCKCC), Tsou-kao (Memorials), 25.3$. On the Shantung Army see Sban-tung cbiin-bting ehi-lueb (Brief record of military campaigns in Shantung), 4a. 8, and Ting Pao-chen, Ting U^en-cb'eng Mung i-cbi(Collected papers of the late Ting Pao-chen), 1.4, 37b; 4.9, 16. On the Honan Army, see Yin Keng-yun el al. Yii-cbun chi lueh (A concise history of the Honan Army), I.J.II; j.io.iob-n; 12.22.5-6. The Yunnan Army originated with Ts'en Yii-ying's cam- paigns against Muslim revolts in that province; see Wang Shu-huai, Hsien-T'ung Yun-nan bui-min sbib-pitn (Muslim revolts in Yunnan during the Hsien-feng and T'ung-chih reigns), 224-8. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 203 that the higher commanders of banner forces above the company level were to be rotated from garrison to garrison every three to five years.2 The Green Standard forces,totalling some 6o0,ooo men in the mid-nineteenth century,were positioned in tiny contingents as a constabulary or in the larger 'direct commands'(piao)of the top provincial civil and military officials.But these commands were only relatively large.For example,in the strategic Shensi-Kansu military area the 40,ooo men were divided into thirteen piao,while in Chihli outside Peking 12,ooo men were distributed among seven piao.3 Although the Green Standard troops were hereditary soldiers,even their middle-ranking officers would stay with a given unit of troops usually between three and five years and never in their native province,in accordance with the law of avoidance.This inhibited the growth of long-term relationships between officers and men and especially between commanders and low-ranking officers in the local contingents.A task force pulled together from several Green Standard commands for a specific occasion seldom performed well:the men were not accustomed to their officers,while the officers were at loggerheads with each other'.+ The merit of the yungying had lain in the close personal ties between officers and men.Army commanders('ung-ling)personally chose the com- manders of the various battalions under them.Each battalion commander (ying-kran)responsible for some sso men would personally choose his com- pany officers (shao-ran)who would in turn choose their platoon officers (shib-chang).The to or so common soldiers who formed a platoon were usually chosen by the platoon officer himself.Tseng Kuo-fan in 1868 extolled this system of personal relationships throughout the organization: 'Although rations came from public funds,the yung-ying troops were never- theless grateful to the officers of the battalion for selecting them to be put on the rolls,as if they had received personal favours from the officers. Since in ordinary times there existed [between the officers and the troops] relations of kindness as well as mutual confidence,in battle it could be expected that they would see each other through hardship and adversity.'s As long as the throne's authority over civil and military appointments was not diminished-including the control of high provincial positions and the granting of the coveted Green Standard titles and posts to the yung-ying a Cp.Robert H.G.Lee,The Mancburian frontier in Cb'ing bistory,24-31.Richard J.Smith, 'Chinese military institutions in the mid-nineteenth century,185o-1860',Journal of Arian History,8.2 (1974)136-41.Chang Po-feng,comp.Ch'ing-tai ko-li cbiang-cbiin tu-I'umng ta-cb'en feng nien-piao,1796-19r (Chronological tables of Manchu generals-in-chief,lieutenants- general,imperial agents,etc.,in various areas under the Ch'ing,1796-1911). Lo Eth-kang,Lii-ying ping-cbib,92-100,126-36,162-4,206-7. Ibid.179-81,213-20,237-44.Chiang Chung-yuan,Chiang Chuong-lieb kung i-cbi (The papers ot the late Chiang Chung-yuan),1.2,4. s TWCKCC,Trou-kao,28.18b-19. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'IN G ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 203 that the higher commanders of banner forces above the company level were to be rotated from garrison to garrison every three to five years.2 The Green Standard forces, totalling some 600,000 men in the mid-nineteenth century, were positioned in tiny contingents as a constabulary or in the larger 'direct commands' (piao) of the top provincial civil and military officials. But these commands were only relatively large. For example, in the strategic Shensi-Kansu military area the 40,000 men were divided into thirteen piao, while in Chihli outside Peking 12,000 men were distributed among seven piao.* Although the Green Standard troops were hereditary soldiers, even their middle-ranking officers would stay with a given unit of troops usually between three and five years and never in their native province, in accordance with the law of avoidance. This inhibited the growth of long-term relationships between officers and men and especially between commanders and low-ranking officers in the local contingents. A task force pulled together from several Green Standard commands for a specific occasion seldom performed well: 'the men were not accustomed to their officers, while the officers were at loggerheads with each other'.* The merit of the yung-ying had lain in the close personal ties between officers and men. Army commanders (t'ung-ling) personally chose the commanders of the various battalions under them. Each battalion commander (ying-kuari) responsible for some 550 men would personally choose his company officers (shao-kuan) who would in turn choose their platoon officers {shih-chang). The 10 or so common soldiers who formed a platoon were usually chosen by the platoon officer himself. Tseng Kuo-fan in 1868 extolled this system of personal relationships throughout the organization: 'Although rations came from public funds, theyung-ying troops were nevertheless grateful to the officers of the battalion for selecting them to be put on the rolls, as if they had received personal favours from the officers. Since in ordinary times there existed [between the officers and the troops] relations of kindness as well as mutual confidence, in battle it could be expected that they would see each other through hardship and adversity.'' As long as the throne's authority over civil and military appointments was not diminished - including the control of high provincial positions and the granting of the coveted Green Standard titles and posts to the yung-ying 1 Cp. Robert H. G. Lee, The Manchwian frontier in Ch'ing history, 24-31. Richard J. Smith, 'Chinese military institutions in the mid-nineteenth century, 18 50-1860', Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974) 136-41. Chang Po-fcng, comp. Ch'ing-tai ko-ti chiang-cbiin tu-t'ung ta-cb'en teng nien-piao, 1796-1)11 (Chronological tables of Manchu generals-in-chief, lieutenantsgeneral, imperial agents, etc., in various areas under the Ch'ing, 1796-1911). 1 Lo Erh-kang, LM-yingping-cbih, 92-100, 126-36, 162-4, 206-7. 4 Ibid. 179-81, 213-20, 237-44. Chiang Chung-yuan, Chiang Cbtmg-Utb kung i-cbi(The papers ot the late Chiang Chung-yuan), 1.2, 4. ' TWCKCC, Tsou-kao, 28.18D-19. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
204 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE commanders and officers-the Ch'ing court could make these new armies serve its purposes within China(see volume ro,chapter 9).But in an age of continuous progress in weapons,tactics and auxiliary services,could armed forces that drew their principal strength from particularistic loyal- ties cope with China's new external challenge? During the 186os Peking approved(and eveninitiated)a number of training programmes-usually with the support of European powers,who hoped to see the Ch'ing dynasty become strong enough to defend the treaty ports and trade routes.But only minimal benefits resulted. The dynasty did not intend to abandon the banner and Green Standard forces.Worthless and costly though they were,their maintenance seemed more important than the improvement of the yang-ying.For example,one notable effort was directed towards the banner armies at Peking itself.The Western-armed Peking Field Force(Shen-chi ying),founded in 1862 by Wen-hsiang and others,was drilled by some soo bannermen who had been trained in the use of modern small arms by British officers at Tientsin,as arranged by the commissioner of trade,Ch'ung-hou (see volume 1o, chapter 9).At first only some 3,ooo strong,the Peking Field Force grew considerably in 1865,after Prince Ch'un,the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi's brother-in-law,was appointed the prince-ministerin charge.At the throne's order,a total of 3o,ooo men from various banner units at Peking were detached for training with the new force.The power of reviewing the merits of troops and officers had meanwhile been transferred from their original commanders to Prince Ch'un.6 But the Peking Field Force did not grow further.Nor did Prince Ch'un make full use of the opportunity for Western training.In 186-6, he agreed to send two contingents of soo men each from the banner infantry to be drilled in the use of Western weapons at Tientsin,but he resisted the suggestion by Ch'ung-hou,Prince Kung's protege,that mounted bannermen should also receive Western training.Fearful that these individuals might 'neglect the skills they practised in the past',he merely allowed a few of them to undergo a brief period of instruction at Tientsin.In 1869-70,the British training programme,now manned by only three foreign instructors(headed by Major Brown,who had served under Gordon in the Ever Victorious Army)was terminated.The Peking Field Force with its 30,ooo men guarded the Ch'ing capital,7 but in 1870,when 6 Hsi Yu-fu ef al.comp.Huang-cl'ao cheng-fien lei-truan (Classified compendium on the govern- mental documents of the Ch'ing dynasty),331.8-9. 7 Chung-kuo k'o-hsuch yuan ef al.comps.Yang-w#yumn-fuong (The Western affairs movement; hereafter YBYT),3.475-79,484-91,497-8.The total strength of the Peking Field Force's core contingents seems to have been kept at 6,ooo men.As late as 1881-2.Japanese intelli- Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
204 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE commanders and officers - the Ch'ing court could make these new armies serve its purposes within China (see volume 10, chapter 9). But in an age of continuous progress in weapons, tactics and auxiliary services, could armed forces that drew their principal strength from particularistic loyalties cope with China's new external challenge ? During the 18 60s Peking approved (and even initiated) a number of training programmes - usually with the support of European powers, who hoped to see the Ch'ing dynasty become strong enough to defend the treaty ports and trade routes. But only minimal benefits resulted. The dynasty did not intend to abandon the banner and Green Standard forces. Worthless and costly though they were, their maintenance seemed more important than the improvement of the jungying. For example, one notable effort was directed towards the banner armies at Peking itself. The Western-armed Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying), founded in 1862 by Wen-hsiang and others, was drilled by some 500 bannermen who had been trained in the use of modern small arms by British officers at Tientsin, as arranged by the commissioner of trade, Ch'ung-hou (see volume 10, chapter 9). At first only some 3,000 strong, the Peking Field Force grew considerably in 1865, after Prince Ch'un, the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi's brother-in-law, was appointed the prince-minister in charge. At the throne's order, a total of 30,000 men from various banner units at Peking were detached for training with the new force. The power of reviewing the merits of troops and officers had meanwhile been transferred from their original commanders to Prince Ch'un.6 But the Peking Field Force did not grow further. Nor did Prince Ch'un make full use of the opportunity for Western training. In 1865-6, he agreed to send two contingents of 500 men each from the banner infantry to be drilled in the use of Western weapons at Tientsin, but he resisted the suggestion by Ch'ung-hou, Prince Kung's protege1 , that mounted bannermen should also receive Western training. Fearful that these individuals might 'neglect the skills they practised in the past', he merely allowed a few of them to undergo a brief period of instruction at Tientsin. In 1869-70, the British training programme, now manned by only three foreign instructors (headed by Major Brown, who had served under Gordon in the Ever Victorious Army) was terminated. The Peking Field Force with its 30,000 men guarded the Ch'ing capital,7 but in 1870, when 6 Hst Yii-fu el a/, comp. Huang-cb'ao tbeng-tien Ui-tsuan (Classified compendium on the govern- mental documents of the Ch'ing dynasty), 331.8-9. 1 Chung-kuo k'o-hsueh yuan et al. comps. Yang-miytm-tung (The Western affairs movement; hereafter YWYT), 3.475-79, 484-91, 497-8. The total strength of the Peking Field Force's core contingents seems to have been kept at 6,000 men. As late as 1881-2, Japanese intelliCambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
CH'ING ARMIES:POST-TAIPING ERA 205 war with France seemed imminent in the wake of the Tientsin Massacre, some 25,ooo men of Li Hung-chang's yung-ying force had to be summoned to bolster Chihli's defences.Li's forces were authorized to be stationed at points half-way between Taku and Peking,up to such towns as Yang-ts'un and Ho-hsi-wu.8 Peking's safety now depended on the loyalty of the Han Chinese. Elsewhere in the empire,banner garrisons that had declined continued to be replenished and financed.But plainly there was no revival of Manchu power.In Canton,Ch'ing officials,conforming with Peking directives, accepted separate British and French offers to drill the Ch'ing troops in the use of modern arms.Beginning in 1863,with equipment purchased by provincial authorities,360 bannermen were trained by the British and 3oo by the French.Coordinated by a Manchu officer,53I local Green Standard troops also underwent drill by the British.The training programmes at Canton were terminated,however,only three years later,when the dis- illusioned foreign consuls wanted the European instructors withdrawn. Meanwhile,Manchu officials were hard put to it to restore the banner garrisons at their statutory locations.In 1867,in Ili and four other centres in Sinkiang,only Iso banner soldiers had survived the Muslim revolts; they had to be transferred to Inner Mongolia for resettlement.In the twelve garrisoned cities of China proper,the bannermen and their families, living in their segregated quarters,were as demoralized as those that re- mained in Manchuria-indigent,addicted to opium,and regularly short- changed by their superiors in their imperial stipends.1o Since banner strength could not easily be revived,the Ch'ing court sought to strengthen the Green Standard Army,over which the boards of War and Revenue still retained control.Ch'ung-hou's British training programme at Tientsin actually drilled more Green Standard troops than bannermen,and out of the former had arisen the Tientsin foreign arms and cannon corps'of soo men,which proved valuable during the Nien War.Meanwhile,Liu Ch'ang-yu,the former Hunan Army commander who became governor-general of Chihli in 1863,had proposed giving new training to some Iso,ooo Chihli Green Standard troops without over- gence found that the force's own command (pen-pw)consisted of only 3,5oo infantry,2,ooo cavalry and soo gunnery troops.See Fukushima Yasumasa,comp.Rimpo beibi ryaks (Military preparedness in neighbouring countries)I.21b-22. Wang Erh-min,Huai-cbin cbib (History of the Anhwei Army),354-5.Li Hung-chang,Li Wen-cbumg kung ch'ian-cbi(Complete papers of Li Hung-chang;hereafter LWCK),Trou-tao (Memorials),17.1ob. YWYT,3.459-70,481.In the mid-1860s,the Ch'ing government employed foreign instruc- tors to train banner and Green Standard forces in two other cities:Foochow (from mid-1865 to 1866);and Wuchang (from early 1866 to mid-1868);sce ibid.471-2,482,492-4. o Huang-cb'ao cbeng-tien lei-truan,333.11.Lee,Mancburian frontier,123-5. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
CH'IN G ARMIES: POST-TAIPING ERA 205 war with France seemed imminent in the wake of the Tientsin Massacre, some 25,000 men of Li Hung-ch&ng'sjung-jing force had to be summoned to bolster Chihli's defences. Li's forces were authorized to be stationed at points half-way between Taku and Peking, up to such towns as Yang-ts'un and Ho-hsi-wu.8 Peking's safety now depended on the loyalty of the Han Chinese. Elsewhere in the empire, banner garrisons that had declined continued to be replenished and financed. But plainly there was no revival of Manchu power. In Canton, Ch'ing officials, conforming with Peking directives, accepted separate British and French offers to drill the Ch'ing troops in the use of modern arms. Beginning in 1863, with equipment purchased by provincial authorities, 360 bannermen were trained by the British and 300 by the French. Coordinated by a Manchu officer, 531 local Green Standard troops also underwent drill by the British. The training programmes at Canton were terminated, however, only three years later, when the disillusioned foreign consuls wanted the European instructors withdrawn.9 Meanwhile, Manchu officials were hard put to it to restore the banner garrisons at their statutory locations. In 1867, in Hi and four other centres in Sinkiang, only 150 banner soldiers had survived the Muslim revolts; they had to be transferred to Inner Mongolia for resettlement. In the twelve garrisoned cities of China proper, the bannermen and their families, living in their segregated quarters, were as demoralized as those that remained in Manchuria - indigent, addicted to opium, and regularly shortchanged by their superiors in their imperial stipends.10 Since banner strength could not easily be revived, the Ch'jng court sought to strengthen the Green Standard Army, over which the boards of War and Revenue still retained control. Ch'ung-hou's British training programme at Tientsin actually drilled more Green Standard troops than bannermen, and out of the former had arisen the Tientsin 'foreign arms and cannon corps' of 500 men, which proved valuable during the Nien War. Meanwhile, Liu Ch'ang-yu, the former Hunan Army commander who became governor-general of Chihli in 1863, had proposed giving new training to some 150,000 Chihli Green Standard troops without overgence found that the force's own command (pen-pu) consisted of only 3,500 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and 500 gunnery troops. See Fukushima Yasumasa, comp. Rimpo heibi ryaku (Military preparedness in neighbouring countries) I.2ib-Z2. * Wang Erh-min, Huai-chiin Mb (History of the Anhwei Army), 5.54-5. Li Hung-chang, JL; Wen-cbung kung cb'uan-cbi (Complete papers of Li Hung-chang; hereafter L.WCK), Tsou-kao (Memorials), 17.10b. » YWYT, 3.459-70, 481. In the mid-i86os, the Ch'ing government employed foreign instructors to train banner and Green Standard forces in two other cities: Foochow (from mid-1865 to 1866); and Wuchang (from early 1866 to mid-1868); see ibid. 471-2, 482, 492-4. 10 Huang-tb'ao cbeng-ticn lei-ttuan, 333.11. Lee, Mancburianfrontier, 123-5. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2o6 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE hauling the traditional command structure.Troops from the tiny brum out- posts were organized into battalions'of soo men each for the purpose of periodic drill in all of the seven centres in the province,but the troops were allowed to return to their posts during the long intervals in between drills. In 1866,Prince Kung secured imperial approval to give governor- general Liu more financial support.Troops from the large piao commands were to be detached to serve in six centres under Liu's coordination.The reorganized force was now designated lien-cbiin,or the 'retrained [Green Standard]forces'.The Board of Revenue at first allocated Ioo,ooo taels from the Tientsin maritime customs for the new training programme's munitions needs.But in January 1867,Lo Tun-yen,president of the board,who belonged to the court faction opposing Prince Kung,memorial- ized to attack the plan-criticism which Tz'u-hsi must have welcomed,for an edict drastically pared down the new programme's revenue.It was not until after the traumatic experience of the Nien cavalry invasion of Chihli in 1868 and the subsequent appointment of Tseng Kuo-fan as Chihli governor-general that further plans were made for the lien-chiin.Arriving at Peking at a time when the Sino-British treaty revision aroused a heated foreign policy debate at court,Tseng found,as he reported to Li Hung- chang,that 'Prince Kung emphasized peace,while Prince Ch'un empha- sized war and defence;the general opinion sided with Prince Ch'un'.Both Manchu factions so trusted Tseng that he was given a free hand to make adjustments in the Green Standard system.Tz'u-hsi herself discussed this with Tseng.13 Tseng adapted his yung-ying formula to the Green Standard Army, although he was inhibited(perhaps by his own conservatism as well as by his political position)from bringing up more basic issues of reform.He recommended in 1869-7o that the newly created battalions should remain intact,their troops and officers to be chosen from the larger Green Standard commands of the provinces.Moreover,the quality and per- formance of the troops and lower-level officers so detached should be reviewed by new battalion officers,each in charge of approximately sso men as in the yung-ying system.In the greatest departure from tradition, t Wang Erh-min,'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yuan chi ch'i i-i'(The origins and significance of the retrained Green Standard contingents),Ta-lu fra-cbib,34.7(April 1967)216,summarizing Liu Ch'ang-yu's memorial. Ch'ing-fai cb'ou-pan i-wu sbib-mo (Complete record of the management of barbarian affairs), Tung-chih (hereafter IWSM-TC),43.10.Liu Ch'ang-yu,Lin Wu-theng erng i-sbu (Papers of the late Liu Ch'ang-yu),12.3,21b,31-7.Ta-Ch'ing li-cb'ao sbib-lu(Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty),Tung-chih (hereafter CSL-TC)193.18b-19. 13 TWCKCC,Sbu-cha (Letters),27.2.Tseng Kuo-fan,Treng Wen-cbeng kimng thou-brieb jib-cbi (Tseng Kuo-fan's holograph diary),2.2856,entry of 27 Feb.1869. Cambridge Histories Online O Cambridge University Press,2008
206 THE MILITARY CHALLENGE hauling the traditional command structure. Troops from the tiny hsun outposts were organized into 'battalions' of 500 men each for the purpose of periodic drill in all of the seven centres in the province, but the troops were allowed to return to their posts during the long intervals in between drills. •' In 1866, Prince Kung secured imperial approval to give governorgeneral Liu more financial support. Troops from the large piao commands were to be detached to serve in six centres under Liu's coordination. The reorganized force was now designated lien-chiin, or the 'retrained [Green Standard] forces'. The Board of Revenue at first allocated 100,000 taels from the Tientsin maritime customs for the new training programme's munitions needs. But in January 1867, Lo Tun-yen, president of the board, who belonged to the court faction opposing Prince Kung, memorialized to attack the plan - criticism which Tz'u-hsi must have welcomed, for an edict drastically pared down the new programme's revenue.I2 It was not until after the traumatic experience of the Nien cavalry invasion of Chihli in 1868 and the subsequent appointment of Tseng Kuo-fan as Chihli governor-general that further plans were made for the lien-chun. Arriving at Peking at a time when the Sino-British treaty revision aroused a heated foreign policy debate at court, Tseng found, as he reported to Li Hungchang, that 'Prince Kung emphasized peace, while Prince Ch'un emphasized war and defence; the general opinion sided with Prince Ch'un'. Both Manchu factions so trusted Tseng that he was given a free hand to make adjustments in the Green Standard system. Tz'u-hsi herself discussed this with Tseng.13 Tseng adapted his yung-ying formula to the Green Standard Army, although he was inhibited (perhaps by his own conservatism as well as by his political position) from bringing up more basic issues of reform. He recommended in 1869-70 that the newly created battalions should remain intact, their troops and officers to be chosen from the larger Green Standard commands of the provinces. Moreover, the quality and performance of the troops and lower-level officers so detached should be reviewed by new battalion officers, each in charge of approximately 550 men as in the yung-ying system. In the greatest departure from tradition, 11 Wang Erh-min, 'Lien-chun ti ch'i-yuan chi ch'i i-i' (The origins and significance of the retrained Green Standard contingents), Ta-lu tsa-cbib, 34.7 (April 1967) 216, summarizing Liu Ch'ang-yu's memorial. 11 Ch'ing-tai cb'ou-pan i-mu sbih-mo (Complete record of the management of barbarian affairs), T'ung-chih (hereafter IWSM-TC), 43.10. Liu Ch'ang-yu, Uu Wu-sbtng kung i-shu (Papers of the late Liu Ch'ang-yu), 12.3, 21b, 31-7. Ta-Cb'ing li-cb'ao shib-lu (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty), T'ung-chih (hereafter CSL.-TC) 193.18D-19. " TWCKCC, Shu-cha (Letters), 27.2. Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Wen-cbeng kung sbou-bsieb jib-tbi (Tseng Kuo-fan's holograph diary), 2.2856, entry of 27 Feb. 1869. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008