48 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 49 the manifest to the Chinese customs authorities,who then in company with local customs authority as a fait accompli.At any rate,the court did not the procurator and captain measured the ship for anchorage dues (the give up direct control in the case of Canton,where the bulk of foreign measurement fee).After 1578 the Portuguese merchants at Macao were trade was already concentrated. able,by a judicious use of presents,to establish the custom of going to The first "Hoppo"or Superintendent of Maritime Customs for Kwang- Canton themselves to buy cargoes for export,so that export duties came tung was appointed in 1685 as a representative of the Imperial Household to be collected by the local authorities of Canton.For the Portuguese alone Department (Nei-wu-fu)at Peking.His job was to collect the duties on the the dues and duties were,reputedly,reduced two-thirds.In this way,by the foreign trade of Canton and remit them to the Board of Revenue at the end of the Ming,the manner of taxing foreign trade had been modified. capital (the Hu-pu),from which some say he derived his famous Western Instead of the traditional control by officials from the court who both re- name of Hoppo.15 He controlled the central offices in Canton;the native ceived tribute-bearing envoys and taxed the merchants in their train,foreign customs (ta-kuan)and inspectors of foreign trade at Macao;and offices trade was for a time taxed by the local and provincial authorities for their under deputies (wei-yuan)at five central ports in the Canton delta. own needs and advantage. The innumerable streams and channels through which the waters of the (2)In the first forty years of Manchu rule,from 1644 to 1684,foreign West River and the Pearl River made their way between Canton city and trade was inhibited by internal disorder and especially by the prohibition the sea created,however,a most difficult administrative problem.The of sea intercourse after 1661,when the new dynasty combatted the rebel policing of such an area,inhabited by fishermen and pirates who could Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung)in Formosa by forbidding Chinese on the not be differentiated,and comprising several hundred square miles,required coast to sail abroad.In 1679 the Manchus used the same expedient which a strong preventive organization.The local officials must sincerely co- the Ming had used against Japanese pirates and ordered the coastal and operate if the emperor were to receive even a part of his revenues.A long island populations to move inland.1s Merchant junks going abroad were struggle seems to have resulted between dynastic and provincial interests, severely restricted.Western contact was consequently limited and dependent marked by periodic reforms of the administration.About 1724 the office upon the Western merchants'arrangements with the local officials at ports of Hoppo was abolished and the management of the customs vested in the like Canton and Amoy.Direct Sino-European trade was at last made pos- local authorities under the supervision of the provincial governor,who was sible by the lifting of the imperial ban on sea intercourse in 1684 after the to remit the duties according to the regulations.In 1729,the Hoppo's pacification of Formosa.Western traders had by then become interested in office was reestablished but underwent various vicissitudes until 1750.16 silk products,which they first found in Siam,as well as in tea,which was One reason for these frequent administrative changes,aside from local entering upon its vogue in Europe. rivalry,was given in an edict of 1734 which pointed out that an official (3)The seventy-five years from 1685 to 1759 were a period of multi- sent directly from the court,though he could organize a reliable adminis- port trade,during which the English and other European companies tried tration of his own,nevertheless had no official connection with the local out the market in a fitful manner at Canton,Amoy,Foochow,and Ningpo. authorities,who therefore offered his establishment no cooperation,and (4)The eventual confinement of this trade to Canton during the period indeed often created friction which permitted smuggling and piracy.The of eighty-two years from I76o to 1842,came as the final solution to the Hoppo's functioning had therefore been impeded.To remedy the situation Chinese problem of control and administration.Since the growth of the the emperor gave the Kwangtung governor-general and governor concur- Canton system was continuous during these last two periods,they may be rent charge of all minor ports,so that they could impeach local officials considered together even though from the Western point of view they were who did not cooperate with the Hoppo and the customs.Meanwhile the successive phases. Hoppo would handle the collection and remission of duties as before,inde- Evolution of the Canton system.After 1685 the Ch'ing established a pendently of the governor-general and governor.17 Soon thereafter,the system of customs control partly by local officials and partly by an agent Kwangtung maritime customs appear to have been under joint control. sent from the court.14 The governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang and the From 175o on,the Hoppo collected the duties,but his report to the Board Tartar-general of Fukien (the highest Manchu military authority in the was made conjointly with the governor-general.Eventually,after 1792,the province)were put in charge of the maritime customs in their respective governor-general and governor reported secretly to the Board every month, areas,so that they became assimilated to the provincial administration. and at the year's end their reports were compared with the collections re- This relinquishment of central control perhaps recognized the growth of ported by the Hoppo
48 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS the manifest to the Chinese customs authorities, who then in company with the procurator and captain measured the ship for anchorage dues (the measurement fee). After I578 the Portuguese merchants at Macao were able, by a judicious use of presents, to establish the custom of going to Canton themselves to buy cargoes for export, so that export duties came to be collected by the local authorities of Canton. For the Portuguese alone the dues and duties were, reputedly, reduced two-thirds. In this way, by the end of the Ming, the manner of taxing foreign trade had been modified. Instead of the traditional control by officials from the court who both received tribute-bearing envoys and taxed the merchants in their train, foreign trade was for a time taxed by the local and provincial authorities for their own needs and advantage. (2) In the first forty years of Manchu rule, from I644 to I684, foreign trade was inhibited by internal disorder and especially by the prohibition of sea intercourse after I66I, when the new dynasty combatted the rebel Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung) in Formosa by forbidding Chinese on the coast to sail abroad. In I679 the Manchus used the same expedient which the Ming had used against Japanese pirates and ordered the coastal and island populations to move inland.13 Merchant junks going abroad were severely restricted. Western contact was consequently limited and dependent upon the Western merchants' arrangements with the local officials at ports like Canton and Amoy. Direct Sino-European trade was at last made possible by the lifting of the imperial ban on sea intercourse in I684 after the pacification of Formosa. Western traders had by then become interested in silk products, which they first found in Siam, as well as in tea, which was entering upon its vogue in Europe. (3) The seventy-five years from I685 to I759 were a periQd of multiport trade, during which the English and other European companies tried out the market in a fitful manner at Canton, Amoy, Foochow, and Ningpo. (4) The eventual confinement of this trade to Canton during the period of eighty-two years from I760 to I842, came as the final solution to the Chinese problem of control and administration. Since the growth of the Canton system was continuous during these last two periods, they may be considered together even though from the Western-point of view they were successive phases. Evolution of the Canton system. After I685 the Ch'ing established a system of customs control partly by local officials and partly by an agent sent from the court.14 The governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang and the Tartar-general of Fukien (the highest Manchu military authority in the province) were put in charge of the maritime customs in their respective areas, so that they became assimilated to the provincial administration. This relinquishment of central control perhaps recognized the growth of CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 49 local customs authority as a fait accompli. At any rate, the court did not give up direct control in the case of Canton, where the bulk of foreign trade was already concentrated. The first "Hoppo" or Superintendent of Maritime Customs for Kwangtung was appointed in I685 as a representative of the Imperial Household Department (Nei-wu-fu) at Peking. His job was to collect the duties on the foreign trade of Canton and remit them to the Board of Revenue at the capital (the H u-pu), from which some say he derived his famous Western name of HOppO.15 He controlled the central offices in Canton; the native customs (ta-kuan) and inspectors of foreign trade at Macao; and offices under deputies (wei-yuan) at five central ports in the Canton delta. The innumerable streams and channels through which the waters of the West River and the Pearl River made their way between Canton city and the sea created, however, a most difficult administrative problem. The policing of such an area, inhabited by fishermen and pirates who could not be differentiated, and comprising several hundred square miles, required a strong preventive organization. The local officials must sincerely cooperate if the emperor were to receive even a part of his revenues. A long struggle seems to have resulted between dynastic and provincial interests, marked by periodic reforms of the administration. About I724 the office of Hoppo was abolished and the management of the customs vested in the local authorities under the supervision of the provincial governor, who was to remit the duties according to the regulations. In I729, the Hoppo's office was reestablished but underwent various vicissitudes until I750.16 One reason for these frequent administrative changes, aside from local rivalry, was given in an edict of I734 which pointed out that an official sent directly from the court, though he could organize a reliable administration of his own, nevertheless had no official connection with the local authorities, who therefore offered his establishment no cooperation, and indeed often created friction which permitted smuggling and piracy. The Hoppo's functioning had therefore been impeded. To remedy the situation the emperor gave the Kwangtung governor-general and governor concurrent charge of all minor ports, so that they could impeach local officials who did not cooperate with the Hoppo and the customs. Meanwhile the Hoppo would handle the collection and remission of duties as before , independently of the governor-general and governorP Soon thereafter, the Kwangtung maritime customs appear to have been under joint control. From I 7 50 on, the Hoppo collected the duties, but his report to the Board was made conjointly with the governor-general. Eventually, after I792, the governor-general and governor reported secretly to the Board every month and at the year's end their reports were compared with the collections re~ ported by the Hoppo
CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 50 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS 51 Thus all the high officials on the spot at Canton came to have a connec- efforts at Canton on the part of one or another local official to set up his tion,official as well as private,with the foreign trade of the port.A fixed own monopolist of foreign trade in the person of a single hong,known to the sum was expected by Peking,to which,in course of time,certain fixed Westerners as "the Emperor's merchant,""the Governor's merchant"or the "surpluses"were added.Amounts in excess of these fixed sums were to like.In the formative period of the early eighteenth century,the governor- be reported if and as collected;18 this left the Hoppo free to choose between general,the Tartar-general,and others including the Kwangtung governor pleasing his imperial master and profiting his own pocket.He was invari- tried in this way to engross the profits of trade,each through his own agent. ably a Manchu and held office usually for three years,during which,as Dr. Finally in 1720,aided apparently by the sudden demise of one of the Morse puts it,"it took the net profit of the first year of his tenure to monopolists of the day,the Thirteen Hongs(their number varied from time obtain his office,of the second year to keep it,and of the third year to drop to time)were able to form themselves into a monopolistic guild,the Cohong it and provide for himself."1 (kung-hang),thus providing a broader and more continuous base for Meanwhile,the Hoppo and his official rivals at Canton had followed the monopoly regulation.The firms which took this action in 1720 subscribed tradition of using a group of Chinese merchants as their agents.This by a blood oath to a code of thirteen articles which governed their com- mercantile body,best known as the Cohong,was the product of a long mercial practices and enabled them to put up a common front against both evolution which,being unofficial,is not easy to document.20 Evidences have the foreigners and the officials. been found that the Canton Superintendency of Merchant Shipping in the From then on,though not without much pulling and hauling,the Canton late Ming period had begun to employ a group of thirty-six brokerage firms system took firm shape.In 1745 the security merchant system was insti- (ya-kang)as agents in the supervision of foreign trade.These middlemen tuted,some one hong being required to assume responsibility for each were comparable to the salt brokers who were licensed by the government to foreign ship,its conduct,and its duties.By 1760 European trade had been supervise the management of that official monopoly.They were also in the confined to Canton,and the tea and silk trades there to the Cohong.Its tradition of the Chinese merchant guilds organized in major lines of trade. members were divided into three classes,one of which dealt with European The famous Thirteen Hongs of Canton (hang or kong means business merchants.The forms of taxation had proliferated.The famous restrictions firm)dated as a recognized body from the seventeenth century,if not also on the freedom of Europeans in the Thirteen Factories were promulgated. from the Ming,and of course antedated the Cohong which was created by In the period of the Canton trade's best days,1760-1834,the hong mer- them in 1720.As agents of the government,the heads of these Thirteen chants assumed more and more duties.They not only settled prices,sold Hongs now acquired a certain official status,such as the ninth official rank goods,guaranteed duties,restrained the foreigners,negotiated with them, and the title of kuan (official)or at first ksis (bachelor)-later known controlled smuggling,and leased the factories to them;they also had to to foreigners as the suffixes qua and shaw,respectively,as in the name of manage all the aspects of a banking business,act as interpreting agencies, their most famous member,Howqua (see further details in Ch.14 below). support the militia and educational institutions,and make all manner of Several of the early hong merchants were from Fukien,but at least three presents and contributions to the authorities far and near.21 came from Kwangtung and one from Anhwei.Their activities in foreign Oficial profit and imperial policy.Among the many ramifications of the trade early became concentrated in the suburb outside the southwest wall Canton system which cannot here be touched upon,one fact stands out- of the city of Canton where the "foreign quarter"(Jan-fang)had flourished that the Cohong was the agent and not the principal on the Chinese side. as early as the Sung period.With the growth of foreign trade in the eight- This is most evident in the long history of bankruptcy and failure among eenth century their functions steadily increased and eventually became its members.One of the most persistent foreign complaints was that the almost as much political as commercial. hong merchants were perpetually insolvent and in need of capital-hence Originally the Thirteen Hongs had supervised the trade of natives of the their foreign debts,which eventually became an international complication Southern Ocean (Nan-yang),that is,Malaya,the Straits,and the Indies. The principal on the Chinese side of the Canton trade was the imperial Only later did they begin to devote most of their attention to the European bureaucracy which fed the imperial coffers and lined its pockets without trade at Canton (they never concerned themselves with the Portuguese at satiety.The evidence abounds and need not be adduced at this point.22 Macao).This fits our picture of European trade as growing up from small Year after year the profits of China's maritime trade (among which the beginnings within the framework of commercial relations already well es- formal revenue hardly held a candle to the informal presents and contri- tablished between China and Southeast Asia.For some time there were butions made by both the Cohong and the Hoppo)flowed toward Peking
50 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS Thus all the high officials on the spot at Canton came to have a connection, official as well as private" with the foreign trade of. the port .. A fixed sum was expected by Peking, to which, in course of tIme, certam fixed "surpluses" were added. Amounts in excess of these fixed sums were to be reported if and as collected; 18 this left the Hoppo free to choose b:twee~ pleasing his imperial master and profiting his own pocke~. He ,;as 1Ovanably a Manchu and held office usually for three years, dunng W.hICh" as Dr. Morse puts it "it took the net profit of the first year of hIS tenure to obtain his offi~e, of the second year to keep it, and of the third year to drop 'd f hi If " 19 it and provi e or mse. Meanwhile, the Hoppo and his official rivals at Canton h~d followed t~e tradition of using a group of' Chinese merchants as theIr agents. ThIS mercantile body, best known as the Cohong, was the ~~oduc:t of a long evolution which, being unofficial, is not easy to document. E~Ide~ce~ have been found that the Canton Superintendency of Merchant Shlpp10g 10 the late Ming period had begun to employ a group of thirty-six broker~ge firms (ya-hang) as agents in the supervision offoreign trade. These mIddlemen were comparable to the salt brokers who were licensed by the governm~nt to supervise the management of that official monopoly: The~ we~e also 10 the tradition of the Chinese merchant guilds orgamzed 10 major hnes of t~ade. The famous Thirteen Hongs of Canton (hang or hong mean~ busmess firm) dated as a recognized body from the seventeenth century, If not also from the Ming, and of course antedated the Cohong which was creat~d by them in 1720. As agents of the government, the heads o~ these ~hlrteen Hongs now acquired a certain official status, s.uch as the mnth offiCIal rank and the title of kuan (official) or at first hszu (b~chelor) ~later known to foreigners as the suffixes qua and shaw, respectIvely, as 10 the name of their most famous member Howqua (see further details in Ch. 14 below). Several of the early hong ~erchants were fro:n Fu~ien, ~u~ ~t l~ast th:ee came from Kwangtung and one from Anhwel. The~r actIVItIes 10 foreign trade early became concentrated in the suburb outSIde the southwest. wall of the city of Canton where the "foreign quarter" (fa~-fang) h~d floun~hed as early as the Sung period. With the growth of foreIgn trade 10 the eIghteenth century their functions steadily increased and eventually became almost as much political as commercial. . O ., 11 the Thirteen Hongs had supervised the trade of natIves of the ngma y . d hId' Southern Ocean (Nan-yang), that is, Malaya,. the Str~Its, an ten Ies. Only later did they begin, to devote most of theIr atte~tlOn to the European trade at Canton (they never concerned themselves WIth ~he Portuguese at M 0) This fits our picture of European trade as grow1Og up from small aca. . l' ld 11 b . nl'ngs within the framework of commercIal re atlOns a rea Y we esegm .' th tablished between China and Southeast ASIa. For some tIme ere were CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 51 efforts at Canton on the part of one or another local official to set up his own monopolist of foreign trade in the person ofa single hong, known to the Westerners as "the Emperor's merchant," "the Governor's merchant" or the like. In the formative period of the early eighteenth century, the governorgeneral, the Tartar-general, and others including the Kwangtung governor tried in this way to engross the profits of trade, each through his own agent. Finally in 1720, aidecl apparently by the sudden demise of one of the monopolists of the day, the Thirteen Hongs (their number varied from time to time) were able to form themselves into a monopolistic guild, the Cohong (kung-hang), thus providing a broader and more continuous base for monopoly regulation. The firms which took this action in 1720 subscribed by a blood oath to a code of thirteen articles which governed their commercial practices and enabled them to put up a common front against both the foreigners and the officials. From then on, though not without much pulling and hauling, the Canton system took firm shape. In 1745 the security merchant system was instituted, some one hong being required to assume responsibility for each foreign ship, its conduct, and its duties. By 1760 European trade had been confined to Canton, and the tea and silk trades there to the Cohong. Its members were divided into three classes, one of which dealt with European merchants. The forms of \llxation had proliferated. The famous restrictions on the freedom of Europeans in the Thirteen Factories were promulgated. In the period of the Canton trade's best days, 1760-1834, the hong merchants assumed more and more duties. They not only settled prices, sold goods, guaranteed duties, restrained the foreigners, negotiated with them, controlled smuggling, and leased the factories to them; they also had to manage all the aspects of a banking business, act as interpreting agencies, support the militia and educational institutions, and make all manner of presents and contributions to the authorities far and near.21 Official profit and imperial policy. Among the many ramifications of the Canton system which cannot here be touched upon, one fact stands outthat the Cohong was the agent and not the principal on the Chinese side. This is most evident in the long history of bankruptcy and failure among its members. One of the most persistent foreign complaints was that the hong merchants were perpetually insolvent and in need of capital- hence their foreign debts, which eventually became an international complication. The principal on the Chinese side of the Canton trade was the imperial bureaucracy which fed the imperial coffers and lined its pockets without satiety. The evidence abounds and need not be adduced at this point.22 Year after year the profits of China's maritime trade (among which the formal revenue hardly held a candle to the informal presents and contributions made by both the Cohong and the Hoppo) flowed toward Peking
52 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 53 or were used upon the Yellow River conservancy or in the suppression of banditry in the interior,or enriched the mandarins.This is not suprising Yet,in spite of this policy,the Canton trade which had begun as a dis- and merely reflects the ancient domination of the mandarin over the mer- esteemed boon to the barbarian turned out in fact to be a rich private booty chant,a deeply imbedded characteristic of Chinese society which made it for the court and for one group of officials after another.The ingrained possible for a dynasty to affect indifference to trade and its taxation while rapacity thus produced among Chinese officialdom was to be one factor in its officials waxed fat upon it.In a sense,the imperial mandarinate had the collapse of the Canton system and later a problem for the British treaty merely transferred its inveterate parasitism from the wealth of the land to makers. the easy wealth of the maritime trade.Seen more sympathetically,the dynasty after ISoo was,no doubt,clutching at every straw to maintain From the various types of evidence adduced above it should be obvious itself.At all events,the result at Canton seems clear-a tradition of that China's unpreparedness for contact with the modern West was part "squeeze"was developed such as had seldom been equalled in Chinese his- and parcel of her old way of life.In modern times the economic and ad- tory,even allowing (as Sansom puts it)for the customary "difference be- ministrative patterns of the old society have been as much a handicap as tween principle and practice."2 the Confucian ideology or the theory of tribute relations,for no part of It is most significant that the fiscal importance of this growing foreign this well-knit and remarkably stable society could be remade without an trade seems never to have been acknowledged in the official ideology of eventual pulling apart and remaking of the whole structure.This has been the Manchu dynasty.The formal policy of the government remained anti- a century-long continuous process,marked by successive phases,among commercial,in keeping with the traditional idea that foreign trade was,at which the creation of the treaty system was the starting point. best,a boon granted to barbarians and,at worst,a channel through which the latter could spy out the strength and weakness of Chinese power.This defensive policy is reminiscent of more recent times.It forbade the outflow of saltpetre,gunpowder and iron goods.It prohibited foreigners bearing arms on Chinese soil,and tried to prevent their studying the Chinese scene either by wintering at Canton,buying certain Chinese books,or learning the language.Toward the promotion of foreign trade the policy of the Ch'ing government at Peking was purely opportunist.It usually handicapped rather than aided the Chinese merchant.When the Dutch massacred Chinese merchants at Batavia in 1741,an angry proposal to stop the Dutch trade with China was overruled and the Hoppo expediently asked two Dutch ships to trade at Macao so as to avoid trouble at Canton.Rather than support Chinese merchants abroad,the court was inclined to forbid their going there and to call them home.Peking seems to have been fearful of overseas commercial expansion on the part of Chinese merchants.Thus the Ch'ing government opposed rather than assisted the extensive and in- creasing activity of Chinese merchants in conducting tributary trade with China on behalf of states like Siam and the small sultanates of the Malay peninsula.The sizable community of Chinese traders who already lived overseas and were in large part the actual operators of the tributary trade, were ignored in the formulation of imperial policy.When Siamese tribute vessels came to Canton in 1807 in the charge of Fukienese and Cantonese, the Canton authorities secured the issuance of an imperial edict which de- nounced Chinese merchants who conducted the tributary trade of foreign countries and declared that they should be treated as traitors.24
52 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS or w~re u~ed upon the Yellow River conservancy or in the suppression of bandItry m the interior, or enriched the mandarins. This is not suprising and merely reflects the ancient domination of the mandarin over the merchant, a deeply imbedded characteristic of Chinese society which made it possible for a dynasty to affect indifference to trade and its taxation while its officials waxed fat upon it. In a sense, the imperial mandarinate had merely transferred its inveterate parasitism from the wealth of the land to the easy wealth of the maritime trade. Seen more sympathetically, the dynasty after 1800 was, no doubt, clutching at every straw to maintain itself. At all events, the result at Canton seems clear - a tradition of "squeeze" was developed such as had seldom been equalled in Chinese history, even allowing (as Sansom puts it) for the customary "difference between principle and practice." 23 It is most significant that the fiscal importance of this growing foreign trade seems never to have been acknowledged in the official ideology of the Manchu dynasty. The formal policy of the government remained anticommercial, in keeping with the traditional idea that foreign trade was at best, a boon granted to barbarians and, at worst, a channel through which the latter could spy out the strength and weakness of Chinese power. This defensive policy is reminiscent of more recent times. It forbade the outflow of saltpetre: gunpo.wder an? iron goods. It prohibited foreigners bearing a;ms on Ch~nese.sOII, and tned to prevent their studying the Chinese scene eIther by wmtenng at Canton, buying certain Chinese books, or learning the language. Towar? the promotion of foreign trade the policy of the Ch'ing government at Peking was purely opportunist. It usually handicapped rather than aided the Chinese merchant. When the Dutch massacred Chinese .merch~nts at Batavia in 1741, an angry proposal to stop the Dutch trade WIt? Chma was overruled and the Hoppo expediently asked two Dutch ShIPS to trade at Macao so as to avoid trouble at Canton. Rather than support Chinese merchants abroad, the court was inclined to forbid their going there and to call them home. Peking seems to have been fearful of overseas commercial expansion on the part of Chinese merchants Thus the Ch'ing government opposed rather than assisted the extensive ;nd increasing activity of Chinese merchants in conducting tributary trade with Chi?a on behalf ?f states like Si~m and the small sultanates of the Malay penmsula. The SIzable commumty of Chinese traders who already lived overs~as and were in large part the actual operators of the tributary trade were Ignored in the formulation of imperial policy. When Siamese tribut~ vessels came to Canton in 1807 in the charge of Fukienese and Cantonese the Canton authorities secured the issuance of an imperial edict which de~ nounced Chinese merchants who conducted the tributary trade of foreign countries and declared that they should be treated as traitors.24 CH'INC POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 53 Yet, in spite of this policy, the Canton trade which had begun as a disesteemed boon to the barbarian turned out in fact to be a rich private booty for the court and for one group of officials after another. The ingrained rapacity thus produced among Chinese officialdom was to be one factor in the collapse of the Canton system and later a problem for the British treaty makers. From the various types of evidence adduced above it should be obvious that China's unpreparedness for contact with the modern West was part and parcel of her old wa~of life. In modern times the economic and administrative patterns of the old society have been as much a handicap as the Confucian ideology or the theory of tribute relations, for no part of this well-knit and remarkably stable society could be remade without an eventual pulling apart and remaking of the whole structure. This has been a century-long continuous process, marked by successive phases, among which the creation of the treaty system was the starting point
PART II THE FIRST BRITISH TREATY SETTLEMENT 1842-43
\ PART II THE FIRST BRITISH TREATY SETTLEMENT 1842-43
CHAPTER IV OPIUM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE CANTON SYSTEM THE BRITISH TREATIES oF 1842-43,so justly celebrated as the foundation of China's century-long "unequal"relations with the West,were charters which promised a new order in Chinese foreign affairs.But as with so many famous constitutional documents,the rights,duties,and procedures speci- fied in the treaties were at first no more than words on paper (indeed, it was later found that some of the English and Chinese words differed). The fact that these legal documents of 1842-43 actually foreshadowed the new order of Sino-Western relations,instead of becoming waste paper like so many other solemn post-war compacts,is due to the way they were drawn up,through trial and error,by men on the spot,one side being backed by superior force.The treaties were not British-made blueprints but Anglo-Chinese compromises.They took account of Chinese values and institutions almost as much as Western.They were end-products of a cen- tury of Anglo-Chinese relations and must first be studied in the context of the old Canton system which they were meant to replace.The next several chapters recount the breakdown of this system,the war and negotiations which followed,and the process by which a rule of law was agreed upon for the legal foreign trade of China,while informal arrangements still remained the most that could be devised to regulate the opium trade.The chief defect of the first treaty settlement was the failure to bring fully within its scheme of things that expanding drug trade which had so largely contributed to the collapse of the old order at Canton. The Hoppo and the Cohong have both been portrayed so vividly in Western records that their urbane relations with the British East India Company have taken on the color of a golden age.The old Canton trade, before 1834,was indeed a picturesque meeting ground for the hong mer- chants and the Honorable Company,who dominated their respective sides of the Sino-foreign commerce in teas and silks,and the Canton scene has been described by many writers.1 Our interest here,however,is not the Canton trade in its halcyon days but rather the evils which beset it and the unsolved problems which it left behind.The pathology of the Canton system developed in three different areas-first among the Chinese offi- cials,whose corruption has been mentioned above,second among the private traders,and third in the opium trade.The old Canton system finally broke down when venal Chinese officials and Western private traders joined hands
·.1 1 /il 'II Iii Iii 1·1 I I, II . i' , CHAPTER IV OPIUM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE CANTON SYSTEM THE BRITISH TREATIES OF 1842-43, so justly celebrated as the foundation of China's century-long "unequal" relations with the West, were charters which promised a new order in Chinese foreign affairs. But as with so many famous constitutional documents, the rights, duties, and procedures specified in the treaties were at first no more than words on paper (indeed, it was later found that some of the English and Chinese words differed). The fact that these legal documents of 1842-43 actually foreshadowed the new order of Sino-Western relations, instead of becoming waste paper like so many other solemn post"war compacts, is due to the way they were drawn up, through trial and error, by men on the spot, one side being backed by superior force. The treaties were not British-made blueprints but Anglo-Chinese compromises. They took account of Chinese values and institutions almost as much as Western. They were end-products of a century of Anglo-Chinese relations and must first be studied in the context of "the old Canton syst~m which they were meant to replace. The next several chapters recount the breakdown of this system, the war and negotiations which followed, and the process by which a rule of law was agreed upon for the legal foreign trade of China, while informal arrangements still remained the most that could be devised to regulate the opium trade. The chief defect of the first treaty settlement was the failure to bring fully within its scheme of things that expanding drug trade which had so largely contributed to the collapse of the old order at Canton. The Hoppo and the Cohong have both been portrayed so vividly in Western records that their urbane relations with the British East India Company have taken on the color of a golden age. The old Canton trade, before 1834, was indeed a picturesque meeting ground for the hong merchants and the Honorable Company, who dominated their respective sides of the Sino-foreign commerce in teas and silks, and the Canton scene has been described by many writers.l Our interest here, however, is not the Canton trade in its halcyon days but rather the evils which beset it and the unsolved problems which it left behind. The pathology of the Canton system developed in three different areas - first among the Chinese officials, whose corruption has been mentioned above, second among the private traders, and third in the opium trade. The old Canton system finally broke down when venal Chinese officials and Western private traders joined hands