《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of Migration）No Vacancy The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Countries.pdf

No Vacancy:The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Countries Jeannette Money This article examines the domestic political sources of immigration control in ad- vanced market economy countries after World War II.'Immigration control can be distinguished from the broader concept of immigration policy by its emphasis on state policies that define the permissible level of resident alien admissions.2 The analysis is based on the well-established fact that immigrant communities are geo- graphically concentrated.I argue that this geographic concentration creates an un- even distribution of costs and benefits,providing a spatial context for immigration politics.In this context,net public demand for tighter immigration control increases in localities where immigrants concentrate when those areas experience higher unem- ployment,rapid increases in immigration,higher immigrant proportions,and more generous immigrant access to social services.Each of these conditions aggravates competition between immigrants and natives,and hence native hostility,in these communities while employer support for immigration usually diminishes.Yet na- tional politicians may ignore changes in the demand for immigration control unless these constituencies are also able to swing a national election from one party to another.The larger and less "safe"the local constituencies,the greater their influ- ence in this sense.Evidence from the United Kingdom between 1955 and 1981 is consistent with these propositions. I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Center for International Relations at the Univer- sity of California,Los Angeles;the faculty senate of the University of California,Davis;the Center for German and European Studies(CGES)at the University of California,Berkeley;and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California,San Diego.I would also like to thank the various individuals who supported this research and commented on different aspects of the project.in- cluding Gary Freeman.Robert Jackman,David Lake,Philip Martin.Ted Perlmutter,Richard Rosecrance, and members of the working group on Comparative Immigration and Integration Policy associated with CGES,as well as John Odell and two anonymous reviewers.Finally,I would like to thank Jan Breemer, Stacy Bumett.and Tressa Tabares for their research assistance. 1.Although immigration control includes temporary visitors who enter the country for a short time. such as tourists and business visitors.I focus only on those who enter on a nontemporary basis.I also exclude from the analysis policies controlling refugees and asylum seekers. 2.Hammar 1985. International Organization 51,4,Autumn 1997,pp.685-720 1997 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

No Vacancy: The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Countries Jeannette Money This article examines the domestic political sources of immigration control in advanced market economy countries after World War II.1 Immigration control can be distinguished from the broader concept of immigration policy by its emphasis on state policies that de ne the permissible level of resident alien admissions.2 The analysis is based on the well-established fact that immigrant communities are geographically concentrated. I argue that this geographic concentration creates an uneven distribution of costs and bene ts, providing a spatial context for immigration politics. In this context, net public demand for tighter immigration control increases in localitieswhere immigrants concentratewhen those areas experience higher unemployment, rapid increases in immigration, higher immigrant proportions, and more generous immigrant access to social services. Each of these conditions aggravates competition between immigrants and natives, and hence native hostility, in these communities while employer support for immigration usually diminishes. Yet national politicians may ignore changes in the demand for immigration control unless these constituencies are also able to swing a national election from one party to another. The larger and less ‘‘safe’’ the local constituencies, the greater their in uence in this sense. Evidence from the United Kingdom between 1955 and 1981 is consistent with these propositions. I would like to acknowledge the nancial support of the Center for InternationalRelations at the University of California, Los Angeles; the faculty senate of the University of California, Davis; the Center for German and European Studies (CGES) at the University of California, Berkeley; and the Institute on Global Con ict and Cooperation at the University of California, San Diego. I would also like to thank the various individuals who supported this research and commented on different aspects of the project, including Gary Freeman, Robert Jackman, David Lake, Philip Martin, Ted Perlmutter, Richard Rosecrance, and members of the working group on Comparative Immigration and Integration Policy associated with CGES, as well as John Odell and two anonymousreviewers. Finally, I would like to thank Jan Breemer, Stacy Burnett, and Tressa Tabares for their research assistance. 1. Although immigration control includes temporary visitors who enter the country for a short time, such as tourists and business visitors, I focus only on those who enter on a nontemporary basis. I also exclude from the analysis policies controlling refugees and asylum seekers. 2. Hammar 1985. International Organization 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 685–720 r 1997 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

686 International Organization In advanced market economy countries in the late 1990s,the importance of under- standing the politics of immigration control may seem self-evident.Immigration is a Janus-faced policy with both domestic and international consequences.Domesti- cally,many politicians are confronting a politically powerful backlash against for- eign residents of all types:undocumented and documented,foreign born and foreign by ethnicity,workers and dependents,voluntary migrants and involuntary refugees and asylum seekers.At the same time,employers continue to petition for greater access to migrant labor,both skilled and unskilled.Internationally,conflict arises over disparate national interests,such as the desire by developing countries for greater emigration versus the preference for limited immigration by advanced industrial coun- tries.Alternatively,conflict arises when one country implements policies that transfer its control problems toother nations.The 1993 German policy to reject asylum seekers transit- ing"safe"countriesen route to Germany reduced Germany's intake of asylum seek- ers but only at the expense of an increase of immigrants in neighboring countries. Empirically,national patterns of immigration control vary widely,despite similar positions of advanced industrial countries in the global economy.From the mid- 1950s to the mid-1970s,for example,many OECD (Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development)countries experienced low unemployment and tight la- bor markets,leading to rising wages.Yet some countries chose to import immigrant labor to moderate wages and labor-market shortages(for example,France,Germany, and Australia),whereas others discouraged immigration altogether(for example,Ja- pan)or began closing the door to labor-market immigrants well before the oil shock of 1973(for example,Great Britain,Switzerland,and Sweden).In light of similar labor market conditions,the variation in immigration control represents an interest- ing empirical puzzle. Moreover,the international flow of people has not yet been systematically drawn into the research agenda in international political economy.3 Although the determi- nants of global patterns of trade,production,and capital flows are now widely stud- ied,immigration remains predominantly in the domain of economists,demogra- phers,and sociologists.The literature on immigration policy formation that does exist tends to be country specific rather than comparative,making it difficult to sort between idiosyncratic factors and more generally applicable theories.As James F. Hollifield notes,"truly comparative works on immigration are few.In the field of migration studies,the tendency has been to collect national case studies,bind them together,and call the study comparative.Such compendia are useful sources of infor- mation,but they rarely yield theoretical insights."4 Comparative research on the sources of immigration policy and patterns will inform the research agenda of inter- national political economy by including an important flow of resources across na- tional boundaries. The article is divided into four parts.In the first section I briefly describe the distinctive patterns of immigration in selected OECD countries and the standard explanations advanced to account for these patterns.I explain in the second section 3.Haus1995 4.Hollifield 1992,17

In advanced market economy countriesin the late 1990s, the importance of understanding the politics of immigration control may seem self-evident. Immigration is a Janus-faced policy with both domestic and international consequences. Domestically, many politicians are confronting a politically powerful backlash against foreign residents of all types: undocumented and documented,foreign born and foreign by ethnicity, workers and dependents, voluntary migrants and involuntary refugees and asylum seekers. At the same time, employers continue to petition for greater access to migrant labor, both skilled and unskilled. Internationally, con ict arises over disparate nationalinterests,such asthe desire by developingcountriesfor greater emigration versusthe preference for limited immigration by advanced industrial countries. Alternatively, conict arises when one country implements policies that transfer its controlproblemsto other nations.The 1993German policy to reject asylumseekerstransiting ‘‘safe’’ countries en route to Germany reduced Germany’s intake of asylum seekers but only at the expense of an increase of immigrants in neighboring countries. Empirically, national patterns of immigration control vary widely, despite similar positions of advanced industrial countries in the global economy. From the mid- 1950sto the mid-1970s, for example, many OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries experienced low unemployment and tight labor markets, leading to rising wages. Yet some countries chose to import immigrant labor to moderate wages and labor-market shortages(for example, France, Germany, and Australia), whereas others discouraged immigration altogether (for example, Japan) or began closing the door to labor-market immigrants well before the oil shock of 1973 (for example, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Sweden). In light of similar labor market conditions, the variation in immigration control represents an interesting empirical puzzle. Moreover, the international ow of people has not yet been systematically drawn into the research agenda in international political economy.3 Although the determinants of global patterns of trade, production, and capital ows are now widely studied, immigration remains predominantly in the domain of economists, demographers, and sociologists. The literature on immigration policy formation that does exist tends to be country speci c rather than comparative, making it difficult to sort between idiosyncratic factors and more generally applicable theories. As James F. Holli eld notes, ‘‘truly comparative works on immigration are few. In the eld of migration studies, the tendency has been to collect national case studies, bind them together, and call the study comparative. Such compendia are usefulsources of information, but they rarely yield theoretical insights.’’ 4 Comparative research on the sources of immigration policy and patterns will inform the research agenda of international political economy by including an important ow of resources across national boundaries. The article is divided into four parts. In the rst section I brie y describe the distinctive patterns of immigration in selected OECD countries and the standard explanations advanced to account for these patterns. I explain in the second section 3. Haus 1995. 4. Holli eld 1992, 17. 686 International Organization

Political Geography of Immigration Control 687 how the geographic concentration of immigrant communities affects the domestic distribution of costs and benefits associated with immigration control policies.5 This geographic concentration provides the spatial context for the politics of immigration control.I then examine the local conditions that create support for and opposition to immigration by focusing on the business community and the general population.To explain the changing attitudes of the native population toward the immigrant commu- nity,I adopt a theory of native-immigrant competition over scarce resources.Busi- ness support varies with the tightness and flexibility of labor markets as well as with the potential for capital mobility,among other factors.I then connect the underlying structural conditions to the local and national political agendas through the dynamics of party competition.In the third section,I illustrate the model with an analysis of British immigration policy.In the fourth section I compare the analysis with the British literature on immigration control to evaluate the power of the general frame- work against country-specific explanations.Finally,I return to the cross-national variation in immigration control and suggest areas for further theoretical and empiri- cal research. Although standard explanations of immigration policy favor domestic political factors,my approach is distinctive in three ways.It focuses on the local community as the primary unit of political analysis;it provides a theory to explain changing local preferences for and against immigration;and it systematically incorporates institu- tional aspects of the political system through which societal demands are funneled. Immigration Patterns and Prevailing Explanations Trends in Immigration Industrial democracies vary greatly in the degree to which they discourage immigra- tion.Because countries employ different labels for different types of individuals who cross national borders,it is impossible to provide a concise picture of cross-national variation in resident alien intake(defined as the level of aliens permitted to enter the host country and take up residence for at least twelve months).Nonetheless,a variety of indicators suggests that tolerance for resident aliens varies substantially among advanced industrial countries.One such indicator is the average annual gross flow of legal resident aliens per capita.As depicted in Table 1,the intake range is broad.At the low end,Japan permitted entrance to only 3 aliens per ten thousand national population per year on average between 1962 and 1991.Australia and New Zealand are at the high end of the spectrum,allowing the entrance of 81 and 136 resident aliens,respectively,per ten thousand national population.Belgium and Canada are 5.Immigration policy is generally understood to be composed of two components-immigration control and immigrant integration.My research question specifically addresses the former rather than the latter and,as such,may not be generalizable to this second aspect of immigration policy. 6.A second indicator is the"stock"of resident aliens as a proportion of total population:see SOPEMI 1993 for current and historical data

how the geographic concentration of immigrant communities affects the domestic distribution of costs and bene ts associated with immigration control policies.5 This geographic concentration providesthe spatial context for the politics of immigration control. I then examine the local conditionsthat create support for and opposition to immigration by focusing on the business community and the general population. To explain the changing attitudesof the native populationtoward the immigrant community, I adopt a theory of native–immigrant competition over scarce resources. Business support varies with the tightness and exibility of labor markets as well as with the potential for capital mobility, among other factors. I then connect the underlying structural conditionsto the local and national political agendasthrough the dynamics of party competition. In the third section, I illustrate the model with an analysis of British immigration policy. In the fourth section I compare the analysis with the British literature on immigration control to evaluate the power of the general framework against country-speci c explanations. Finally, I return to the cross-national variation in immigration control and suggest areas for further theoretical and empirical research. Although standard explanations of immigration policy favor domestic political factors, my approach is distinctive in three ways. It focuses on the local community asthe primary unit of political analysis; it provides a theory to explain changing local preferences for and against immigration; and it systematically incorporates institutional aspects of the politicalsystem through which societal demands are funneled. Immigration Patterns and Prevailing Explanations Trends in Immigration Industrial democracies vary greatly in the degree to which they discourage immigration. Because countries employ different labelsfor different types of individualswho cross national borders, it is impossible to provide a concise picture of cross-national variation in resident alien intake (de ned as the level of aliens permitted to enter the host country and take up residence for at least twelve months). Nonetheless, a variety of indicators suggests that tolerance for resident aliens varies substantially among advanced industrial countries. One such indicator is the average annual gross ow of legal resident aliens per capita.6 As depicted in Table 1, the intake range is broad. At the low end, Japan permitted entrance to only 3 aliens per ten thousand national population per year on average between 1962 and 1991. Australia and New Zealand are at the high end of the spectrum, allowing the entrance of 81 and 136 resident aliens, respectively, per ten thousand national population. Belgium and Canada are 5. Immigration policy is generally understood to be composed of two components—immigration control and immigrant integration. My research question speci cally addresses the former rather than the latter and, as such, may not be generalizable to thissecond aspect of immigration policy. 6. A second indicator is the ‘‘stock’’ of resident aliens as a proportion of total population;see SOPEMI 1993 for current and historical data. Political Geography of Immigration Control 687