34 PEKING POLITICS,I918-1923 FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT 35 a faction does not become corporatized after recruitment but remains structured which large factions can engage in finely coordinated activities.The faction, along the lines of the original ties that formed the bases of recruitment.18 in short,is highly flexible but self-limiting in its extensiveness. Upward and downward communications tend to follow the lines of recruit- Since it is founded upon exchange relationships,a faction depends for its ment.This lends the faction considerable flexibility:the leader sees the opportu- growth and continuity upon the ability of the leader to secure and distribute nity for political gain,separately recruits each member into the faction,19 and rewards to his followers.It tends to expand and contract with success or failure directs the activities of each member for the overall good of the faction.The and may even be dissolved when removed from power.But the leader can members need never meet,although they may do so.The members'activities always reconstitute it when he regains the capability to reward the members. in disparate locations and institutions can be coordinated through individual The faction is thus capable of intermittent but persistent functioning.It takes communications with the leader.20 Indeed,in routine political situations,re- form out of the broader network of clientelist ties in response to an opportunity gularized coordination can be dispensed with entirely,since the faction as a for political gain,and when it becomes necessary to retire from politics,as dur- whole can rely on the members'loyalty to the leader to insure that each member ing the dominance of the political arena by an enemy,it can become relatively works to the faction's benefit.Thus,the faction is capable of the greatest flex- dormant.Its political activities temporarily cease,especially if the members have ibility in seizing political opportunities and in engaging in a general political scattered,or the activities may continue at a low level of occasional contact with strategy on the basis of scattered positions throughout a political system or an other opposition groups to scheme for a return to power.When the enemy organization. is overthrown,the faction may return to full activity unchanged in form and On the other hand,such a communications pattern involves certain liabilities. fexibility. Upward and downward communications are not delivered directly to the re- It also follows that a faction cannot survive its leader.The members may cipient(in the case of complex factions)but flow through a series of nodes (sub- continue in political activity after the leader's death or retirement;several leaders).The more steps through which the information flows,the more time members may associate for a time and continue to be known by the original it takes and the more distorted it is likely to become.2 This is one of several name of the faction.Members may also join other factions as temporary allies, structural characteristics that tend to set limits on the number of levels to which or they may seek to found their own faction.But since the set of clientelist ties the faction can extend without becoming corporatized22 and on the degree to on which it is founded forms a unique configuration centered on the leader,the 18.If a faction becomes corporatized,the clientelist relations are submerged in authority faction can never be taken over as a whole by a successor.The unique com- relations and the structure ceases to be a faction in this sense.What might encourage or bination of personnel and strategic political positions held by the faction cannot discourage corporatization ofa faction is a question that cannot be investigated here.For the be completely reconstructed once the leader is lost. concept of"corporate"used here,see Weber,Theory of Social and Economic Organization, The more extended the complex faction becomes,the greater the number pp.14548. of subordinate leaders it contains and the farther removed they are from the 19.The follower may in turn recruit others as his followers. primary leader.The leader of each simple faction within the complex faction is 20.For a suggestive exploration of the advantages of this sort of communications pat- tern,see Alex Bavelas,"Communications Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups,"in Daniel primarily responsible to his own followers for political spoils.This responsibi- Lemner and Harold D.Lasswell,eds.,The Policy Sciencer(Stanford,Calif.,1951),pp.193- lity may come into contradiction with the loyalty he owes his own leader,who 202. is pursuing the interests of a different set of persons.This creates the tendency 21.See Barry E.Collins and Bertram H.Raven,"Group Structure:Attraction,Coali- for the leaders of lower segments to betray the interests of the faction as a whole tions,Communications,and Power,"in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson,eds.,The in order to secure greater rewards for the segments they lead,which are capable Handbook of Social Psychology,2ded.(Reading,Mass,1969),4:137-55. of operating as distinct factions if they free themselves from the larger faction.23 22.It may be asked why communications patters and other structural features to be discussed below limit the size of factions but not of"clientelist parties."For one thing, Because of this tendency toward breakdown,complex factions are most although a clientelist party is founded on patronage dispensed through clientelist ties,itso small-scale system.Thus,although I argue here that certain elements of factional structure takes on elements of formal organization (party label,headquarters,officers,rules)to enable limit factional size,I could just as well build the argument in reverse:a political setting that it to administer its mass electoral base.It is in this sense not a"pure type"of clientelist involves relatively few people makes it possible for people to organize in ways that would structure.In the case of both faction and party,each stands in an adaptive relationship to its not be suited to mass-participation settings and large-scale organizations. political environment.The clientelist party is adapted to,and tends to maintain,a mass 23.Cf.the "size principle"as enunciated by William H.Riker,The Theory of Political clectoral political system.The faction is adapted to and tends to maintain an oligarchic or Coalitions (New Haven,Conn.,1962),pp.32-33
36 PEKING POLITICS,1918-1923 FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT 37 likely to develop,and are likely to develop to the largest size,within bureauc- organization,their clear boundaries,and their high degree of control over ratic formal organizations.First,in formal organizations,the personal loyalty participants,engage in feats of mobilization,indoctrination,and coordination of faction leaders at lower levels to leaders at higher levels is reinforced by that are beyond the capacities of factions.24 A faction,of course,is limited in hierarchical authority patterns.Second,the faction benefits from the intra- power only so long as it remains a faction;there is nothing inherent in the organizational communications network in coordinating its activities.Third, existence of a faction to prevent the members,if they need more power,from the effort to gain control of the organization or to influence its policies requires organizing in some other way.However,people often do not organize in the cooperation of the subleaders at the various levels and tends to bring their another way,but in factions.Why they choose to do so,and what conditions interests into harmony.In short,the hierarchy and established communications may cause them to shift to another form of organization,are important ques- and authority flow of the existing organization provide a kind of trellis upon tions beyond the scope of this model. which the complex faction is able to extend its own informal,personal loyalties and relations. Characteristics of Factional Politics There is a tendency for vertical cleavages to develop within the complex faction,running up to the level directly under the highest leader.Vertical For the sake of simplicity,I limit the following discussion to an ideal-typical cleavages also develop at each lower level,but remain latent as long as they are political system that is organized primarily by factions.Factions will bebave submerged within the greater rivalry between the two major segments.(Be- differently when they are competing against structures that are not factions cause the struggle is for access to and influence over the leader,cleavages tend (for example,clans or political parties),but the easiest case to deal with is the to be limited to two.)The conflict between the two major entities within a pure case"of an all-factional system.What modes of conflict will be typical faction is kept under tight rein by the faction leader.After his retirement or of factions operating in an environment consisting primarily of rival factions?5 death,however,the two entities become two new complex factions. A first set of propositions is based upon the power limitations typical of fac- Internal cleavage tends to be increased by the fruits of victory.First,the path tions.Factions enjoy less power capability than formal organizations because of to victory inevitably involves reaching opportunistic alliances with factional the limitations on their extent,coordination,and control of followers implied leaders who are incorporated as allies within the faction but are not reliable by their basis in the clientelist tic,their one-to-one communications structure, Second,the increased scale and numerical force of the growing faction enhances and their tendency toward breakdown.Consequently,the several factions in a the tendency mentioned earlier for divergent interests to cmerge among sub- given factional arena will tend,over time,to enjoy relative power equality; leaders and subfactions.Even if loyalty prevents an open revolt against the for no faction will be able to achieve and maintain overwhelmingly superior leader,it permits political clashes and struggles among his subordinates.Third, power.One faction may for the moment enjoy somewhat greater power than if the faction comes near to or achieves victory in a conflict arena as a whole, rival factions,but this power will not be so much greater that the victorious the unifying factor of a common enemy ceases to exist,while divisive factors, faction is capable of expunging its rivals and assuring permanent dominance. such as struggle over spoils and efforts by smaller,enemy factions to buy over This is the more so because the flexibility of the weaker factions and their capa- component units,increase in salience.Fourth,the growth of the faction tends to bility for intermittent functioning enhance their ability to evade and survive deprive the leader of direct control over component units,weakens his position repression.A faction engaging in conflict with other factions must therefore vis-a-vis subordinates,and thus hastens his political retirement and the conse- operate on the assumption that it will not be able decisively and finally to elimi- quent open split of the faction.In short,division and decline is the almost nate its rivals.The faction that holds power today can expect to be out of power inevitable result of success.The only way to avoid such disintegration is to 24.Cf.Amitai Etzioni,Modem Organizations(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.,1964),passint. refuse to expand beyond the borders of an internally unified,and easily de- 25.As was the case with the structural characteristics of factions,the claim is not made fended,factional base. that the modes of conflict characteristic of factions are each unique to factional systems, Finally,it follows from all the above that the faction is limited in the amount merely that none of them is universal to all political systems and that the combination of and kinds of power it can generate and wield.A faction is limited in size,fol- all of them is found only in factional systems. lower commitment,and stability by the principles of its own organization. 26.A major reason for differences in the power of factions is the differing power of their Certain other types of conflict structure,for example highly organized political support structures (regional and/or institutional power bases).But opposing power bases cannot be entirely eliminated,nor,given the tendency of large,victorious factions to split, parties or armies,can,by virtue of their complex,functionally specialized can they be taken over
38 PEKING POLITICS,I918-1923 FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT 39 and vulnerable tomorrow.Politicians in a factional system are"condemned to politician was able to organize a cabinet set in motion the jealousy and opposi- live together."27 This enables us to posit that the following modes of conflict tion that soon led to its fall.Where the titular government leader is suprafac- will be typical of factional systems. tional and enjoys little power,however,the formal governmental leadership of 1.Since the impulse to crush one's rivals decisively is stymied by the limited a factional system may remain stable for long periods.) nature of power,a code of civility circumscribes the nature of political con- 5.Since the political life of a factional system consists of occasional initiatives fict.28 Factions relatively seldom kill,jail,or even confiscate the property of by constituent factions,followed by defensive alliances against the initiator, their opponents within the system(the killing and jailing of persons felt to pre- any given faction is obliged to enter into a series of constantly shifting defensive sent a threat to the system is another matter:see point 12).Indeed,factional alliances.Factional alliances cannot remain stable.Today's enemy may have to systems require punctiliously polite face-to-face conduct between politicians. be tomorrow's ally. As Nathan Leites has written with respect to the French National Assembly of 6.It is therefore impossible for factions to make ideological agreement a the Third and Fourth republics,"the vicissitudes of political life exacerbate primary condition for alliance with other factions.As argued below,factions one's feclings,but it is imperative that rage be channelled into entirely appro- operate within a broad ideological consensus(point 13)while exaggerating the priate expressions so as not to endanger one's career." small differences that remain among them (point 10).The struggle for office 2.Since factions are incapable of building sufficient power to rid the political and influence is unremitting,immediate,and never decisively resolved.In order system of rival factions,they have little incentive to try to do so.For any given to stay in the game,factions must often cooperate with those with whom they faction,the most important and usually most immediate concern is to protect have recently disagreed.Although factional alignments do not cross major its base of power while opposing accretions of power by rival factions;initi- ideological boundaries,within those boundaries,they are not determined by atives to increase its own power and position are of secondary importance. doctrinal differences.30 Defensive political strategies therefore predominate over political initiatives in 7.When decisions(resolutions of conflict,policy decisions)are made by the frequency and importance. factional system as a whole,they are made by consensus among the factions.To 3.When a faction does take a political initiative(which it does only on those attempt to take action without first achieving such a consensus would take the rare occasions when it fecls that its power base is secure and its rivals are relative- ruling coalition beyond the limits of its power:the decision could never be ly off balance),it relies upon secret preparation and surprise offensive.This enforced.Furthermore,the effort to enforce a decision would hasten the forma- minimizes the ability of rivals to prepare defensive moves in advance and tion of an opposition coalition to topple the ruling group from power.Decision enables the aggressive faction,until such defensive moves stop its progress,to by consensus also has the advantage that action is taken in the company of one's gain more ground than would otherwise be the case. rivals,so that responsibility cannot be pinned on any single faction.31 4.In the face of such an initiative,the defensive orientation of the other 8.A typical cycle of consensus formation and decline characterizes factional factions in the system tends to encourage them to unite against the initiative. systems.It begins with a political crisis.As the factions contemplate the crisis, Thus,factional political systems tend to block the emergence of strong leaders. "the limits of what every party(or every clique or individual)may be capable of The strong leader constitutes a threat to the other factions'opportunities for attaining"become clear to all,and after a lapse of time the crisis becomes power,and they band together long enough to topple him from power.(In “ripe.”“Imperious necessity.,,make[s]the..·groups disregard their many political systems,governmental instability results.In France under the 30.In the Chinese context,for example,factional alignments did not cross the ideological Third and Fourth republics,for example,where the government was dependent boundaries between the late Ch'ing conservatives on the one hand and the constitutionalists for its office upon an alignment of parliamentary factions,the very fact that a and revolutionaries on the other,or between the Kuomintang and the CCP.But within each major ideological current,factional alignments were not(how could they be?)deter- 27.Nathan Leites,On the Gamte of Politics in France(Stanford,Calif,1959),pp.23,45. mined by pure,4 priori ideological compatibilitics.Ideological stands were developed and 28.Cf.F.G.Bailey,"Parapolitical Systems,"in Swartz,ed.,Locel-Level Polirics,p.282; revised in the course of politics.For a case study of the process by which ideological stand- Bernard Gallin,"Political Factionalism and its Impact on Chinese Village School Organi- point becomes defined in the course of political conflict,as rivals force one another to zation in Taiwan,"ibid.,p.390;and Melford E.Spiro,"Factionalsim and Politics in Village delincate and clarify their positions,see Benjamin I.Schwartz,Chinese Codthe Burma,"ibid.,pp.410-12. Rise of Mao (Cambridge,Mass.,1952). 29.Leites,On the Game,p.117. 31.Cf.Leites,On the Game,pp.48-49
40 PEKING POLITICS,I918-1923 FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT 4I positions of principle,"which had blocked consensus,and action becomes trinalism,i.e.,the couching of factional struggle for power in terms of abstract possible.2 issues of ideology,honor,and face.35 Factions adopt rigid and minutely defined As a result of the consensus among the factions on the need for action,a ideological positions,exaggerate small differences on abstract questions,and faction or factional alliance achieves office and receives a mandate to act.The stress the purity of their own motives.Yet the issues that arouse such fierce and victorious faction takes culturally appropriate actions to test and solidify the elaborate debate appear upon close examination to be those with strategic im- support the other factions have been obliged to give it.The leader may refuse to plications for factional power.36 Although the real distance between factions in take office until the other factions have publicly committed themselves to him; ideology and program is small (points 12 and 13),and although no faction is he may try to associate the leaders of other factions in the action he proposes likely to be able to carry out an innovative political program,grand policies to take;he may allow,or encourage,the crisis to worsen.Ultimately,however, and sweeping programs are articulated and debated,with small points attracting he acts. the most passionate and lengthy discussion. The third phase is the decline of the factional consensus.The actions taken by Such debate serves several purposes.First,it distinguishes one faction from the faction in power inevitably have implications for the relative strength of all another,37 providing a rationale for continued struggle among such otherwise the factions in the system.While the actions carry the system through the similar entities.Second,it provides an opportunity to discredit other politicians crisis that had produced the consensus,they benefit some factions-usually the and to justify oneself on abstract or ideological grounds.Third,the broad pro- one in power and its allies-more than others.The other factions act to block grams often include inconspicuous provisions of true strategic political im- the effort of the leading faction to strengthen itself,and the factional consensus portance.The struggle,which is couched in abstract terms,is really over the deteriorates.The factions return to mutual squabbling. advantages of a policy to one side or the other. The period of factional conflict often lasts a long while as the factions man- A third set of propositions concerns the size and shape of the factional system euver for political resources,alliances,and a favorable moment and pretext for as a whole and the way it relates to its political environment. precipitating a new crisis.Eventually a faction feels it is in a good position to 11.Any factional arena is composed of a rather small number of factions. take a political initiative,to precipitate a test of strength with its major op- When a great many factions interact in an arena,they find it in their interests to ponent.In many factional systems,this takes the form of asking the most amalgamate,in order to defend against other factions doing the same thing.The obstructive opposition factions to form a government in the expectation that incentives to amalgamate cease to be stronger than those to engage in conflict they will fail.a3 Whatever its form,the test of strength initiates a new crisis only when the total number of factions has been reduced to the point where which begins another cycle. most constituent factions enjoy enough strength to launch political initiatives A second set of propositions is based upon the fact that factions consist of a and defend themselves,and when further amalgamation would simply bring in series of clientelist ties.The resources with which the faction carries out political more followers to share the rewards of the faction without decisively affecting confict are not corporate,shared resources,but the personal resources of the its ability to survive.It is doubtful that more than a score or two of factions can individual members-their personal prestige,official positions,and their own exist in a given factional system or arena.(The limitations on the number of further clientelist ties. members in a faction,and on the number of factions in a system,form a logical 9.To weaken their rivals,factions try to discredit opposition faction mem- circle with the initial assumption of an oligarchic or small-scale arena.) bers,dislodge them from their posts,and buy away their allies.Such efforts 12.I have already stated that the members of the small factional elite act lead to a politics of personality in which rumor,character assassination,bribery, lence of"status,"rather than "program,"incentives among Colombian politicians.How- and deception are used.Passions ofjealousy and revenge are aroused,opportun- ever,if my model is correct,factionalism can occur in the presence of either type ofincen- ism and corruption are fostered,and urgent short-term political goals require tive.Politicians in factional systems will tend to act as if they were motivated by status the compromise of principles.These,in short,are the"comic opera"politicsor incentives because of the importance of personal prestige and personal connections as pure politics"so characteristic of factional systems.4 political resources in factional systems.It is immaterial to the model how high-minded the 10.A further characteristic of factional political conflict may be called doc- ultimate motives for conflict are. 35.Cf.Leites,On the Gante,pp.7-34. 32.Ibid.,Chapter 4,esp.pp.97-98. 36.Cf.Payne,Patterns of Conflict,pp.249-50. 33.Cf.ibid.,pp.82-83. 37.Myron Weiner,Party Politics in India:The Development of a Multi-Party System (Prin- 34.Cf.James L.Payne,Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven,Comn.,1968).pp. ceton,N.J..1957),pp.237-40.See also Lewis A.Coser,The Finctions of Social Conflict 3-24.Payne attempts to explain factionalism in Colombian politics on the basis of the preva- (New York,1964.pp.33-38
42 PEKING POLITICS,I918-1923 FACTIONALISM AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT 43 within a code of civility that limits the severity of the sanctions they employ and under tactical constraints that require alliances with former enemies and opposi- pete in expressions of fealty to the constitution or leader and rationalize every tion to former allies.38 This closely knit elite is further united by one overriding action and every position in terms of their fidelity to it or him.Care is taken to ensure the constitutional or charismatic continuity of the regime. shared interest:that the resources over which they are struggling should be 14.Issucs that arise within the clite are resolved only slowly and with diffi- allocated among themselves and in accordance with the rules of conflict they are following,rather than to some force from outsde the system which pays no culty.The consensus necessary for action is difficult to achieve because every attention to those rules and whose victory would end the political existence of decision is more advantageous to some factions than to others.Only the cycle of the factions.The result is a sharp difference between the modes of intraelite crisis and consensus brings action,but it is short-term action to meet the im- mediate emergency and may in any case be followed by contradictory decisions conflict described in points 1 through 10 and the drastic steps that may be taken by the united factional elite to resist external enemies or to destroy counterelites after the next cycle of conflict.The resulting failure of policy to move clearly in any one direction is what was called,in the French Third and Fourth repub- who challenge the legitimacy of the factional system.39 When,for example, lics,immobilisme. foreign conquest,rebellion,or a military coup threatens to overthrow a factional regime,the factions unite behind a suitable leader long enough to 15.The immobilism of factional systems,the lack of extreme sanctions preserve the system,before returning to politics as usual.o If the threat to the employed in their struggles,and their tendency to defend their existence against system comes from within,from a factional leader attempting to break the rival elites or external threats mean that they are in a certain sense extremely rules,the efforts of the other factions are directed toward defeating that attempt stable.It does not seem to be true,as some observers have suggested,that fac- tional systems have an inherent tendency to break down.42 In the absence of and reestablishing the stability of the system. pressures from outside the system (in which I include those from social forces 13.Within the factional elite,it is taboo to question the principle of legiti- macy upon which the factions base their claim to a role in the larger society. within the society),no force within the factional system is capable of amassing enough power to overthrow it.Thus,only continued factionalism can be pre- Thus,for example,a factional parliament,regime,or party may play the role, dicted for a system that is already factional. in the larger society,of a central or local government,on the basis of a consti- tutional or charismatic claim to legitimacy.No matter how much the vicissi- A factional system tends to preserve itself;yet at the same time,if it is a con- stitutional system,it eats away at its own legitimacy with every cycle of conflict. tudes of struggle oblige the factions to trample in fact upon constitutional principles,or to disobey in fact their symbolic leader,these must never be openly The politics of personality,the defeat of all constructive projects,the repeated questioned or flouted since that would encourage other forces in the larger collapse of governments,all run radically counter to the political ideals likely society to"throw the rascals out."4 Thus,politicians in factional systems com- to be embodied in any constitution-those of stable government,regulated conflict based on debate over issues,and government capability to take construc- 38.On the unifying effects of conflict,see further Coser,Fictions,passi;and George tive initiatives.If no constitutional government fully achieves such ideals,none Simmel,Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations,trans.by Kurt H.Wolff and Reinhard is likely to deviate further from them than a factional regime.The consequence Bendix(New York,1955),pp.13-123. is likely to be that,although the factional system is internally stable,it alienates 39.The same distinction holds if the group of factions is itself the counterelite and its the social support upon which it is based and eventually bows to a counterelite enemies are the ruling elite. that promises more effective rule.Such seems to have been the fate of the early 40.Of course,they do not always succeed in preserving the regime.If the social context of the regime has been changing so that,e.g.,new problems demand solutions or new groups republic,whose urban,professional base of support turned almost unanimously demand access to the system,immobilism(see below)may prevent the regime from re- in the mid and late 1920s to the Kuomintang to reconstruct China. sponding successfully.The consequent loss of legitimacy may make the regime an easy target for a strong rival.An example is the crumbling of the Pcking goverment before the 42.Bernard J.Sicgel and Alan R.Beals,"Pervasive Factionalism,"American Anthropolo- gist 62,no.3 Jume,1960),pp.394-417.For a critiquc,see Nicholas,"Factions,"pp.56-57. Kuomintang advance in 1928. The Clemenceau and Poincare ministries in France are well-known instances of resistance There will,of course,be other causes acting upon a factional system,which also affect the by a factional system to exteral threat.See Philip M.Williams,Crisis and Compromise: outcome.Personal,cultural,and technical resources for more complex organizations may be Politics in the Fourth Republic (Garden City,N.Y.,1966).p.11. present to a greater or lesser degree;so may leaders'political vision and the will to move 41.Cf.Simmel,Conflict,p.41. beyond the factional form of organization;and so may the challenge of changing social conditions