SINESSSCHOOL 9703-497 APRIL 1. 2003 PANKAJ GHEMAWAT JOSE LUIS NUENO ZARA: Fast Fashion article becomes subject to rapid changes of fashion, the greater the demand for cheap products of its kind an Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation.The mor Georg Simmel, "Fashion"(1904) Inditex(Industria de Diseno Textil)of Spain, the owner of Zara and five other apparel retailing chains, continued a trajectory of rapid profitable growth by posting net income of (340 million on revenues of 63, 250 million in its fiscal year 2001 (ending January 31, 2002). Inditex had had a heavily oversubscribed Initial Public Offering in May 2001. In the next 12 months, its stock price increased by nearly 50%--despite bearish stock market conditions-to push its market valuation to E13. 4 billion The high stock price made Inditex's founder, Amancio Ortega, who had begun to work in the apparel trade as an errand boy half-a-century earlier, Spain s richest man. However, it also implied a significant growth challenge. Based on one set of calculations, for example, 76% of the equity value implicit in Inditex's stock price was based on expectations of future growth-higher than an estimated 69% for Wal-Mart or, for that matter, other high-performing retailers The next section of this case briefly describes the structure of the global apparel chain, from producers to final customers. The section that follows profiles three of Inditex's leading international competitors in apparel retailing: The Gap(U.S), Hennes Mauritz(Sweden), and Benetton(Italy) The rest of the case focuses on Inditex, particularly the business system and international expansion of the zara chain that dominated its results The Global Apparel Chai The global apparel chain had been characterized as a prototypical example of a buyer-driven global chain, in which profits derived from"unique combinations of high-value research, design, sales, marketing, and financial services that allow retailers, branded marketers, and branded manufacturers to act as strategic brokers in linking overseas factories"with markets. These attributes were thought to distinguish the vertical structure of commodity chains in apparel and other labor were coordinated and dominated by upstream manufacturers rather than downstream intermediar k intensive industries such as footwear and toys from producer-driven chains(e. g, in automobiles)that (see Exhibit 1) rofessor Pankaj Ghemawat and IESE Professor Jose Luis Ni repared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class rimary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright @2003 President and Fello Harvard College To order equest permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, www.hbsp.harvard.edu.Nopartofthispublicationmay reproduced, stored in a retrieval used in a spreadsheet, o ed in any form or by any means-electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise-without the permission of Harvard Business School
9-703-497 APRIL 1, 2003 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ HBS Professor Pankaj Ghemawat and IESE Professor José Luis Nueno prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2003 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. PANKAJ GHEMAWAT JOSÉ LUIS NUENO ZARA: Fast Fashion Fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation...The more an article becomes subject to rapid changes of fashion, the greater the demand for cheap products of its kind. —Georg Simmel, “Fashion” (1904). Inditex (Industria de Diseño Textil) of Spain, the owner of Zara and five other apparel retailing chains, continued a trajectory of rapid, profitable growth by posting net income of €340 million on revenues of €3,250 million in its fiscal year 2001 (ending January 31, 2002). Inditex had had a heavily oversubscribed Initial Public Offering in May 2001. In the next 12 months, its stock price increased by nearly 50%—despite bearish stock market conditions—to push its market valuation to €13.4 billion. The high stock price made Inditex’s founder, Amancio Ortega, who had begun to work in the apparel trade as an errand boy half-a-century earlier, Spain’s richest man. However, it also implied a significant growth challenge. Based on one set of calculations, for example, 76% of the equity value implicit in Inditex’s stock price was based on expectations of future growth—higher than an estimated 69% for Wal-Mart or, for that matter, other high-performing retailers.1 The next section of this case briefly describes the structure of the global apparel chain, from producers to final customers. The section that follows profiles three of Inditex’s leading international competitors in apparel retailing: The Gap (U.S.), Hennes & Mauritz (Sweden), and Benetton (Italy). The rest of the case focuses on Inditex, particularly the business system and international expansion of the Zara chain that dominated its results. The Global Apparel Chain The global apparel chain had been characterized as a prototypical example of a buyer-driven global chain, in which profits derived from “unique combinations of high-value research, design, sales, marketing, and financial services that allow retailers, branded marketers, and branded manufacturers to act as strategic brokers in linking overseas factories”2 with markets. These attributes were thought to distinguish the vertical structure of commodity chains in apparel and other laborintensive industries such as footwear and toys from producer-driven chains (e.g., in automobiles) that were coordinated and dominated by upstream manufacturers rather than downstream intermediaries (see Exhibit 1)
703-497 ZARA: Fast Fashi Production Apparel production was very fragmented. On average, individual apparel manufacturing firms mployed only a few dozen people, although internationally traded production, in particular, could countries. About 30% of world production of apparel was exported, witead across dozens of feature tiered production chains comprising as many as hundreds of firm ith developing countries generating an unusually large share, about one-half, of all exports. These large cross-border flows of apparel reflected cheaper labor and inputs-partly because of cascading labor efficiencies-in developing countries. (See Exhibit 2 for comparative labor productivity data and Exhibit 3 for an example. Despite extensive investments in substituting capital for labor, apparel production remained highly labor-intensive so that even relatively large"manufacturers"in developed countries outsourced labor-intensive production steps (e.g, sewing) to lower-cost labor sources nearby Proximity also mattered because it reduced shipping costs and lags, and because poorer neighbors sometimes benefited from trade concessions. While China became an export powerhouse across the board, greater regionalization was the dominant motif of changes in apparel trade in the 1990s Turkey, North Africa, and sundry East European countries emerged as major suppliers to the European Union, Mexico and the Caribbean Basin as major suppliers to the United States, and China as the dominant supplier to Japan(where there were no quotas to restrict imports) World trade in apparel and textiles continued to be regulated by the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), which had restricted imports into certain markets(basically the United States, Canada, and West Europe)since 1974. Two decades later, agreement was reached to phase out the MFA's quot system by 2005, and to further reduce tariffs(which averaged 7% to 9% in the major markets). As of 2002, some warned that the transition to the post-MFA world could prove enormously disruptive for suppliers in many exporting and importing countries, and might even ignite demands for"managed trade. There was also potential for protectionism in the questions that nongovernmental organizations and others in developed countries were posing about the basic legitimacy of sweatshop trade"in buyer-driven global chains such as apparel and footwear. Cross-Border intermediation Trading companies had traditionally played the primary role in orchestrating the physical flows of apparel from factories in exporting countries to retailers in importing countries. They continued to be important cross-border intermediaries, although the complexity and(as a result)the specialization of their operations seemed to have increased over time. Thus, Hong Kongs largest trading company, Li Fung, derived 75% of its turnover from apparel and the remainder from hard goods by setting up and managing multinational supply chains for retail clients through its offices in more than 30 countries.For example, a down jacket's filling might come from China, the outer shell fabric from Korea, the zippers from Japan, the inner lining from Taiwan, and the elastics, label, and other trim from Hong Kong Dyeing might take place in South Asia and stitching in China, followed by quality assurance and packaging in Hong Kong. The product might then be shipped to the United States for delivery to a retailer such as The Limited or Abercrombie Fitch, to whom credit risk matching, market research, and even design services might also be supplied Branded marketers represented another, newer breed of middlemen. Such intermediaries outsourced the production of apparel that they sold under their own brand names. Liz Claiborne, founded in 1976, was a good example. Its eponymous founder identified a growing customer group (professional women)and sold them branded apparel designed to fit evolving workplace norms and their actual shapes (which she famously described as"pear-shaped"), that was presented in collections within which they could mix and match in upscale department stores. Production wa outsourced from the outset, first domestically, and then, in the course of the 1980s, increasingly to
703-497 ZARA: Fast Fashion 2 Production Apparel production was very fragmented. On average, individual apparel manufacturing firms employed only a few dozen people, although internationally traded production, in particular, could feature tiered production chains comprising as many as hundreds of firms spread across dozens of countries. About 30% of world production of apparel was exported, with developing countries generating an unusually large share, about one-half, of all exports. These large cross-border flows of apparel reflected cheaper labor and inputs—partly because of cascading labor efficiencies—in developing countries. (See Exhibit 2 for comparative labor productivity data and Exhibit 3 for an example.) Despite extensive investments in substituting capital for labor, apparel production remained highly labor-intensive so that even relatively large “manufacturers” in developed countries outsourced labor-intensive production steps (e.g., sewing) to lower-cost labor sources nearby. Proximity also mattered because it reduced shipping costs and lags, and because poorer neighbors sometimes benefited from trade concessions. While China became an export powerhouse across the board, greater regionalization was the dominant motif of changes in apparel trade in the 1990s. Turkey, North Africa, and sundry East European countries emerged as major suppliers to the European Union, Mexico and the Caribbean Basin as major suppliers to the United States, and China as the dominant supplier to Japan (where there were no quotas to restrict imports).3 World trade in apparel and textiles continued to be regulated by the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), which had restricted imports into certain markets (basically the United States, Canada, and West Europe) since 1974. Two decades later, agreement was reached to phase out the MFA’s quota system by 2005, and to further reduce tariffs (which averaged 7% to 9% in the major markets). As of 2002, some warned that the transition to the post-MFA world could prove enormously disruptive for suppliers in many exporting and importing countries, and might even ignite demands for “managed trade.” There was also potential for protectionism in the questions that nongovernmental organizations and others in developed countries were posing about the basic legitimacy of “sweatshop trade” in buyer-driven global chains such as apparel and footwear. Cross-Border Intermediation Trading companies had traditionally played the primary role in orchestrating the physical flows of apparel from factories in exporting countries to retailers in importing countries. They continued to be important cross-border intermediaries, although the complexity and (as a result) the specialization of their operations seemed to have increased over time. Thus, Hong Kong’s largest trading company, Li & Fung, derived 75% of its turnover from apparel and the remainder from hard goods by setting up and managing multinational supply chains for retail clients through its offices in more than 30 countries.4 For example, a down jacket’s filling might come from China, the outer shell fabric from Korea, the zippers from Japan, the inner lining from Taiwan, and the elastics, label, and other trim from Hong Kong. Dyeing might take place in South Asia and stitching in China, followed by quality assurance and packaging in Hong Kong. The product might then be shipped to the United States for delivery to a retailer such as The Limited or Abercrombie & Fitch, to whom credit risk matching, market research, and even design services might also be supplied. Branded marketers represented another, newer breed of middlemen. Such intermediaries outsourced the production of apparel that they sold under their own brand names. Liz Claiborne, founded in 1976, was a good example.5 Its eponymous founder identified a growing customer group (professional women) and sold them branded apparel designed to fit evolving workplace norms and their actual shapes (which she famously described as “pear-shaped”), that was presented in collections within which they could mix and match in upscale department stores. Production was outsourced from the outset, first domestically, and then, in the course of the 1980s, increasingly to
ZARA: Fast Fashion Asia, with a heavy reliance on OEM or"full-package"suppliers, and was organized in terms of six seasons rather than four to let stores buy merchandise in smaller batches. But after a performance decline in the first half of the 1990s, Liz Claiborne restructured its supply chain to reduce the number of suppliers and inventory levels, shifted half of production back to the Western Hemisphere to ompress cycle times and simultaneously cut the number of seasonal collections from six to four so as to allow some reorders of merchandise that was selling well in the third month of a season Other types of cross-border intermediaries could be seen as forward or backward integrators rather than as pure middlemen. Branded manufacturers, like branded marketers, sold products under their own brand names through one or more independent retail channels and owned some manufacturing as well. Some branded manufacturers were based in developed countries(e.g, U.S based VF Corporation, which sold jeans produced in its factories overseas under the Lee and Wrangler brands) and others in developing countries (e.g, Giordano, Hong Kongs leading apparel brand). And in terms of backward integration, many retailers internalized at least some cross-borde functions by setting up their own overseas buying offices, although they continued to rely on specialized intermediaries for others(e.g, import documentation and clearances) retailing tos respective of whether they internalized most cross-border functions, retailers played a dominant role in shaping imports into developed countries: thus, direct imports by them accounted for half of all apparel imports into West Europe. The increasing concentration of apparel retailing in major markets was thought to be one of the key drivers of increased trade. In the United States, the top five chains came to account for more than half of apparel sales in the course concentration levels elsewhere, while lower, also rose during the decade. Increased concentration was generally accompanied by displacement of independent stores by retail chains, a trend that had also helped increase average store size over time. By the late 1990s, chains accounted for about 85% of total retail sales in the United States, about 70% in West Europe, between one-third to one-half in Latin America, East Asia, and East Europe, and less than 10% in large but poor markets such as China and India Larger apparel retailers had also played the leading role in promoting quick response(QR), a set of policies and practices targeted at improving coordination between retailing and manufacturing so as to increase the speed and flexibility of responses to market shifts, that began to diffuse in apparel and textiles in the second half of the 1980s. QR required changes that spanned functional, geographic, and organizational boundaries but could help retailers reduce forecast errors and inventory risks by planning assortments closer to the selling season, probing the market, placing smaller initial orders and reordering more frequently, and so on. QR had led to significant compression of cycle times(see Exhibit 4), enabled by improvements in information technology and encouraged by shorter fashion cycles and deeper markdowns, particularly in womens wear Retailing activities themselves remained quite local: the top 10 retailers worldwide operated in an average of 10 countries in 2000-compared with top averages of 135 countries in pharmaceuticals, 73 in petroleum, 44 in automobiles, and 33 in electronics-and derived less than 15% of their total sales from outside their hom rkets. Against this baseline, apparel retailing was relatively globalized particularly the fashion segment. Apparel retailing chains from Europe had been the most successful at cross-border expansion, although the U.S. market remained a major challenge. Their success probably reflected the European design roots of apparel, somewhat akin to U. S -based fast food chains'international dominance, and the gravitational pull of the large U.S. market for U.S. based retailers. Thus, The Gap, based on its sales at home in the United States, dwarfed H&M and Inditex
ZARA: Fast Fashion 703-497 3 Asia, with a heavy reliance on OEM or “full-package” suppliers, and was organized in terms of six seasons rather than four to let stores buy merchandise in smaller batches. But after a performance decline in the first half of the 1990s, Liz Claiborne restructured its supply chain to reduce the number of suppliers and inventory levels, shifted half of production back to the Western Hemisphere to compress cycle times and simultaneously cut the number of seasonal collections from six to four so as to allow some reorders of merchandise that was selling well in the third month of a season. Other types of cross-border intermediaries could be seen as forward or backward integrators rather than as pure middlemen. Branded manufacturers, like branded marketers, sold products under their own brand names through one or more independent retail channels and owned some manufacturing as well. Some branded manufacturers were based in developed countries (e.g., U.S.- based VF Corporation, which sold jeans produced in its factories overseas under the Lee and Wrangler brands) and others in developing countries (e.g., Giordano, Hong Kong’s leading apparel brand). And in terms of backward integration, many retailers internalized at least some cross-border functions by setting up their own overseas buying offices, although they continued to rely on specialized intermediaries for others (e.g., import documentation and clearances). Retailing Irrespective of whether they internalized most cross-border functions, retailers played a dominant role in shaping imports into developed countries: thus, direct imports by them accounted for half of all apparel imports into West Europe.6 The increasing concentration of apparel retailing in major markets was thought to be one of the key drivers of increased trade. In the United States, the top five chains came to account for more than half of apparel sales in the course of the 1990s, and concentration levels elsewhere, while lower, also rose during the decade. Increased concentration was generally accompanied by displacement of independent stores by retail chains, a trend that had also helped increase average store size over time. By the late 1990s, chains accounted for about 85% of total retail sales in the United States, about 70% in West Europe, between one-third to one-half in Latin America, East Asia, and East Europe, and less than 10% in large but poor markets such as China and India.7 Larger apparel retailers had also played the leading role in promoting quick response (QR), a set of policies and practices targeted at improving coordination between retailing and manufacturing so as to increase the speed and flexibility of responses to market shifts, that began to diffuse in apparel and textiles in the second half of the 1980s.8 QR required changes that spanned functional, geographic, and organizational boundaries but could help retailers reduce forecast errors and inventory risks by planning assortments closer to the selling season, probing the market, placing smaller initial orders and reordering more frequently, and so on. QR had led to significant compression of cycle times (see Exhibit 4), enabled by improvements in information technology and encouraged by shorter fashion cycles and deeper markdowns, particularly in women’s wear. Retailing activities themselves remained quite local: the top 10 retailers worldwide operated in an average of 10 countries in 2000-compared with top averages of 135 countries in pharmaceuticals, 73 in petroleum, 44 in automobiles, and 33 in electronics—and derived less than 15% of their total sales from outside their home markets.9 Against this baseline, apparel retailing was relatively globalized, particularly the fashion segment. Apparel retailing chains from Europe had been the most successful at cross-border expansion, although the U.S. market remained a major challenge. Their success probably reflected the European design roots of apparel, somewhat akin to U.S.-based fast food chains’ international dominance, and the gravitational pull of the large U.S. market for U.S.-based retailers. Thus, The Gap, based on its sales at home in the United States, dwarfed H&M and Inditex
703-497 ZARA: Fast Fashi yet to achieve market shares of more than 2%-3% in more than two or three major countries6 combined. The latter two companies were perhaps the most pan-European apparel retailers but had Markets and customers In 2000, retail spending on clothing or apparel reached approximately e900 billion worldwide According to one set of estimates, (West) Europe accounted for 34% of the total market, the United States for 29%, and Asia for 23%. Differences in market size reflected significant differences in per capita spending on apparel as well as in population levels. Per capita spending on apparel tended to grow less proportionately with increases in per capita income, so that its share of expenditures typically decreased as income increased. Per capita spending was also affected by price levels, which were influenced by variations in per capita income, in costs, and in the intensity of competition(given that competition continued to be localized to a significant extent) There was also significant local variation in customers' attributes and preferences, even within a region or a country. Just within West Europe, for instance, one study concluded that the British sought out stores based on social affinity, that the French focused on variety /quality, and that Germans were more price-sensitive. Relatedly, the French and the Italians were considered more fashion-forward than the Germans or the British. Spaniards were exceptional in buying apparel only seven times a year, compared with a European average of nine times a year, and higher-than-average levels for the Italians and French, among others. Differences between regions were even greater than within regions: Japan, while generally traditional, also had a teenage market segment that wa considered the trendiest in the world on many measures, and the U.S. market was, from the perspective of many European retailers, significantly less trendy except in a few, generally coastal pockets. There did, however, seem to be more cross-border homogeneity within the fashion segment Popular fashion, in particular, had become less of a hand-me-down from high-end designers. It now seemed to move much more quickly as people, especially young adults and teenagers, with ever richer communication links reacted to global and local trends, including other elements of popular culture(e. g, desperately seeking the skirt worn by the rock star at her last concert) Attempts had also been made to identify the strategic implications of the changing structure of the global apparel chain that were discussed above. Some reduced to" get big fast others, however, were more sophisticated. Thus, an article by three McKinsey consultants identified five ways for retailers to expand across borders: choosing a"sliver"of value instead of competing across the entire value chain; emphasizing partnering; investing in brands; minimizing(tangible) investments; and arbitraging international factor price differences. But Inditex, particularly its Zara chain, supplied a reminder that strategic imperatives depended on how a retailer sought to create and sustain a competitive advantage through its cross-border activities. Key International Competitors While Inditex competed with local retailers in most of its markets, analysts considered its three closest comparable competitors to be The Gap, H&M, and Benetton. All three had narrower vertical pe than Zara, which owned much of its production and most of its stores. The Gap and H&M which were the two largest specialist apparel retailers in the world, ahead of Inditex, owned most of their stores but outsourced all production. Benetton, in contrast, had invested relatively heavily in production, but licensees ran its stores. The three competitors were also positioned differently in product space from Inditex's chains(see Exhibit 5 for a positioning map and Exhibit 6 for financial and other comparisons)
703-497 ZARA: Fast Fashion 4 combined. The latter two companies were perhaps the most pan-European apparel retailers but had yet to achieve market shares of more than 2%-3% in more than two or three major countries. Markets and Customers In 2000, retail spending on clothing or apparel reached approximately €900 billion worldwide. According to one set of estimates, (West) Europe accounted for 34% of the total market, the United States for 29%, and Asia for 23%.10 Differences in market size reflected significant differences in per capita spending on apparel as well as in population levels. Per capita spending on apparel tended to grow less proportionately with increases in per capita income, so that its share of expenditures typically decreased as income increased. Per capita spending was also affected by price levels, which were influenced by variations in per capita income, in costs, and in the intensity of competition (given that competition continued to be localized to a significant extent). There was also significant local variation in customers’ attributes and preferences, even within a region or a country. Just within West Europe, for instance, one study concluded that the British sought out stores based on social affinity, that the French focused on variety/quality, and that Germans were more price-sensitive.11 Relatedly, the French and the Italians were considered more fashion-forward than the Germans or the British. Spaniards were exceptional in buying apparel only seven times a year, compared with a European average of nine times a year, and higher-than-average levels for the Italians and French, among others.12 Differences between regions were even greater than within regions: Japan, while generally traditional, also had a teenage market segment that was considered the trendiest in the world on many measures, and the U.S. market was, from the perspective of many European retailers, significantly less trendy except in a few, generally coastal pockets. There did, however, seem to be more cross-border homogeneity within the fashion segment. Popular fashion, in particular, had become less of a hand-me-down from high-end designers. It now seemed to move much more quickly as people, especially young adults and teenagers, with ever richer communication links reacted to global and local trends, including other elements of popular culture (e.g., desperately seeking the skirt worn by the rock star at her last concert). Attempts had also been made to identify the strategic implications of the changing structure of the global apparel chain that were discussed above. Some reduced to “get big fast”; others, however, were more sophisticated. Thus, an article by three McKinsey consultants identified five ways for retailers to expand across borders: choosing a “sliver” of value instead of competing across the entire value chain; emphasizing partnering; investing in brands; minimizing (tangible) investments; and arbitraging international factor price differences.13 But Inditex, particularly its Zara chain, supplied a reminder that strategic imperatives depended on how a retailer sought to create and sustain a competitive advantage through its cross-border activities. Key International Competitors While Inditex competed with local retailers in most of its markets, analysts considered its three closest comparable competitors to be The Gap, H&M, and Benetton. All three had narrower vertical scope than Zara, which owned much of its production and most of its stores. The Gap and H&M, which were the two largest specialist apparel retailers in the world, ahead of Inditex, owned most of their stores but outsourced all production. Benetton, in contrast, had invested relatively heavily in production, but licensees ran its stores. The three competitors were also positioned differently in product space from Inditex’s chains (see Exhibit 5 for a positioning map and Exhibit 6 for financial and other comparisons).
ZARA: Fast Fashion The gap The Gap, based in San Francisco, had been founded in 1969 and had achieved stellar growth profitability through the 1980s and much of the 1990s with what was described as an"unpretentious real clothes stance, "comprising extensive collections of T-shirts and jeans as well as"smart casual work clothes. The Gaps production was internationalized--more than 90% of it was outsourced from outside the United States-but its store operations were U.S"centric. International expansion of the store network had begun in 1987, but its pace had been limited by difficulties finding locations in markets such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan(which accounted for 86% of store locations outside North America), adapting to different customer sizes and preferences, and dealing with what were, in many cases, more severe pricing pressures than in the United States. And by the end of the 1990s, supply chains that were still too long, market saturation, imbalances, and inconsistencies across the companys three store chains-Banana Republic, The Gap, and Old Navy and the lack of a clear fashion positioning had started to take a toll even in the U.S. market. A failed attempt to reposition to a more fashion-driven assortment-a major fashion miss-triggered significant writedowns, a loss for calendar year 2001, a massive decline in the Gap's stock price, and the departure, in May 2002, of its long-time CEO, Millard Drexler Hennes and mauritz Hennes and Mauritz(H& M), founded as Hennes(hers)in Sweden in 1947, was another high performing apparel retailer. While it was considered Inditex's closest competitor, there were number of key differences. H&M outsourced all its production, half of it to European suppliers implying lead times that were good by industry standards but significantly longer than Zara's. H&M had been quicker to internationalize, generating more than half its sales outside its home country by 1990, 10 years earlier than Inditex. It also had adopted a more focused approach, entering one country at a time-with an emphasis on northern Europe-and building a distribution center in each one. Unlike Inditex, H&M operated a single format, although it marketed its clothes under numerous labels or concepts to different customer segments. H&M also tended to have slightly lower prices than Zara(which it displayed prominently in store windows and on shelving), engaged in extensive advertising like most other apparel retailers, employed fewer designers(40% as many as Zara, Ithough Zara was still 40% smaller), and refurbished its stores less frequently. H&M's price-earnings ratio, while still high, had declined to levels comparable to Inditex's because of a fashion miss that had reduced net income by 17% in 2000 and a recent announcement that an aggressive effort to expand in the United States was being slowed down. Benetton Benetton, incorporated in 1965 in Italy, emphasized brightly colored knitwear. It achieved prominence in the 1980s and 1990s for its controversial advertising and as a network organization that outsourced activities that were labor-intensive or scale-insensitive to subcontractors But Benetton actually invested relatively heavily in controlling other production activities. Where it was investment-light was downstream: it sold its production through licensees, often entrepreneurs with no more than $100,000 to invest in a small outlet that could sell only Benetton products. While Benetton was fast at certain activities such as dyeing, it looked for its retailing business to provide significant forward order books for its manufacturing business and was therefore geared to operate n lead times of several months. Benettons format appeared to hit saturation by the early 1990s and profitability continued to slide through the rest of the 1990s. In response, it embarked on a strategy of narrowing product lines, further consolidating key production activities by grouping them into production poles"in a number of different regions, and expanding or focusing existing outlets while
ZARA: Fast Fashion 703-497 5 The Gap The Gap, based in San Francisco, had been founded in 1969 and had achieved stellar growth and profitability through the 1980s and much of the 1990s with what was described as an “unpretentious real clothes stance,” comprising extensive collections of T-shirts and jeans as well as “smart casual” work clothes. The Gap’s production was internationalized—more than 90% of it was outsourced from outside the United States—but its store operations were U.S.-centric. International expansion of the store network had begun in 1987, but its pace had been limited by difficulties finding locations in markets such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan (which accounted for 86% of store locations outside North America), adapting to different customer sizes and preferences, and dealing with what were, in many cases, more severe pricing pressures than in the United States. And by the end of the 1990s, supply chains that were still too long, market saturation, imbalances, and inconsistencies across the company’s three store chains—Banana Republic, The Gap, and Old Navy— and the lack of a clear fashion positioning had started to take a toll even in the U.S. market. A failed attempt to reposition to a more fashion-driven assortment—a major fashion miss—triggered significant writedowns, a loss for calendar year 2001, a massive decline in the Gap’s stock price, and the departure, in May 2002, of its long-time CEO, Millard Drexler. Hennes and Mauritz Hennes and Mauritz (H&M), founded as Hennes (hers) in Sweden in 1947, was another highperforming apparel retailer. While it was considered Inditex’s closest competitor, there were a number of key differences. H&M outsourced all its production, half of it to European suppliers, implying lead times that were good by industry standards but significantly longer than Zara’s. H&M had been quicker to internationalize, generating more than half its sales outside its home country by 1990, 10 years earlier than Inditex. It also had adopted a more focused approach, entering one country at a time—with an emphasis on northern Europe—and building a distribution center in each one. Unlike Inditex, H&M operated a single format, although it marketed its clothes under numerous labels or concepts to different customer segments. H&M also tended to have slightly lower prices than Zara (which it displayed prominently in store windows and on shelving), engaged in extensive advertising like most other apparel retailers, employed fewer designers (40% as many as Zara, although Zara was still 40% smaller), and refurbished its stores less frequently. H&M’s price-earnings ratio, while still high, had declined to levels comparable to Inditex’s because of a fashion miss that had reduced net income by 17% in 2000 and a recent announcement that an aggressive effort to expand in the United States was being slowed down. Benetton Benetton, incorporated in 1965 in Italy, emphasized brightly colored knitwear. It achieved prominence in the 1980s and 1990s for its controversial advertising and as a network organization that outsourced activities that were labor-intensive or scale-insensitive to subcontractors. But Benetton actually invested relatively heavily in controlling other production activities. Where it was investment-light was downstream: it sold its production through licensees, often entrepreneurs with no more than $100,000 to invest in a small outlet that could sell only Benetton products. While Benetton was fast at certain activities such as dyeing, it looked for its retailing business to provide significant forward order books for its manufacturing business and was therefore geared to operate on lead times of several months. Benetton’s format appeared to hit saturation by the early 1990s and profitability continued to slide through the rest of the 1990s. In response, it embarked on a strategy of narrowing product lines, further consolidating key production activities by grouping them into “production poles” in a number of different regions, and expanding or focusing existing outlets while