International Organization http://journals.cambridge.orq/INO Additional services for International Organization: Email alerts:Click here Subscriptions:Click here Commercial reprints:Click here Terms of use:Click here Support for Free Trade:Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety Edward D.Mansfield and Diana C.Mutz International Organization Volume 63/Issue 03/July 2009,pp 425-457 DOl:10.1017/S0020818309090158,Published online:15 July 2009 Link to this article:http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract S0020818309090158 How to cite this article: Edward D.Mansfield and Diana C.Mutz(2009).Support for Free Trade:Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety.International Organization,63,pp 425-457 doi:10.1017/S0020818309090158 Request Permissions:Click here CAMERIKXE JOURNALB Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/lNO,IP address:211.80.95.69 on 14 Jan 2015
International Organization http://journals.cambridge.org/INO Additional services for International Organization: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety Edward D. Manseld and Diana C. Mutz International Organization / Volume 63 / Issue 03 / July 2009, pp 425 - 457 DOI: 10.1017/S0020818309090158, Published online: 15 July 2009 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0020818309090158 How to cite this article: Edward D. Manseld and Diana C. Mutz (2009). Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. International Organization, 63, pp 425-457 doi:10.1017/S0020818309090158 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/INO, IP address: 211.80.95.69 on 14 Jan 2015
Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety Edward D.Mansfield and Diana C.Mutz Abstract Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass atti- tudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce,only a handful of studies have addressed this topic.These studies have focused largely on testing two models,both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual's income.The factor endowments or Heckscher- Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works.We find little support for either of these mod- els using two representative national surveys of Americans.The only potential excep- tion involves the effects of education.Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related,which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model.However,further analysis reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals'anxieties about involve- ment with out-groups in their own country and beyond.Furthermore,we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by percep- tions of how the U.S.economy as a whole is affected by trade. The politics of international trade has been a long-standing puzzle for social sci- entists.Among economists,there is widespread agreement that free trade is ben- eficial.Open trade and cross-national market integration help to allocate factors of production efficiently and to promote the welfare of countries and the world as Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,Philadelphia;seminars at the University of Chicago(Harris School),Emory Uni- versity,Harvard University,and the University of Virginia:and a conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy,held at Princeton University.We are grateful to Marc Busch,Jens Hain- mueller,So Young Kim,Richard Valelly,the editors of International Organization,and two anony- mous reviewers for helpful comments;to Rumi Morishima,Matthew Tubin,and Carmela Aquino for research assistance;and to the Christopher H.Browne Center for International Politics and the Insti- tute for the Study of Citizens and Politics for financial assistance. Note from the editors:Since one of the authors is an associate editor of this journal,the editors handled this article outside of the normal editorial management system and put in place special proce- dures to ensure rigorous,double-blind peer review. 1.Alston,Kearl,and Vaughan 1992. International Organization 63,Summer 2009,pp.425-57 2009 by The IO Foundation. doi:10.1017/S0020818309090158
Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety Edward D+ Mansfield and Diana C+ Mutz Abstract Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic+ These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual’s income+ The factor endowments or HeckscherOhlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person’s skills+ The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works+ We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans+ The only potential exception involves the effects of education+ Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model+ However, further analysis reveals that education’s effects are less representative of skill than of individuals’ anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond+ Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U+S+ economy as a whole is affected by trade+ The politics of international trade has been a long-standing puzzle for social scientists+ Among economists, there is widespread agreement that free trade is beneficial+ 1 Open trade and cross-national market integration help to allocate factors of production efficiently and to promote the welfare of countries and the world as Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia; seminars at the University of Chicago ~Harris School!, Emory University, Harvard University, and the University of Virginia; and a conference on Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy, held at Princeton University+ We are grateful to Marc Busch, Jens Hainmueller, So Young Kim, Richard Valelly, the editors of International Organization, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments; to Rumi Morishima, Matthew Tubin, and Carmela Aquino for research assistance; and to the Christopher H+ Browne Center for International Politics and the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics for financial assistance+ Note from the editors: Since one of the authors is an associate editor of this journal, the editors handled this article outside of the normal editorial management system and put in place special procedures to ensure rigorous, double-blind peer review+ 1+ Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan 1992+ International Organization 63, Summer 2009, pp+ 425–57 © 2009 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818309090158
426 International Organization a whole.Historically,however,open trade has been the exception rather than the rule. Studies of the political economy of trade often attribute variations in trade pref- erences to the distributional implications of overseas commerce.Despite the eco- nomic benefits that a given country would accrue from open trade,some individuals suffer economic harm as a result.If these individuals form a politically potent constituency,they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole.If, on the other hand,the individuals who derive welfare gains from trade are partic- ularly influential,then an open trade regime is likely to take hold.Recent research indicates that,in democratic countries,constituency opinion on trade plays a cen- tral role in influencing the policy positions of public officials.2 There are two principle ways of assessing the distributional consequences of trade.First,the factor endowments approach emphasizes that,in a given country, trade benefits those individuals who own factors of production that are in abun- dant supply relative to the remainder of the world,and harms owners of factors that are in scarce supply.In countries such as the United States,which has a skilled labor force,free trade benefits highly skilled workers and harms less skilled work- ers.Second,the specific factors approach predicts that an individual's attitudes toward trade will reflect characteristics of the industry in which he or she works. People employed in industries that depend on overseas markets should be more supportive of open trade than people working in industries that face considerable competition from imports. A small but growing number of studies have evaluated the strength of these explanations for trade policy preferences.We extend this body of research using two representative national surveys of Americans and more comprehensive mea- sures of industries and occupations than previous studies had available to them.In addition,we link the study of trade preferences to the more extensive body of theory and empirical research on how self-interest enters into the formation of domestic economic policy preferences. Substantial research in other economic policy domains has demonstrated that self-interest rarely shapes the formation of policy opinions because people have a difficult time understanding the connection between personal economic well- being and government policy.By mounting the most thorough individual-level examination to date of the effects of industry and skill on individual trade prefer- ences,we seek to determine whether trade is,indeed,one of those rare exceptions in which personal experiences are successfully politicized.Alternatively,if atti- tudes about trade are formed in a manner similar to attitudes about domestic eco- nomic domains such as unemployment,then trade policy preferences will be based on how people believe a policy affects the country collectively rather than on nar- rowly defined self-interest.Importantly,the analysis of aggregate-level data-the 2.See Fordham and McKeown 2003;and Kono 2008
a whole+ Historically, however, open trade has been the exception rather than the rule+ Studies of the political economy of trade often attribute variations in trade preferences to the distributional implications of overseas commerce+ Despite the economic benefits that a given country would accrue from open trade, some individuals suffer economic harm as a result+ If these individuals form a politically potent constituency, they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole+ If, on the other hand, the individuals who derive welfare gains from trade are particularly influential, then an open trade regime is likely to take hold+ Recent research indicates that, in democratic countries, constituency opinion on trade plays a central role in influencing the policy positions of public officials+ 2 There are two principle ways of assessing the distributional consequences of trade+ First, the factor endowments approach emphasizes that, in a given country, trade benefits those individuals who own factors of production that are in abundant supply relative to the remainder of the world, and harms owners of factors that are in scarce supply+ In countries such as the United States, which has a skilled labor force, free trade benefits highly skilled workers and harms less skilled workers+ Second, the specific factors approach predicts that an individual’s attitudes toward trade will reflect characteristics of the industry in which he or she works+ People employed in industries that depend on overseas markets should be more supportive of open trade than people working in industries that face considerable competition from imports+ A small but growing number of studies have evaluated the strength of these explanations for trade policy preferences+ We extend this body of research using two representative national surveys of Americans and more comprehensive measures of industries and occupations than previous studies had available to them+ In addition, we link the study of trade preferences to the more extensive body of theory and empirical research on how self-interest enters into the formation of domestic economic policy preferences+ Substantial research in other economic policy domains has demonstrated that self-interest rarely shapes the formation of policy opinions because people have a difficult time understanding the connection between personal economic wellbeing and government policy+ By mounting the most thorough individual-level examination to date of the effects of industry and skill on individual trade preferences, we seek to determine whether trade is, indeed, one of those rare exceptions in which personal experiences are successfully politicized+ Alternatively, if attitudes about trade are formed in a manner similar to attitudes about domestic economic domains such as unemployment, then trade policy preferences will be based on how people believe a policy affects the country collectively rather than on narrowly defined self-interest+ Importantly, the analysis of aggregate-level data—the 2+ See Fordham and McKeown 2003; and Kono 2008+ 426 International Organization
Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety 427 approach used by most previous studies of trade preferences-cannot differentiate between these two possibilities.Thus,uniquely,this study simultaneously exam- ines both how personal economic self-interest and perceptions of the collective national interest influence trade preferences. Our findings indicate that accounting for perceptions of how the U.S.economy is affected by trade is important to modeling trade preferences.Consistent with previous research on the impact of self-interest on policy attitudes,our data show little support for either the factor endowments or the specific factors model.By contrast,perceptions of how trade affects the country as a whole-what are often referred to as "sociotropic"perceptions-play a substantial role in shaping atti- tudes about foreign commerce,a role that is largely independent of self-interest. Indeed,these perceptions are among the most important influences on opinions about trade. Finally,we further improve our understanding of mass trade preferences by incor- porating into our model indicators of domestic ethnocentrism and foreign policy attitudes.There is little support for free trade among people who believe the United States should take an isolationist stance on international affairs more generally or those who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups are less praisewor- thy than their own racial or ethnic group.Although such views have no direct bearing on the economic benefits of trade,they are far more predictive of trade preferences than indicators of economic self-interest. Taken as a whole,the results of this article cast doubt on the ability of standard political economy models to explain trade preferences.Furthermore,the fact that sociotropic perceptions and out-group anxiety are such powerful predictors of these preferences indicates that research on trade policy would benefit by developing psychologically based models that address how individuals process information about the economy,and how they form attitudes about people and places beyond their borders. The Origins of Trade Preferences Much of the existing research on trade preferences has been guided by two mod- els.The factor endowments,or Heckscher-Ohlin,model assumes that all factors of production within a country are mobile across sectors,that markets are perfectly competitive,and that there are constant returns to scale in production.Based on these assumptions,Stolper and Samuelson showed that,in a given country,open trade benefits owners of factors of production that are abundant,relative to the remain- der of the world,and harms owners of scarce factors.3 Consequently,in the United States-a country endowed with an abundance of highly skilled and well-educated labor relative to the rest of the world-free trade benefits highly skilled workers 3.Stolper and Samuelson 1941
approach used by most previous studies of trade preferences—cannot differentiate between these two possibilities+ Thus, uniquely, this study simultaneously examines both how personal economic self-interest and perceptions of the collective national interest influence trade preferences+ Our findings indicate that accounting for perceptions of how the U+S+ economy is affected by trade is important to modeling trade preferences+ Consistent with previous research on the impact of self-interest on policy attitudes, our data show little support for either the factor endowments or the specific factors model+ By contrast, perceptions of how trade affects the country as a whole—what are often referred to as “sociotropic” perceptions—play a substantial role in shaping attitudes about foreign commerce, a role that is largely independent of self-interest+ Indeed, these perceptions are among the most important influences on opinions about trade+ Finally, we further improve our understanding of mass trade preferences by incorporating into our model indicators of domestic ethnocentrism and foreign policy attitudes+ There is little support for free trade among people who believe the United States should take an isolationist stance on international affairs more generally or those who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups are less praiseworthy than their own racial or ethnic group+ Although such views have no direct bearing on the economic benefits of trade, they are far more predictive of trade preferences than indicators of economic self-interest+ Taken as a whole, the results of this article cast doubt on the ability of standard political economy models to explain trade preferences+ Furthermore, the fact that sociotropic perceptions and out-group anxiety are such powerful predictors of these preferences indicates that research on trade policy would benefit by developing psychologically based models that address how individuals process information about the economy, and how they form attitudes about people and places beyond their borders+ The Origins of Trade Preferences Much of the existing research on trade preferences has been guided by two models+ The factor endowments, or Heckscher-Ohlin, model assumes that all factors of production within a country are mobile across sectors, that markets are perfectly competitive, and that there are constant returns to scale in production+ Based on these assumptions, Stolper and Samuelson showed that, in a given country, open trade benefits owners of factors of production that are abundant, relative to the remainder of the world, and harms owners of scarce factors+ 3 Consequently, in the United States—a country endowed with an abundance of highly skilled and well-educated labor relative to the rest of the world—free trade benefits highly skilled workers 3+ Stolper and Samuelson 1941+ Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety 427
428 International Organization and damages less-skilled individuals.Open trade increases the demand for skilled workers,since the United States has a comparative advantage in the production of goods that use this input intensively.As the demand for such workers rises,so do their wages.Conversely,heightened trade decreases the demand for low-skilled labor in the United States and depresses its wage rate since goods produced using such labor intensively can be produced more efficiently abroad.'The factor endow- ments approach therefore predicts that highly skilled workers in the United States should be protrade,whereas other workers should hold more protectionist views. Empirical studies of trade policy attitudes have generated a fair amount of sup- port for this theory.In a set of cross-national analyses,O'Rourke and Sinnott and Mayda and Rodrik find that mass opinion about trade corresponds closely to pre- dictions stemming from the factor endowments approach.s Scheve and Slaughter provide some additional support for this approach,based on an analysis of public attitudes in the United States;and Balistreri concludes that this model helps to explain Canadian attitudes toward the Canadian-U.S.Free Trade Agreement.'None- theless,a number of recent studies have raised questions about the fit between trade preferences and the factor endowments model.s A key assumption in the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that factors of production can move quickly and easily from one sector to another.In the long run,this assumption is not difficult to jus- tify.In the short run,however,it can be difficult for people (not to mention other factors of production)to change the sector in which they are employed. The specific factors,or Ricardo-Viner,model is an alternative framework that assumes that,at least in the short run,certain factors of production cannot be shifted across sectors.If workers cannot easily move from one sector to another,then they will base their trade preferences on how changes in trade policy are expected to affect the industry in which they are currently employed.This model suggests that individuals who work in export-oriented sectors of the economy will support open trade because they personally benefit from it,while those in import-competing sectors will be more protectionist.Equally,an individual employed in a nontraded sector of the economy should be more protrade than someone employed in an industry that faces substantial competition from foreign imports. Few studies have tried to evaluate whether trade preferences correspond to the specific factors model,primarily due to a lack of data on individuals'industry of 4.Leamer 1984. 5.The human capital model makes similar predictions about the attitudes of highly skilled workers in countries with a highly skilled labor force.In this model,however,the reason highly skilled work- ers should support open trade is that they can more easily shift occupations and industries,and thus adapt successfully to economic change.See Gabel 1998;Baker 2003 and 2005;Kaltenthaler,Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004:and Kocher and Minushkin 2006. 6.See O'Rourke and Sinnott 2002;and Mayda and Rodrik 2005 7.See Balistreri 1997;and Scheve and Slaughter 2001. 8.See Baker 2003;and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006. 9.The model may still prove useful if citizens use a relatively long time frame to evaluate the impact of trade policies.On this point,see Mayda and Rodrik 2005
and damages less-skilled individuals+ 4 Open trade increases the demand for skilled workers, since the United States has a comparative advantage in the production of goods that use this input intensively+ As the demand for such workers rises, so do their wages+ Conversely, heightened trade decreases the demand for low-skilled labor in the United States and depresses its wage rate since goods produced using such labor intensively can be produced more efficiently abroad+ 5 The factor endowments approach therefore predicts that highly skilled workers in the United States should be protrade, whereas other workers should hold more protectionist views+ Empirical studies of trade policy attitudes have generated a fair amount of support for this theory+ In a set of cross-national analyses, O’Rourke and Sinnott and Mayda and Rodrik find that mass opinion about trade corresponds closely to predictions stemming from the factor endowments approach+ 6 Scheve and Slaughter provide some additional support for this approach, based on an analysis of public attitudes in the United States; and Balistreri concludes that this model helps to explain Canadian attitudes toward the Canadian–U+S+ Free Trade Agreement+ 7 Nonetheless, a number of recent studies have raised questions about the fit between trade preferences and the factor endowments model+ 8 A key assumption in the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that factors of production can move quickly and easily from one sector to another+ In the long run, this assumption is not difficult to justify+ In the short run, however, it can be difficult for people ~not to mention other factors of production! to change the sector in which they are employed+ 9 The specific factors, or Ricardo-Viner, model is an alternative framework that assumes that, at least in the short run, certain factors of production cannot be shifted across sectors+ If workers cannot easily move from one sector to another, then they will base their trade preferences on how changes in trade policy are expected to affect the industry in which they are currently employed+ This model suggests that individuals who work in export-oriented sectors of the economy will support open trade because they personally benefit from it, while those in import-competing sectors will be more protectionist+ Equally, an individual employed in a nontraded sector of the economy should be more protrade than someone employed in an industry that faces substantial competition from foreign imports+ Few studies have tried to evaluate whether trade preferences correspond to the specific factors model, primarily due to a lack of data on individuals’ industry of 4+ Leamer 1984+ 5+ The human capital model makes similar predictions about the attitudes of highly skilled workers in countries with a highly skilled labor force+ In this model, however, the reason highly skilled workers should support open trade is that they can more easily shift occupations and industries, and thus adapt successfully to economic change+ See Gabel 1998; Baker 2003 and 2005; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; and Kocher and Minushkin 2006+ 6+ See O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ 7+ See Balistreri 1997; and Scheve and Slaughter 2001+ 8+ See Baker 2003; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+ 9+ The model may still prove useful if citizens use a relatively long time frame to evaluate the impact of trade policies+ On this point, see Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ 428 International Organization