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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：International Influences）State Power and the Structure of International Trade

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STATE POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE By STEPHEN D.KRASNER* INTRODUCTION I N recent years,students of international relations have multina- tionalized,transnationalized,bureaucratized,and transgovernment- alized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic con- struct.Nowhere is that trend more apparent than in the study of the politics of international economic relations.The basic conventional as- sumptions have been undermined by assertions that the state is trapped by a transnational society created not by sovereigns,but by nonstate actors.Interdependence is not seen as a reflection of state policies and state choices (the perspective of balance-of-power theory),but as the result of elements beyond the control of any state or a system created by states. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading.It may explain developments within a particular international economic structure,but it cannot explain the structure itself.That structure has many institu- tional and behavioral manifestations.The central continuum along which it can be described is openness.International economic struc- tures may range from complete autarky (if all states prevent move- ments across their borders),to complete openness (if no restrictions exist).In this paper I will present an analysis of one aspect of the international economy-the structure of international trade;that is, the degree of openness for the movement of goods as opposed to cap- ital,labor,technology,or other factors of production. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century,this structure has gone through several changes.These can be explained,albeit imperfectly,by a state-power theory:an approach that begins with the assumption that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to maximize national goals.The first step in this argument is to relate four basic state interests-aggregate national *I would like to thank Robert Art,Peter Gourevitch,Samuel Huntington,Robert Keohane,Rachel MeCulloch,Joseph Nye,Ronald Rogowski,and Robert W.Tucker for their comments.My greatest intellectual debt,and one not adequately refected in the footnotes,is to Robert Gilpin.Completion of this paper was made possible by support from the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University

STATE POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE By STEPHEN D. KRASNERX INrecent years, students of international relations have multinationalized, transnationalized, bureaucratized, and transgovernmentalized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic construct. Nowhere is that trend more apparent than in the study of the politics of international economic relations. The basic conventional assumptions have been undermined by assertions that the state is trapped by a transnational society created not by sovereigns, but by nonstate actors. Interdependence is not seen as a reflection of state policies and state choices (the perspective of balance-of-power theory), but as the result of elements beyond the control of any state or a system created by states. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading. It may explain developments within a particular international economic structure, but it cannot explain the structure itself. That structure has many institutional and behavioral manifestations. The central continuum along which it can be described is openness. International economic structures may range from complete autarky (if all states prevent movements across their borders), to complete openness (if no restrictions exist). In this paper I will present an analysis of one aspect of the international economy-the structure of international trade; that is, the degree of openness for the movement of goods as opposed to capital, labor, technology, or other factors of production. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, this structure has gone through several changes. These can be explained, albeit imperfectly, by a state-power theory: an approach that begins with the assumption that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to maximize national goals. The first step in this argument is to relate four basic state interests-aggregate national +I would like to thank Robert Art, Peter Gourevitch, Samuel Huntington, Robert Keohane, Rachel McCulloch, Joseph Nye, Ronald Rogowski, and Robert W. Tucker for their comments. My greatest intellectual debt, and one not adequately reflected in the footnotes, is to Robert Gilpin. Completion of this paper was made possible by support from the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University

318 WORLD POLITICS income,social stability,political power,and economic growth-to the degree of openness for the movement of goods.The relationship be- tween these interests and openness depends upon the potential eco- nomic power of any given state.Potential economic power is opera- tionalized in terms of the relative size and level of economic development of the state.The second step in the argument is to relate different distributions of potential power,such as multipolar and hege- monic,to different international trading structures.The most impor- tant conclusion of this theoretical analysis is that a hegemonic distribu- tion of potential economic power is likely to result in an open trading structure.That argument is largely,although not completely,sub- stantiated by empirical data.For a fully adequate analysis it is neces- sary to amend a state-power argument to take account of the impact of past state decisions on domestic social structures as well as on inter- national economic ones.The two major organizers of the structure of trade since the beginning of the nineteenth century,Great Britain and the United States,have both been prevented from making policy amendments in line with state interests by particular societal groups whose power had been enhanced by earlier state policies. THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT:STATE INTERESTS,STATE POWER,AND INTERNATIONAL TRADING STRUCTURES Neoclassical trade theory is based upon the assumption that states act to maximize their aggregate economic utility.This leads to the conclusion that maximum global welfare and Pareto optimality are achieved under free trade.While particular countries might better their situations through protectionism,economic theory has generally looked askance at such policies.In his seminal article on the optimal tariff, Harry Johnson was at pains to point out that the imposition of succes- sive optimal tariffs could lead both trading partners to a situation in which they were worse off than under competitive conditions.'Neo- classical theory recognizes that trade regulations can also be used to correct domestic distortions and to promote infant industries,but these are exceptions or temporary departures from policy conclusions that lead logically to the support of free trade. 1 Johnson,"Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation,"in Harry Johnson,International Trade and Economic Growth (Cambridge:Harvard University Press 1967),31-61. 2 See,for instance, Everett Hagen,"An Economic Justification of Protectionism," Ouarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.72 (November 1958),496-514;Harry Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions,"in Robert Baldwin and others,Trade,Growth and the Balance of Payments:Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler (Chicago:Rand McNally 1965),3-34;and Jagdish Bhagwati,Trade, Tarifis,and Growth (Cambridge:MIT Press 1969),295-308

318 WORLD POLITICS income, social stability, political power, and economic growth-to the degree of openness for the movement of goods. The relationship between these interests and openness depends upon the potential economic power of any given state. Potential economic power is operationalized in terms of the relative size and level of economic development of the state. The second step in the argument is to relate different distributions of potential power, such as multipolar and hegemonic, to different international trading structures. The most important conclusion of this theoretical analysis is that a hegemonic distribution of potential economic power is likely to result in an open trading structure. That argument is largely, although not completely, substantiated by empirical data. For a fully adequate analysis it is necessary to amend a state-power argument to take account of the impact of past state decisions on domestic social structures as well as on international economic ones. The two major organizers of the structure of trade since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Great Britain and the United States, have both been prevented from making policy amendments in line with state interests by particular societal groups whose power had been enhanced by earlier state policies. Neoclassical trade theory is based upon the assumption that states act to maximize their aggregate economic utility. This leads to the conclusion that maximum global welfare and Pareto optimality are achieved under free trade. While particular countries might better their situations through protectionism, economic theory has generally looked askance at such policies. In his seminal article on the optimal tariff, Harry Johnson was at pains to point out that the imposition of successive optimal tariffs could lead both trading partners to a situation in which they were worse off than under competitive conditions.' Neoclassical theory recognizes that trade regulations can also be used to correct domestic distortions and to promote infant industries,' but these are exceptions or temporary departures from policy conclusions that lead logically to the support of free trade. 1Johnson, "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," in Harry Johnson, Znternational Trade and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1967), 31-61. See, for instance, Everett Hagen, "An Economic Justification of Protectionism," Quarterly lournal of Economics, Vol. 72 (November 1958), 496-514; Harry Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions," in Robert Baldwin and others, Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965), 3-34; and Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade, Tarifls, and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press 1969), 295-308

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 319 STATE PREFERENCES Historical experience suggests that policy makers are dense,or that the assumptions of the conventional argument are wrong.Free trade has hardly been the norm.Stupidity is not a very interesting analytic category.An alternative approach to explaining international trading structures is to assume that states seek a broad range of goals.At least four major state interests affected by the structure of international trade can be identified.They are:political power,aggregate national income, economic growth,and social stability.The way in which each of these goals is affected by the degree of openness depends upon the potential economic power of the state as defined by its relative size and level of development. Let us begin with aggregate national income because it is most straightforward.Given the exceptions noted above,conventional neo- classical theory demonstrates that the greater the degree of openness in the international trading system,the greater the level of aggregate economic income.This conclusion applies to all states regardless of their size or relative level of development.The static economic bene- fits of openness are,however,generally inversely related to size.Trade gives small states relatively more welfare benefits than it gives large ones.Empirically,small states have higher ratios of trade to national product.They do not have the generous factor endowments or po- tential for national economies of scale that are enjoyed by larger- particularly continental-states. The impact of openness on social stability runs in the opposite direc- tion.Greater openness exposes the domestic economy to the exigencies of the world market.That implies a higher level of factor movements than in a closed economy,because domestic production patterns must adjust to changes in international prices.Social instability is thereby increased,since there is friction in moving factors,particularly labor, from one sector to another.The impact will be stronger in small states than in large,and in relatively less developed than in more developed ones.Large states are less involved in the international economy:a smaller percentage of their total factor endowment is affected by the international market at any given level of openness.More developed states are better able to adjust factors:skilled workers can more easily be moved from one kind of production to another than can unskilled laborers or peasants.Hence social stability is,ceteris paribus,inversely related to openness,but the deleterious consequences of exposure to the international trading system are mitigated by larger size and greater economic development

STATE POWER AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 319 STATE PREFERENCES Historical experience suggests that policy makers are dense, or that the assumptions of the conventional argument are wrong. Free trade has hardly been the norm. Stupidity is not a very interesting analytic category. An alternative approach to explaining international trading structures is to assume that states seek a broad range of goals. At least four major state interests affected by the structure of international trade can be identified. They are: political power, aggregate national income, economic growth, and social stability. The way in which each of these goals is affected by the degree of openness depends upon the potential economic power of the state as defined by its relative size and level of development. Let us begin with aggregate national income because it is most straightforward. Given the exceptions noted above, conventional neoclassical theory demonstrates that the greater the degree of openness in the international trading system, the greater the level of aggregate economic income. This conclusion applies to all states regardless of their size or relative level of development. The static economic benefits of openness are, however, generally inversely related to size. Trade gives small states relatively more welfare benefits than it gives large ones. Empirically, small states have higher ratios of trade to national product. They do not have the generous factor endowments or potential for national economies of scale that are enjoyed by largerparticularly continental-states. The impact of openness on social stability runs in the opposite direction. Greater openness exposes the domestic economy to the exigencies of the world market. That implies a higher level of factor movements than in a closed economy, because domestic production patterns must adjust to changes in international prices. Social instability is thereby increased, since there is friction in moving factors, particularly labor, from one sector to another. The impact will be stronger in small states than in large, and in relatively less developed than in more developed ones. Large states are less involved in the international economy: a smaller percentage of their total factor endowment is affected by the international market at any given level of openness. More developed states are better able to adjust factors: skilled workers can more easily be moved from one kind of production to another than can unskilled laborers or peasants. Hence social stability is, ceteris paribus, inversely related to openness, but the deleterious consequences of exposure to the international trading system are mitigated by larger size and greater economic development

320 WORLD POLITICS The relationship between political power and the international trad- ing structure can be analyzed in terms of the relative opportunity costs of closure for trading partners.The higher the relative cost of closure, the weaker the political position of the state.Hirschman has argued that this cost can be measured in terms of direct income losses and the adjustment costs of reallocating factors.These will be smaller for large states and for relatively more developed states.Other things being equal,utility costs will be less for large states because they generally have a smaller proportion of their economy engaged in the interna- tional economic system.Reallocation costs will be less for more ad- vanced states because their factors are more mobile.Hence a state that is relatively large and more developed will find its political power enhanced by an open system because its opportunity costs of closure are less.The large state can use the threat to alter the system to secure economic or noneconomic objectives.Historically,there is one impor- tant exception to this generalization-the oil-exporting states.The level of reserves for some of these states,particularly Saudi Arabia,has reduced the economic opportunity costs of closure to a very low level despite their lack of development. The relationship between international economic structure and eco- nomic growth is elusive.For small states,economic growth has gen- erally been empirically associated with openness.Exposure to the inter- national system makes possible a much more efficient allocation of resources.Openness also probably furthers the rate of growth of large countries with relatively advanced technologies because they do not need to protect infant industries and can take advantage of expanded world markets.In the long term,however,openness for capital and technology,as well as goods,may hamper the growth of large,devel- oped countries by diverting resources from the domestic economy,and by providing potential competitors with the knowledge needed to develop their own industries.Only by maintaining its technological lead and continually developing new industries can even a very large state escape the undesired consequences of an entirely open economic system.For medium-size states,the relationship between international trading structure and growth is impossible to specify definitively, 3 This notion is reflected in Albert O.Hirschman,National Power and the Structure of Forcign Trade (Berkeley:University of California Press 1945);Robert W.Tucker, The New Isolationism:Threat or Promise?(Washington:Potomac Associates 1972); and Kenneth Waltz,"The Myth of Interdependence,"in Charles P.Kindleberger,ed., The International Corporation (Cambridge:MIT Press 1970),205-23. Hirschman (fn.3),I3-34. 5 Simon Kuznets,Modern Economic Growth:Rate,Structure,and Spread (New Haven:Yale University Press 1966),302

320 WORLD POLITICS The relationship between political power and the international trading structure can be analyzed in terms of the relative opportunity costs of closure for trading partnem3 The higher the relative cost of closure, the weaker the political position of the state. Hirschman has argued that this cost can be measured in terms of direct income losses and the adjustment costs of reallocating factom4 These will be smaller for large states and for relatively more developed states. Other things being equal, utility costs will be less for large states because they generally have a smaller proportion of their economy engaged in the international economic system. Reallocation costs will be less for more advanced states because their factors are more mobile. Hence a state that is relatively large and more developed will find its political power enhanced by an open system because its opportunity costs of closure are less. The large state can use the threat to alter the system to secure economic or noneconomic objectives. Historically, there is one important exception to this generalization-the oil-exporting states. The level of reserves for some of these states, particularly Saudi Arabia, has reduced the economic opportunity costs of closure to a very low level despite their lack of development. The relationship between international economic structure and economic growth is elusive. For small states, economic growth has generally been empirically associated with opennes~.~Exposure to the international system makes possible a much more efficient allocation of resources. Openness al~o-~robabl~ furthers the rate of growth of large countries with relatively advanced technologies because they do not need to protect infant industries and can take advantage of expanded world markets. In the long term, however, openness for capital and technology, as well as goods, may hamper the growth of large, developed countries by diverting resources from the domestic economy, and by providing potential competitors with the knowledge needed to develop their own industries. Only by maintaining its technological lead and continually developing new industries can even a very large state escape the undesired consequences of an entirely open economic system. For medium-size states, the relationship between international trading structure and growth is impossible to specify definitively, This notion is reflected in Albert 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press 1945); Robert W. Tucker, The New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? (Washington: Potomac Associates 1972); and Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation (Cambridge: MIT Press 1970)~ 205-23. Hirschman (fn.3), 13-34 5 Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 302

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