Educated Preferences:Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe Jens Hainmueller and Michael J.Hiscox Abstract Recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor-market competition as a potent source of anti-immigrant senti- ment,in particular among less-educated or less-skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for much lower wages.We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey.In contrast to predictions based on conventional argu- ments about labor-market competition,which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels,we find that people with higher levels of educa- tion and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question.Across Europe,higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants.These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force (that is,those competing for jobs)and those not in the labor force.Contrary to the conventional wisdom,then, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little,if anything,to do with fears about labor- market competition.This finding is consistent with extensive economic research show- ing that the income and employment effects of immigration in European economies are actually very small.We find that a large component of the link between educa- tion and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs.More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts;they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole. Political debates over immigration policy have been rising in volume and inten- sity in recent years in almost all Western economies.On the one hand,immigra- tion is seen by many as an economic and cultural lifeline that can supply firms in The authors would like to thank Beth Simmons,Shigeo Herano,Mike Tomz,James Alt,Jeffry Frieden, Ron Rogowski,Ken Scheve,Torben Iversen,Andy Baker,and Peter Gourevitch for helpful comments on earlier drafts. International Organization 61,Spring 2007,pp.399-442 2007 by The IO Foundation. D0L:10.1017/S0020818307070142
Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe Jens Hainmueller and Michael J+ Hiscox Abstract Recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor-market competition as a potent source of anti-immigrant sentiment, in particular among less-educated or less-skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for much lower wages+ We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey+ In contrast to predictions based on conventional arguments about labor-market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, we find that people with higher levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill attributes of the immigrants in question+ Across Europe, higher education and higher skills mean more support for all types of immigrants+ These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the labor force ~that is, those competing for jobs! and those not in the labor force+ Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labormarket competition+ This finding is consistent with extensive economic research showing that the income and employment effects of immigration in European economies are actually very small+ We find that a large component of the link between education and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs+ More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity than do their counterparts; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole+ Political debates over immigration policy have been rising in volume and intensity in recent years in almost all Western economies+ On the one hand, immigration is seen by many as an economic and cultural lifeline that can supply firms in The authors would like to thank Beth Simmons, Shigeo Herano, Mike Tomz, James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Ron Rogowski, Ken Scheve, Torben Iversen, Andy Baker, and Peter Gourevitch for helpful comments on earlier drafts+ International Organization 61, Spring 2007, pp+ 399–442 © 2007 by The IO Foundation+ DOI: 10+10170S0020818307070142
400 International Organization key industries with skilled workers,relieve strains on tax-funded pension systems threatened by the graying of the local population,and inject new artistic and intel- lectual life into the nation.On the other hand,there are concerns that immigrants may take jobs away from local workers,subtract more from the government in the form of social services than they give back in taxes,and create ethnic enclaves that balkanize the nation,undermine traditional culture,and lead to crime and other social ills.These latter concerns have encouraged the recent imposition of much tighter immigration controls in several countries while also nurturing the growth of extremist anti-immigrant political movements in many parts of Europe and increasing the incidence of hate crimes directed toward immigrants.The debate seems certain to continue in the years ahead,and grow fiercer. A great deal of new research has examined survey data on individual attitudes toward immigration,focusing on the determinants of anti-immigration sentiments. Some of the most recent and prominent studies have concluded that realistic fears about the economic effects of labor-market competition among low-skilled,blue- collar workers lie at the heart of much anti-immigration feeling.2 These studies all rest their analysis on economic models of the distributive effects of immigration anticipating that low-skilled (that is,less-educated)native workers will lose out when forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants.3 The key support- ing evidence for their claims is that opposition to immigration among survey respon- dents in advanced industrialized countries is negatively and significantly associated with individual levels of educational attainment.Viewed from this perspective, the immigration debate is to a large extent about economics,and a critical battle line is the one that separates high-skilled and low-skilled workers. But this account does not fit well with the growing body of evidence,available from a variety of studies of European and American labor markets,showing that the effects of immigration flows on income,employment,and unemployment actu- ally appear to be quite small.Since the most sophisticated economic models are quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers,perhaps these latter results should not be so surprising.But this does raise a big question about how exactly one should interpret the clear relationship between the education or skill levels among individuals and their views about immigration.One established line of scholar- ship would regard this pattern not as a reflection of labor-market dynamics,but instead as confirmation that higher levels of education lead to greater ethnic and racial tolerance among individuals and more cosmopolitan outlooks.3 Viewed in 1.See,for example,Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b;Citrin et al.1997;and Dustmann and Preston 2001. 2.See,for example,Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b;Kessler 2001;and Mayda 2006. 3.See Borjas 1999a and 1999b. 4.See Friedberg and Hunt 1995;Bhagwati 2000 and 2002;Dustmann et al.2004;and Card 2005; although see Borjas 2003. 5.See,for example,Espenshade and Calhoun 1993;Citrin et al.1997;and McLaren 2001
key industries with skilled workers, relieve strains on tax-funded pension systems threatened by the graying of the local population, and inject new artistic and intellectual life into the nation+ On the other hand, there are concerns that immigrants may take jobs away from local workers, subtract more from the government in the form of social services than they give back in taxes, and create ethnic enclaves that balkanize the nation, undermine traditional culture, and lead to crime and other social ills+ These latter concerns have encouraged the recent imposition of much tighter immigration controls in several countries while also nurturing the growth of extremist anti-immigrant political movements in many parts of Europe and increasing the incidence of hate crimes directed toward immigrants+ The debate seems certain to continue in the years ahead, and grow fiercer+ A great deal of new research has examined survey data on individual attitudes toward immigration, focusing on the determinants of anti-immigration sentiments+ 1 Some of the most recent and prominent studies have concluded that realistic fears about the economic effects of labor-market competition among low-skilled, bluecollar workers lie at the heart of much anti-immigration feeling+ 2 These studies all rest their analysis on economic models of the distributive effects of immigration anticipating that low-skilled ~that is, less-educated! native workers will lose out when forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants+ 3 The key supporting evidence for their claims is that opposition to immigration among survey respondents in advanced industrialized countries is negatively and significantly associated with individual levels of educational attainment+ Viewed from this perspective, the immigration debate is to a large extent about economics, and a critical battle line is the one that separates high-skilled and low-skilled workers+ But this account does not fit well with the growing body of evidence, available from a variety of studies of European and American labor markets, showing that the effects of immigration flows on income, employment, and unemployment actually appear to be quite small+ 4 Since the most sophisticated economic models are quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers, perhaps these latter results should not be so surprising+ But this does raise a big question about how exactly one should interpret the clear relationship between the education or skill levels among individuals and their views about immigration+ One established line of scholarship would regard this pattern not as a reflection of labor-market dynamics, but instead as confirmation that higher levels of education lead to greater ethnic and racial tolerance among individuals and more cosmopolitan outlooks+ 5 Viewed in 1+ See, for example, Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al+ 1997; and Dustmann and Preston 2001+ 2+ See, for example, Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b; Kessler 2001; and Mayda 2006+ 3+ See Borjas 1999a and 1999b+ 4+ See Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Bhagwati 2000 and 2002; Dustmann et al+ 2004; and Card 2005; although see Borjas 2003+ 5+ See, for example, Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin et al+ 1997; and McLaren 2001+ 400 International Organization
Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 401 this light,immigration is an issue that raises fundamental questions about values and identities among individuals,debates over immigration are shaped less by labor- market competition than by cultural conflict,and the division between more-and less-educated natives is primarily a cultural or ideological distinction. Which of these interpretations is more correct?Is the main motivator for oppo- sition to immigration the threat of economic competition,felt most acutely among the less educated?Or is it a deeper animosity toward foreigners and foreign cul- tures,felt least strongly among the more educated?The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the politics of immigration and the treatment of ethnic minorities.It is crucial,too,for policymakers and others who support immi- gration and worry about the growth of extremist,often violent,anti-immigrant movements.If anti-immigration sentiments are based primarily on economic cal- culations,there are some very direct ways in which policymakers might address them:for instance,by targeting forms of adjustment assistance and job creation programs toward the communities or industries in which the economic impact is felt most heavily.If opposition to immigration is motivated by more deep-seated cultural factors,on the other hand,these types of adjustment assistance are unlikely to be effective and it is much more difficult to imagine simple,short-run measures that would mitigate the political tensions. We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey (ESS).Unlike other sources of survey data on attitudes toward immigrants,the 2003 ESS provides a rich,detailed set of questions about the immigration issue,probing respondents'views about immigrants from differ- ent countries.The detailed data allow us to provide new tests of the labor-market competition explanation for anti-immigration sentiments among European voters. We focus,in particular,on the complex relationship between education and atti- tudes toward immigration.Our results indicate that,in contrast to predictions based on the conventional arguments about labor-market competition,which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels,people with higher education levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from and their likely skill attributes.Across Europe,higher education means more support for all types of immigrants.This is true for alter- native measures of education in all twenty-two ESS countries.The same relation- ship holds for direct (occupational)measures of respondent skill levels:higher skills are associated with greater support for all types of immigration.These rela- tionships are almost identical among those in the labor force and those not in the labor force. The findings thus suggest that,contrary to the conventional wisdom,the con- nection between the educational or skill attributes of individuals and their views about immigration appears to have very little,if anything,to do with fears about labor-market competition.The conventional story appears to be based on a funda- mental misinterpretation of the available evidence.We find that a large com- ponent of the effect of education on individual attitudes toward immigrants is
this light, immigration is an issue that raises fundamental questions about values and identities among individuals, debates over immigration are shaped less by labormarket competition than by cultural conflict, and the division between more- and less-educated natives is primarily a cultural or ideological distinction+ Which of these interpretations is more correct? Is the main motivator for opposition to immigration the threat of economic competition, felt most acutely among the less educated? Or is it a deeper animosity toward foreigners and foreign cultures, felt least strongly among the more educated? The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the politics of immigration and the treatment of ethnic minorities+ It is crucial, too, for policymakers and others who support immigration and worry about the growth of extremist, often violent, anti-immigrant movements+ If anti-immigration sentiments are based primarily on economic calculations, there are some very direct ways in which policymakers might address them: for instance, by targeting forms of adjustment assistance and job creation programs toward the communities or industries in which the economic impact is felt most heavily+ If opposition to immigration is motivated by more deep-seated cultural factors, on the other hand, these types of adjustment assistance are unlikely to be effective and it is much more difficult to imagine simple, short-run measures that would mitigate the political tensions+ We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social Survey ~ESS!+ Unlike other sources of survey data on attitudes toward immigrants, the 2003 ESS provides a rich, detailed set of questions about the immigration issue, probing respondents’ views about immigrants from different countries+ The detailed data allow us to provide new tests of the labor-market competition explanation for anti-immigration sentiments among European voters+ We focus, in particular, on the complex relationship between education and attitudes toward immigration+ Our results indicate that, in contrast to predictions based on the conventional arguments about labor-market competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, people with higher education levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from and their likely skill attributes+ Across Europe, higher education means more support for all types of immigrants+ This is true for alternative measures of education in all twenty-two ESS countries+ The same relationship holds for direct ~occupational! measures of respondent skill levels: higher skills are associated with greater support for all types of immigration+ These relationships are almost identical among those in the labor force and those not in the labor force+ The findings thus suggest that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the connection between the educational or skill attributes of individuals and their views about immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor-market competition+ The conventional story appears to be based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the available evidence+ We find that a large component of the effect of education on individual attitudes toward immigrants is Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 401
402 International Organization associated with differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs.More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cul- tural diversity;they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole.Together,these factors account for around 65 percent of the estimated relationship between education and support for immigration. Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration Which individuals are most likely to oppose immigration?Standard economic mod- els of the income effects of immigration emphasize the importance of the differ- ent types of productive factors people own.What is critical in this respect is the impact that immigration has on relative supplies of factors of production in the local economy.In the most commonly analyzed scenario,it is assumed that immi- grants have relatively low skill levels when compared with native workers.Immi- gration thus increases the supply of low-skilled labor relative to other factors(land, capital,and high-skilled labor).In a simple closed-economy model in which new (low-skilled)immigrants can price themselves into employment only by lowering the wages of native low-skilled workers,as more low-skilled labor is applied to fixed amounts of the other factors,the real wages of the less skilled will decline while the earnings of owners of land,capital,and skills will rise.6 This model of the impact of immigration is often referred to as "factor-proportions"(FP)analy- sis.It renders the distributive effects of inflows of low-skilled immigrants in stark terms:native low-skilled workers are clearly the economic losers.Of course,if immigrants were high-skilled(rather than low-skilled)workers the effect of the inflows would be to lower real wages for native high-skilled workers and to raise real earnings for all others (including low-skilled workers). There has been a good deal of research on public attitudes toward immigration that has looked for signs that economic concerns related to job security do lie behind anti-immigrant sentiments,with mixed results.8 But several recent studies have set out explicitly to test the proposition that a fear of lower wages induces low-skilled individuals,in particular,to oppose immigration.Most prominently, Scheve and Slaughter have examined data from National Election Studies (NES) 6.Standard models assume full employment and wage flexibility,so that the distributional effects are reflected in wages.In models that permit labor-market imperfections,these effects can also take the form of changes in local unemployment rates (see Razin and Sadka 1995:and Angrist and Kugler 2003).Alternative models also allow for geographic differences within national labor markets so that the wage and employment effects of immigration may be concentrated in"gateway communities"where immigrants tend to settle in large numbers (see Card 1990;LaLonde and Topel 1991;and Borjas 1999a, 10-11). 7.See Borjas,Freeman,and Katz 1996 and 1997;and Borjas 1999a. 8.See,for example,Studlar 1977;Harwood 1986;Simon 1987;Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al.1997;Burns and Gimpel 2000;Fetzer 2000;and Dustmann and Preston 2001
associated with differences among individuals in cultural values and beliefs+ More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole+ Together, these factors account for around 65 percent of the estimated relationship between education and support for immigration+ Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration Which individuals are most likely to oppose immigration? Standard economic models of the income effects of immigration emphasize the importance of the different types of productive factors people own+ What is critical in this respect is the impact that immigration has on relative supplies of factors of production in the local economy+ In the most commonly analyzed scenario, it is assumed that immigrants have relatively low skill levels when compared with native workers+ Immigration thus increases the supply of low-skilled labor relative to other factors ~land, capital, and high-skilled labor!+ In a simple closed-economy model in which new ~low-skilled! immigrants can price themselves into employment only by lowering the wages of native low-skilled workers, as more low-skilled labor is applied to fixed amounts of the other factors, the real wages of the less skilled will decline while the earnings of owners of land, capital, and skills will rise+ 6 This model of the impact of immigration is often referred to as “factor-proportions” ~FP! analysis+ 7 It renders the distributive effects of inflows of low-skilled immigrants in stark terms: native low-skilled workers are clearly the economic losers+ Of course, if immigrants were high-skilled ~rather than low-skilled! workers the effect of the inflows would be to lower real wages for native high-skilled workers and to raise real earnings for all others ~including low-skilled workers!+ There has been a good deal of research on public attitudes toward immigration that has looked for signs that economic concerns related to job security do lie behind anti-immigrant sentiments, with mixed results+ 8 But several recent studies have set out explicitly to test the proposition that a fear of lower wages induces low-skilled individuals, in particular, to oppose immigration+ Most prominently, Scheve and Slaughter have examined data from National Election Studies ~NES! 6+ Standard models assume full employment and wage flexibility, so that the distributional effects are reflected in wages+ In models that permit labor-market imperfections, these effects can also take the form of changes in local unemployment rates ~see Razin and Sadka 1995; and Angrist and Kugler 2003!+ Alternative models also allow for geographic differences within national labor markets so that the wage and employment effects of immigration may be concentrated in “gateway communities” where immigrants tend to settle in large numbers ~see Card 1990; LaLonde and Topel 1991; and Borjas 1999a, 10–11!+ 7+ See Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996 and 1997; and Borjas 1999a+ 8+ See, for example, Studlar 1977; Harwood 1986; Simon 1987; Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al+ 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fetzer 2000; and Dustmann and Preston 2001+ 402 International Organization
Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 403 surveys in the United States in 1992,1994,and 1996 that asked respondents about their preferences regarding immigration restrictions.They found that individuals with lower skills,measured primarily by years of education,were far more likely to support restrictions on immigration than those with higher skills.Mayda reached similar conclusions after examining cross-national survey data on twenty-three nations from the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP),as well as data on forty-four nations from the third wave of the World Value Survey (WVS),conducted between 1995 and 1997.10 She reports that respondents with higher levels of skill (again,measured by years of educa- tion)are much more likely to voice pro-immigration opinions than those with lower levels of skill. There are several reasons to be cautious about how we interpret these findings. One issue is whether immigration,in practice,has actually had the distributional effects anticipated by the standard closed-economy models.A growing set of empir- ical studies dedicated to this question has found only small wage and employment effects attributable to immigration flows into European labor markets(there is still much debate about the evidence in the American case).In part this may be because there appears to be a great deal of variation in the skill levels of immigrants,and there is considerable debate now over whether immigrants actually tend,in gen- eral,to have low levels of skills relative to native workers.2 To varying degrees, of course,the immigration policies in many Western countries are actually aimed at selecting candidates for entry based on the quality of their skills and excess local demand for those skills.13 More fundamentally,the most sophisticated economic models are actually quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers with similar skills.14 In the following we briefly summarize the theoretical predictions of current open-economy models of immigration;we provide a detailed technical description in a separate Web 9.Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b. 10.Mayda2006. 11.For general reviews,see Friedberg and Hunt 1995;and Bhagwati 2000 and 2002.For evidence on the impact of immigration in European labor markets,see Zimmerman 1995:Hunt 1992:DeNew and Zimmerman 1994;Hartog and Zorlu 2005;and Dustmann et al.2004.Evidence on immigration effects on wages in the United States is discussed in Card 1990;Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994a;Borjas, Freeman,and Katz 1997:and Borjas 1999a.Two recent studies of the effects of immigration on wages and employment in the United States,Borjas 2003 and Card 2005,reach opposing conclusions about the magnitude of these effects. 12.Angrist and Kugler 2003,16,report"considerable overlap between the immigrant and native schooling distributions"for thirteen European countries in 1995 and 1999.Borjas,Freeman,and Katz 1997 and Borjas 1999a present evidence from U.S.census data indicating that,on average,immigrants to the United States had approximately two fewer years of education than natives in 1998.According to Bhagwati 2002,310,however,the evidence of a large native versus immigrant skill difference is less clear judging from data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 13.See Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1972. 14.See Friedberg and Hunt 1995;and Scheve and Slaughter 2001a,135-37
surveys in the United States in 1992, 1994, and 1996 that asked respondents about their preferences regarding immigration restrictions+ 9 They found that individuals with lower skills, measured primarily by years of education, were far more likely to support restrictions on immigration than those with higher skills+ Mayda reached similar conclusions after examining cross-national survey data on twenty-three nations from the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme ~ISSP!, as well as data on forty-four nations from the third wave of the World Value Survey ~WVS!, conducted between 1995 and 1997+ 10 She reports that respondents with higher levels of skill ~again, measured by years of education! are much more likely to voice pro-immigration opinions than those with lower levels of skill+ There are several reasons to be cautious about how we interpret these findings+ One issue is whether immigration, in practice, has actually had the distributional effects anticipated by the standard closed-economy models+ A growing set of empirical studies dedicated to this question has found only small wage and employment effects attributable to immigration flows into European labor markets ~there is still much debate about the evidence in the American case!+ 11 In part this may be because there appears to be a great deal of variation in the skill levels of immigrants, and there is considerable debate now over whether immigrants actually tend, in general, to have low levels of skills relative to native workers+ 12 To varying degrees, of course, the immigration policies in many Western countries are actually aimed at selecting candidates for entry based on the quality of their skills and excess local demand for those skills+ 13 More fundamentally, the most sophisticated economic models are actually quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local workers with similar skills+ 14 In the following we briefly summarize the theoretical predictions of current open-economy models of immigration; we provide a detailed technical description in a separate Web 9+ Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b+ 10+ Mayda 2006+ 11+ For general reviews, see Friedberg and Hunt 1995; and Bhagwati 2000 and 2002+ For evidence on the impact of immigration in European labor markets, see Zimmerman 1995; Hunt 1992; DeNew and Zimmerman 1994; Hartog and Zorlu 2005; and Dustmann et al+ 2004+ Evidence on immigration effects on wages in the United States is discussed in Card 1990; Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994a; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997; and Borjas 1999a+ Two recent studies of the effects of immigration on wages and employment in the United States, Borjas 2003 and Card 2005, reach opposing conclusions about the magnitude of these effects+ 12+ Angrist and Kugler 2003, 16, report “considerable overlap between the immigrant and native schooling distributions” for thirteen European countries in 1995 and 1999+ Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997 and Borjas 1999a present evidence from U+S+ census data indicating that, on average, immigrants to the United States had approximately two fewer years of education than natives in 1998+ According to Bhagwati 2002, 310, however, the evidence of a large native versus immigrant skill difference is less clear judging from data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service+ 13+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1972+ 14+ See Friedberg and Hunt 1995; and Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 135–37+ Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe 403