6 be a foreigner in the Qing service.As such a person himself,Hart apparently felt that any stigma or doubt that might attach to Gordon might also apply to him.Under these ciircumstances,issues of personal morality surrendered to the demands of expediency [17] In any case,on February 1,after a number of false starts,Hart,Li,and Gordon finally met at Suzhou and agreed that the Ever-Victorious Army would take the field following the Chinese New Year.From this point onward,Hart played an integral role in the EVA's affairs.He assisted Gordon in securing prompt and regular pay for his men, and also detached a member of the customs staff,H.E.Hobson,to serve as an interpreter for the force.In addition,Hart helped Li Hongzhang to improve his tattered image among the foreign ministers in Beijing.On February 6,for example,Hart wrote a long letter to Bruce,providing a lengthy and vigorous defense of Li's actions at Suzhou.This letter unquestionably enhanced Li's stock in the foreign diplomatic community.[18] Hart's journal indicates that at this time he also became an adviser to Li,and that the two chatted at length about diplomatic and study missions to Europe,iron and coal mining,foreign steamers,weapons and arsenals,as well as customs matters.These conversations obviously impressed Hart,who lamented later in the year(and in subsequent years as well)that Li--although impetuous,and relatively unconcerned with details--did not hold a position in the Zongli Yamen.From this time onward,Hart came to consider Li an "ally"in his quest to modernize China;and for the next several decades he continually gave Li assistance and advice.But the I.G.was by no means the only one of Li's foreign advisers during this initial and formative period of the governor's contact with Westerners.Nor was he even the most influential.From all indications,Halliday Macartney,who aspired to occupy a position in nineteenth century China analogous to that of the Jesuits Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest in the early Qing,was Li's most valuable adviser.According to Gordon himself,Li and Macartney "talked for hours"about Western inventions,foreign relations,and other matters of vital concern; and Gordon acknowledged without apparent jealousy that Marcartney had done a great deal for the Chinese in the face of many obstacles.However,the British commander was less willing to admit the key role Macartney played in the Ever-Victorious Army's internal affairs.[19] The Ever-Victorious Army played a significant role in the recovery of several major Taiping strongholds following its return to action in February of 1864;but by May it had become clear to both Li and Gordon that the force had passed its prime,and was in fact deteriorating rapidly.They therefore hastily made plans for its disbandment.In their opinion,the EVA was too expensive,too ineffective,and too "local"in its loyalties to justify further financial support.The Anhui Army,they both believed,was a superior and sufficient instrument for the protection of Jiangsu province.But Hart and the British authorities at Shanghai felt that the Sino-foreign contingent should not be disbanded too precipitously,and that at least part of the EVA should be "kept up permanently"as a local defense force and training program.After extensive and sometimes difficult negotiations involving Hart,the British Consul (Harry Parkes),Gordon,Li and Li's newly recruited and extremely able assistant,Ding Richang,the various parties reached a compromise whereby about a thousand men from the Ever-Victorious Army would be retained under Gordon's temporary supervision as the nucleus of a foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan--a small town about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai.[20]
6 be a foreigner in the Qing service. As such a person himself, Hart apparently felt that any stigma or doubt that might attach to Gordon might also apply to him. Under these ciircumstances, issues of personal morality surrendered to the demands of expediency. [17] In any case, on February 1, after a number of false starts, Hart, Li, and Gordon finally met at Suzhou and agreed that the Ever-Victorious Army would take the field following the Chinese New Year. From this point onward, Hart played an integral role in the EVA's affairs. He assisted Gordon in securing prompt and regular pay for his men, and also detached a member of the customs staff, H. E. Hobson, to serve as an interpreter for the force. In addition, Hart helped Li Hongzhang to improve his tattered image among the foreign ministers in Beijing. On February 6, for example, Hart wrote a long letter to Bruce, providing a lengthy and vigorous defense of Li's actions at Suzhou. This letter unquestionably enhanced Li's stock in the foreign diplomatic community. [18] Hart's journal indicates that at this time he also became an adviser to Li, and that the two chatted at length about diplomatic and study missions to Europe, iron and coal mining, foreign steamers, weapons and arsenals, as well as customs matters. These conversations obviously impressed Hart, who lamented later in the year (and in subsequent years as well) that Li--although impetuous, and relatively unconcerned with details--did not hold a position in the Zongli Yamen. From this time onward, Hart came to consider Li an "ally" in his quest to modernize China; and for the next several decades he continually gave Li assistance and advice. But the I.G. was by no means the only one of Li's foreign advisers during this initial and formative period of the governor's contact with Westerners. Nor was he even the most influential. From all indications, Halliday Macartney, who aspired to occupy a position in nineteenth century China analogous to that of the Jesuits Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest in the early Qing, was Li's most valuable adviser. According to Gordon himself, Li and Macartney "talked for hours" about Western inventions, foreign relations, and other matters of vital concern; and Gordon acknowledged without apparent jealousy that Marcartney had done a great deal for the Chinese in the face of many obstacles. However, the British commander was less willing to admit the key role Macartney played in the Ever-Victorious Army's internal affairs. [19] The Ever-Victorious Army played a significant role in the recovery of several major Taiping strongholds following its return to action in February of 1864; but by May it had become clear to both Li and Gordon that the force had passed its prime, and was in fact deteriorating rapidly. They therefore hastily made plans for its disbandment. In their opinion, the EVA was too expensive, too ineffective, and too "local" in its loyalties to justify further financial support. The Anhui Army, they both believed, was a superior and sufficient instrument for the protection of Jiangsu province. But Hart and the British authorities at Shanghai felt that the Sino-foreign contingent should not be disbanded too precipitously, and that at least part of the EVA should be "kept up permanently" as a local defense force and training program. After extensive and sometimes difficult negotiations involving Hart, the British Consul (Harry Parkes), Gordon, Li and Li's newly recruited and extremely able assistant, Ding Richang, the various parties reached a compromise whereby about a thousand men from the Ever-Victorious Army would be retained under Gordon's temporary supervision as the nucleus of a foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan--a small town about twenty-five miles southwest of Shanghai. [20]
7 The Early Lessons of Barbarian Management By the summer of 1864,Li had learned virtually all he needed to know about the advantages and disadvantages of using foreigners in his self-strengthening enterprises. His experience with the Ever-Victorious Army,and his contact with foreigners such as Ward,Burgevine,Gordon,Hart and Macartney--not to mention his frequent and often frustrating negotiations with various Western civil and military authorities--formed the basis for his opinions regarding foreign assistance and the adoption of Western military technology for the next three decades.What exactly did he learn? Although Li readily perceived the advantages to be gained by utilizing foreign arms,training methods,and personnel,he also recognized the special problems involved in accepting foreign assistance,especially in military affairs.One difficulty was,of course,the danger of inordinate foreign influence.Few Westerners in the Chinese military service were inclined to "turn toward Chinese civilization [xianghua]"in the classic pattern.Most foreign officers,had no admiration for Chinese culture,and few, Ward and Gordon included,bothered to learn Chinese--just as few Chinese learned a foreign language.Disputes between Western officers and the Chinese occurred frequently.Dressed in semi-Western uniforms and responding to foreign command words,the men of the Ever-Victorious Army (and other such contingents)were in the minds of most Chinese "counterfeit foreign-devils"(jia yangguizi)--overpaid,rowdy, unacquainted with Confucian moral instruction and,in Zeng Guofan's words,"utterly coarse."[21] The problems created by the Ever-Victorious Army's system of foreign officering went well beyond cultural subversion and the inevitable friction of daily Sino-foreign contact.Independent freebooters like Ward,Burgevine,and their subordinates,tended to be arrogant and unmanageable;while commanding officers on loan from regular Western military and naval forces,such as Holland and Gordon,invited continual interference from their home governments.Even civilian advisers such as Hart--although a Qing bureaucrat and reportedly "as completely Chinese in his sympathies as the Chinese himself"--created problems for Li.Despite his appreciation for the I.G.'s useful and energetic services,Li occasionally described him as "quite contentious,"and wrote that his willingness to exert himself on China's behalf was primarily because he coveted his large salary.[22] Furthermore,foreigners involved in Chinese military affairs inevitably constituted a security risk.Rumors circulated throughout Ward's lifetime that he planned to dethrone the Manchus;Burgevine actually defected to the Taipings in 1863,together with several officers of the Ever-Victorious Army;Gordon threatened to join the rebels and attack the Anhui Army in the aftermath of the Suzhou Incident;and after disbandment of the EVA in 1864,several prominent officers of the force entered the Taiping service under Li Shixian.[23] From the Qing government's standpoint,the exposure of foreigners to the inner workings of the Qing military only increased the possibility of subterfuge.According to some reports,contact with Western officers in the Ever-Victorious Army encouraged certain "anti-Mandarin"tendencies on the part of the Chinese rank-and-file--even though anti-foreignism seems to have been by far the more common outcome.Furthermore, Westerners in the Qing military service were clearly in a position to report on Chinese
7 The Early Lessons of Barbarian Management By the summer of 1864, Li had learned virtually all he needed to know about the advantages and disadvantages of using foreigners in his self-strengthening enterprises. His experience with the Ever-Victorious Army, and his contact with foreigners such as Ward, Burgevine, Gordon, Hart and Macartney--not to mention his frequent and often frustrating negotiations with various Western civil and military authorities--formed the basis for his opinions regarding foreign assistance and the adoption of Western military technology for the next three decades. What exactly did he learn? Although Li readily perceived the advantages to be gained by utilizing foreign arms, training methods, and personnel, he also recognized the special problems involved in accepting foreign assistance, especially in military affairs. One difficulty was, of course, the danger of inordinate foreign influence. Few Westerners in the Chinese military service were inclined to "turn toward Chinese civilization [xianghua]" in the classic pattern. Most foreign officers, had no admiration for Chinese culture, and few, Ward and Gordon included, bothered to learn Chinese--just as few Chinese learned a foreign language. Disputes between Western officers and the Chinese occurred frequently. Dressed in semi-Western uniforms and responding to foreign command words, the men of the Ever-Victorious Army (and other such contingents) were in the minds of most Chinese "counterfeit foreign-devils" (jia yangguizi)--overpaid, rowdy, unacquainted with Confucian moral instruction and, in Zeng Guofan's words, "utterly coarse." [21] The problems created by the Ever-Victorious Army's system of foreign officering went well beyond cultural subversion and the inevitable friction of daily Sino-foreign contact. Independent freebooters like Ward, Burgevine, and their subordinates, tended to be arrogant and unmanageable; while commanding officers on loan from regular Western military and naval forces, such as Holland and Gordon, invited continual interference from their home governments. Even civilian advisers such as Hart--although a Qing bureaucrat and reportedly "as completely Chinese in his sympathies as the Chinese himself"--created problems for Li. Despite his appreciation for the I. G.'s useful and energetic services, Li occasionally described him as "quite contentious," and wrote that his willingness to exert himself on China's behalf was primarily because he coveted his large salary. [22] Furthermore, foreigners involved in Chinese military affairs inevitably constituted a security risk. Rumors circulated throughout Ward's lifetime that he planned to dethrone the Manchus; Burgevine actually defected to the Taipings in 1863, together with several officers of the Ever-Victorious Army; Gordon threatened to join the rebels and attack the Anhui Army in the aftermath of the Suzhou Incident; and after disbandment of the EVA in 1864, several prominent officers of the force entered the Taiping service under Li Shixian. [23] From the Qing government's standpoint, the exposure of foreigners to the inner workings of the Qing military only increased the possibility of subterfuge. According to some reports, contact with Western officers in the Ever-Victorious Army encouraged certain "anti-Mandarin" tendencies on the part of the Chinese rank-and-file--even though anti-foreignism seems to have been by far the more common outcome. Furthermore, Westerners in the Qing military service were clearly in a position to report on Chinese