《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：International Influences）State Power and the Structure of International Trade

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 321 either theoretically or empirically.On the one hand,writers from the mercantilists through the American protectionists and the German historical school,and more recently analysts of dependencia,have argued that an entirely open system can undermine a state's effort to develop,and even lead to underdevelopment.On the other hand, adherents of more conventional neoclassical positions have maintained that exposure to international competition spurs economic transforma- tion.'The evidence is not yet in.All that can confidently be said is that openness furthers the economic growth of small states and of large ones so long as they maintain their technological edge. FROM STATE PREFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL TRADING STRUCTURES The next step in this argument is to relate particular distributions of potential economic power,defined by the size and level of development of individual states,to the structure of the international trading sys- tem,defined in terms of openness. Let us consider a system composed of a large number of small,highly developed states.Such a system is likely to lead to an open international trading structure.The aggregate income and economic growth of each state are increased by an open system.The social instability produced by exposure to international competition is mitigated by the factor mobility made possible by higher levels of development.There is no loss of political power from openness because the costs of closure are symmetrical for all members of the system. Now let us consider a system composed of a few very large,but unequally developed states.Such a distribution of potential economic power is likely to lead to a closed structure.Each state could increase its income through a more open system,but the gains would be modest. Openness would create more social instability in the less developed countries.The rate of growth for more backward areas might be e See David P.Callco and Benjamin Rowland,America and the World Political Economy (Bloomington:Indiana University Press 1973),Part II,for a discussion of American thought;Eli Heckscher,Mercantilism (New York:Macmillan 1955);and D.C.Coleman,ed.,Revisions in Mercantilism (London:Methuen 1969),for the classic discussion and a collection of recent articles on mercantilism;Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America:Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York:Monthly Review 1969); Arghiri Emmanucl,Unequal Exchange:A Study of the Imperialism of Trade (New York:Monthly Review 1972);and Johan Galtung,"A Structural Theory of Imperial. ism,"Journal of Peace Research,vul,No.2 (I971),81-117,for some representative argu- ments about the deleterious effects of free trade. 1 See Gottfried Haberler,International Trade and Economic Development (Cairo: National Bank of Egypt 1959);and Carlos F.Diaz-Alejandro,"Latin America:Toward 2000 A.D.,"in Jagdish Bhagwati,ed.,Economics and World Order from the 1g7os to the rogos (New York:Macmillan 1972),223-55,for some arguments concerning the benefits of trade

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 321 either theoretically or empirically. On the one hand, writers from the mercantilists through the American protectionists and the German historical school, and more recently analysts of dependencia, have argued that an entirely open system can undermine a state's effort to develop, and even lead to ~nderdevelopment.~ On the other hand, adherents of more conventional neoclassical positions have maintained that exposure to international competition spurs economic transforma￾ti~n.~The evidence is not yet in. All that can confidently be said is that openness furthers the economic growth of small states and of large ones so long as they maintain their technological edge. FROM STATE PREFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL TRADING STRUCTURES The next step in this argument is to relate particular distributions of potential economic power, defined by the size and level of development of individual states, to the structure of the international trading sys￾tem, defined in terms of openness. Let us consider a system composed of a large number of small, highly developed states. Such a system is likely to lead to an open international trading structure. The aggregate income and economic growth of each state are increased by an open system. The social instability produced by exposure to international competition is mitigated by the factor mobility made possible by higher levels of development. There is no loss of political power from openness because the costs of closure are symmetrical for all members of the system. Now let us consider a system composed of a few very large, but unequally developed states. Such a distribution of potential economic power is likely to lead to a closed structure. Each state could increase its income through a more open system, but the gains would be modest. Openness would create more social instability in the less developed countries. The rate of growth for more backward areas might be See David P. Calleo and Benjamin Rowland, America and the World Political Economy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press r973), Part 11, for a discussion of American thought; Eli Heckscher, Mercantilism (New York: Macmillan 1955); and D. C. Coleman, ed., Revisions in Mercantilism (London: Methuen 1969), for the classic discussion and a collection of recent articles on mercantilism; Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review 1969); Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade (New York: Monthly Review 1972); and Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperial￾ism," lournal of Peace Research, VIII, No. 2 (1971), 81-117, for some representative argu￾ments about the deleterious effects of free trade. 7 See Gottfried Haberler, international Trade and Economic Development (Cairo: National Bank of Egypt 1959); and Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "Latin America: Toward 2000 A.D.," in Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the rggos (New York: Macmillan 1g72), 223-55, for some arguments concerning the benefits of trade

322 WORLD POLITICS frustrated,while that of the more advanced ones would be enhanced. A more open structure would leave the less developed states in a polit- ically more vulnerable position,because their greater factor rigidity would mean a higher relative cost of closure.Because of these disad- vantages,large but relatively less developed states are unlikely to accept an open trading structure.More advanced states cannot,unless they are militarily much more powerful,force large backward countries to accept openness. Finally,let us consider a hegemonic system-one in which there is a single state that is much larger and relatively more advanced than its trading partners.The costs and benefits of openness are not sym- metrical for all members of the system.The hegemonic state will have a preference for an open structure.Such a structure increases its ag- gregate national income.It also increases its rate of growth during its ascendency-that is,when its relative size and technological lead are increasing.Further,an open structure increases its political power,since the opportunity costs of closure are least for a large and developed state. The social instability resulting from exposure to the international sys- tem is mitigated by the hegemonic power's relatively low level of involvement in the international economy,and the mobility of its factors. What of the other members of a hegemonic system?Small states are likely to opt for openness because the advantages in terms of ag- gregate income and growth are so great,and their political power is bound to be restricted regardless of what they do.The reaction of medium-size states is hard to predict;it depends at least in part on the way in which the hegemonic power utilizes its resources.The potentially dominant state has symbolic,economic,and military capa- bilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure. At the symbolic level,the hegemonic state stands as an example of how economic development can be achieved.Its policies may be emu- lated,even if they are inappropriate for other states.Where there are very dramatic asymmetries,military power can be used to coerce weaker states into an open structure.Force is not,however,a very efficient means for changing economic policies,and it is unlikely to be employed against medium-size states. Most importantly,the hegemonic state can use its economic resources to create an open structure.In terms of positive incentives,it can offer access to its large domestic market and to its relatively cheap exports. In terms of negative ones,it can withhold foreign grants and engage

322 WORLD POLITICS frustrated, while that of the more advanced ones would be enhanced. A more open structure would leave the less developed states in a polit￾ically more vulnerable position, because their greater factor rigidity would mean a higher relative cost of closure. Because of these disad￾vantages, large but relatively less developed states are unlikely to accept an open trading structure. More advanced states cannot, unless they are militarily much more powerful, force large backward countries to accept openness. Finally, let us consider a hegemonic system-one in which there is a single state that is much larger and relatively more advanced than its trading partners. The costs and benefits of openness are not sym￾metrical for all members of the system. The hegemonic state will have a preference for an open structure. Such a structure increases its ag￾gregate national income. It also increases its rate of growth during its ascendency-that is, when its relative size and technological lead are increasing. Further, an open structure increases its political power, since the opportunity costs of closure are least for a large and developed state. The social instability resulting from exposure to the international sys￾tem is mitigated by the hegemonic power's relatively low level of involvement in the international economy, and the mobility of its factors. What of the other members of a hegemonic system? Small states are likely to opt for openness because the advantages in terms of ag￾gregate income and growth are so great, and their political power is bound to be restricted regardless of what they do. The reaction of medium-size states is hard to predict; it depends at least in part on the way in which the hegemonic power utilizes its resources. The potentially dominant state has symbolic, economic, and military capa￾bilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure. At the symbolic level, the hegemonic state stands as an example of how economic development can be achieved. Its policies may be emu￾lated, even if they are inappropriate for other states. Where there are very dramatic asymmetries, military power can be used to coerce weaker states into an open structure. Force is not, however, a very efficient means for changing economic policies, and it is unlikely to be employed against medium-size states. Most importantly, the hegemonic state can use its economic resources to create an open structure. In terms of positive incentives, it can offer access to its large domestic market and to its relatively cheap exports. In terms of negative ones, it can withhold foreign grants and engage

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 323 in competition,potentially ruinous for the weaker state,in third- country markets.The size and economic robustness of the hegemonic state also enable it to provide the confidence necessary for a stable international monetary system,and its currency can offer the liquidity needed for an increasingly open system. In sum,openness is most likely to occur during periods when a hegemonic state is in its ascendency.Such a state has the interest and the resources to create a structure characterized by lower tariffs,rising trade proportions,and less regionalism.There are other distributions of potential power where openness is likely,such as a system composed of many small,highly developed states.But even here,that potential might not be realized because of the problems of creating confidence in a monetary system where adequate liquidity would have to be pro- vided by a negotiated international reserve asset or a group of national currencies.Finally,it is unlikely that very large states,particularly at unequal levels of development,would accept open trading relations. These arguments,and the implications of other ideal typical con- figurations of potential economic power for the openness of trading structures,are summarized in the following chart. Size of States RELATIVELY EQUAL VERY UNEQUAL SMALL LARGE Level of EQUAL Moderate- Low- High Moderate High Development of States UNEQUAL Moderate Low Moderote- High CHART I.PROBABILITY OF AN OPEN TRADING STRUCTURE WITH DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTIONS OF POTENTIAL ECONOMIC POWER THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE:DESCRIBING THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM The structure of international trade has both behavioral and institu- tional attributes.The degree of openness can be described both by the fow of goods and by the policies that are followed by states with respect to trade barriers and international payments.The two are not unre- lated,but they do not coincide perfectly. In common usage,the focus of attention has been upon institutions. Openness is associated with those historical periods in which tariffs

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 323 in competition, potentially ruinous for the weaker state, in third￾country markets. The size and economic robustness of the hegemonic state also enable it to provide the confidence necessary for a stable international monetary system, and its currency can offer the liquidity needed for an increasingly open system. In sum, openness is most likely to occur during periods when a hegemonic state is in its ascendency. Such a state has the interest and the resources to create a structure characterized by lower tariffs, rising trade proportions, and less regionalism. There are other distributions of potential power where openness is likely, such as a system composed of many small, hghly developed states. But even here, that potential might not be realized because of the problems of creating confidence in a monetary system where adequate liquidity would have to be pro￾vided by a negotiated international reserve asset or a group of national currencies. Finally, it is unlikely that very large states, particularly at unequal levels of development, would accept open trading relations. These arguments, and the implications of other ideal typical con￾figurations of potential economic power for the openness of trading structures, are summarized in the following chart. Size of States RELATIVELY EQUAL VERY UNEQUAL SMALL LARGE EQUAL Moderote- Low- Level of High High Moderote Development of States UNEQUAL Moderote Low Moderate - High The structure of international trade has both behavioral and institu￾tional attributes. The degree of openness can be described both by the pow of goods and by the policies that are followed by states with respect to trade barriers and international payments. The two are not unre￾lated, but they do not coincide perfectly. In common usage, the focus of attention has been upon institutions. Openness is associated with those historical periods in which tariffs

324 WORLD POLITICS were substantially lowered:the third quarter of the nineteenth century and the period since the Second World War. Tariffs alone,however,are not an adequate indicator of structure. They are hard to operationalize quantitatively.Tariffs do not have to be high to be effective.If cost functions are nearly identical,even low tariffs can prevent trade.Effective tariff rates may be much higher than nominal ones.Non-tariff barriers to trade,which are not easily com- pared across states,can substitute for duties.An undervalued exchange rate can protect domestic markets from foreign competition.Tariff levels alone cannot describe the structure of international trade." A second indicator,and one which is behavioral rather than institu- tional,is trade proportions-the ratios of trade to national income for different states.Like tariff levels,these involve describing the system in terms of an agglomeration of national tendencies.A period in which these ratios are increasing across time for most states can be described as one of increasing openness. A third indicator is the concentration of trade within regions com- posed of states at different levels of development.The degree of such regional encapsulation is determined not so much by comparative ad- vantage (because relative factor endowments would allow almost any backward area to trade with almost any developed one),but by polit- ical choices or dictates.Large states,attempting to protect themselves from the vagaries of a global system,seek to maximize their interests by creating regional blocs.Openness in the global economic system has in effect meant greater trade among the leading industrial states.Peri- ods of closure are associated with the encapsulation of certain advanced states within regional systems shared with certain less developed areas. A description of the international trading system involves,then,an exercise that is comparative rather than absolute.A period when tariffs are falling,trade proportions are rising,and regional trading patterns are becoming less extreme will be defined as one in which the structure is becoming more open. TARIFF LEVELS The period from the 1820's to 1879 was basically one of decreasing tariff levels in Europe.The trend began in Great Britain in the 1820's, 8 Sec Harry Johnson,Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries (New York:Praeger 1967),90-94,for a discussion of nominal versus effective tariffs;Bela Belassa,Trade Liberalization among Industrial Countries (New York:McGraw-Hill 1967),chap.3,for the problems of determining the height of tariffs;and Hans O. Schmitt,"International Monetary System:Three Options for Reform,"International Affairs,L (April 1974),200,for similar effects of tariffs and undervalued exchange rates

324 WORLD POLITICS were substantially lowered: the third quarter of the nineteenth century and the period since the Second World War. Tariffs alone, however, are not an adequate indicator of structure. They are hard to operationalize quantitatively. Tariffs do not have to be high to be effective. If cost functions are nearly identical, even low tariffs can prevent trade. Effective tariff rates may be much higher than nominal ones. Non-tariff barriers to trade, which are not easily com￾pared across states, can substitute for duties. An undervalued exchange rate can protect domestic markets from foreign competition. Tariff levels alone cannot describe the structure of international trade." A second indicator, and one which is behavioral rather than institu￾tional, is trade proportions-the ratios of trade to national income for different states. Like tariff levels, these involve describing the system in terms of an agglomeration of national tendencies. A period in which these ratios are increasing across time for most states can be described as one of increasing openness. A third indicator is the concentration of trade within regions com￾posed of states at different levels of development. The degree of such regional encapsulation is determined not so much by comparative ad￾vantage (because relative factor endowments would allow almost any backward area to trade with almost any developed one), but by polit￾ical choices or dictates. Large states, attempting to protect themselves from the vagaries of a global system, seek to maximize their interests by creating regional blocs. Openness in the global economic system has in effect meant greater trade among the leading industrial states. Peri￾ods of closure are associated with the encapsulation of certain advanced states within regional systems shared with certain less developed areas. A description of the international trading system involves, then, an exercise that is comparative rather than absolute. A period when tariffs are falling, trade proportions are rising, and regional trading patterns are becoming less extreme will be defined as one in which the structure is becoming more open. TARIFF LEVELS The period from the 1820's to 1879 was basically one of decreasing tariff levels in Europe. The trend began in Great Britain in the 1820's~ See Harry Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries (New York: Praeger 1967), 9094, for a discussion of nominal versus effective tariffs; Rela Belassa, Trade Liberalization among Industrial Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill I&), chap. 3, for the problems of determining the height of tariffs; and Hans 0. Schmitt, "International Monetary System: Three Options for Reform," International Aflairs, L (April 1974), 200, for similar effects of tariffs and undervalued exchange rates

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 325 with reductions of duties and other barriers to trade.In 1846 the abolition of the Corn Laws ended agricultural protectionism.France reduced duties on some intermediate goods in the 1830's,and on coal, iron,and steel in 1852.The Zollverein established fairly low tariffs in 1834.Belgium,Portugal,Spain,Piedmont,Norway,Switzerland, and Sweden lowered imposts in the 1850's.The golden age of free trade began in 1860,when Britain and France signed the Cobden- Chevalier Treaty,which virtually eliminated trade barriers.This was followed by a series of bilateral trade agreements between virtually all European states.It is important to note,however,that the United States took little part in the general movement toward lower trade barriers." The movement toward greater liberality was reversed in the late 187o's.Austria-Hungary increased duties in 1876 and 1878,and Italy also in 1878;but the main breach came in Germany in 1879.France increased tariffs modestly in 1881,sharply in 1892,and raised them still further in IgIo.Other countries followed a similar pattern.Only Great Britain,Belgium,the Netherlands,and Switzerland continued to follow free-trade policies through the 1880's.Although Britain did not herself impose duties,she began establishing a system of prefer- ential markets in her overseas Empire in 1898.The United States was basically protectionist throughout the nineteenth century.The high tariffs imposed during the Civil War continued with the exception of a brief period in the I8go's.There were no major duty reductions before I914. During the 192o's,tariff levels increased further.Western European states protected their agrarian sectors against imports from the Danube region,Australia,Canada,and the United States,where the war had stimulated increased output.Great Britain adopted some colonial pref- erences in I919,imposed a small number of tariffs in I92I,and ex- tended some wartime duties.The successor states of the Austro-Hun- garian Empire imposed duties to achieve some national self-sufficiency. The British dominions and Latin America protected industries nur- tured by wartime demands.In the United States the Fordney- Charles P.Kindleberger,"The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe 1820-1875," The Journal of Economic History,xxxv (March 1975),20-55;Sidney Pollard,European Economic Integration 1815-1970 (London:Thames and Hudson 1974),117;J.B. Condliffe,The Commerce of Nations (New York:Norton 1950),212-23,229-30. 10 Charles P.Kindleberger,"Group Behavior and International Trade,"Journal of Political Economy,Vol.59 (February 1951),33;Condliffe (fn.9),498;Pollard (fn. 9),I2I;and Peter A.Gourevitch,"International Trade,Domestic Coalitions,and Liberty:Comparative Responses to the Great Depression of 1873-1896,"paper delivered to the International Studies Association Convention,Washington,1973

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 325 with reductions of duties and other barriers to trade. In 1846 the abolition of the Corn Laws ended agricultural protectionism. France reduced duties on some intermediate goods in the 183o's, and on coal, iron, and steel in 1852. The Zollverein established fairly low tariffs in 1834. Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Piedmont, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden lowered imposts in the 1850's. The golden age of free trade began in 1860, when Britain and France signed the Cobden￾Chevalier Treaty, which virtually eliminated trade barriers. This was followed by a series of bilateral trade agreements between virtually all European states. It is important to note, however, that the United States took little part in the general movement toward lower trade barriers." The movement toward greater liberality was reversed in the late 1870's. Austria-Hungary increased duties in 1876 and 1878, and Italy also in 1878; but the main breach came in Germany in 1879. France increased tariffs modestly in 1881, sharply in 1892, and raised them still further in 1910. Other countries followed a similar pattern. Only Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland continued to follow free-trade policies through the 1880's. Although Britain did not herself impose duties, she began establishing a system of prefer￾ential markets in her overseas Empire in 1898." The United States was basically protectionist throughout the nineteenth century. The high tariffs imposed during the Civil War continued with the exception of a brief period in the 1890's. There were no major duty reductions before 1914. During the 1920's, tariff levels increased further. Western European states protected their agrarian sectors against imports from the Danube region, Australia, Canada, and the United States, where the war had stimulated increased output. Great Britain adopted some colonial pref￾erences in 1919, imposed a small number of tariffs in 1921, and ex￾tended some wartime duties. The successor states of the Austro-Hun￾garian Empire imposed duties to achieve some national self-sufficiency. The British dominions and Latin America protected industries nur￾tured by wartime demands. In the United States the Fordney￾Charles P. Kindleberger, "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe 1820-1875," The Iournal of Economic History, xxxv (March 1975), 20-55; Sidney Pollard, European Economic Integration 18rfi-1970 (London: Thames and Hudson 1974)~ "7; J. R. Condliffe, The Commerce of Nations (New York: Norton 1950), 212-23, 229-30. 10 Charles P. Kindleberger, "Group Behavior and International Trade," Journal oj Political Economy, Vol. 59 (February rggr), 33; Condliffe (fn. g), 498; Pollard (fn. 9), 121; and Peter A. Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Great Depression of 1873-1896," paper delivered to the International Studies Association Convention, Washington, 1973