Intervention mind.Considerations of economy were very important,16 as were considerations of domestic politics.In 1857 the first Palmerston government had won an election precipitated by the outbreak of the Arrow war in China,and Palmerston's second government launched the campaign of 1859-60 after the Taku repulse.For this government to become embroiled so soon in yet another large-scale war in China was likely to prove too much even for John Bull himself to carry off successfully with parliament and the electorate.The possibility of just such a war developing was a main point in the arguments of the numerous critics in England of the policy of intervention,and the govern- ment was always at some pains to insist that it was only going so far and no further. In any case,the British government was not urged to commit its forces deeply by the government it was supporting.The Manchu authorities maintained a decidedly ambivalent attitude on the question of foreign aid against the rebellion.The need for it,within limits the desirability of it,was recognized,but it was accepted with many misgivings as the lesser of two con- siderable evils.After the rejection of the Russian offer at the beginning of 1861 there was no further discussion of the question among high Manchu officials until the beginning of 1862,al- though plans for acquiring foreign arms and vessels were developed.The initiative in reopening the question of direct foreign aid came from the local gentry and officials at Shanghai. The former were particularly active,one of them,P'an Tseng- wei,even writing to Tseng Kuo-fan and travelling himself to Peking in order to urge the need for hiring foreign troops,not only to protect Shanghai but to help recapture inland cities such as Soochow.17 Leading Manchu officials were,however, chary of these proposals for the extensive use of foreign aid in the interior.Tseng Kuo-fan argued that,whereas at ports such as Shanghai and Ningpo Western and Chinese interests were bound up together and should be defended in common,this was not so in the interior.If foreign troops were hired to help recapture cities such as Soochow,Changchow or Nanking, 'failure would lead to ridicule and success to unpredictable difficulties later'.18 Prince Kung raised practical objections to the use of foreign troops in the interior.They moved much more quickly than did the Chinese,yet would be dependent on them 116
J9饣 矽召rV召 刀艹 'ε 刀 lIlind。 Considerations of economy were Ⅴery llIlportant,工 6 as were considcrations of domestic poⅡ住cs。 In 1857 the nrst 贽跏 :∶ ∶};;∶;∶∶}甯J觜:虔 1:∶ goverIllrlent1aun0hed the campaign of1859~60after the Taku :l}∶f冫B显瑟摁解盅孺 repuIse。 For tlt]1jis goverIllnent to become embroⅡ ed so soon h yet another hrgeˉ scaIe war Ⅱ1 Chha was like1y to prove too 黜 fl呈l￡:∶ I:∶∶l嚣:捃 嘛 ℃恳 簖 滞 撼 骢 a钅蛰 develop血g was a Inain pointin the arguInents ofthe numerous critics in Eng1and ofthe poⅡcy ofintervention,and the governˉ 茗 毖 $絮 苜 挠 氵叩 ep血 sω h⒍晚 that⒒ was∞圩 g血g 掖 on the question of fore珏 ￡犭f1盅咒奖逮喘 虏器鞯罗默。酝J⒊泔号嚣拇t属娆 买1aid against the rebeⅡion。 The need for it,Ⅵ泛伽 n1i1nits the desirabⅡity of it,was recogn弦ed,but it was accepted Ⅵ`ith many Ⅱ蛀sg⒈没ngs as the1esser of two con- 蕊derable evils。 After the r(:∶ iec砬 on ofthe Rus蛀 an ofFer at the 黜 i蹴 though plans for acquir至 溉捃耦 ng foreign arms and vesse1s were 嚣璐帮犭滗芒蹴扌拶宁 deve1oped。 The kⅡtiatiⅤe 血 reopenhg the question of dkect 苫 舞 苕 强 蓊 邈 瑟 瑙 磷 蘑 邋 :鞲 Pekhg in order to urge the need for hiring foreign troops,not on1y to protect shanghai but to heIp recapture in1and G沈 ies suoh as soochow。 工?Leading ⅣIanchu oflcia1s were,however, chary ofthese proposaIs for the extensiⅤe use of foreign aid h the inteⅡ or.Tseng Kuoˉ fan argued that,whereas at ports such as shanghai and卜 ⅡngpO Western and Chinese interests were bound up together and shou1d be defended in cOIll1110n,this 禚 d皿cu1t⒗ 弼 s1ateΓ 黯、鞴 ,18Prince Kmg rahed practiGtal ouections t。 、f∶i嵌潸琚懈 糨 摧 the use offoreign troops in the interior。 They王noVed Fnuch1nore quickly than did the Chinese,yet wou1d be dependent on them 116
Intervention for supplies;they were impatient and always anxious to advance, but China would have to supply the garrisons for the places they recaptured.Altogether,the value of using foreign troops beyond the treaty ports was questionable,he argued.19 In addition,although this was no doubt partly a face-saving formula,such aid as was accepted was to be on a temporary basis,necessary only in a period of acute crisis.'The English ambassador says it is possible to send troops to help suppress the rebels,but only temporarily,not permanently',an Edict of February 25,1862,read.'He should be informed that after the alarm was sounded at Shanghai,troops were despatched from every quarter.But since this relief has not yet arrived it is necessary to borrow the help of foreign countries;but once our strength has been concentrated there,and put under competent command,naturally there will be no need of help.'20 There was no anxiety to see large numbers of foreign troops brought to China to help suppress the rebels.In the middle of 1862,after the failure of the first combined attempt to clear a thirty-mile radius around Shanghai,there were reports that the British proposed to get more troops from India to assist in a later campaign.Both Tseng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang,who was leading the Chinese forces in Kiangsu and Chekiang,expressed their opposition to this,Tso being sceptical of their value on the ground that recent reverses near Shanghai showed that the barbarians were as much afraid of the rebels as China's own forces,and Tseng arguing that China's own resources were adequate to the task in hand.Many cities had been recaptured, Tseng wrote,the means for subduing Kiangsu and Chekiang exist,and if our policies do not succeed and the rebel conflagra- tion die out,China should bear the burden herself....How can we lightly hire foreign forces and so become an object of scorn to later generations?'China,in suppressing the rebels,should not plant the seeds of future complications,he concluded.21 When criticized for being too accommodating towards the foreign powers in the interpretation of the treaties,a situation in which Bruce could sympathize with him,Prince Kung vehemently defended the policies of the Tsungli Yamen and indicated another aspect of the official Manchu attitude towards foreign aid.'As for the opinion that foreign help in putting down the rebels is not trustworthy,I am very far from saying 117
rr,矽纟rv召 rF矽 jo刀 for suppⅡes;they werei1npauent and a1ways anxiousto advance, but China wouId have to supp1y伍 e garrisons for the places they recaptured.Altogether,the value of using foreign troops beyond the treaty ports、 vas ques伍 onab1e,he argued,|9 In addition,altllough this was no doubt partly a face冖 savmg formula,such aid as was accepted was to be on a temporary bas厶,necessary only in a peⅡ od of acute αi“s.‘ The Engloh ambassador says it is possible to scnd troops to help suppress the rebels,but0n1y temporaⅡ ly,not permanently’ ,an Edict of Februa,ry25,1862,read.‘ IΙe should be informed that after the alar1m was sounded at shanghai,troops、 氵、`ere despatched from eVery quarter。 But since this reⅡ ef has not yet arrived it is necessary to borrow the heIp offoreign countⅡ es;but once our strength has been cOncentrated there,and put under competent CoⅡ1Inand,naturaⅡ y there wi11be no need of help'20There Was no anxiety to see large numbers of f° reign troops brought to CⅡna to help suppress the rebcIs。 I殂 the middle of1862,after 伍e faⅡurc of the nrst c。mbined attempt to clear a thirtyˉmile radius around shanghai, there were reports that the British proposed to get more troops frO1n India to assist in a later campaign。 Both Tseng Kuoˉ fan and Tso Tsungˉ t’ ang,who lvas leading the Chinese forces in Xjangsu and Chekiang,expressed their opposition to this,Tso being sc。 ptical oftheir value on the ground that recent reVerses near Shanghai sh° wed that the barbarians were as much afraid of the rebels as China’ s Own forces, and Tseng arguhg that China’ s own resources were adequate to the task in hand,】 Ⅰˇ‘[any cities had been recaptured, Tseng wrote, ‘the Ineans for subduing XⅡ angsu and Chekiang exist,and if our poⅡ cies do not succeed and the rebe1con丑 agration die out,ChiI1a should bear the burden herse1【 、。。.1Iow can we ligl△ dy Ⅱre fore璁 n forces and so become an o刂 ect of scom to later generati° ns?’ C血a,in suppressing the rebels,should not phnt the seeds of future complications,he concluded。 ⒓1 When criticizcd for being too accommodathg to、vards the fore廴 了1powers in the interpretation of the treaties,a situation 瑰h婆茹l祧赢甜皙嬲骢飞紫责靶F慨e阝甘:号 indioated another aspeot ofthe o伍 cial⒒汀anchu attitude tOwards foreign aid。 ‘As for the opⅡ1ion that foreign help in putung down the rebels h not trustwOrthy,I am very far f1· om saying 1I7