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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：Domestic Politics）Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility

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American Political Science Review Vol.96,No.3 September 2002 Commerce,Coalitions,and Factor Mobility:Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation MICHAEL J.HISCOX Harvard University The extent to which political conflict over U.S.trade policy has led to clashes between broad- based class coalitions has varied significantly over time during the past two centuries.I argue that much of this variation can be explained by changes in economywide levels of interindustry factor mobility.Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high;when mobility is low,industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions.I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries.These changes coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics.Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns. istory has shown that international trade can create class antagonisms and yet also affect the relative generate intense class conflict,pitting capital fortunes of different industries.What is at issue is the against labor,or farmers against industry,and definition of the basic building blocks of political econ- making the tariff the central policy issue in electoral omy:the alignment of preferences that creates political competition between political parties.In the United coalitions. States,at the turn of the twentieth century,the trade is- I argue here that variation in coalition patterns can be sue did ignite a fierce political contest between protrade explained in large measure by changes in economywide farmers and protectionist urban interests,and the tariff levels of interindustry factor mobility:that is,the ease became the focal point for the parties in virtually every with which owners of factors of production(land,labor, election fought between 1888 and 1914.But this type and capital)can move between industries.Class distinc- of intense class warfare was not the norm in American tions between voters are more economically and polit- trade politics prior to the Civil War,when battles over ically salient when interindustry mobility is high;when policy were dominated by regionally specific,industry- mobility is low,industry distinctions become more crit- based groups (Pincus 1977),nor has it continued in ical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. more recent times,when policies have been shaped in I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of large measure by the lobbying efforts of industry asso- labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries ciations,labor unions,and political action committees. These changes coincide with significant shifts in the and the trade issue has all but vanished at election time character of American trade politics.Analysis of con- (Destler 1992). gressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legisla- In what circumstances does international trade tion between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large deepen class cleavages in politics?When do narrower, swings in coalition patterns.The findings carry impor- industry-based coalitions tend to flourish instead?The tant implications for political-economic studies of eco- existing scholarly literature is largely silent on the ques- nomic policymaking in general,for the future direction tion and strangely polarized.While Rogowski(1989) of U.S.trade policy,for future economic growth,and for presents evidence that trade can create class divisions arguments in favor of adjustment assistance programs that are so fundamental that they can reshape entire po- that would raise levels of interindustry factor mobility. litical systems,much of the recent analysis of American trade politics follows Schattschneider(1935)in placing industry-based lobbies at center stage (Baldwin 1985; TRADE THEORY,COALITIONS AND Grossman and Helpman 1995).This division mirrors FACTOR MOBILITY a more fundamental divide between Marxist politi- According to the Stolper-Samuelson (1941)theorem. cal economy,in which all politics is class politics,and trade increases real returns for owners of the factor of pluralist-style approaches to American politics that fo- production with which the economy is relatively abun- cus on the activities of interest groups.Bridging the dantly endowed,while real returns for owners of the gap is vital for understanding the political-economic scarce factor decline.This result depends critically on origins of not only trade policy,but a vast range of the assumption that factors of production,while im- regulatory,industrial,and monetary policies that can mobile internationally,are perfectly mobile within the domestic economy.The logic is simple enough:In- creased trade lowers the price of the imported good. Michael J.Hiscox is John L.Loeb Associate Professor of the Social leading to a reduction in its domestic production and Sciences,Harvard University,Cambridge,MA 02138 (hiscox@fas. harvard.edu). I thank Jim Alt,Lawrence Broz,Jeff Frieden,Mike Gilligan,Peter 1 Factors are identified as broad categories of productive inputs and Gourevitch,David Lake,Lisa Martin,Ron Rogowski,Verity Smith, include at least labor and capital.Traditional studies focus on land and seminar participants at Harvard University,MIT,and UCSD for labor,and capital,though the case has been for subdividing these comments and suggestions. into narrower categories(Leamer 1984). 593

American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 3 September 2002 Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from congressional Votes on Trade egisl la ti on- - MICHAEL J. HISCOX Harvard University he extent to which political conflict over U.S. trade policy has led to clashes between broad- Tbased class coalitions has varied significantly over time during the past two centuries. I argue that much of this variation can be explained by changes in economywide levels of interindustry factor mobility. Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high; when mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries. These changes coincide with signiJicantshifts in the character of American trade politics. Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns. History has shown that international trade can generate intense class conflict, pitting capital against labor, or farmers against industry, and making the tariff the central policy issue in electoral competition between political parties. In the United States, at the turn of the twentieth century, the trade issue did ignite a fierce political contest between protrade farmers and protectionist urban interests, and the tariff became the focal point for the parties in virtually every election fought between 1888 and 1914. But this type of intense class warfare was not the norm in American trade politics prior to the Civil War, when battles over policy were dominated by regionally specific, industrybased groups (Pincus 1977), nor has it continued in more recent times, when policies have been shaped in large measure by the lobbying efforts of industry associations, labor unions, and political action committees, and the trade issue has all but vanished at election time (Destler 1992). In what circumstances does international trade deepen class cleavages in politics? When do narrower, industry-based coalitions tend to flourish instead? The existing scholarly literature is largely silent on the question and strangely polarized. While Rogowski (1989) presents evidence that trade can create class divisions that are so fundamental that they can reshape entire political systems, much of the recent analysis of American trade politics follows Schattschneider (1935) in placing industry-based lobbies at center stage (Baldwin 1985; Grossman and Helpman 1995). This division mirrors a more fundamental divide between Marxist political economy, in which all politics is class politics, and pluralist-style approaches to American politics that focus on the activities of interest groups. Bridging the gap is vital for understanding the political-economic origins of not only trade policy, but a vast range of regulatory, industrial, and monetary policies that can Michael J. Hiscox is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 (hiscox@fas. harvard.edu). I thank Jim Alt, Lawrence Broz, Jeff Frieden, Mike Gilligan, Peter Gourevitch, David Lake, Lisa Martin, Ron Rogowski, Verity Smith, and seminar participants at Harvard University, MIT, and UCSD for comments and suggestions. create class antagonisms and yet also affect the relative fortunes of different industries. What is at issue is the definition of the basic building blocks of political economy: the alignment of preferences that creates political coalitions. I argue here that variation in coalition patterns can be explained in large measure by changes in economywide levels of interindustry factor mobility: that is, the ease with which owners of factors of production (land, labor, and capital) can move between industries. Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high; when mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries. These changes coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics. Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns. The findings carry important implications for political-economic studies of economic policymaking in general, for the future direction of U.S. trade policy, for future economic growth, and for arguments in favor of adjustment assistance programs that would raise levels of interindustry factor mobility. TRADE THEORY, COALITIONS AND FACTOR MOBILITY According to the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem, trade increases real returns for owners of the factor of production with which the economy is relatively abundantly endowed, while real returns for owners of the scarce factor decline. This result depends critically on the assumption that factors of production, while immobile internationally, are perfectly mobile within the domestic economy.' The logic is simple enough: Increased trade lowers the price of the imported good, leading to a reduction in its domestic production and Factors are identified as broad categories of productive inputs and include at least labor and capital. Traditional studies focus on land, labor, and capital, though the case has been for subdividing these into narrower categories (Leamer 1984)

Commerce,Coalitions,and Factor Mobility September 2002 freeing up more of the factor it uses relatively inten- issue that affects relative commodity prices-will di- sively (the scarce factor)than is demanded elsewhere vide an economy into very different types of coalitions in the economy at existing prices.When factor prices if there is substantial variation in levels of interindustry adjust,returns to the scarce factor fall even further than factor mobility (see Appendix A for a formal,general- the price of the imported good,while returns to the equilibrium treatment) abundant factor rise even further than the price of the exported good.The interindustry mobility of the fac- tors assures that trade affects owners of each factor in EVIDENCE OF TRENDS IN FACTOR MOBILITY IN THE U.S.ECONOMY the same way no matter where they are employed in the economy.This is the insight that encouraged Rogowski (1989)to anticipate broad-based conflict among owners Measuring Interindustry Factor Mobility of land,labor,and capital in trade politics.2 Given the obvious importance of interindustry factor Very different results are generated by alternative mobility in determining the income distribution effects types of models (often referred to as"Ricardo-Viner" of trade(and,hence,the politics of trade),it is vexing,as models)in which one or more factor of production is as- Grossman and Levinsohn(1989)have pointed out,that sumed to be immobile between industries (Jones 1971; very few attempts have actually been made to assess Mussa 1974.1982).3 In these models,the returns to levels of mobility empirically.The most direct evidence "specific"factors are tied closely to the fortunes of the has been provided in work on industry wage differen- industry in which they are employed.Factors specific to tials(e.g.,Krueger and Summers 1988),the response of export industries receive a real increase in returns due stock-market returns to import price shocks(Grossman to trade,while those employed in import-competing in- and Levinsohn 1989),and prices in secondary markets dustries lose in real terms.4 Factor specificity thus drives for capital equipment (Ramey and Shapiro 1998).6 All a wedge between members of the same class employed these studies suggest significant factor specificity and in different industries.The implication is that political sizable industry rents in U.S.manufacturing in recent coalitions form along industry lines,and this has guided years,but we do not have a historical standard of ref- much of the empirical analysis in the"endogenous pol- erence with which to compare these findings. icy"literature in economics that relates variation in To compare levels of factor mobility in the U.S.econ- import barriers across industries to the relative polit- omy in different periods,I have examined the variation ical strength of different industry-based groups (e.g., between rates of return for factors employed in differ- Anderson 1980:Lavergne 1983). ent industries.This is simply an application of the "law The Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner models of one price."If factors are highly mobile (i.e.,mov- examine extreme,or polar,cases,in which productive able),return differentials should be arbitraged away factors are either perfectly mobile or specific.5 Fac- by (actual or potential)factor movement.Smaller dif- tor mobility is better regarded as a continuous vari- ferentials in wages and profits across industries are thus able,affected by a range of economic,technological, indicators of higher levels of mobility.The magnitude of and political conditions.Allowing that factors can have the differentials will reflect the costs of moving factors varying degrees of interindustry mobility,the simple between industries,which are influenced by a range of prediction is that broad class-based political coalitions economic and political variables,including the speci- are more likely where factor mobility is high,while ficity of human and physical capital to particular firms narrow industry-based coalitions are more likely where and industries,any factor market regulations that affect mobility is low.The trade issue-and,in fact,any policy firm entry and exit and hiring and firing,any policies that assist relocation and retraining,and the costs of transportation and communication.Different versions 2 Classes are defined here simply in terms of factor ownership:Each of this type of measure have been used previously in factor class comprises those individuals well endowed with a factor relative to the economy as a whole.This definition allows for the fact a wide range of studies of labor and capital mobility. that individuals often own a mix of factors(Mayer 1984). 3 The original model was introduced independently by Jones(1971) and Samuelson(1971):The former christened it the"specific-factors' 6 Magee (1980)examined the "revealed preferences"of industry model,while the latter named it the "Ricardo-Viner"model. groups to make inferences about mobility in his much-cited study Again,the logic is straightforward:A decrease in the domestic of testimony by labor unions and management groups before the production of an imported good releases any mobile factors for em- House Ways and Means Committee on the Trade Act of 1974. ployment elsewhere in the economy and thus renders factors specific In contrast,a great deal of empirical work has been done on the to the import-competing industry less productive,driving down their interregional mobility of labor and capital in the American economy real returns.Returns on the mobile factor rise relative to the price of aimed explicitly at uncovering historical trends,with much of the the imported good but fall relative to the price of exports,so that the attention focused on the geographic integration of the markets for income effects of trade for owners of this factor depend on patterns labor and capital during the nineteenth century (e.g.,Coelho and of consumption. Shepherd 1976;Davis 1965;Lebergott 1964:Odell 1989;Rosenbloom S The bifurcation is generally considered unproblematic in the eco 1990). nomics literature:Specific-factors effects are regarded as important 8 On industry wage variance in recent years,see Dickens and Katz in the short term but not the long term (Caves et al.1990,146-49; 1987,Gibbons and Katz 1992,Katz and Summers 1989,and Krueger Krugman and Obstfeld 1988,81;Mussa 1974).It is simply assumed and Summers 1987,1988.Almost all the work on the geographic that,over time,all factors are perfectly mobile.But this ignores integration of U.S.labor and financial markets has focused upon politics:Factor owners do not just choose between accepting their regional differences in wages and interest rates,and rate-of return returns in one industry and moving to another,they can also lobby differentials have also been used to gauge the level of international to influence policy (and hence returns). capital mobility (e.g.,Frankel 1991). 594

Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility freeing up more of the factor it uses relatively intensively (the scarce factor) than is demanded elsewhere in the economy at existing prices. When factor prices adiust. returns to the scarce factor fall even further than thi price of the imported good, while returns to the abundant factor rise even further than the price of the exported good. The interindustry mobility of the factors assures that trade affects owners of each factor in the same way no matter where they are employed in the economy. This is the insight that encouraged Rogowski (1989) to anticipate broad-based conflict among owners of land, labor, and capital in trade politics.* Very different results are generated by alternative types of models (often referred to as "Ricardo-Viner" models) in which one or more factor of production is assumed to be immobile between industries (Jones 1971; Mussa 1974. 198213 In these models. the returns to "specific" factors ire tied closely to the fortunes of the industry in which they are employed. Factors specific to export industries receive a real increase in returns due to trade, while those employed in import-competing industries lose in real terms.4 Factor specificity thus drives a wedge between members of the same class employed in different industries. The implication is that political coalitions form along industry lines, and this has guided much of the empirical analysis in the "endogenous policy" literature in economics that relates variation in import barriers across industries to the relative political strength of different industry-based groups (e.g., Anderson 1980; Lavergne 1983). The Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner models examine extreme, or polar, cases, in which productive factors are either perfectly mobile or ~pecific.~ Factor mobility is better regarded as a continuous variable, affected by a range of economic, technological, and political conditions. Allowing that factors can have varying degrees of interindustry mobility, the simple prediction is that broad class-based political coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high, while narrow industry-based coalitions are more likely where mobility is low. The trade issue-and, in fact, any policy Classes are defined here simply in terms of factor ownership: Each factor class comprises those individuals well endowed with a factor relative to the economy as a whole. This definition allows for the fact that individuals often own a mix of factors (Mayer 1984). The original model was introduced independently by Jones (1971) and Samuelson (1 971): The former christened it the "specific-factors" model. while the latter named it the "Ricardo-Viner" model. "gain, the logic is straightforward: A decrease in the domestic production of an imported good releases any mobile factors for employment elsewhere in the economy and thus renders factors specific to the import-competing industry less productive, driving down their real returns. Returns on the mobile factor rise relative to the price of the imported good but fall relative to the price of exports, so that the income effects of trade for owners of this factor depend on patterns of consumption. The bifurcation is generally considered unproblematic in the economics literature: Specific-factors effects are regarded as important in the short term but not the long term (Caves et al. 1990. 14649; Krugman and Obstfeld 1988, 81; Mussa 1974). It is simply assumed that, over time, all factors are perfectly mobile. But this ignores politics: Factor owners do not just choose between accepting their returns in one industry and moving to another, they can also lobby to influence policy (and hence returns). September 2002 issue that affects relative commodity prices-will divide an economy into very different types of coalitions if there is substantial variation in levels of interindustry factor mobility (see Appendix A for a formal, generalequilibrium treatment). EVIDENCE OF TRENDS IN FACTOR MOBILITY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY Measuring Interindustry Factor Mobility Given the obvious importance of interindustry factor mobility in determining the income distribution effects of trade (and, hence, the politics of trade), it is vexing, as Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) have pointed out, that very few attempts have actually been made to assess levels of mobility empirically. The most direct evidence has been provided in work on industry wage differentials (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988), the response of stock-market returns to import price shocks (Grossman and Levinsohn 1989), and prices in secondary markets for capital equipment (Ramey and Shapiro 1998)~ All these studies suggest significant factor specificity and sizable industry rents in U.S. manufacturing in recent years, but we do not have a historical standard of reference with which to compare these findings7 To compare levels of factor mobility in the U.S. economy in different periods, I have examined the variation between rates of return for factors employed in different industries. This is simply an application of the "law of one price." If factors are highly mobile (i.e., movable), return differentials should be arbitraged away by (actual or potential) factor movement. Smaller differentials in wages and profits across industries are thus indicators of higher levels of mobility. The magnitude of the differentials will reflect the costs of moving factors between industries, which are influenced by a range of economic and political variables, including the specificity of human and physical capital to particular firms and industries, any factor market regulations that affect firm entry and exit and hiring and firing, any policies that assist relocation and retraining, and the costs of transportation and communication. Different versions of this type of measure have been used previously in a wide range of studies of labor and capital m~bility.~ Magee (1980) examined the "revealed preferences" of industry groups to make inferences about mobility in his much-cited study of testimony by labor unions and management groups before the House Ways and Means Committee on the Trade Act of 1974. 'In contrast. a great deal of empirical work has been done on the interregional mobility of labor and capital in the American economy aimed explicitly at uncovering historical trends, with much of the attention focused on the geographic integration of the markets for labor and capital during the nineteenth century (e.g., Coelho and Shepherd 1976; Davis 1965: Lebergott 1964; Odell1989; Rosenbloom 1990). 'On industry wage variance in recent years, see Dickens and Katz 1987, Gibbons and Katz 1992, Katz and Summers 1989, and Krueger and Summers 1987, 1988. Almost all the work on the geographic integration of U.S. labor and financial markets has focused upon regional differences in wages and interest rates, and rate-of return differentials have also been used to gauge the level of international capital mobility (e.g.. Frankel 1991)

American Political Science Review Vol.96,No.3 FIGURE 1.Interindustry Variation in Wages 40 35 20 15 8 10 1800 1820 1840 1880188019001920194019601980 2000 Year -Annual eamings in 15 industries (Census)-Annual eamings in 20 industries(Census) Hourty wage rates for unskilled workers (NICB)Hourty eamings of prod.workers (BLS) -Annual eamings of prod.workers (Census)-Daity wages of common labor(Weeks) There are good reasons for exercising caution when on annual wages of production workers in two-digit SIC examining wage and profit differentials,since they may industries is readily available from the Department of partly reflect other features of factor markets besides Commerce,12 hourly earnings for production workers mobility (these issues are discussed further below).It are calculated after 1947 by the Bureau of Labor Statis- is the size of industry rents that is key for the political tics(BLS),13 and separate data on hourly wages for un- story here,however,and wage and profit differentials skilled workers between 1920 and 1937 were compiled are the clearest measure we have of whether such rents by the National Industrial Conference Board(Glasser actually exist.9 1940,36). Using each of the data series to calculate coefficients Interindustry Variation in Wages and Profits of variation across industries yields an interesting set of results.The data,shown in Figure 1,indicate two broad Following Long(1960)I use data on wage payments trends:a general decline in interindustry variation in reported in the decennial census to calculate annual wages over the course of the nineteenth century,con- wages for workers in major manufacturing industries sistent with a marked rise in interindustry labor mobil- (approximates of the modern two-digit Standard In- ity,and a general increase in wage variation beginning dustrial Classification [SIC]categories)for each census sometime between the 1910s and the 1930s,indicating year beginning in 1820.10 I also calculated average daily a steep decline in interindustry mobility more recently. wages of"common laborers"in each of these industries These different trends have been noted separately from the payroll records of firms compiled in the Weeks by analysts focusing on particular eras (e.g.,Atack report of 1886.11 After the turn of the century,evidence Bateman,and Margo 2000;Bell and Freeman 1991), and the evidence of sizable differences in wages across industries in recent years is also consistent with much Hiscox(2002)providesa detailed discussion and treatment of these recent work by labor economists using more detailed measurement issues and a more detailed analysis of all the available evidence on historical trends in U.S.factor mobility. survey data on individual workers (e.g.,Dickens and 10 I began with the 17 industries examined by Long(1960,72-73) for the period 1860 to 1890,amending the list to extend the series and Pennsylvania only(since all data were entered manually for each for 15 of these industries for which data are available over the period hrm). 1820 to 1910.I then created a separate series for 20 industries,adding 12 See the U.S.Department of Commerce's,Census of Manufactures five categories that were excluded from Long's study but for which and Annual Survey of Manufactures (various years).Beginning in data exist over the full span of years.All lists,and original data,are 1900,earnings data are reported for 15 two-digit SICindustries;from available from the author. 1 The Weeks report was published as U.S.Congress,House(1886).I Employmen an amin calculated simple averages across firms in Massachusetts,New York, (various years). 595

American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 3 Year +Annual earnings in 15industries (Census) +Annual earnings in 20 industries (Census) 4Houriy wage rates for unskilled workers (NICB) tHouriy earnings of prod. workers (BLS) I+Annual earnings of prod. workers (Census) tDaily wages of cwnmon labor (Weeks) There are good reasons for exercising caution when examining wage and profit differentials, since they may partly reflect other features of factor markets besides mobility (these issues are discussed further below). It is the size of industry rents that is key for the political story here, however, and wage and profit differentials are the clearest measure we have of whether such rents actually exist.9 Interindustry Variation in Wages and Profits Following Long (1960) I use data on wage payments reported in the decennial census to calculate annual wages for workers in major manufacturing industries (approximates of the modern two-digit Standard Industrial Classification [SIC]categories) for each census year beginning in 1820." I also calculated average daily wages of "common laborers" in each of these industries from the payroll records of firms compiled in the Weeks report of 1886." After the turn of the century, evidence Hiscox (2002) provides a detailed discussion and treatment of these measurement issues and a more detailed analysis of all the available evidence on historical trends in U.S. factor mobility. lo I began with the 17 industries examined by Long (1960, 72-73) for the period 1860 to 1890, amending the list to extend the series for 15 of these industries for which data are available over the period 1820 to 1910. I then created a separate series for 20 industries, adding five categories that were excluded from Long's study but for which data exist over the full span of years. All lists, and original data, are available from the author. l1 The Weeks report was published as U.S. Congress, House (1886). I calculated simple averages across firms in Massachusetts, New York, on annual wages of production workers in two-digit SIC industries is readily available from the Department of commerce,12 hourly earnings for production workers are calculated after 1947 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),'~ and separate data on hourly wages for unskilled workers between 1920 and 1937 were compiled by the National Industrial Conference Board (Glasser 1940,36). Using each of the data series to calculate coefficients of variation across industries yields an interesting set of results. The data, shown in Figure 1, indicate two broad trends: a general decline in interindustry variation in wages over the course of the nineteenth century, consistent with a marked rise in interindustry labor mobility, and a general increase in wage variation beginning sometime between the 1910s and the 1930s, indicating a steep decline in interindustry mobility more recently. These different trends have been noted separately by analysts focusing on particular eras (e.g., Atack, Bateman, and Margo 2000; Bell and Freeman 1991), and the evidence of sizable differences in wages across industries in recent years is also consistent with much recent work by labor economists using more detailed survey data on individual workers (e.g., Dickens and and Pennsylvania only (since all data were entered manually for each firm). l2 See the U.S. Department of Commerce's, Census of Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures (various years). Beginning in 1900, earnings data are reported for 15 two-digit SIC industries; from 1947, they are reported for 19 industries. l3 See the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment and Earnings (various years)

Commerce,Coalitions,and Factor Mobility September 2002 FIGURE 2.Interindustry Variation in Profits 140 120 100 60 40 20 0 18001820 184018601880 19001920194019601980 2000 Year --Annual profits,of capital in 15 industries (Census)--Annual profits,of capital in 20 industries (Census) Annual profits per man-hour (Census) --Corporation after-tax profits,of net worth (SEC) Katz 1987;Krueger and Summers 1988).14 As Figure 1 according to their main activities into two-digit SIC indicates,the size of these much-discussed "indus- industries.16 For earlier years,following Bateman and try rents"trended downward markedly during ear- Weiss (1981),I used census manuscripts to calculate lier stages of industrialization and upward only more profits(value-added minus wage costs)as a percentage recently.15 of the capital invested for firms in each of the major There is very little direct evidence on firm profits in manufacturing industries in each census year.After different industries prior to 1909,when federal taxes 1919,the Department of Commerce ceased reporting were first imposed on corporate incomes(Epstein and data on capital invested,but from 1947 reports total Gordon 1939,122).Beginning in 1933,data from an- man-hours consumed per year for each industry,and nual reports on corporation profits (as percentages of these can be used as a proxy for total investments.17 net worth and equity)are available from the U.S.Secu- Figure 2 charts coefficients of variation in profits rities and Exchange Commission (SEC),categorized across manufacturing industries using these different data series.The results generally match the pattern ex- 14 Only very basic controls can be applied in the aggregate data to hibited in the wages data.There was a general decline account for heterogeneity in skill levels across industries.There is in interindustry variation in profits over most of the strong evidence,however,that interindustry differences in skill mixes nineteenth century,indicating a sharp rise in capital are quite stable over time and controlling for a greater range of indi- mobility,but then a long-term increase in profit differ- vidual skill variables is not important for estimating the relative size entials beginning some time between the 1880s and the of differentialsover time.See Hiscox 2002 and Krueger and Summers 1987. 1910s,indicating a significant decline in interindustry is Note too that the latter trend fits with evidence of a long-term de- capital mobility since then.18 The evidence suggesting cline in quit rates among manufacturing workers since 1919(Hiscox high levels of capital specificity in recent years matches 2002:Ragan 1984)and with survey data on job tenure that show that the number of years spent on the same job by the average worker rose substantially between 1950 and 1990.Workers aged 55 to 64 1 The data are reported by the U.S.Securities and Exchange Com- were at their jobs an average of 16.0 years in 1991,compared with mission,in Survey of American Listed Corporations:Corporation 9.5 years in 1951;those aged 45 to 54 had been at their jobs an av- Profits (various years),and the U.S.Department of Commerce,in erage of 12.2 years in 1991,up from 7.9 years in 1951;and for those Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). in the 35 to 44 age bracket the average tenure rose to 7.9 years in This follows Alt et al.1999.Note that the industry lists used for cal- 1991 from 4.3 years in 1951.Data are from the Employee Benefits culations of profit variation are identical to those used in the analysis Research Institute:see The Economist,January 28,1995.Economists of wages. have noted that these data clash violently with the widely held per- 18 There are no controls here for cross-industry differences in risk ception that the U.S.workforce has become increasingly mobile in or demand shocks,but Hiscox (2002)reports matching results us- response to globalization and technological change;see reports in ing measures of profits disaggregated to the four-digit SIC level to The Economist,January 28.1995,and in The New York Times,April estimate equations and control for industry-specific risk and demand- 1993. side variables. 596

Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility September 2002 FIGURE 2. Interindustry Variation in Profits 0 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 Year Ib~nnual profits, % of capital in 15 industries (Census) +Annual profls, % of capital in 20 industries (Census) +Annual profits per man-hour (Census) Katz 1987: Krueger and Summers 1988).14 As Figure 1 indicates, the size of these much-discussed "industry rents" trended downward markedly during earlier stages of industrialization and upward only more recently.'' There is very little direct evidence on firm profits in different industries prior to 1909, when federal taxes were first imposed on corporate incomes (Epstein and Gordon 1939, 122). Beginning in 1933, data from annual reports on corporation profits (as percentages of net worth and equity) are available from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), categorized Only very basic controls can be applied in the aggregate data to account for heterogeneity in skill levels across industries. There is strong evidence, however, that interindustry differences in skill mixes are quite stable over time and controlling for a greater range of individual skill variables is not important for estimating the relative size of differentials over time. See Hiscox 2002 and Krueger and Summers 1987. l5 Note too that the latter trend fits with evidence of a long-term decline in quit rates among manufacturing workers since 1919 (Hiscox 2002; ~agan 1984) and with survey data-on job tenure that show that the number of years spent on the same job by the average worker rose substantially between 1950 and 1990. Workers aged 55 to 64 were at their jobs an average of 16.0 years in 1991, compared with 9.5 years in 1951; those aged 45 to 54 had been at their jobs an average of 12.2 years in 1991. up from 7.9 years in 1951; and for those in the 35 to 44 age bracket the average tenure rose to 7.9 years in 1991 from 4.3 years in 1951. Data are from the Employee Benefits Research Institute; see The Economist, January 28.1995. Economists have noted that these data clash violently with the widely held perception that the U.S. workforce has become increasingly mobile in response to globalization and technological change: see reports in The Economist, January 28. 1995, and in The New York Times. April 1993. +Corporation after-tax profits, % of net worth (SEC) according to their main activities into two-digit SIC industries.16 For earlier years, following Bateman and Weiss (1981), I used census manuscripts to calculate profits (value-added minus wage costs) as a percentage of the capital invested for firms in each of the major manufacturing industries in each census year. After 1919, the Department of Commerce ceased reporting data on capital invested, but from 1947 reports total man-hours consumed per year for each industry, and these can be used as a proxy for total investments." Figure 2 charts coefficients of variation in profits across manufacturing industries using these different data series. The results generally match the pattern exhibited in the wages data. There was a general decline in interindustry variation in profits over most of the nineteenth century, indicating a sharp rise in capital mobility, but then a long-term increase in profit differentials beginning some time between the 1880s and the 1910s, indicating a significant decline in interindustry capital mobility since then.18 The evidence suggesting high levels of capital specificity in recent years matches '"e data are reported by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in Survey of American Listed Corporations: Corporation Profits (various years), and the U.S. Department of Commerce. in Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). l7 This follows Alt et al. 1999. Note that the industry lists used for calculations of profit variation are identical to those used in the analysis of wages. l8 There are no controls here for cross-industry differences in risk or demand shocks, but Hiscox (2002) reports matching results using measures of profits disaggregated to the four-digit SIC level to estimate equations and control for industry-specific risk and demandside variables

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