prominent a role than he does to imperialism as an ultimate 65-66).Tseng's view that the economy is not expandable,and that cause of China's transformation. foreign economic activity is always at the expense of Chinese economic activity,is analogous to Isaacs'argument that foreign trade and industry stifled Chinese handicrafts and industry.Tseng's view that China is self-sufficient and does not need the barbarians,while the barbarians need Chinese goods.is analagous to Isaacs'argument that foreign economic activity only drains China of her wealth.Tseng's vicw that the ruler is responsible for popular welfare and that worsening conditions may endanger the dynasty is analogous to Isaacs'argument that the Chinese revolution was a response to immiseration brought on by imperialism.Perhaps these parallels testify to the existence of certain shared points of common wisdom about imperialism's effects between Westerners and Chinese,Marxists and non-Marxists-sharcd NOTES points which were not adequately tested against the facts by their formulators. .I am grateful to Stephen Andors,Joseph Esherick,Steven Levine, 10.Rhoads Murphey,The Treaty Ports and Cbina's Modernization Perry Link,Walter Nimocks,Carl Riskin and Ernest Young for valuable Wbat Went Wrong?(Ann Arbor,Mich.:Center for Chinese Studies, comments on the present essay.Participants at a colloguium at the Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No.7,1970),32-44. Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan also made 11.!wight H.Perkins,Agricultural Development in Cbina useful criticisms.The usual disclaimer that the author remains 1368-1968(Chicago:Aldine,1969)185 and passim. responsible for the view expressed acquires special force in this 12.Ramon H.Myers,Tbe Cbinese Peasant Economy:Agricultural instance,since a number of commentators disagreed with points made Development in Hopei and Sbantung,1890-1949 (Cambridge,Mass.: here. Harvard University Press,1970),13-24. 13.lbd.,273-295, 1.James Peck,"The Roots of Rhctoric:The Professional Ideology 14.Albert lcuerwerker,Tbe Cbinese Economy,c.1870-1911(Ann of America's China Watchers,"Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scbolars Arbor,Mich.:Center for Chinese Studies,Michigan Papers in Chinese Il:1 (October 1969).59-69;reprinted in Edward Friedman and Mark Studies No.5,1969),17-31.Cf.further Jack M.Potter,Capitalism and tbe Cbinese Peasant (Berkeley:University of California Press,1968) Selden,eds.,America's Asia:Dissenting Essays on Asian-American 179-182. Relations (New York:Vintage,1971),40-66.Citations here are to the Bulletin. 15.G.William Skinner,"Marketing and Social Structure in Rural 2.1bd.,64-65 China,"Journal of Asian Studies XXIV:1 (November 1964),3-43. 16.However,the import of foreign yarn gave an impetus to the 3.bid.,65 4.For the convenience of readers,I will refer to the second revised domestic cloth weaving industry,which expanded.Foreign woven cloth was unable to dominate the Chinese market.See edition (Stanford,Calif.:Stanford University Press,1961;New York: Athencum,1966,paperback).However,I have checked the relevant Lcon0y,1870-1911,18-29 passages with the first edition (London: 17.Silk and tea are mentioned here to give a rounded picture of the Secker and Warburg,1938). Despite many small changes of word and phrasc,the essential meaning health of handicrafts,but it should be noted that the decline in export of the passages cited from the first two chapters remains unchanged in demand for these items cannot be regarded as an effect of imperialism: the second revised edition. rather,the very existence of export demand was an effect of 5.Isaacs is not mentioned in Peck's footnotes,but the sources for a imperialism revolutionary Marxist viewpoint which are cited (Mandel,Horowitz 18.Chi-ming Hou,Foreign Investment and Ecomomic Development Belden,Myrdal)would not be convenient foci for a discussion of China in Cbina,1840-1937 (Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press, either because they do not themselves focus on China or because (in 1965).Hou's major findings are confirmed by John E.Schrecker, Belden's case)the analysis is less complete that Isaacs'.Instead of Imperialism and Cbinese Nationalism:Germany Sbantung Isaacs,of course,one could select Fei Hsiao-t'ung,Ho Kan-chih, or (Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1971):sec,especially other authors,but Isaacs is convenient because his discussion of the 258. effects of imperialism in China is exceptionally clear and well-rounded, 19.Albert leuerwerker.The Cbinese Economy,1912-1949 (Ann and is concentrated in two chapters of the book.In any case.the Arbor,Mich.:Center for Chinese Studies,Michigan Papers in Chinese important thing is not precisely whose views are discussed,but to Studies No.1.1968),14. discuss a set of views that are clearly laid out,susceptible to proof or 20.Ibid..17-19.One might,however,arguc that a strong disproof on the basis of evidence,sufficiently influential to repay the government investment program could have compensated for the effort of discussion,and which adequately represent the gist of the absence of market demand in the initial stages of industrialization.If it revolutionary Marxist interpretation.Isaacs'book certainly fulfills the were possible to trace the weakness of the Chinese government's first three criteria;and if I am mistaken in thinking it fulfills the last industrial investment program to imperialism,the case for ascribing a this article will provide an occasion for others to clarify where a major detrimental economic impact to imperialism would be revolutionary Marxist view diverges from Isaacs. established.But this would require evidence that either the political 6.These well-known facts can be checked in John K.Fairbank, weakness of the government or the shortage of capital for government Edwin O.Reischauer and Albert M.Craig,last Asia:Tbe Modern investment was due to imperialism.The latter point is treated in note Transformation (Boston:Houghton Mifflin.1965).I do not discuss 22.The former,restated in Isaacs'terms (i.e..that by strengthening the here the direct invasion of China by Japan in the twentieth century;of forces of reaction imperialism postponed the arrival of a truly strong U.S.intervention in the Chinese civil war since the 1940s.These had government which could undertake an industrialization program).is serious effects on China.But Peck implicitly and Issacs explicitly are discussed later in the essay. 21.1bd,70. talking about imperialism in its late nineteenth and early twentieth century form,and I think it is a validly separable question what the 22.The impact of the foreign drain was probably more serious in pre-1937 impact of imperialism was on China. some areas of the country than in others because of the varying 7.I am indebted for this estimate to Roy M.Hofheinz,Jr. effectiveness of tax collection.But the more serious the impact of the 8.The quotation is from Hudson Taylor,as cited in Paul A.Cohen, drain of wealth in one locality,the less serious the impact in the rest of China and Cbristianity:The Missionary Movement and tbe Growtb of the nation.Rescarch may disclose either that the impact was Chinese Antiforeignism,1860-1870.(Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard widespread but slight,or that it was heavy but localized.In either case. University Press,1963),78-79. the impact would not be capable of explaining an overall trend,if there 9.Issacs.Tragedy.4.5.7,11,23,31.Isaacs'Marxist argument is was one,toward poverty or economic weakness. paraliel in some interesting ways to Tseng Kuo-fan's Confucian view in It may be argued,however,that the sums drained from China were 1867 of what imperialism was doing to China (see John K.Fairbank precisely the crucial amounts that would have stimulated economic and Ssu-yu Teng,Cbina's Response to the West:A Documentary takeoff if they had been invested in industry (cf.note 20).The obvious Survey,1839-1923,Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press,1961 rejoinder is to ask how likely it is that,in the absence of imperialism, 7
I prominent a role than he does to imperialism as an ultimate cause of China's transformation. I i I I NOTES I • I am grateful to Stephen Andors, joseph Esherick, Steven Levine, j Perry Link, Walter Nimocks, Carl Riskin and Ernest Young for valuable comments on the present essay. Participants at a colloquium at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan also made useful criticisms. The usual disclaimer that the author remains i responsible for the view expressed acquires special force in this instance, since a number of commentators disagreed with points made here. 1. james Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 1 11:1 (October 1969), 59-69; reprinted in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian·American I ;~ Relations (New York: Vintage, 1971), 40-66. Citations here are to the Bulletin. 2. Ibid., 64-65. 3. Ibid., 65. 4. For the convenience of readers, I will refer to the second revised edition (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961; New York: Atheneum, 1966, paperback). However, I have checked the relevant passages with the first edition (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1938). Despite many small changes of word and phrase, the essential meaning of the passages cited from the first two chapters remains unchanged in the second revised edition. 5. Isaacs is not mentioned in Peck's footnotes, but the sources for a revolutionary Marxist viewpoint which are cited (Mandel Horowitz Belden, Myrdal) would not be convenient foci for a discussi~n of Chin~ either because they do not themselves focus on China or because (in Belden's case) the analysis is less complete that Isaacs'. Instead of Isaacs, of course, one could select Fei Hsiao-t'ung, Ho Kan·chih, or other authors, but Isaacs is convenient because his discussion of the effects of imperialism in China is exceptionally clear and well-rounded, and is conccntrated in two chapters of the book. In any case, the important thing is not precisely whose views arc discussed, but to discuss a set of views that are clearly laid out, susceptible to proof or disproof on the basis of evidence, sufficiently influential to repay the effort of discussion, and which adequately represent the gist of the revolutionary Marxist interpretation. Isaacs' book certainly fulfills the first three criteria; and if I am mistaken in thinking it fulfills the last, this article will provide an occasion for others to clarify where a revolutionary Marxist view diverges from Isaacs. 6. These well-known facts can be checked in john K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965). , do not discuss here the direct invasion of China by Japan in the twentieth century; of I U.S. intervention in the Chinese civil war since the I940s. These had serious effects on China. But Peck implicitly and Issacs explicitly are talkmg about Imperialism in its late nineteenth and early twentieth century form, and , think it is a validly separable question what the pre-I 9 37 impact of imperialism was on China. 7. I am indebted for this estimate to Roy M. Hofheinz, Jr. 8. The quotation is from Hudson Taylor, as cited in Paul A. Cohen, I Chi.na and C~ristia.nity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chrnese Antiforergmsm, 1860-1870. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963),78-79. 9.lssacs, Tragedy, 4, 5, 7, 11,23, 31. Isaacs' Marxist argument is I parallel in some interesting ways to Tseng Kuo-fan's Confucian view in 1867 of what imperialism was doing to China (see John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yU Te~, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961, I I I j 65·66). Tseng's view that the economy is not expandable, and that foreIgn economic activity is always at the expense of Chinese economic activity, is analogous to lsa~cs' argument that foreign trade and md.ustry stifled <:h.mese handicrafts and industry. Tseng's view that Chma IS self-suffiCient and does not need the barbarians while the barbarians need Chinese goods, is analagous to Isaacs' ar~ment that foreign economic activity only drains China of her wealth. Tseng's view that .t~e ruler is responsible for popular welfare and that worsening conditIons may endanger the dynasty is analogous to Isaacs' argument that the Chmese revolutIOn was a response to immiseration brought on by Imperialism. Perhaps these parallels testify to the existence of certain shared points of common wisdom about imperialism's effects between Westerners and Chinese, Marxists and non-Marxists-shared points which were not adequately tested against the facts by their formu lators. 10. Rhoads Murphey, The Treaty Ports and China's Modernization: What Went Wrong?(Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No.7, 1970),32-44. ' 11. !)wight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968 (Chicago: Aldine, 1-969) 185 and passim. ' 12. Ramon H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949 (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13-24_ 13. Ibid., 273-295. 14. Albert 'o'euerwerker, The Chinese Economy, c. 1870-1911 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No.5, 1969), 17-31. Cf. further Jack M. Potter, Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 179-182. 15. G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," Journal ofAsian Studies XXIV: 1 (November 1964), 3-43. 16. However, the import of foreign yarn gave an impetus to the domestic doth weaving industry, which expanded, Foreign woven doth was unable to dominate the Chinese market. See Feuetwerker I!'conomy, 1870-1911, 18-29. ' 17. Silk and tea are mentioned here to give a rounded picture of the health of handicrafts, but it should be noted that the decline in export demand for these items cannot be regarded as an effect of imperialism; rather, the very existence of export demand was an effect of imperialism. . 18..Chi-ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development m Chma, 1840-1937 (Cambridge, Mass_: Harvard University Press, 1965). Hou's major findings are confirmed by John E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Sbdntung (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); see, especially. 258. 19. Albert I'euerwerker, The Chinese b'conomy, 1912-1949 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Chinese Studies, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies No. I, 1968), 14. 20. Ibid., 17-19. One might, however, argue that a strong government investment program could have compensated for the absence of market demand in the initial stages of industrialization. If it were possible to trace the weakness of the Chinese government's industrial investment program to imperialism, the case for ascribing a major detrimental economic impact to imperialism would be established. But this would require evidence that either the political weakness of the government or the shortage of capital for government investment was due to imperialism. The latter point is treated in note 22. The former, rcstated in Isaacs' terms (i.e., that by strengthening the forces of reaction imperialism postponed the arrival of a truly strong government which could undertake an industrialization program), is discussed later in the essay. 21. Ibid, 70. 1 22. The impact of the foreign drain was probably more serious in some. areas of the country than in others because of the varying I effectiveness of tax collection. But the more serious the impact of the dram of wealth in one locality, the less serious the impact in the rest of the nation. Research may disclose either that the impact was widespread but slight, or that it was heaVy but localized. In either case the impact would not be capable of explaining an overall trend, if ther~ was one, toward poverty or economic weakness. It may be argued, however, that the sums drained from China were precisely the crucial amounts that would have stimulated economic takeoff if they had been invested in industry (cf. note 20). The obvious rejoinder is to ask how likely it is that, in the absence of imperialism, 7
either the government or capitalists would have gathered this money Ouarterly,51 (July-September 1972),428. and invested it in modern industry? 25.Fairbank,Reischauer and Craig,East Asia,Chs.2 and 5. Isaacs'point about the debasement of the currency is also relevant at 26.These are the tentative findings of the present author and,as he this point:did not the drain of silver cause depreciation of the understands it,of others doing research on the warlord period. widely-used copper currency,thus contributing to the popular misery? 27.As noted in an earlier footnote,U.S.involvement in the Chinese I do not comment on this point in the text because I am not aware of civil war since the 1940s has been a different matter.Here there was new research on the subject.But surely the currency squeeze suffered obviously a considerable effect in terms of postponing the Communist by the Chinese masses was not an inevitable result of the drain of silver. victory on the mainland and preventing,so far,the final resolution of but instead represented a political decision by landlords,merchants and the CCP-KMT conflict. officials to capitalize on the opportunity offered by the rising price of 28.Indeed,most studics of the Chinese revolutionary process stress silver-to capitalize on it by insisting upon continuing to express the the roles (respectively revolutionary and counter-revolutionary)of the peasant's obligations in terms of silver and his payments in terms of two rural classes,peasants and gentry. copper.Imperialism at most offered the opportunity-perhaps difficult 29.Cf.note 9 above. to resist-for elites to raise the masses'cost of living. 30.Cf.Schrecker,Imperialism and Cbinese Nationalism,43-58 and 23.Peek,"Roots,"65,as quoted earlier in this article 249-259. 24.Feuerwerker,Economy,1912-1949,66.The exception to this 31.The point is well brought out in Ernest P.Young,"Nationalism, statement,as Herbert Bix has pointed out,was Manchuria,but as Bix Reform,and Republican Revolution:China in the Early Twentieth also points out,Manchuria was "subordinated far more than the rest of Century,"in James B.Crowley,ed.,Modern East Asia:Essays in China to imperialist economic domination."Herbert P.Bix,"Japanese Interpretation (New York:Harcourt,Brace and World,1970),151-179. Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy.1900-31,"The Cbina 32.Peck,“Roots,"64. JOURNAL of CONTEMPORARY ASIA A quarterly journal seriously concerned with the Premen Addy,South Asia in China's Foreign Policy nature and modes of social change in contemporary Ho Chi Minh,The Youth of Annam (not available Asia.In its pages we have published articles on both before) the theory of social change and intepretations of Asian political,social and economic problems. Subscription rates per annum: Recent articles,Vol.II,No.4: Individual...$8.50;Institution/Library ..$11.00; George Lee,An Assimilating Imperialism Business Firms/Government agencies...$13.00; Michael Morrow,Thailand:America's New Frontier Citizens of the Third World (in residence)...$6.00 Richard Franke,Limited Good and Cargo Cult in Indonesian Economic Development Journal of Contemporary Asia,P.O.Box 49010, John Gittings,Hong Kong's Cbina Watcbers Stockholm 49,Sweden
JOURNAL of CONTEMPORARY ASIA either the government or capitalists would have gathered this money and invested it in modern industry? Isaacs' point about the debasement of the currency is also relevant at this point: did not the drain of silver cause depreciation of the widely-used copper currency, thus contributing to the popular misery? I do not comment on this point in the text because I am not aware of new research on the subject. But surely the currency squeeze ~uffered by the Chinese masses was not an inevitable result of the drain of silver. but instead represented a political decision by landlords. merchants and officials to capitalize on the opportunity offered by the rising price of silver-to capitalize on it by insisting upon continuing to express the peasant's obligations in terms of silver and his payments in terms of copper. Imperialism at most offered the opportunity-perhaps difficult to resist-for elites to raise the masses' cost of living. 23. Peck, "Roots," 65, as quoted earlier in this article. 24. Feuerwerker, Economy, 1912-1949, 66. The exception to this statement, as Herbert Bix has pointed out, was Manchuria, but as Bix also points out, Manchuria was "subordinated far more than the rest of China to imperialist economic domination." Herbert P. Bix, "Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy. 1900-31," The China QUaI'lerly. 51 (july-September 1972),428. 25. Fairbank. Relschauer and Craig, East Asia. Chs. 2 and 5. 26. These are the tentative findings of the present author and, as he understands it, of others doing research on the warlord period. 27. As noted in an earlier footnote, U.S. involvement in the Chinese civil war since the 1940s has been a different matter. Here there was obviously a considerable effect in terms of postponing the Communist victory on the mainland and preventing, so far. the final resolution of the CCP-KMT conflict. 28. Inde/?d, most studies of the Chinese revolutionary process stress the roles (respectively revolutionary and counter-revolutionary) of the rwo rural classes, peasants and gentry. 29. Cf. note 9 above. 30. Cf. Schrecker. Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism. 43-58 and 249-259. 31. The point is well brought out in Ernest P. Young, "Nationalism, Reform, and Republican Revolution: China in the Early Twentieth Century," in James B. Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays' in Interpretation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), 151-179. 32. Peck, "Roots," 64. - _.- .... _...--.,. .".: ~ A quarterly journal seriously concerned with the nature and modes of social change in contemporary Asia. In its pages we have published articles on both the theory of social change and intepretations of Asian political, social and economic problems. Recent articles, Vol. II, No.4: George Lee, An Assimilating Imperialism Michael Morrow, Thailand: America's New Frontier Richard Franke, Limited Good and Cargo Cult in Indonesian Economic Development John Gittings, Hong Kong's China Watchers Premen Addy, South Asia in China's Foreign Policy Ho Chi Minh, Tbe Youth of Annam (not available before) Subscription rates per annum: Individual ... $8.50; Institution/Library $11.00; Business Firms/Government agencies $13.00; Citizens of the Third World (in residence) ... $6.00 Journal of Contemporary Asia, P.O. Box 49010, Stockholm 49, Sweden 8
Harvard on China: The Apologetics of Imperialism Joseph Esherick The classic works on modern China-by Harold Isaacs, and that the employment of foreigners to administer China's Edgar Snow,Jack Belden,even Mao Tse-tung himself-have all customs was in fact "one of the most con structive features of led us to believe that the revolutionary ferment which surged the treaty system."6 Similarly,in 1913,when Yuan Shih-k'ai through China in the twentieth century was the result of rural was forced to turn the administration of China's salt gabelle impoverishment,cconomic stagnation and governmental over to foreigners in order to secure foreign financial support weakness and decay.All of them stressed the crucial role of for his effort to eradicate Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang,the Western and Japanese imperialism which had reduced China to result was "the modernization of the Chinese salt such a sorry state in the first half of the twentieth century. administration."7 Finally,for any who might have feared that Recently,however,a growing number of American the foreigners were modernizing urban society and political scholars-a remarkable percentage of whom have been trained institutions while the peasantry was suffering in increasing at Harvard and had their works published by Harvard's East poverty,Ramon Myers has assured us that"There is not any Asian Research Center-have put forth a radical new version of evidence that peasant living standards before 1937 China's modern history.Imperialism,it seems,was largely declined....8 beneficial to China.On the economic side,Chi-ming Hou In short,imperialism fostered economic development, assures us that "..foreign capital was largely responsible for progressive Western-style nationalism and institutional the development of whatever economic modernization took modernization.The Chinese may have suffered wounded pride place in China before 1937."Furthermore,"the often-held and cultural shock at having modernization so abruptly forced assumption that the traditional or indigenous sector of the down their throats,but basically what the West did was both Chinese economy (handicrafts,small mines,junks,etc.) necessary and good.The anti-imperialism of both the KMT suffered severe decline as a result of foreign economic and the CCP was thus short-sighted-the result of a failure to intrusion lacks factual basis."2 understand the beneficent inevitability of Western-type John Schrecker's study of Germany in Shantung fully modernization. endorses these conclusions: While the conclusions of these Harvard studies need not the direction of tbe German impact was positive. be accepted as definitive,they cannot be dismissed out of Tsingtao,a tiny,isolated fishing village in 1897,bad hand.An extensive monographic literature,backed by become a major port by the time the Germans left.It bad thorough research and patient scholarship,has made the an efficient administration and modern public services and Harvard school the source of today's "normative science"in scbools.It also bad up-to-date facilities for transportation, the China field.Scholars interested in developing alternatives communication and banking.As a result,commercial to the Harvard paradigm will have to produce works of similar activities flowered,and there was even some industrial scholarly quality in a varicty of key areas-the handicraft growtb.It was German capital,skills,personnel and industry,the treaty port economy-before a viable alternative international contracts which laid the foundation for this to the Harvard paradigm can be presented.This essay has a more modest aim:to identify some of the pitfalls of the development. Harvard approach and to advance some tentative suggestions For Schrecker an even more important contribution of for an alternative paradigm. Western imperialism was its encouragement of the spread of Throughout,the focus of discussion will be the role of nationalism which became "the most significant development imperialism in nineteenth and twentieth century China.Surely of the last decades of the Ch'ing."Nationalism became no exercise is more difficult than the effort to factor out and possible only when the West taught China to perceive her measure in isolation the role of one particular force in the problems "not in traditional terms but rather within the organic development of a nation's history.One cannot expect framework of new ideas and categories derived from the to get back to imperialism as the "first cause"or "prime West."4 mover"of some particular historical development.One can, Foreigners were similarly responsible for China's however,attempt to assess the role of imperialism in institutional "modernization."John K.Fairbank,the founding interaction with the complex of forces shaping the father of the Harvard school,has noted that the Imperial development of modern Chinese history,and demonstrate that Maritime Customs Service "assisted China's effort at imperialism was something more than the misunderstood, modernization within the framework of the treaty system.,"5 maligned scapegoat of Chinese nationalism. 9
Harvard on China: The Apologetics of IInperialisIn Joseph Esherick The classic works on modern China-by Harold Isaacs, Edgar Snow, Jack Belden, even Mao Tse-tung himself-have all led us to believe that the revolutionary ferment which surged through China in the twentieth century was the result of rural impoverishment, economic stagnation and governmental weakness and decay. All of them stressed the crucial role of Western and Japanese imperialism which had reduced China to such a sorry state in the first half of the twentieth century. Recently, however, a growing number of American scholars-a remarkable percentage of whom have been trained at Harvard and had their works published by Harvard's East Asian Research Center-have put fonh a radical new version of China's modern history. Imperialism, it seems, was largely beneficial to China. On the economic side, Chi-ming Hou assures us that " ... foreign capital was largely responsible for the development of whatever economic modernization took place in China before 1937.,,1 Funhermore, "the often-held assumption that the traditional or indigenous sector of the Chinese economy (handicrafts, small mines, junks, etc.) suffered severe decline as a result of foreign economic intrusion lacks factual basis."l John Schrecker's study of Germany in Shantung fully endorses these conclusions: . .. the direction of the German impact was posItIve. Tsingtao, a tiny, isolated fishing village in 1897, had become a major port by the time the Germans left. It had an efficient administration and modern public services and schools. It also had up-to-date facilities for transportation, communication and banking. As a result, commercial activities flowered, and there was even some industrial growth. It was German capital, skills, personnel and international contracts which laid the foundation for this development. 3 For Schrecker an even more important contribution of Western imperialism was its encouragement of the spread of nationalism which became "the most significant development of the last decades of the Ch'ing." Nationalism became possible only when the West taught China to perceive her problems "not in traditional terms but rather within the framework of new ideas and categories derived from the West. ,,4 Foreigners were similarly responsible for China's institutional "modernization." John K. Fairbank, the founding father of the Harvard school, has noted that the Imperial Maritime Customs Service "assisted China's effort at modernization within the framework of the treaty system, ,,5 and that the employment of foreigners to administer China's customs was in fact "one of the most con structive features of the treaty system. ,,6 Similarly, in 1913, when Yuan Shih-k'ai was forced to turn the administration of China's salt gabelle over to foreigners in order to secure foreign financial support for his effort to eradicate Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, the result was "the modernization of the Chinese salt administration.',7 Finally, for any who might have feared that the foreigners were modernizing urban society and political institutions while the peasantry was suffering in increasing poveny, Ramon Myers has assured us that "There is not any evidence that peasant living standards before 1937 declined......8 In short, imperialism fostered economic development, progressive Western-style nationalism and institutional modernization. The Chinese may have suffered wounded pride and cultural shock at having modernization so abruptly forced down their throats, but basically what the West did was both necessary and good. The anti-imperialism of both the KMT and the CCP was thus shon-sighted-the result of a failure to understand the beneficent inevitability of Western-type modernization. 9 While the conclusions of these Harvard studies need not be accepted as definitive, they cannot be dismissed out of hand. An extensive monographic literature, backed by thorough research and patient scholarship, has made the Harvard school the source of today's "normative science" in the China field. Scholars interested in developing alternatives to the Harvard paradigm will have to produce works of similar scholarly quality in a variety of key areas-the handicraft industry, the treaty port economy-before a viable alternative to the Harvard paradigm can be presented. This essay has a more modest aim: to identify some of the pitfalls of the Harvard approach and to advance some tentative suggestions for an alternative paradigm. Throughout, the focus of discussion will be the role of imperialism in nineteenth and twentieth century China. Surely no exercise is more difficult than the effort to factor out and measure in isolation the role of one panicular force in the organic development of a nation's history. One cannot expect to get back to imperialism as the "first cause" or "prime mover" of some particular historical development. One can, however, attempt to assess the role of imperialism in interaction with the complex of forces shaping the development of modern Chinese history, and demonstrate that imperialism was something more than the misunderstood, maligned scapegoat of Chinese nationalism. 9
The term "imperialism"should be understood to refer clearly influenced China's "response to the West."It might be to the total historical process wherein foreigners intervene to argued,for example,that the puritanical Taiping opposition to restructure the economy,society,polity and culture of Third opium was a major barrier to trade between the rebel areas and World nations in ways which serve the economic and political Shanghai,and that the Taiping threat to the opium trade interests of the metropolitan powers.In apologetic moved the foreign community to aid in the suppression of the scholarship,such restructuring is generally regarded as part of rebellion.In any case,in assessing the impact of imperialism in the process of "modernization."The hypothesis of this essay China,we must be constantly aware of its unique and narcotic is that imperialism produced economic,social and political content. disruptions,distortions and instability of such a nature as to The importance of opium in China's foreign trade was of make successful modernization of any bourgeois-democratic course due to the inability of other foreign products to variety impossible.Revolution became the logical alternative. compete in China's already well-developed indigenous producing and marketing system.It is often noted by those It is convenient to begin a discussion of imperialism in who stress the limited or benign effects of imperialism,that China with the Opium War.Back in 1841,John Quincy Adams China's per-capita foreign trade was the lowest of all 83 expressed an authoritative Harvard view of that Anglo-Chinese countries listed by the League of Nations.14 This is of course conflict: undeniable.China was relatively successful in resisting the Tbe justice of tbe cause between the two parties-wbicb bas impulse of the Western bourgeoisie to "nestle everywhere, tbe rigbteous cause?You bave perbaps been surprised to settle everywhere,establish connections everywhere."is She bear me answer,Britain.Britain bas tbe rigbteous cause. was never reduced to the status of an Egypt,an India or an But to prove it,I bave been obliged to show that the opium Argentina.Furthermore,after 1949,revolutionary China, "aided"by the U.S.economic blockade,was cut off from the question is not tbe cause of the war....Tbe cause of the war is the kowtow!-the arrogant and insupportable West and from the possibility of falling into a state of pretension of China that she will bold commercial permanent economic dependence.This happened precisely at intercourse with tbe rest of mankind,not on terms of the time when the United States acquired the ability and the or tbendeadinoo will to make far greater economic inroads into the economies of the Third World than had even before been possible.In effect,Mao's revolution-itself in part a response to and Subsequent Harvard men have stuck loyally to Adams'view product of imperialism-prevented imperialism from running that China's reluctance to trade with the West was its full course. "insupportable"and that opium was not really the cause of Despite this abbreviation of imperialism's impact, the war.To quote Fairbank himself: China's involvement in the international market economy had By tbe nineteenth century,the Cbinese position on foreign long since become sufficiently intense to induce severe relations,like the contemporary seclusion policy of Japan, distortions in her own economy.In 1842,92%of China's was out of date and no longer supportable.... In exports were silk and tea;in 1868,their percentage was 93.5% demanding diplomatic equality and commercial by 1890 the percentage figure had fallen to 64.5%,though in opportunity,Britain represented all the Western states, absolute terms the trade continued to grow.Throughout the wbicb would sooner or later bave demanded tbe same nineteenth century,tea and silk constituted at least one-half of things if Britain bad not.It was an accident of bistory that China's annual exports.In response to this strong export the dynamic Britisb commercial interest in the China trade demand,many peasants shifted their meagre resources to the was centered not only on tea but also on opium. production of tea and silk,and a substantial proportion of the production of these commodities was exclusively for the In fact,the central role of opium was far from "an export market:at least 40%of the tea in the late nineteenth accident of history."There were demonstrable economic century,17 and 50-70%of the silk as late as the 1920s.18 By causes for the opium trade:not only was the sale of Bengal World War II,foreign markets for Chinese tea and silk had opium an important source of revenue for the British virtually disappeared,and countless thousands of Chinese administration in India,but opium was the only commodity peasants found themselves deprived of their livelihood.19 marketable in China in sufficient quantity to balance the While the conventional Western wisdom sees the moral of this triangular trade between China,Britain and India.This tale of tea and silk to be the inability of an incompetent paramount position of opium among China's imports did not Chinese government and an inefficient Chinese business result from an ignorant xenophobic Chinese resistance to establishment to enforce quality control and compete Western manufactures,but from a well-informed conviction effectively with Japanese silk and Japanese and Ceylonese that China could get along very well without them.Thus,even tea,20 the inescapable facts remain that (1)foreigners had if other Western states "sooner or later"had made the same created,controlled and then closed a market for Chinese demands as Britain,opium would have been a major issue.As goods,and to that extent China had been a victim of a world late as 1870,well after the opening of China by the "armed market in which she was an essentially passive participant;and opium propaganda"2 of the West,opium constituted4%of (2)for China to have competed effectively she would have had China's imports,and it remained the largest single Chinese to allow foreign tea plantations on the South Asian model import until 1890.13 Opium,then,was the West's only feasible (which would have meant an intensification of imperialist entree into the China market and its role was hardly influence in China),or to have established efficient "accidental."Furthermore,the fact that opium-pushing governmental supervision of these industries as was the case in remained the West's most important economic activity Japan.The latter would have required a far stronger Chinese through all but the last decade of the nineteenth century government than-as we shall presently see-was possible 10
• • • The term "imperialism" should be understood to refer to the total historical process wherein foreigners intervene to restructure the economy, society, polity and culture of Third World nations in ways which serve the economic and political interests of the metropolitan powers. In apologetic scholarship, such restructuring is generally regarded as part of the process of "modernization." The hypothesis of this essay is that imperialism produced economic, social and political disruptions, distortions and instability of such a nature as to make successful modernization of any bourgeois-democratic variety impossible. Revolution became the logical alternative. It is convenient to begin a discussion of imperialism in China with the Opium War. Back in 1841, John Quincy Adams expressed an authoritative Harvard view of that AnglO-Chinese conflict: The justice ofthe cause between the two parties-which has the righteous cause? You have perhaps been surprised to bear me answer, Britain. Britain has the righteous cause. But to prove it, I have been obliged to show that the opium question is not the cause of the war . ... The cause of the war is the kowtow!-the arrogant and insupportable pretension of China that she will hold commercilll intercourse with the rest of mankind. not on terms of reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of lord and fHlSsal. 10 Subsequent Harvard men have stuck loyally to Adams'view that China's reluctance to trade with the West was "insupportable" and that opium was not really the cause of the war. To quote Fairbank himself: By the nineteenth century, the Chinese position on foreign relations, like the contemporary seclusion policy of Japan. was out of date and no longer supportable.... In demanding diplomatic equality and commercial opportunity, Britain represented all the Western states, which would sooner or later have demanded the same things if Britain had not. It was an accident of history that the dynamic British commercial interest in the China trade was centered not only on tea but also on opium. 11 In fact, the central role of opium was far from "an accident of history." There were demonstrable economic causes for the opium trade: not only was the sale of Bengal opium an important source of revenue for the British administration in India, but opium was the only commodity marketable in China in sufficient quantity to balance the triangular trade between China, Britain and India. This paramount position of opium among China's imports did not result from an ignorant xenophobic Chinese resistance to Western manufactures, but from a well-informed conviction that China could get along very well without them. Thus, even if other Western states "sooner or later" had made the same demands as Britain, opium would have been a major issue. As late as 1870, well after the opening of China by the "armed opium propaganda,,12 of the West, opium constituted 43% of China's imports, and it remained the largest single Chinese import untiT 1890. 13 Opium, then, was the West's only feasible entree into the China market and its role was hardly "accidental." Furthermore, the fact that opium-pushing remained the West's most important economic activity through all but the last decade of the nineteenth century clearly influenced China's "response to the West." It might be argued, for example, that the puritanical Taiping opposition to opium was a major barrier to trade between the rebel areas and Shanghai, and that the Taiping threat to the opium trade moved the foreign community to aid in the suppression of the rebellion. In any case, in assessing the impact of imperialism in China, we must be constantly aware of its unique and narcotic content. The importance of opium in China's foreign trade was of course due to the inability of other foreign products to compete in China's already well-developed indigenous producing and marketing system. It is often noted by those who stress the limited or benign effects of imperialism, that China's per-capita foreign trade was the lowest of all 83 countries listed by the League of Nations. 14 This is of course undeniable. China was relatively successful in resisting the impulse of the Western bourgeoisie to "nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere." 15 She was never reduced to the status of an Egypt, an India or an Argentina. Furthermore, after 1949, revolutionary China, "aided" by the U.S. economic blockade, was cut off from the West and from the possibility of falling into a state of permanent economic dependence. This happened precisely at the time when the United States acquired the ability and the will to make far greater economic inroads into the economies of the Third World than had even before been possible. In effect, Mao's revolution-itself in part a response to and product of imperialism-prevented imperialism from running its full course. Despite this abbreviation of imperialism's impact, China's involvement in the international market economy had long since become sufficiently intense to induce severe distortions in her own economy. In 1842, 92% of China's exports were silk and tea; in 1868, their percentage was 93.S%; by 1890 the percentage figure had fallen to 64.5%, though in absolute terms the trade continued to grow. Throughout the nineteenth century, tea and silk constituted at least one-half of China's annual exports. 16 In response to this strong export demand, many peasants shifted their meagre resources to the production of tea and silk, and a substantial proportion of the production of these commodities was exclusively for the export market: at least 40% of the tea in the late nineteenth century,17 and SO-70% of the silk as late as the 1920s.18 By World War II, foreign markets for Chinese tea and silk had virtually disappeared, and countless thousands of Chinese peasants found themselves deprived of their livelihood. 19 While the conventional Western wisdom sees the moral of this tale of tea and silk to be the inability of an incompetent Chinese government and an inefficient Chinese business establishment to enforce quality control and compete effectively with Japanese silk and Japanese and Ceylonese tea,2() the inescapable facts remain that (1) foreigners had created, controlled and then closed a market for Chinese goods, and to that extent China had been a victim of a world market in which she was an essentially passive participant; and (2) for China to have competed effectively she would have had to allow foreign tea plantations on the South Asian model (which would have meant an intensification of imperialist influence in China), or to have established efficient governmental supervision of these industries as was the case in Japan. The latter would have required a far stronger Chinese government than-as we shall presently see-was possible 10
before the final expulsion of the imperialists in 1949. contemporary Chinese bistorians for baving progressively With the decline of the tea and silk trade,China's "crushed"and "exploited"domestic bandicraft industry exports became considerably more diversified-escaping the from the mid-nineteentb century onward is belied by the sort of restrictive dependence on the export of two or three actual state of the Chinese economy as late as tbe primary products which still plagues most Latin American and 1930's....Anyone wbo would claim that the Hunan or African nations.This diversification of exports,however,was Szecbwan peasant in the 1930's dressed in Naigaiwata not accomplished by a shift from the export of extractive cottons,smoked BAT cigarettes,and used Meiji sugar bas a commodities to the export of manufactures.In fact,between big case to prove.27 1913 and 1936,beverages,foodstuffs and raw materials increased from 46.5%to 60.5%of China's exports,while Is it,however,necessary to prove these propositions? Feuerwerker's own research has demonstrated the decline in manufactures and semi-manufactures declined from 50.9%to 39.5%.21 In effect,China's foreign trade was increasingly handicraft spinning.In addition,he has acknowledged.that conforming to that pattern so common to underdeveloped when handicraft weaving relies on yarn from foreign mills, nations:she was exporting products the demand for which is handicraft production becomes "ancillary to the mechanized relatively inclastic and likely to fall as manufactured factories," and "subservient to forcign capitalism." substitutes are developed.Thus,in the postwar years,an Handicraft workshops thus prove incapable of contributing to unblockaded China would have found her hog bristles replaced the development of an independent,self-sufficient national by plastics,her silk overwhelmed by synthetic fabrics,her tung economy..Furthermore,as we attempt to assess the impact of and linseed oil replaced by government-subsidized production foreign trade on socio-political developments in China,we in the U.S.,and her tin and tungsten replaced by lower grade should note the conclusions of Frederic Wakeman on South American ores which the U.S.learned to refine Kwangtung at the time of the Opium Wars:"...the rural efficiently in the course of war production.22 areas in which the decline of cottage industry seemed most Well before the 1950s,the terms of trade had turned marked were precisely those areas which were most against China.The net barter terms of trade(=price of imports antiforeign.It was almost as if the peasantry rationally blamed over price of exports,1913 here taken as 100)stood at 76.5 in their plight on foreign imports. The inescapable fact 1870 and had risen to 122.9 by 1935.23 What this meant,in remains that imperialism transformed a remarkably stable, effect,is that in 1935 China would have had to export 160% albeit"underdeveloped"Chinese economy into an increasingly as much in real goods to buy the same imports she got in unstable and dependent economy in which millions of peasants would experience displacement and deprivation 1870.Needless to say,the pattern of international trade prices which has prevailed since World War II would have produced a traceable to the vagaries of the international market.To such far greater deterioration in the Chinese terms of trade had she peasants-for whom one bad year could mean perpetual debt and poverty-there was little solace in the thought that the remained within the "Free World"trading system in the 1950s and'60s.24 textile industry was being mechanized,GNP was rising and “modernization”was taking place, If we turn from China's exports to her imports,we are immediately faced with the enormous question of their effect on handicraft production.Albert Feuerwerker's meticulous The effects of foreign investments in China were somewhat different from the effects of foreign trade.Foreign study of the cotton textile industry indicates that handicraft trade spinning of cotton yarn was severely crippled by foreign produced instability,while the very permanence of imports as early as 1910,suffering a 50%reduction from an capital investment produced a lasting impact on the structure of the Chinese economy.Both,however,made the Chinese estimated 4,883,381 tan average annual production for 1871-80 to 2,449,715 tan for 1901-10.Handicraft weaving economy more dependent on foreigners.Here it is perhaps (with foreign and domestic factory yarn)managed to hold its appropriate to reexamine the claim in the leading apologist own,but weaving could only absorb one-tenth of the two work on economic imperialism in China:"..foreign capital million man-years of labor released by the decline in was largely responsible for the development of whatever spinning.25 Furthermore,there was a tendency for weaving to economic modernization took place in China before 1937." concentrate in urban weaving shops,which made it an unlikely Quite obviously,this same proposition could be stated alternative source of income for peasants who used to spin at somewhat differently:the modern sector of the Chinese home in the winter months to supplement their meagre economy was under the domination of foreign capital.To be sure,this was not true of all segments of the industrial sector: earnings.Cotton spinning is the classic case of the crippled handicraft,but it is not the only one:Feuerwerker elsewhere smaller,labor-intensive,consumer goods industries were notes that "native iron and steel production in Hunan and generally left for Chinese capital to develop.In the areas where Kiangsi nearly disappeared by the end of the nineteenth foreigners concentrated,however,they overwhelmed all native century,"and of course Standard Oil's kerosene replaced competition.The key sectors of mining and transportation vegetable oil for lighting purposes.Obviously,in the absence were almost an exclusive foreign preserve.In 1920,99%of the of tariff autonomy,China was powerless to shield any of these pig iron,99%of the iron ore,and 76%of the coal mined by handicraft industries from the immediate and drastic impact of modern methods was extracted from foreign mines.In the same year,83%of the steamer tonnage cleared through the imports,or,for that matter,to reshape in any way the pattern of her foreign trade. Maritime Customs,and 78%of that on China's main internal Despite all this it is undoubtedly true,as Feuerwerker waterway,the Yangtze River,was in foreign bottoms.Foreign control of railways resulted largely from loans rather than contends,that direct investment,but according to one set of figures,foreign The simplistic indictment of "foreign capitalism"by some capital controlled 93%of China's railways in 1911,98%in 1927,and91%in1936.31 11
• • • I before the final expulsion of the imperialists. in 1949. ., contemporary Chinese historians for having progressively With the decline of the tea and sdk trade, ChIna s "crushed" and "exploited" domestic handicraft industry exports became considerably more diversified-escaping the from the mid-nineteenth century onward is belied by the sort of restrictive dependence on the export of two or three actual state of the Chinese economy as late as tbe primary products which still plagues most Latin American and 1930's . ... Anyone who would claim that the Hunan or African nations. This diversification of exports, however, was Szechwan peasant in the 1930's dressed in Naigaiwata not accomplished by a shift from the export of extractive commodities to the export of manufactures. In fact, between 1913 and 1936, beverages, foodstuffs and raw materials increased from 46.5% to 60.S% of China's exports, while manufactures and semi-manufactures declined from SO.9% to 39.S%.21 In effect, China's foreign trade was increasingly conforming to that pattern so common to underdeve~ope~ nations: she was exporting products the demand for which IS relatively inelastic and likely to fall as manufactured substitutes are developed, Thus, in the postwar years, an unblockaded China would have found her hog bristles replaced by plastics, her silk overwhelmed by syntheti~ ~abrics, her t~ng and linseed oil replaced by government-subsldlzed production in the U.S., and her tin and tungsten replaced by lower grade South American ores which the U.S. learned to refine efficiently in the course of war production. 22 Well before the 19S0s, the terms of trade had turned against China. The net barter terms of trade (=price of impo~s over price of exports, 1913 here taken as 100) stood at 76.5 In 1870 and had risen to 122.9 by 1935. 23 What this meant, in effect, is that in 1935 China would have had to export 160% as much in real goods to buy the same imports she got in 1870. Needless to say, the pattern of international trade prices which has prevailed since World War II would have produced a far greater deterioration in the Chinese: terms of ~ade had she remained within the "Free World" trading system ID the 19S0s and '60s. 24 If we tum from China's exports to her imports, we are immediately faced with the enormous question of their effect on handicraft production. Albert Feuerwerker's meticulous study of the cotton textile industry indicates that handicraft spinning of cotton yarn was severely crippled by foreign imports as early as 1910, suffering a SO% reduction from an estimated 4,883,381 tan average annual production for 1871-80 to 2,449,71S tan for 1901-10. Handicraft weaving (with foreign and domestic factory yarn) managed to hold its own, but weaving CQuid only absorb one-tenth of t~e ~o million man-years of labor released by the decline In spinning.25 Furthermore, there was a tendency for weaving to concentrate in urban weaving shops, which made it an unlikely alternative source of income for peasants who used to spin at home in the winter months to supplement their meagre earnings. Cotton spinning is the classic case of the crippled handicraft, but it is not the only one: Feuerwerker elsewhere notes that "native iron and steel production in Hunan and Kiangsi nearly disappeared by the end of the nineteenth century,,,26 and of course Standard Oil's kerosene replaced vegetable oil for lighting purposes. Obviously, in the absence of tariff autonomy, China was powerless to shield any of these handicraft industries from the immediate and drastic impact of the imports, or, for that matter, to reshape in any way the pattern of her foreign trade. Despite all this it is undoubtedly true, as Feuerwerker contends, that The simplistic indictment of "foreign capitalism" by some cottons, smoked BA T cigarettes, and used Meiji sugar has a b ' 27 tg case to prove. I, Is it, however, necessary to prove these propositions? r Feuerwerker's own research has demonstrated the decline in ! handicraft spinning. In addition, he has acknowledged ,that I when handicraft weaving relies on yarn from foreign mills, I handicraft production becomes "ancillary to the mechanized factories," and "subservient to foreign capitalism." 28 Handicraft workshops thus prove incapable of contributing to I the development of an independent, self-sufficient national economy,. Furthermore, as we attempt to assess the impact of foreign trade on socio-political developments in China, we should note the conclusions of Frederic Wakeman on Kwangtung at the time of the Opium Wars: ..... the rural areas in which the decline of cottage industry seemed most marked were precisely those areas which were most antiforeign. It was almost as if the peasantry rationally blamed their plight on foreign imports,,,29 The inescapable fact remains that imperialism transformed a remarkably stable, albeit "underdeveloped" Chinese economy into an increasingly unstable and dependent economy in which millions of peasants would experience displacement and deprivation traceable to the vagaries of the international market. To such peasants-for whom one bad year could mean perpetual debt and poverty-there was little solace in the thought that the textile industry was being mechanized, GNP was rising and "modernization" was taking place. The effects of foreign investments in China were somewhat different from the effects of foreign trade, Foreign trade produced instability, while the very permanence of capital investment produced a lasting impact on the stru~ture of the Chinese economy. Both, however, made the ChInese economy more dependent on foreigners. Here it is perhaps appropriate to reexamine the claim in the leadin~ apolo~ist work on economic imperialism in China: " ... foretgn capital was largely responsible for the development of whatever economic modernization took place in China before 1937,,,30 Quite obviously, this same proposition could be stated somewhat differently: the modern sector of the Chinese economy was under the domination of foreign capital. To be sure, this was not true of all segments of the industrial sector: smaller, labor-intensive, consumer goods industries were generally left for Chinese capital to develop. In the areas wh:re foreigners concentrated, however, they overwhelmed all native competition. The key sectors of mining and transportation were almost an exclusive foreign preserve. In 1920,99% of the pig iron, 99% of the iron ore, and 76% of the coal mined by modern methods was extracted from foreign mines. In the same year, 83% of the steamer tonnage cleared through Maritime Customs, and 78% of that on China's main internal waterway, the Yangtze River, was in foreign bottoms. Foreign control of railways resulted largely from loans rather than direct investment, but according to one set of figures, foreign capital controlled 93% of China's railways in 1911, 98% in 1927, and 91% in 1936. 31 I I