《近代中国对外关系史 The History of Modern China's Foreign Relations》课程教学资源（阅读材料）John King Fairbank - Trade and Diploma on the China Coast

38 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS motivation was commercial,this evidence lends strong support to the theory that tribute missions functioned chiefly as a vehicle for trade.Whether the commercial profits were gained by the tributary rulers and their merchants CHAPTER III or mainly by Chinese merchants and officials remains to be investigated. At least in the case of Siam the missions came over a route dominated by the Chinese junk trade.The arrival of this tribute at the Chinese court CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM was therefore an ill omen,a sign of the rising tide of maritime trade con- ducted by Chinese merchants,with the help of which the merchants of the ANOTHER SOURCE OF CHINA's WEAKNESS in dealing with the problem of West were about to burst the dike of the tribute system and invade the Western trade lay in the Manchu dynasty.By the same factors which gave Middle Kingdom.It is a fascinating question whether the court was not, them strength on the Inner Asian frontiers of China,these alien rulers on the contrary,lulled into a false sense of security by this apparent in- were handicapped in facing the maritime West. crease of barbarian submissiveness.This prostitution of the tribute system The Manchu position in China.As the last and most successful of the for commercial ends seems to have confirmed the Chinese idea of superior- half dozen invaders of North China,the Manchus had profited by the trials ity just when it was most urgently necessary to get rid of it. and errors of many precursors,whose record is only beginning to be seri- ously examined.It is now plain that the early barbarian dynasties of Siam was recorded as sending tribute only eleven times in the one hundred and fifteen years from 1662 to 1776,an average of about one year in ten instead of one in three as required by statute.But conquest did not become“absorbed'”or“assimilated.”Beginning with the in the next seventy-seven years from 1777 through 1853.Siamese missions were recorded thirty-eight times, and half again as frequently as the regulations prescribed! Ch'i-tan Mongols,who set up the Liao dynasty,these rulers"continued to by sea along the main cosstal trade route maintain the center of their political and military power in their old tribal connecting Canton with Soutbeast Asia and the Straits.Tribute from Burma came only three times before 1788;from then until I853 it came thirteen times,an average of once in five years instead of territory."1 They did not abandon their tribal culture nor its political and once In ten years as prescrbed.Tribute from Laos came seventeen times between r7so and I853. military organization.They continued to be mainly pastoral people or- averaging somewhat beiter than the statutory decade.Sulu is recorded only seven times,between176 and 1754,and may be left out of account. ganized on a tribal basis.While ruling in North China,they also had a homeland beyond the Wall. In similar fashion,the Chin,Yuan,and Ch'ing rulers all maintained cen- ters of their native life outside of China proper.This gave rise to a profound dualism in their economy and society and also in their administration.The Chinese were agricultural while the Ch'i-tan and their successors relied upon stock-breeding,hunting,and some fishing.Different regulations and standards of treatment were applied to the Chinese and the barbarian populations.In the bureaucracy,key positions were normally reserved for the conquerors,and barbarian military domination was preserved.This duality applied to all aspects of both societies-food,clothing,religious observances,kinship relations,and many other cultural traits.The Jurchen who set up the Chin dynasty maintained their cultural and political inde- pendence of the Chinese.For example,they continued to use their own language and script,parallel to Chinese,in official documents.When one looks at the Yuan dynasty of the Mongols,the division between Chinese and barbarian is even more striking.Wittfogel and Feng call it a"brutally divided world,"in which Marco Polo could become a bureaucrat under the Mongols and have only minimal acquaintance with the Chinese language and people.Like their predecessors,the Mongols of the Yuan dynasty ex- erted a military domination,used their own language parallel to Chinese in administration,and forbade Mongol intermarriage with Chinese.Indeed,the

38 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS motivation was commercial, this evidence lends strong support to the theory that tribute missions functioned chiefly as a vehicle for trade. Whether the commercial profits were gained by the tributary rulers and their merchants or mainly by Chinese merchants and officials remains to be investigated. At least in the case of Siam the missions came over a route dominated by the Chinese junk trade. The arrival of this tribute at the Chinese court was therefore an ill omen, a sign of the rising tide of maritime trade con￾ducted by Chinese merchants, with the help of which the merchants of the West were about to burst the dike of the tribute system and invade the Middle Kingdom. It is a fascinating question whether the court was not, on the contrary, lulled into a false sense of security by this apparent in￾crease of barbarian submissiveness. This prostitution of the tribute system for commercial ends seems to have confirmed the Chinese idea of superior￾ity just when it was most urgently necessary to get rid of it. Siam was recorded as sending tribute only eleven times in the one hundred and fifteen years from 1662 to 1776, an average of about one year in ten instead of one in three as required by statute. But in the next seventy-seven years from 1777 through 1853, Siamese missions were recorded thirty-eight times, on the average every other year, and half again as frequently as the regulations prescribed! Significance is added by the fact that Siamese tribute came by sea along the main coastal trade route connecting Canton with Southeast Asia and the Straits. Tribute from Burma came only three times before 1788; from then until 1853 it came thirteen times, an average of once in five years instead of once in ten years as prescribed. Tribute from Laos came seventeen times between 1730 and 1853, averaging somewhat better than the statutory decade. Sulu is recorded only seven times, between 1726 and '754, and may be left out of account. CHAPTER III CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM ANOTHER SOURCE OF CHINA'S WEAKNESS in dealing with the problem of Western trade lay in the Manchu dynasty. By the same factors which gave them strength on the Inner Asian frontiers of China, these alien rulers were handicapped in facing the maritime West. The Manchu position in China. As the last and most successful of the half dozen invaders of North China, the Manchus had profited by the trials and errors of many precursors, whose record is only beginning to be seri￾ously examined. It is now plain that the early barbarian dynasties of conquest did not become "absorbed" or "assimilated." Beginning with the Ch'i-tan Mongols, who set up the Liao dynasty, these rulers "continued to maintain the center of their political and military power in their old tribal territory." 1 They did not abandon their tribal culture nor its political and military organization. They continued to be mainly pastoral people or￾ganized on a tribal basis. While ruling in North China, they also had a homeland beyond the Wall. In similar fashion, the Chin, Yuan, and Ch'ing rulers all maintained cen￾ters of their native life outside of China proper. This gave rise to a profound dualism in their economy and society and also in their administration. The Chinese were agricultural while the Ch'i-tan and their successors relied upon stock-breeding, hunting, and some fishing. Different regulations and standards of treatment were applied to the Chinese and the barbarian populations. In the bureaucracy, key positions were normally reserved for the conquerors, and barbarian military domination was preserved. This duality applied to all aspects of both societies - food, clothing, religious observances, kinship relations, and many other cultural traits. The Jurchen who set up the Chin dynasty maintained their cultural and political inde￾pendence of the Chinese. For example, they continued to use their own language and script, parallel to Chinese, in official documents. When one looks at the Yuan dynasty of the Mongols, the division between Chinese and barbarian is even more striking. Wittfogel and Feng call it a "brutally divided world," in which Marco Polo could become a bureaucrat under the Mongols and have only minimal acquaintance with the Chinese language and people. Like their predecessors, the Mongols of the Yuan dynasty ex￾erted a military domination, used their own language parallel to Chinese in administration, and forbade Mongol intermarriage with Chinese. Indeed, the

40 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS CHING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 41 rigor with which the Mongols remained separate from Chinese society, 1668-partly,it must be noted,to preserve the valuable monopoly of gin- constantly reinforced as they were through their contact with the Mongol seng(a supposedly rejuvenative root)by the imperial household,and partly homeland on the steppe,had much to do with their failure to retain control also,to keep Chinese settlers from the hunting lands.3 For this purpose over China in the fourteenth century.Wittfogel suggests that this situa- they built the famous willow palisade which stretched for several hundred tion,in which the barbarian conquerors preserved themselves as a non- miles in a great arc from the Wall at Shanhaikuan to the north of Kirin Chinese social group in China,may be termed symbiosis:cultural exchange and southeastward to the Yalu river.This was not,of course,for defense did not result in the creation of a new homogeneous culture but merely in but to mark a boundary as a means of checking Chinese migration beyond the coexistence of two mutually adapted cultures. it.In spite of the inevitable overflow of Chinese migrants into the Three By the time of the Manchu conquest in 1644,it was possible for this Eastern Provinces,Manchuria in effect remained a vacuum down to the symbiosis to be consciously institutionalized by a mixture of political, late nineteenth century.Thus it is that Manchuria today is a new country military,social and cultural arrangements.Perhaps under the Ch'ing it ap- with but a brief tradition of civil government from Peking. proached more closely a"synthesis"between the Chinese and their highly The racial purity of the conquerors was also preserved by the ban on sinicized rulers.Nevertheless,something of the spirit of earlier conquerors intermarriage with Chinese.Manchu separatism was emphasized by the ban persisted,and the Manchus sought vigorously to maintain their separate on Manchus engaging in trade and other activities in competition with identity while minimizing their barbarian origin. Chinese.Manchu women were customarily allowed much greater social In politics the Manchus'first policy,as an alien dynasty on the defensive, freedom than Chinese women.In addition to these practices,the clan was to champion the established order.They took over the Ming govern- organization of the Manchus,supported by the religious system of shaman- ment almost as it stood,merely inserting themselves at the top.Their ad- ism,was preserved and used to prevent the assimilation of Manchus by the ministrative innovations,like the Grand Council,were made gradually and Chinese around them. unobtrusively.To the inherited political edifice they added certain safe- No argument is necessary to prove that the Manchus adapted their own guards of their power but these merely served to reinforce the traditional institutions to meet their major problem of holding power in China.Many structure.Change thus became their enemy. specific procedures were developed so that the conquerors might rule over The fundamental Manchu political problem was how to succeed where China in a Chinese way,but without becoming Chinese.For example,they the Mongols had failed.Like the Mongols they entered China as a small early arranged to use Chinese troops as an important though subordinate alien minority.But unlike the hordes of Monka and Khublai,they were from part of their military organization.Military control of China was sustained the beginning much closer to the Chinese in culture.?In their capital at by the banner organization of the Manchu nation-in-arms,from which Mukden they had imitated the Chinese court a generation before the in- were drawn garrisons stationed at strategic points in a military cordon cursion of 1644.There,in southern Manchuria,the settled arts had long around the symbol of imperial rule,Peking,and in big provincial centers superseded those of the steppe nomad and the forest hunter.Once at such as Chengtu,Nanking,Hangchow,Soochow and Canton.Meanwhile Peking the Manchu rulers became Confucian scholars and calligraphers, the Chinese provincial army (Li-ying,"Army of the Green Standard")was patrons of learning and of the arts in the Chinese tradition.They kept the little more than a provincial constabulary for use against bandits and was examination system and used a majority of Chinese in the provincial gov- never allowed to become a unified military power under central control. ernments.This system of joint Chinese and Manchu civil administration- In any situation of symbiosis,influences operate in both directions. a Manchu governor-general often being bracketed with two Chinese gov- Chinese institutions were themselves profoundly influenced by the succes- ernors-amounted to a sort of dyarchy.The Manchus were loyal and the sive barbarian conquerors,whose rule had a pervasive effect on many aspects Chinese did the work. of Chinese society.Barbarian influence is symbolized most vividly in the To preserve this dyarchy-Chinese administration under Manchu Chinese wearing of the queue under the Manchus.This was a compulsory supervision-the first essential was that the Manchu minority should sartorial custom which became part of everyday life among the masses and maintain its social identity.Several measures were taken to this end.Out- served as a constant reminder of Manchu domination. numbered as they were,a few million Manchus might easily have been Among their political innovations,the Manchu ruling house departed from lost in the great body of China if they had not preserved their homeland the Chinese tradition of primogeniture.The emperor's eldest son was not as a base.They therefore closed Manchuria to immigration from China in made a crown prince and the heir to the throne was chosen among all the

lli···.'.'.' ::,j' 40 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS rigor with which the Mongols remained separate from Chinese society, constantly reinforced as they were through their contact with the Mongol homeland on the steppe, had much to do with their failure to retain control over China in the fourteenth century. Wittfogel suggests that this situa￾tion, in which the barbarian conquerors preserved themselves as a non￾Chinese social group in China, may be termed symbiosis: cultural exchange did not result in the creation of a new homogeneous culture but merely in the coexistence of two mutually adapted cultures. By the time of the Manchu conquest in 1644, it was possible for this symbiosis to be consciously institutionalized by a mixture of political, military, social and cultural arrangements. Perhaps under the Ch'ing it ap￾proached more closely a "synthesis" between the Chinese and their highly sinicized rulers. Nevertheless, something of the spirit of earlier conquerors persisted, and the Manchus sought vigorously to maintain their separate identity while minimizing their barbarian origin. In politics the Manchus' first policy, as an alien dynasty on the defensive, was to champion the established order. They took over the Ming govern￾ment almost as it stood, merely inserting themselves at the top. Their ad￾ministrative innovations, like the Grand Council, were made gradually and unobtrusively. To the inherited political edifice they added certain safe￾guards of their power but these merely served to reinforce the traditional structure. Change thus became their enemy. The fundamental Manchu political problem was how to succeed where the Mongols had failed. Like the Mongols they entered China as a small alien minority. But unlike the hordes of Monka and Khublai, they were from the beginning much closer to the Chinese in culture.2 In their capital at Mukden they had imitated the Chinese court a generation before the in￾cursion of 1644. There, in southern Manchuria, the settled arts had long superseded those of the steppe nomad and the forest hunter. Once at Peking the Manchu rulers became Confucian scholars and calligraphers, patrons of learning and of the arts in the Chinese tradition. They kept the examination system and used a majority of Chinese in the provincial gov￾ernments. This system of joint Chinese and Manchu civil administration￾a Manchu governor-general often being bracketed with two Chinese gov￾ernors - amounted to a sort of dyarchy. The Manchus were loyal and the Chinese did the work. To preserve this dyarchy - Chinese administration under Manchu supervision - the first essential was that the Manchu minority should maintain its social identity. Several measures were taken to this end. Out￾numbered as they were, a few million Manchus might easily have been lost in the great body of China if they had not preserved their homeland as a base. They therefore closed Manchuria to immigration from China in CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 41 1668 -'- partly, it must be noted, to preserve the valuable monopoly of gin￾seng (a supposedly rejuvenative root) by the imperial household, and partly also, to keep Chinese settlers from the hunting lands.3 For this purpose they built the famous willow palisade which stretched for several hundred miles in a great arc from the Wall at Shanhaikuan to the north of Kirin and southeastward to the Yalu river. This was not, of course, for defense but to mark a boundary as a means of checking Chinese migration beyond it. In spite of the inevitable overflow of Chinese migrants into the Three Eastern Provinces, Manchuria in effect remained a vacuum down to the late nineteenth century. Thus it is that Manchuria today is a: new country with but a brief tradition of civil government from Peking. The racial purity of the conquerors was also preserved by the ban on intermarriage with Chinese. Manchu separatism was emphasized by the ban on Manchus engaging in trade and other activities in competition with Chinese. Manchu women were customarily allowed much greater social freedom than Chinese women. In addition to these practices, the clan organization of the Manchus, supported by the religious system of shaman￾ism, was preserved and used to prevent the assimilation of Manchus by the Chinese around them.4 No argument is necessary to prove that the Manchus adapted their own institutions to meet their major problem of holding power in China. Many specific procedures were developed so that the conquerors might rule over China in a Chinese way, but without becoming Chinese. For example, they early arranged to use Chinese troops as an important though subordinate part of their military organization. Military control of China was sustained by the banner organization of the Manchu nation-in-arms, from which were drawn garrisons stationed at strategic points in a military cordon around the symbol of imperial rule, Peking, and in big provincial centers such as Chengtu, Nanking, Hangchow, Soochow and Canton. Meanwhile the Chinese provincial army (Lu-ying, (CArmy of the Green Standard") was little more than a provincial constabulary for use against bandits and was never allowed to become a unified military power under central control. In any situation of symbiosis, influences operate in both directions. Chinese institutions were themselves profoundly influenced by the succes￾sive barbarian conquerors, whose rule had a pervasive effect on many aspects of Chinese society. Barbarian influence is symbolized most vividly in the Chinese wearing of the queue under the Manchus. This was a compulsory sartorial custom which became part of everyday life among the masses and served as a constant reminder of Manchu domination. Among their political innovations, the Manchu ruling house departed from the Chinese tradition of primogeniture. The emperor's eldest son was not made a crown prince and the heir to the throne was chosen among all the

42 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 43 sons,with greater benefit to the dynastic interest.The Ch'ing further Mongols was arranged to split up inherited lands and so prevent the rise sought to avoid the fate of the Yuan by preserving effective rule within the of a new Chinghis Khan or any feudal leader who might create a striking imperial clan,whose members were kept out of power to avoid family power upon the steppe through the organization of his personal following. squabbles over the succession.Until the late nineteenth century the im- Tribe was used against tribe.The Lamaist church was encouraged as a perial princes were not given important posts nor great wealth nor were balance to the power of the temporal princes. they made territorial lords.Government by women and by eunuchs was also This importance of Lamaism as a political tool in Mongolia naturally checked until after 1860.By such devices the Manchus succeeded in ruling reinforced the Ch'ing interest in Tibet.The Dalai Lama,temporal ruler at for 267 years over a Chinese population one hundred times more numerous. Lhasa,had received his title from a Mongol prince in the sixteenth cen- Behind all these safeguards lay a basic motive,the preservation of power. tury,and the Mongols had intervened at Lhasa and put the Dalai on the Manchu rule was from the first a contest to see how long an invading throne in 164I just before the Manchu entrance into China.5 It was not minority could rule the Chinese state;the welfare of China and its people unnatural,therefore,that the Manchu rulers became patrons of Lamaism was an essential but secondary consideration.To put it another way,there as a means of influence in both Tibet and Mongolia.The copy of the Dalai's was no use in any measure which might benefit the country but destroy the palace at Lhasa,the Potala,which was built at the Ch'ing emperors'sum- dynasty.Any attempt at a purely Chinese "national"policy might conflict mer capital at Ch'eng-te in Jehol,is a symbol of this interest.To forestall with dynastic policy.In the end,this division of counsels must be taken as Mongol control,the K'ang-hsi emperor intervened and established im- one cause of the debacle which overtook both the country and its rulers. perial residents (amban)at Lhasa in I720.This was followed by extensions This intricate Chinese-Manchu relationship awaits further analysis. Tentatively it may be useful to approach it through two channels,political of Ch'ing control in 175I and again after 1792. Activity on the Inner Asian frontiers of China had constituted the great and social.The political approach leads us to consider first the Manchu part of Ch'ing foreign relations.It is true that friction with Burma had led conduct of foreign relations. to hostilities in the r76o's and that there had also been friction with Annam Early Mancku foreign policy.This was by no means always the same as in the late eighteenth century.There was also,of course,contact with a Chinese foreign policy and was strongly colored by the fact that the Russia which led to the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689,the Russian mission Manchu empire embraced a good deal more than China proper.The Inner resident in Peking,and later intermittent relations in the northeast.The Mongols had become vassals of the Ch'ing before 1644.The vast areas of fact remains that Manchu foreign relations had been almost entirely con- Outer Mongolia,Tibet,and Turkestan where the Manchu power was later tinental and had been concentrated upon the problem of safeguarding the established became subject not to China but to the dynasty-a fact which was to provide the logical basis for their defection from the Chinese Re- Manchu position in China.This meant that the arrival of the English by public at the time of the revolution of rorI.Inner Asia until then was not sea posed utterly novel problems,and at the same time inspired the court at under China but under the Manchus.Thus until the nineteenth century Peking to act primarily with a view to preserving the political control over China which it had built up with such care. Inner Asia had been the focus of the dynasty's foreign policy,for there on the steppe was the great traditional source of danger.The legend of Chinghis Since the object of the alien conquerors was primarily to keep their politi- cal power,we might naturally expect their influence to be greatest on Khan and his successors and the long struggle between the Mongols and the Chinese political institutions,especially on the monarchy.The hypothesis Ming dynasty in the early fifteenth century were still in the memory of may be advanced that the Confucian monarchy in the last six or seven Peking.The security of the Mongol border was,therefore,considered all hundred years of its existence was profoundly molded and influenced by important.Successful Ch'ing campaigns against the Outer Mongols in the the barbarian rulers who controlled it during so much of that period.This seventeenth century were followed in the eighteenth by the conquest of influence applied both to policies and procedures,and to theories.It may be Chinese Turkestan,which was eventually to be formed into the New suggested that the general effect upon the monarchy was to keep it dena- Dominion (Sinkiang).This absorption of the Tarim basin,completed by tionalized,inoculated against an ethnocentric Chinese nationalism.This 1759,followed the precedent of the Han and the T'ang.It placed Chinese result was achieved from both the barbarian and the Chinese sides. and Manchu forces in the oases of Central Asia on the flank of the Mongol The Chinese of the Sung period who reintegrated their philosophy in tribes to the north and served as strategic insurance against them.Mean- Neo-Confucianism had found themselves at the very same time subject to while tribal boundaries were fixed and the law.of succession among the increasing pressure from northern barbarians.The alien Liao dynasty in

42 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS sons, with greater benefit to the dynastic interest. The Ch'ing further sought to avoid the fate of the Yuan by preserving effective rule within the imperial clan, whose members were kept out of power to avoid family squabbles over the succession. Until the late nineteenth century the im￾perial princes were not given important posts nor great wealth nor were they made territorial lords. Government by women and by eunuchs was also checked until after 1860., By such devices the Manchus succeeded in ruling for 267 years over a Chinese population one hundred times more numerous. Behind all these safeguards lay a basic motive, the preservation of power. Manchu rule was from the first a contest to see how long an invading minority could rule the Chinese state; the welfare of China and its people was an essential but secondary consideration. To put it another way, there was no use in any measure which might benefit the country but destroy the dynasty. Any attempt at a purely Chinese "national" policy might conflict with dynastic policy. In the end, this division of counsels must be taken as one cause of the debacle which overtook both the country and its rulers. This intricate Chinese-Manchu relationship awaits further analysis. Tentatively it may be useful to approach it through two channels, political and social. The political approach leads us to consider first the Manchu conduct of foreign relations. Early Manchu foreign policy. This was by no means always the same as a Chinese foreign policy and was strongly colored by the fact that the Manchu empire embraced a good deal more than China proper.' The Inner Mongols had become vassals of the Ch'ing before 1644. The vast areas of Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan where the Manchu power was later established became subject not to China but to the dynasty - a fact which was to provide the logical basis for their defection from the Chinese Re￾public at the time of the revolution of 1911. Inner Asia until then was not under China but under the Manchus. Thus until the nineteenth century Inner Asia had been the focus of the dynasty's foreign policy, for there on the steppe was the great traditional source of danger. The legend of Chinghis Khan and his successors and the long struggle between the Mongols and the Ming dynasty in the early fifteenth century were still in the memory of Peking. The security of the Mongol border was, therefore, considered all important. Successful Ch'ing campaigns against the Outer Mongols in the seventeenth century were followed in the eighteenth by the conquest of Chinese Turkestan, which was eventually to be formed into the New Dominion (Sinkiang). This absorption of the Tarim basin, completed by 1759, followed the precedent of the Han and the T'ang. It placed Chinese and Manchu forces in the oases of Central Asia on the flank of the Mongol tribes to the north and served as strategic insurance against them. Mean￾while tribal boundaries were fixed and the law, of succession among the CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 43 Mongols was arranged to split up inherited lands and so prevent the rise of a new Chinghis Khan or any feudal leader who might create a striking power upon the steppe through the organization of his personal following. Tribe was used against tribe. The Lamaist church was encouraged as a balance to the power of the temporal princes. This importance ,of Lamaism as a political tool in Mongolia naturally reinforced the Ch'ing interest in Tibet. The Dalai Lama, temporal ruler at Lhasa had received his title from a Mongol prince in the sixteenth cen￾tury, ~nd the Mongols had intervened at Lhasa a~d put t?e ~alai on the throne in 1641 just before the Manchu entrance mto Chma. It was not unnatural, therefore, that the Manchu rulers became patrons of Lamais.m as a means of influence in both Tibet and Mongolia. The copy of the Dalal'S palace at Lhasa, the Potala, which was built at the Ch'ing emperors' sum￾mer capital at Ch'eng-te in Jehol, is a symbol of this interest. To forestall Mongol control, the K'ang-hsi emperor intervened and established im￾perial residents (amban) at Lhasa in I720. This was followed by extensions of Ch'ing control in 1751 and again after 1792. Activity on the Inner Asian frontiers of China had constituted the great part of Ch'ing; foreign relations. It is true that friction ~th. Bur~a had led to hostilities in the 1760's and that there had also been fnctlOn With Annam in the late eighteenth century. There was also, of course, contact with Russia which led tOl the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, the Russian mission resident in Peking, and later intermittent relations in the northeast. The fact remains that Manchu foreign relations had been almost entirely con￾tinental and had been concentrated upon the problem of safeguarding the Manchu position in China. This meant that the arrival of the English by sea posed utterly novel problems, and at the same time inspired the court at Peking to,act primarily with a view to preserving the political control over China which it had built up with such care. Since the object of the alien conquerors was primarily to keep their politi￾cal power, we might naturally expect their influence to be greatest o~ Chinese political institutions, especially on the monarchy. The hypothesls may be advanced that the Confucian monarchy in the last six or seven hundred years of its existence was profoundly molded and influenced by the barbarian rulers who controlled it during so' much of that period. This influence applied both to policies and procedures, and to theories. It may be suggested that the general effect upon the monarchy was to keep it dena￾tionalized, inoculated against an ethnocentric Chinese nationalism. This result was achieved from both the barbarian and the Chinese sides. The Chinese of the Sung period who reintegrated their philosophy in Neo-Confucianism had found themselves at the very same time subject to increasing pressure from northern barbarians. The alien Liao dynasty in

44 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 45 North China(9o7-25)preceded the lifetime of Chu Hsi,and its successor that day,by its nature as an institution,represented both the Manchu the Chin dynasty (III5-1234),outlasted him.These barbarian rulers of rulers and the Chinese landlord-scholar-official class at the same time.In North China were but precursors of the Mongols who subjugated all China this dyarchy it cannot be said that either racial group arbitrarily called the in the thirteenth century.It was therefore natural that Neo-Confucianism, tune for the other.The regime as a whole,because of its dual nature,was which achieved its final formulation in a period of barbarian invasion, inhibited from responding to the West in either a purely Manchu or a should tacitly or by implication take account of the barbarians.In fact the purely Chinese fashion. new world view of medieval China incorporated the barbarians in the Con- Under this synthesized Sino-barbarian Confucian monarchy,there was no fucian system by stressing their position under the emperor's personal rule. room for popular movements and,therefore,no room for nationalism in its Equally on their part,alien invaders once in power found it expedient to modern mass form;the xenophobia of the Chinese scholar class was the emphasize the universal nature of the emperor's personal sway.The power response of a cultural and social elite.In the Confucian scheme of things structure which the emperor represented rested upon a complex foundation the Chinese literati had been trained to treat as barbarians those who acted which included an elite military force,socio-cultural separatism between like barbarians,and to treat as Chinese those barbarians who behaved in a Chinese and barbarian,and the universal ethical sanction of Confucianism Chinese fashion.The Manchu dynasty at its height under Ch'ien-lung in the by which the economic and political processes of Chinese society were latter part of the eighteenth century had gone to great pains to proscribe fostered and supervised within a traditional social order.The monarch's and destroy literature which emphasized the non-Chinese character of function was to maintain the order of society.But,since ancient times,he barbarian conquerors.In the imperial literary inquisition of that period had been expected to do this both within the area of China and over the some two thousand works had been suppressed.At the same time some border regions of the steppe.The emperor's sway was not exclusively con- thirty-five hundred were brought together in the gigantic imperial collection fined to the settled area of intensive Chinese agriculture.Under barbarian known as the Ssu-k'u ck'iian-shu.s The Gleichschaltung thus effected,by dynasties it had equally extended over the barbarian homeland beyond the which the content of Chinese scholarship was kept in line with the dynastic Wall.This fact had the effect of emphasizing the monarchy's universality interest of the Manchus,appears to have been on the whole successful. and playing down its peculiarly Chinese character. In the first half of the nineteenth century there is little evidence of anti- This brings us to the second of the two channels of approach to Manchu- Manchu thought or feeling among the Chinese officials who served the Chinese relations mentioned above-that by way of the social structure emperor. of the Confucian state,into which the Manchus had fitted themselves. The identity of interest between the Chinese and Manchu ruling classes Judging by the strongly bifurcated class structure of the Chinese state who jointly participated in the government of China under the Confucian (the division between the literate ruling elite and the politically inert mass monarchy made them stand together both against the Western invaders of the peasantry),the Manchus in China had their position already pre- from without and against rebellion from within.It was therefore impossible pared for them before they took power,for the dynasty was the institu- for them,as the joint rulers of China,to utilize the latent resources of tionalized leader and patron of the landlord gentry class.The latter domi- popular anti-foreignism in any formal way.They could not rouse a spirit of nated the local scene in the countryside,just as the court dominated the mass resistance to the British without endangering the Confucian system of bureaucracy in the cities and major towns.Dynasty and gentry were neces- elitist government.This became evident when the imperial authorities at sarily allies,over against the Chinese peasant masses.Neither ally could Canton,in their effort to use the local Cantonese anti-foreignism against normally dispense with the other,even though one were of alien race. the British in the 184o's,found that it was a two-edged sword which,if The result of all this was that the policy of the Manchu dynasty was sharpened,might endanger the local authority of the imperial government never synonymous with a policy of the Chinese people as a nation.This in itself. turn meant that the response of the Chinese imperial regime to the Western This integrated Manchu-Chinese response,both to the West and to influx of the nineteenth century was not a purely Chinese response,but domestic rebellion,was evident throughout the nineteenth century.It is rather the response of a hybrid institution,the Manchu-Chinese Confucian noteworthy that after the early Manchu effort to suppress the Taipings had monarchy.It would not be fair to say that the government at Peking during failed,the Confucian monarchy was eventually saved by its Chinese,instead the early part of the century reacted to the West on the basis of a purely of its Manchu,component.The strength of the common bond between the selfish concern for Manchu power and prestige.The Confucian monarchy of Manchu and Chinese ruling groups was attested by the fact that the Con-

44 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS North China (907-II25) preceded the lifetime of Chu Hsi, and its successor, the Chin dynasty (III5-1234), outlasted him. These barbarian rulers of North China were but precursors of the Mongols who subjugated all China in the thirteenth century. It was therefore natural that Neo-Confucianism, which achieved its final formulation in a period of barbarian invasion, should tacitly or by implication take account of the barbarians. In fact the new world view of medieval China incorporated the barbarians in the Con￾fucian system by stressing their position under the emperor's personal rule. Equally on their part, alien invaders once in power found it expedient to emphasize the universal nature of the emperor's personal sway. The power structure which the emperor represented rested upon a complex foundation which included an elite military force, socio-cultural separatism between Chinese and barbarian, and the universal ethical sanction of Confucianism by which the economic and political processes of Chinese society were fostered and supervised within a traditional social order. The monarch's function was to maintain the order of society. But, since ancient times, he had been expected to do this both within the area of China and over the border regions of the steppe. The emperor's sway was not exclusively con￾fined to the settled area of intensive Chinese agriculture. Under barbarian dynasties it had equally extended over the barbarian homeland beyond the Wall. This fact had the effect of emphasizing the monarchy's universality and playing down its peculiarly Chinese character. This brings us to the second of the two channels of approach to Manchu￾Chinese relations mentioned above - that by way of the social structure of the Confucian state, into which the Manchus had fitted themselves. Judging by the strongly bifurcated class structure of the Chinese state (the division between the literate ruling elite and the politically inert mass of the peasantry), the Manchus in China had their position already pre￾pared for them before they took power, for the dynasty was the institu￾tionalized leader and patron of the landlord gentry class. The latter domi￾nated the local scene in the countryside, just as the court dominated the bureaucracy in the cities and major towns. Dynasty and gentry were neces￾sarily allies, over against the Chinese peasant masses. Neither ally could normally dispense with the other, even though one were of alien race. The result of all this was that the policy of the Manchu dynasty was never synonymous with a policy of the Chinese people as a nation. This in turn meant that the response of the Chinese imperial regime to the Western influx of the nineteenth century was not a purely Chinese response, but rather the response of a hybrid institution, the Manchu-Chinese Confucian monarchy. It would not be fair to say that the government at Peking during the early part of the century reacted to the West on the basis of a purely selfish concern for Manchu power and prestige. The Confucian monarchy of CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 45 that day; by its nature as an institution, represented both the Manchu rulers and the Chinese landlord-scholar-official class at the same time. In this dyarchy it cannot be said that either racial group arbitrarily called the tune for the other. The regime as a whole, because of its dual nature, was inhibited from responding to the West in either a purely Manchu or a purely Chinese fashion. Under this synthesized Sino-barbarian Confucian monarchy, there was no room for popular movements and, therefore, no room for nationalism in its modern mass form; the xenophobia of the Chinese scholar class was the response of a cultural and social elite. In the Confucian scheme of things the Chinese literati had been trained to treat as barbarians those who acted like barbarians, and to treat as Chinese those barbarians who behaved in a Chinese fashion. The Manchu dynasty at its height under Ch'ien-Iung in the latter part of the eighteenth century had gone to great pains to proscribe and destroy literature which emphasized the non-Chinese character of barbarian conquerors. In the imperial literary inquisition of that period some two thousand works had been suppressed. At the same time some thirty-five hundred were brought together in the gigantic imperial collection known as the Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu.6 The Gleichschaltung thus effected, by which the content of Chinese scholarship was kept'in line with the dynastic interest of the Manchus, appears to have been on the whole successful. In the first half of the nineteenth century there is little evidence of anti￾Manchu thought or feeling among the Chinese officials who served the emperor. The identity of interest between the Chinese and Manchu ruling classes who jointly participated in the government of China under the Confucian monarchy made them stand together both against the Western invaders from without and against rebellion from within. It was therefore impossible for them, as the joint rulers of China, to utilize the latent resources of popular anti-foreignism in any formal way., They could not rouse a spirit of mass resistance to the British without endangering the Confucian system of elitist government. This became evident when the imperial authorities at Canton, in their effort to use the local Cantonese anti-foreignism against the British in the 1840'S, found that it was a two-edged sword which, if sharpened, might endanger the local authority of the imperial government itselF This integrated Manchu-Chinese response, both to the West and to domestic rebellion, was evident throughout the nineteenth century. It is noteworthy that after the early Manchu effort to suppress the Taipings had failed, the Confucian monarchy was eventually saved by its Chinese, instead of its Manchu, component. The strength of the common bond between the Manchu and Chinese ruling groups was attested by the fact that the Con-

46 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS CH'ING POLICY AND THE CANTON SYSTEM 47 fucian monarchy,though headed by Manchus,survived for another fifty cies under inspectors (T'i-chi)at Canton,Ch'uan-chou,and Ningpo. years on the loyalty of its Chinese supporters.While not pro-Manchu,these Tributary envoys were entertained and sent to Peking,where they might Chinese were pro-Confucian,as were the Manchus themselves.The Con- also trade;foreign merchants at the ports were allowed to trade after their fucian order was the common bond which commanded their loyalty,not goods had been taxed. the Chinese“nation.” Already the Chinese merchants had been brought into the system as Imbedded as they were in the old social order of the agrarian-bureaucratic official agents,one of their functions being to report to the authorities all Chinese state and in the power relations of their Inner Asian empire,the arrivals of foreign ships as a first step in the process of taxation and trade. Ch'ing rulers were in no position to respond creatively to the growth of The object of the foreign trader,meanwhile,was to dispose of as much cargo maritime trade with Europe.From earlier dynasties they inherited certain as possible before reporting it for formal taxation.This he was able to do administrative mechanisms for the regulation of commerce at Canton and by exchanging part of it in illegal trade with the Chinese merchants,while other southern ports,but they had little to add themselves. at the same time presenting part of it to the Chinese officials as "squeeze" The background of Ch'ing policy at Canton.The record of official regu- to gain their connivance.Apparently,the classic pattern was already fixed: lation of China's maritime trade is long and detailed,s even though the the officials partly served the emperor and partly profited themselves,the record of the trade itself is hard to find.The Arab trade at Canton was Chinese merchants partly aided the officials and partly sought to evade under government regulation at least as early as the T'ang.By the eighth them,and the foreign traders did the best they could.When the palace century a Superintendency of Merchant Shipping (Skil-po-ssu)was set up eunuchs,who usually monopolized the Superintendencies of Merchant Ship- there to keep a register of foreign vessels and captains,inspect their mani- ping,lost some of their power in the later Ming,the local and provincial fests,collect duties,and enforce laws against smuggling.In the ninth cen- authorities had their innings and began themselves to tax foreign merchant tury it appears that the cargoes of Arab vessels arriving at Canton were held vessels.In I522,however,the Superintendencies at Ch'tan-chou and Ningpo by the authorities until the arrival of all the season's fleet,whereupon three- were closed because of the raids of Japanese pirates 10 who were then tenths of each kind of merchandise was taken as import duty and the ravaging the coast,and only that at Canton remained.Meanwhile the balance returned to the owners.Ch'iian-chou in Fukien (the Arab Zayton) Portuguese had arrived in China,shortly after their seizure of Malacca in became a second port as the trade expanded.Under the Sung by the year I5II,and were gradually fitted into the system.11 rooo a state monopoly had been established which forbade private trading The early Western commerce in China went through four chief periods.12 with foreigners and obliged all foreign goods of value to be deposited in (I)The first century,from the arrival of the Portuguese in I514 to the government warehouses.Meanwhile a central office was set up at the demise of the Ming in 1644,saw little direct trade between China and capital to control the superintendencies at the ports.This system was pre- Europe.Canton and Macao from the European point of view remained out- served under the Yuan Dynasty,which had Superintendencies (Shik-po- posts of the main emporia at Malacca and Batavia. ssu)in the time of Marco Polo at Canton,Zayton,Wenchow,Ningpo (then From 1521 to 1554,while Sino-Portuguese trade was officially banned Ch'ing-yuan),Shanghai,Hangchow and nearby Kan-p'u (Polo's Canfu). because of Portuguese violence,it continued in clandestine fashion,particu- By the thirteenth century the main features of this system were well larly along the coasts of Fukien,where the gentry,the officials and the established:the supervision and taxation of trade by officials responsible fisher-folk all had an interest in it.After 1557,the first recorded date of directly to the capital,the confinement of trade to certain ports (chiefly its existence,the Portuguese settlement at Macao (Ao-men)rose rapidly. Canton and Ch'uian-chou),the confinement of foreigners at these ports Chinese control over Macao and its commerce was never relinquished,even (chiefly the Arabs)to their own quarter,where they were under the au- though the Portuguese set up their own local government.Chinese author- thority of one of their own number.The rate of taxation varied in the ity was exercised both by the local magistrate of the district of Heung-shan statutes but was usually below 3o per cent ad valorem.In practice it was the (Hsiang-skan),to whom a ground rent was paid annually,and by Chinese object of the government to see that Sino-foreign trade was carried on customs officers stationed in the port.By the high provincial authorities under official surveillance so that the duties might be levied before trading and the court above them,Macao was at first officially ignored and the began.All these arrangements were,of course,a recognized application of customs duties,therefore,went to enrich the local officials and their the tribute system which has already been described. superiors within the province.Duties were collected jointly:the procurator The Ming dynasty preserved these features,?setting up Superintenden- of Macao,a Portuguese official,announced the arrival of a vessel and sent

46 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS fucian monarchy, though headed by Manchus, survived for another fifty years on the loyalty of its Chinese supporters. While not pro-Manchu, these Chinese were pro-Confucian, as were the Manchus themselves. The Con￾fucian order was the common bond which commanded their loyalty, not the Chinese "nation." Imbedded as they were in the old social order of the agrarian-bureaucratic Chinese state and in the power relations of their Inner Asian empire, the Ch'ing rulers were in no position to respond creatively to the growth of maritime trade with Europe. From earlier dynasties they inherited certain administrative mechanisms for the regulation of commerce at Canton and other southern ports, but they had little to add themselves. The background of Ch'ing policy at Canton. The record of official regu￾lation of China's maritime trade is long and detailed,S even though the record of the trade itself is hard to find. The Arab trade at Canton was under government regUlation at least as early as the T'ang. By the eighth century a Superintendency of Merchant Shipping (Shih-po-ssu) was set up there to keep a register of foreign vessels and captains, inspect their mani￾fests, collect duties, and enforce laws against smuggling. In the ninth cen￾tury it appears that the cargoes of Arab vessels arriving at Canton were held by the authorities until the arrival of all the season's fleet, whereupon three￾tenths of each kind of merchandise was taken as import duty and the balance returned to the owners. Ch'iian-chou in Fukien (the Arab Zayton) became a second port as the trade expanded. Under the Sung by the year 1000 a state monopoly had been established which forbade private trading with foreigners and obliged all foreign goods of value to be deposited in government warehouses. Meanwhile a central office was set up at the capital to control the superintendencies at the ports. This system was pre￾served under the Yuan Dynasty, which had Superintendencies (Shih-po￾ssu) in the time of Marco Polo at Canton, Zayton, Wenchow, Ningpo (then Ch'ing-yuan), Shanghai, Hangchow and nearby Kan-p'u (Polo's Canfu). By the thirteenth century the main features of this system were well established: the supervision and taxation of trade by officials responsible directly to the capital, the confinement of trade to certain ports (chiefly Canton and Ch'iian-chou), the confinement of foreigners at these ports (chiefly the Arabs) to their own quarter, where they were under the au￾thority of one of their own number. The rate of taxation varied in the statutes but was usually below 30 per cent ad valorem. In practice it was the object of the government to see that Sino-foreign trade was carried on under official surveillance so that the duties might be levied before trading began. All these arrangements were, of course, a recognized application of the tribute system which has already been described. The Ming dynasty preserved these features,9 setting up Superintenden￾CH'ING POLICY AND THE) CANTON SYSTEM 47 cies under inspectors (T'i-chu) at Canton, Ch'iian-chou, and Ningpo. Tributary envoys were entertained and sent to Peking, where they might also trade; foreign merchants at the ports were allowed to trade after their goods had been taxed. Already the Chinese merchants had been brought into the system as official agents, one of their functions being to report to the authorities all arrivals of foreign ships as a first step in the process of taxation and trade. The object of the foreign trader, meanwhile, was to dispose of as much cargo as possible before reporting it for formal taxation. This he was able to do by exchanging part of it in illegal trade with the Chinese merchants, while at the same time presenting part of it to the Chinese officials as "squeeze" to ga,in their connivance. Apparently, the classic pattern was already fixed: the officials partly served the emperor and partly profited themselves, the Chinese merchants partly aided the officials and partly sought to evade them, and the foreign traders did the best they could. When the palace eunuchs,who usually monopolized the Superintendencies of Merchant Ship￾ping, lost some of their power in the later Ming, the local and provincial authorities had their innings and began themselves to tax foreign merchant vessels. In 1522, however, the Superintendencies at Ch'iian-chou and Ningpo were closed because of the raids of Japanese pirates 10 who were then ravaging the coast, and only that at Canton remained. Meanwhile the Portuguese had arrived in China, shortly after their seizure of Malacca in I5Il, and were gradually fitted into the systemP The early Western commerce in China went through four chief periods.12 (r) The first century, from the arrival of the Portuguese in 1514 to the demise of the Ming in 1644, saw little direct trade between China and Europe. Canton and Macao from the European point of view remained out￾posts of the main emporia at Malacca and Batavia. From 1521 to r554, while Sino-Portuguese trade was officially banned because of Portuguese violence, it continued in clandestine fashion, particu￾larly along the'coasts of Fukien, where the gentry, the officials and the fisher-folk all had an interest in it. After r 5 5 7, the first recorded date of its existence, the Portuguese settlement at Macao (Ao-men) rose rapidly. Chinese control over Macao and its commerce was never relinquished, even though the Portuguese set up their own local government. Chinese author￾ity was exercised both by the local magistrate of the district of Heung-shan (Hsiang-shan), to whom a ground rent was paid annually, and by Chinese customs officers stationed in the port. By the high provincial authorities and the court above them, Macao was at first officially ignored and the customs duties, therefore, went to enrich the local officials and their superiors within the province. Duties were collected jointly: the procurator of Macao, a Portuguese official, announced the arrival of a vessel and sent