《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of Migration）A Political Economy of International Migration, 1815-1914

The Manchester School Vol LX No.4 December 1992 0025-2034$2.50359-376 A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION,1815-1914* by JAMES FOREMAN-PECK St.Antony's College,Oxford "Give me...your huddled masses,yearning to breathe free" I INTRODUCTION Why was Emma Lazarus's sentiment,engraved on the base of the Statue of Liberty,so much more widely embodied in policy in the nineteenth century than in recent decades?During the earlier period,the enormous inter- continental migrations that peopled Siberia,the mid-west of the United States and other territories often laid the foundations for international reconfigurations of economic and political power.These population move- ments certainly established ethnic mixes that have greatly influenced sub- sequent domestic policies,from Fiji to South Africa.Despite the magnitude of the changes,the nineteenth-century pattern of intercontinental migration left open to Europeans their principal destinations:North America,Australasia and Latin America.Equally notable was the segregated stream of Asian migrants to mines and plantations in Malaya,the Dutch East Indies,Ceylon, Mauritius and the Caribbean. The years between the World Wars marked a new phase of forced migration in Europe as a consequence of the redrawing of frontiers.Immi- gration restrictions in destinations of European migration,abandonment of indentured labour and substantial net return migration during the 1930s further distinguished this period from the nineteenth century.After 1945, north western Europe hosted immigrants from southern Europe and from current and former colonial possessions in Africa,Asia and the Caribbean. The U.S.increasingly drew in migrants,legal and illegal,from the south, especially from Mexico.All higher-income countries after two decades began to conclude that unskilled immigrants were undesirable and imposed tight restrictions.But highly-trained professionals in scarcity fields remained eli- gible,at least for temporary permits:the "brain drain"flowed faster. The present paper investigates how much a simple economic theory of .Manuscript received 27.2.91;final version received 4.12.91. tMy thoughts on this subject have been clarified by anonymous referees and by seminar and conference participants at Leeds,Oxford,Liverpool,Manchester and Santander.The Hallsworth Fellowship in Political Economy at the University of Manchester allowed me to complete the project. 359

The Manchester School Vol LX No. 4 December 1992 0025-2034 $2.50 359-376 A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 1815-1914* by JAMES FOREMAN-PECKT St. Antony’s College, Oxford “Give me.. . your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free” I INTRODUCTION Why was Emma Lazarus’s sentiment, engraved on the base of the Statue of Liberty, so much more widely embodied in policy in the nineteenth century than in recent decades? During the earlier period, the enormous inter￾continental migrations that peopled Siberia, the mid-west of the United States and other territories often laid the foundations for international reconfigurations of economic and political power. These population move￾ments certainly established ethnic mixes that have greatly influenced sub￾sequent domestic policies, from Fiji to South Africa. Despite the magnitude of the changes, the nineteenth-century pattern of intercontinental migration left open to Europeans their principal destinations: North America, Australasia and Latin America. Equally notable was the segregated stream of Asian migrants to mines and plantations in Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Ceylon, Mauritius and the Caribbean. The years between the World Wars marked a new phase of forced migration in Europe as a consequence of the redrawing of frontiers. Immi￾gration restrictions in destinations of European migration, abandonment of indentured labour and substantial net return migration during the 1930s further distinguished this period from the nineteenth century. After 1945, north western Europe hosted immigrants from southern Europe and from current and former colonial possessions in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. The U.S. increasingly drew in migrants, legal and illegal, from the south, especially from Mexico. All higher-income countries after two decades began to conclude that unskilled immigrants were undesirable and imposed tight restrictions. But highly-trained professionals in scarcity fields remained eli￾gible, at least for temporary permits: the “brain drain” flowed faster. The present paper investigates how much a simple economic theory of * Manuscript received 27.2.91; final version received 4.12.91. t My thoughts on this subject have been clarified by anonymous referees and by seminar and conference participants at Leeds, Oxford, Liverpool, Manchester and Santander. The HaHsworth Fellowship in Political Economy at the University of Manchester allowed me to complete the project. 359

360 The Manchester School policy can contribute to an understanding of the distinctive nineteenth- century international migration policy.At first sight,the explanation is twofold.First,European immigration was not considered a problem for state policy in host countries,or perhaps was to be encouraged,because the railway and the steamship augmented the effective supply of land so that there was plenty of space.Second,racism was responsible for the restriction of Asian migrants to tropical areas,where Europeans had no interest in settling. If this is correct,a theoretical approach to nineteenth-century international migration policy is unnecessary.However the simple explanations fail to account for the variety of migration policies,do not address Arthur Lewis's (1978,p.192)economic analysis of discrimination against Asian migration to the regions of recent European settlement,and are silent about why even host country electors who were comparatively well-off should have accepted lower incomes by allowing in migrant labour.(Williamson,1974,p.249,calculated U.S.real annual earnings in Eastern industries were 11 per cent lower than they would have been in 1910 if no immigration had been permitted.) A simple model cannot hope to explain all policies but it may provide a classification of cases and an account of why the nineteenth-century world economy was so open to labour movements.Section II outlines a political economy of international migration based upon factor income maximization, factor endowments,income distribution and constitutions,Section III shows how the model fits a large component of nineteenth-century experience and Section Iv focuses on the,at first sight,anomalous policy of the most important destination for European immigration,the United States. II POLITICAL ECONOMY The two key questions of any political economy of international migration are(1)who gains and who loses from migration?and(2)who is in a position to do something about it?The answer to the first question identifies a demand for policies and that to the second reveals a policy supply.The model assumes,at first,economies closed to external trade in goods and self- interested persons who receive their income primarily from one factor.Then the demand for policies will be aimed at preventing the reduction of returns to the owner's factor by increases in supply of that factor.Factor owners prefer those policies that expand the supply of other factors.A pro-labour state aims to protect and augment labour income,which might require the encourage- ment of emigration and discouraging of immigration. The simplest case to analyse is where migrant and domestic labour are perfect substitutes and the policy objective is only to maximize domestic wages (analogously with the insider-outsider behaviour of the neoclassical monopoly union).Then,in Fig.1,the expansion path as the demand for labour moves outward from L is L shaped.When L<L*,there is domestic unemployment,which is likely to deter immigration and encourage emigra-

360 The Manchester School policy can contribute to an understanding of the distinctive nineteenth￾century international migration policy. At first sight, the explanation is twofold. First, European immigration was not considered a problem for state policy in host countries, or perhaps was to be encouraged, because the railway and the steamship augmented the effective supply of land so that there was plenty of space. Second, racism was responsible for the restriction of Asian migrants to tropical areas, where Europeans had no interest in settling. If this is correct, a theoretical approach to nineteenth-century international migration policy is unnecessary. However the simple explanations fail to account for the variety of migration policies, do not address Arthur Lewis’s (1978, p. 192) economic analysis of discrimination against Asian migration to the regions of recent European settlement, and are silent about why even host country electors who were comparatively well-off should have accepted lower incomes by allowing in migrant labour. (Williamson, 1974, p. 249, calculated U.S. real annual earnings in Eastern industries were 11 per cent lower than they would have been in 1910 if no immigration had been permitted.) A simple model cannot hope to explain all policies but it may provide a classification of cases and an account of why the nineteenth-century world economy was so open to labour movements. Section I1 outlines a political economy of international migration based upon factor income maximization, factor endowments, income distribution and constitutions, Section I11 shows how the model fits a large component of nineteenth-century experience and Section IV focuses on the, at first sight, anomalous policy of the most important destination for European immigration, the United States. I1 POLITICAL ECONOMY The two key questions of any political economy of international migration are (1) who gains and who loses from migration? and (2) who is in a position to do something about it? The answer to the first question identifies a demand for policies and that to the second reveals a policy supply. The model assumes, at first, economies closed to external trade in goods and self￾interested persons who receive their income primarily from one factor. Then the demand for policies will be aimed at preventing the reduction of returns to the owner’s factor by increases in supply of that factor. Factor owners prefer those policies that expand the supply of other factors. A pro-labour state aims to protect and augment labour income, which might require the encourage￾ment of emigration and discouraging of immigration. The simplest case to analyse is where migrant and domestic labour are perfect substitutes and the policy objective is only to maximize domestic wages (analogously with the insider-outsider behaviour of the neoclassical monopoly union). Then, in Fig. 1, the expansion path as the demand for labour moves outward from L* is L shaped. When L < L*, there is domestic unemployment, which is likely to deter immigration and encourage emigra-

A Political Economy of International Migration,1815-1914 361 Wages(w)↑ Labour↑ V(w.r) Compromise 一声 L Land Production Function 务 Rent(r) FIG.1 Biases in Immigration Policy tion policies,but the wage is determined by market forces.Once labour demand is strong enough for L>L,immigration controls are introduced so that all of the increased demand is channelled into higher wages and none into increased employment(for immigrants)(Labour in Fig.1).Where other factor owners influence immigration policy,the expansion path will allow for some immigration,for it raises the returns to other factors (Compromise in Fig.1).An entirely landowner-dominated policy would aim to encourage immigration sufficiently to prevent any rise in wages(Land in Fig.1). The supply of policies then comes from governments in effect choosing the numbers of migrants.They do so by maximizing an objective function,V, with factor prices as arguments,which will best satisfy the government's principals.The precise form of function then depends upon the distribution of wealth,factor endowments and the (de facto)constitution.If all land and capital were distributed equally and the government was elected by universal adult suffrage,then the objective function would depend only upon national factor endowments.A labour-abundant country in these circumstances would place the greatest weight upon wages,whereas electors in a land- abundant country under the same conditions would favour emphasizing rents. The more common historical experience is that the bulk of land and capital is owned by a few.Under a democratic franchise the objective function then only includes wages,regardless of national endowments,because the majority have no income from land or from capital.A fully democratic franchise in the nineteenth century,given difficulties of registration and limited powers of elected institutions,was rather rare.In practice,even constitutions with universal adult suffrage were prone to be swayed more by the wealthy and,therefore,non-wage incomes could be of interest to the government.Many constitutions were still effectively controlled by a rela-

A Political Economy of International Migration, 181 5-1 91 4 I Production Function 361 Rent (r) FIG. 1 Biases in Immigration Policy tion policies, but the wage is determined by market forces. Once labour demand is strong enough for L > L*, immigration controls are introduced so that all of the increased demand is channelled into higher wages and none into increased employment (for immigrants) (Labour in Fig. 1). Where other factor owners influence immigration policy, the expansion path will allow for some immigration, for it raises the returns to other factors (Compromise in Fig. 1). An entirely landowner-dominated policy would aim to encourage immigration sufficiently to prevent any rise in wages (Land in Fig. 1). The supply of policies then comes from governments in effect choosing the numbers of migrants. They do so by maximizing an objective function, V, with factor prices as arguments, which will best satisfy the government’s principals. The precise form of function then depends upon the distribution of wealth, factor endowments and the (de facto) constitution. If all land and capital were distributed equally and the government was elected by universal adult suffrage, then the objective function would depend only upon national factor endowments. A labour-abundant country in these circumstances would place the greatest weight upon wages, whereas electors in a land￾abundant country under the same conditions would favour emphasizing rents. The more common historical experience is that the bulk of land and capital is owned by a few. Under a democratic franchise the objective function then only includes wages, regardless of national endowments, because the majority have no income from land or from capital. A fully democratic franchise in the nineteenth century, given difficulties of registration and limited powers of elected institutions, was rather rare. In practice, even constitutions with universal adult suffrage were prone to be swayed more by the wealthy and, therefore, non-wage incomes could be of interest to the government. Many constitutions were still effectively controlled by a rela-

362 The Manchester School tively small number of landholders who owned most of the wealth.In these territories the objective function included only rents,regardless of endow- ments. The constraint on the objective function is the productive capacity of the economy,determined by technology,institutions and endowments.A second constraint is that domestic labour(L)is fully employed.Factors are assumed to be paid their marginal products.Where L2 are migrants,K is capital,T is land,O is output,wi and r are(real prices)respectively of domestic labour and land,and x is the rental of capital: max y=aw1+Bx+(1-a-B)r (1) s.t. Q=f(L1,L2,T;K) (2) f1L2+fxL2+(1-&-)frL2-f2=0 (3) The equilibrium policy is attained when the marginal product of immi- grant labour is a weighted average of the effects of an increment of immigrant labour on domestic factor prices.Where domestic and immigrant labour are (q into p)substitutes,f>0.Other things being equal,the larger is a(the more pro-domestic labour is immigration policy),the larger are the positive equilibrium marginal effects of migrant workers on other factor prices.The immigrant labour target stock is smaller,to hold up these positive marginal effects,when a is large.Where immigrants are complements to domestic labour,larger a's encourage policies that favour more migrants. Where land ownership and political control are highly concentrated(B is large),an increase in the scarcity of labour relative to land creates both a demand,and a supply from the landowner-controlled government,for poli- cies to encourage immigration,either by direct subsidy to immigrant travel to plantations and latifundia or through administering or recognizing indenture contracts.A neutral state policy,by contrast,sets the rules to maximize a weighted average of all factor prices,the weights reflecting the current factor distribution of income,rather than interests of owners of particular factors. The resulting migrant worker stock is that of the "free market",the operations of which policy is intended to facilitate by the provision of defence,law and order and the elimination of harmful externalities,such as communicable diseases."Free market"economies do not exist in cultural and institutional vacuums;even their migration stances will differ with assimilation and franchise policy,for these influence when a member of L2 transfers to Lt,and therefore affect the size of the Lz target. From(2)and the assumption that factors are paid their marginal products,(1)may be rewritten, V=或1+附x+(1一a-阴fr (3)is then obtained by differentiating V-@with respect to L2

362 The Manchester School tively small number of landholders who owned most of the wealth. In these territories the objective function included only rents, regardless of endow￾ments. The constraint on the objective function is the productive capacity of the economy, determined by technology, institutions and endowments. A second constraint is that domestic labour (L,) is fully employed. Factors are assumed to be paid their marginal products. Where L2 are migrants, K is capital, T is land, Q is output, w1 and r are (real prices) respectively of domestic labour and land, and n is the rental of capital: s.t. Q = fW1, ~52, T K) 4.lLZ + BfXL.2 +u -.-P)fTL2-L.2 = 0 (2) (3) The equilibrium policy is attained when the marginal product of immi￾grant labour is a weighted average of the effects of an increment of immigrant labour on domestic factor prices.’ Where domestic and immigrant labour are (q into p) substitutes, fLlL2 > 0. Other things being equal, the larger is a (the more pro-domestic labour is immigration policy), the larger are the positive equilibrium marginal effects of migrant workers on other factor prices. The immigrant labour target stock is smaller, to hold up these positive marginal effects, when o! is large. Where immigrants are complements to domestic labour, larger a’s encourage policies that favour more migrants. Where land ownership and political control are highly concentrated (j is large), an increase in the scarcity of labour relative to land creates both a demand, and a supply from the landowner-controlled government, for poli￾cies to encourage immigration, either by direct subsidy to immigrant travel to plantations and latifundia or through administering or recognizing indenture contracts. A neutral state policy, by contrast, sets the rules to maximize a weighted average of all factor prices, the weights reflecting the current factor distribution of income, rather than interests of owners of particular factors. The resulting migrant worker stock is that of the “free market”, the operations of which policy is intended to facilitate by the provision of defence, law and order and the elimination of harmful externalities, such as communicable diseases. “Free market” economies do not exist in cultural and institutional vacuums; even their migration stances will differ with assimilation and franchise policy, for these influence when a member of Lz transfers to L1, and therefore affect the size of the L2 target. ‘From (2) and the assumption that factors are paid their marginal products, (1) may be rewritten, = afLl + PfK -.-fi)fP (3) is then obtained by differentiating V-Q with respect to L2

A Political Economy of International Migration,1815-1914 363 TABLE 1 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REGIMES:A FIRST APPROXIMATION Pro-Labour Pro-Land/Capital Empire Source Country policy encourage discourage encourage Destination Country policy discourage encourage encourage The supply of policies may be subject to external constraints,such as treaty obligations.Nineteenth-century empires introduce another constraint and perhaps policy motivation,if not type of state.In at least one respect,a concern with security,the empire is analogous to the neutral or coalition state.But because the empire spans continents or partly self-governing boundaries,migration policy may appear different.Perhaps more important is that the geographical range of empire places a greater policy emphasis on security and sometimes on the related goal of "nation building"(ensuring cultural homogeneity).In principle,empires could be any of the three previous types of state,neutral/coalition,labour or land/capital-dominated. Typically land/capital empires can be expected to have been more concerned to control emigration so as to prevent the escape of conscripts and sub- versives. For international migration to take place not only must economic conditions be favourable but accommodating policies must be adopted in both source and destination territories.The analogy between immigration policy and slavery and serfdom is clearest when both source and host state are run by landowners.The source state will never encourage migration and will generally discourage it,to hold down the cost of labour.Potential source countries must be run either by labour or neutral ruling groups or the land- owning rulers must be less than fully effective if there is to be much inter- national migration (Table 1). Relations between states could be developed by agreements that allowed a closer meshing of their desired policies:by labour conditions treaties and by the regulation of indenture contracts.Indenture contracts facilitated the migration of labour unable to afford or to borrow fares.The employer advanced the fares in return for an agreement to work for a specified period at a specified wage.2 As transport costs fell,the period of the contract also should have shortened,if the contracts were a solution to a market imperfection. Treaties between nations to regulate labour conditions could have prevented immigrant labour threatening native labour and made sense for pro-labour The practical difficulty was that enforcement of the indenture contract was too close to a new form of slavery for many people's liking

A Political Economy of International Migration, 1815-1 91 4 363 TABLE 1 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REGIMES: A FIRST APPROXIMATION Fro-Labour Pro-LandlCapital Empire Source Country pohcy encourage discourage encourage Destination Country policy discourage encourage encourage The supply of policies may be subject to external constraints, such as treaty obligations. Nineteenth-century empires introduce another constraint and perhaps policy motivation, if not type of state. In at least one respect, a concern with security, the empire is analogous to the neutral or coalition state. But because the empire spans continents or partly self-governing boundaries, migration policy may appear different. Perhaps more important is that the geographical range of empire places a greater policy emphasis on security and sometimes on the related goal of “nation building” (ensuring cultural homogeneity). In principle, empires could be any of the three previous types of state, neutral/coalition, labour or land/capital-dominated. Typically landlcapital empires can be expected to have been more concerned to control emigration so as to prevent the escape of conscripts and sub￾versives. For international migration to take place not only must economic conditions be favourable but accommodating policies must be adopted in both source and destination territories. The analogy between immigration policy and slavery and serfdom is clearest when both source and host state are run by landowners. The source state will never encourage migration and will generally discourage it, to hold down the cost of labour. Potential source countries must be run either by labour or neutral ruling groups or the land￾owning rulers must be less than fully effective if there is to be much inter￾national migration (Table 1). Relations between states could be developed by agreements that allowed a closer meshing of their desired policies: by labour conditions treaties and by the regulation of indenture contracts. Indenture contracts facilitated the migration of labour unable to afford or to borrow fares. The employer advanced the fares in return for an agreement to work for a specified period at a specified wage.2 As transport costs fell, the period of the contract also should have shortened, if the contracts were a solution to a market imperfection. Treaties between nations to regulate labour conditions could have prevented immigrant labour threatening native labour and made sense for pro-labour 2The practical difficulty was that enforcement of the indenture contract was too close to a new form of slavery for many people’s liking