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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of International Trade：Domestic Politics）Before Hegemony. Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization

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Before Hegemony:Adam Smith, American Independence,and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization James Ashley Morrison Abstract While extensive scholarship has shown that it is possible to maintain global economic openness after hegemony,economic liberalization is still thought to be unlikely prior to hegemonic ascent.This assumption is based on the conven- tional narrative that Great Britain began lowering its trade barriers in the 1820s as it began its hegemonic ascent.This article shows that Britain began pursuing an open trading structure in the 1780s-in precisely the multipolar world that heg- emonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift.This change in commercial strategy depended crucially on the intellectual conversion of a key policymaker-the Earl of Shelburne-from mercantilist foreign economic pol- icy to Adam Smith's revolutionary laissez-faire liberalism.Using the case of "the world's most important trading state"in the nineteenth century,this article high- lights the importance of intellectuals-as well as their ideas-in shaping states'for- eign policy strategies.It also provides further evidence of key individuals'significance and their decisions at"critical junctures." I owe to a journey I made with Mr.Smith from Edinburgh to London the difference between light and darkness...The novelty of his principles .. made me unable to comprehend them at the time,but he urged them with so much...eloquence,that they took a certain hold which,though it did not... arrive at full conviction for some few years after,I can truly say has consti- tuted ever since the happiness of my life. -The Earl of Shelburne,Prime Minister(1782-83) I am indebted to Douglas Irwin,Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey,Jack Rakove,Judith Goldstein,Barry Weingast,Richard Boyd,David Steinberg,Jonathan Herzog,Margaret Peters,James Fearon,David Stasavage,Patrick Leblond,Craig Murphy,David Hancock,Moonhawk Kim,Kristina Johnson,Jeff Colgan,and Molly Roberts.I am also grateful to my colleagues at Middlebury College and the par- ticipants in the NEPSA,IPES,and ISA meetings.I also thank the editors and reviewers of this journal for their invaluable suggestions. International Organization 66,Summer 2012,pp.395-428 2012 by The IO Foundation. do:10.1017/S0020818312000148

Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization James Ashley Morrison Abstract While extensive scholarship has shown that it is possible to maintain global economic openness after hegemony, economic liberalization is still thought to be unlikely prior to hegemonic ascent+ This assumption is based on the conventional narrative that Great Britain began lowering its trade barriers in the 1820s as it began its hegemonic ascent+ This article shows that Britain began pursuing an open trading structure in the 1780s—in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift+ This change in commercial strategy depended crucially on the intellectual conversion of a key policymaker—the Earl of Shelburne—from mercantilist foreign economic policy to Adam Smith’s revolutionary laissez-faire liberalism+ Using the case of “the world’s most important trading state” in the nineteenth century, this article highlights the importance of intellectuals—as well as their ideas—in shaping states’ foreign policy strategies+ It also provides further evidence of key individuals’ significance and their decisions at “critical junctures+” I owe to a journey I made with Mr+ Smith from Edinburgh to London the difference between light and darkness +++ The novelty of his principles +++ made me unable to comprehend them at the time, but he urged them with so much +++ eloquence, that they took a certain hold which, though it did not +++ arrive at full conviction for some few years after, I can truly say has constituted ever since the happiness of my life+ —The Earl of Shelburne, Prime Minister ~1782–83! I am indebted to Douglas Irwin, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, Jack Rakove, Judith Goldstein, Barry Weingast, Richard Boyd, David Steinberg, Jonathan Herzog, Margaret Peters, James Fearon, David Stasavage, Patrick Leblond, Craig Murphy, David Hancock, Moonhawk Kim, Kristina Johnson, Jeff Colgan, and Molly Roberts+ I am also grateful to my colleagues at Middlebury College and the participants in the NEPSA, IPES, and ISA meetings+ I also thank the editors and reviewers of this journal for their invaluable suggestions+ International Organization 66, Summer 2012, pp+ 395–428 © 2012 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818312000148

396 International Organization What an extraordinary man [Prime Minister William]Pitt is;he understands my ideas better than I do myself. -Adam Smith Theories of international organization have not yet escaped the long shadow of so-called hegemonic stability theory.The neoliberal institutionalists theorized that it was possible for openness to exist independent of hegemony,2 and they empiri- cally demonstrated that openness has persisted even"after hegemony."3 But there still has not been a robust challenge to the hegemonic stability theorists'claim that trade liberalization is least likely in a system populated by large,unequally developed states.4 The debate about the distribution of power's influence on global economic open- ness is as important as ever.Regimes of global economic governance have proven sufficiently durable to maintain openness even in the face of American relative economic decline.But the increasing tensions within these regimes,the ascent of economic powers resistant to complete market integration-like China and India- and the continuing economic malaise all increase the propensity toward closure.3 Will actors continue to support economic openness as the "structure"of the inter- national system evolves?If global markets shift toward closure,can they shift back toward openness absent a rising hegemon? I address these pressing questions by reexamining the origins of the first era of trade liberalization.Focused on the "openness"achieved,scholars of international politics have largely assumed that Britain did not begin pursuing openness until the 1820s.But the pursuit of openness might long antedate its achievement.Indeed, Britain first sought openness in the 1780s,as a threatened power in a hostile,multi- polar system.At that point,Britain relinquished control over the American colo- nies and pursued free trade with friend and foe alike. This article challenges "materialist"explanations for Britain's shift toward free trade that exclusively consider the structure of interests,institutions,and power at the international and domestic levels.The shift toward openness came well before hegemony,in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift.I also show that domestic inter- ests and institutions underdetermined Britain's commercial strategy in the 1780s. These material variables did matter.They defined the range of possibilities.But this was a broad range,and it remained for policymakers to choose among com- peting strategies as they pursued power and plenty. 1.See Kindleberger 1973:Krasner 1976;and Keohane 1997. 2.See Ruggie 1982;Keohane 1984;Lake 1984;and Snidal 1985. 3.See McKeown 1983 and 1991;Conybeare 1983;Webb and Krasner 1989;and Lake 1991. 4.See Krasner 1976,323;and Mansfield 1994,179-80. 5.See Keohane and Nye 2003;Barton et al.2006,192-94;Mearsheimer 2001 and 2010; Schattschneider 1935;and Eichengreen 1989

What an extraordinary man @Prime Minister William# Pitt is; he understands my ideas better than I do myself+ —Adam Smith Theories of international organization have not yet escaped the long shadow of so-called hegemonic stability theory+ 1 The neoliberal institutionalists theorized that it was possible for openness to exist independent of hegemony, 2 and they empirically demonstrated that openness has persisted even “after hegemony+”3 But there still has not been a robust challenge to the hegemonic stability theorists’ claim that trade liberalization is least likely in a system populated by large, unequally developed states+ 4 The debate about the distribution of power’s influence on global economic openness is as important as ever+ Regimes of global economic governance have proven sufficiently durable to maintain openness even in the face of American relative economic decline+ But the increasing tensions within these regimes, the ascent of economic powers resistant to complete market integration—like China and India— and the continuing economic malaise all increase the propensity toward closure+ 5 Will actors continue to support economic openness as the “structure” of the international system evolves? If global markets shift toward closure, can they shift back toward openness absent a rising hegemon? I address these pressing questions by reexamining the origins of the first era of trade liberalization+ Focused on the “openness” achieved, scholars of international politics have largely assumed that Britain did not begin pursuing openness until the 1820s+ But the pursuit of openness might long antedate its achievement+ Indeed, Britain first sought openness in the 1780s, as a threatened power in a hostile, multipolar system+ At that point, Britain relinquished control over the American colonies and pursued free trade with friend and foe alike+ This article challenges “materialist” explanations for Britain’s shift toward free trade that exclusively consider the structure of interests, institutions, and power at the international and domestic levels+ The shift toward openness came well before hegemony, in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift+ I also show that domestic interests and institutions underdetermined Britain’s commercial strategy in the 1780s+ These material variables did matter+ They defined the range of possibilities+ But this was a broad range, and it remained for policymakers to choose among competing strategies as they pursued power and plenty+ 1+ See Kindleberger 1973; Krasner 1976; and Keohane 1997+ 2+ See Ruggie 1982; Keohane 1984; Lake 1984; and Snidal 1985+ 3+ See McKeown 1983 and 1991; Conybeare 1983; Webb and Krasner 1989; and Lake 1991+ 4+ See Krasner 1976, 323; and Mansfield 1994, 179–80+ 5+ See Keohane and Nye 2003; Barton et al+ 2006, 192–94; Mearsheimer 2001 and 2010; Schattschneider 1935; and Eichengreen 1989+ 396 International Organization

Origins of the First Era of Globalization 397 Britain's shift depended on a previously unnoticed variable:the influence of an enterprising intellectual on a key policymaker at a critical juncture.The intellec- tual was Adam Smith.The policymaker was William Petty,the second Earl of Shelburne.And the critical juncture was the American Revolutionary War. A leading member of Parliament,Shelburne commanded the support the oppo- sition needed to capture the government,grant the American colonies indepen- dence,and reform Britain's commercial policy.Initially,Shelburne extolled the mercantile system as the best means to preserve Britain's empire,emphatically arguing that commercial regulation was the solution to-rather than the cause of-the American Revolution.Shelburne's repeated engagement with Smith,how- ever,caused him to rethink this assumption.Ireland's 1779 uprising in favor of free trade provided the empirical evidence that confirmed,in Shelburne's mind, Smith's prediction that mercantilism engenders conflict.When he became prime minister in 1782,Shelburne designed the postwar settlement to embody Smith's prescriptions:American independence,peace with Europe,and trade liberaliza- tion for all.Despite the brief tenure of his government,Shelburne's initiatives pro- vided the framework for the liberalizing reforms that followed in the 1780s and beyond.? No previous scholar has identified the decisive role Smith played in the politi- cal battles that determined America's fate.This may be due to the difficulties inherent in studying Smith and Shelburne.Understanding Smith's role has proven elusive because the fragmentary evidence supports multiple interpretations.Shel- burne presents the inverse challenge:much of his corpus survives,but he has received only a few serious treatments in several centuries.0 In addition to revising our understanding of the origins of the first era of open- ness,this article deepens our understanding of the role ideas play in shaping for- eign policy.Rather than treating "ideas"as disembodied formulations accounting for unexplained variation,this article reembodies ideas in the intellectuals who developed,saw adopted,and helped to implement their policymaking frame- works.It shows that policy-influencing ideas were chosen in part on their intellec- tual merits-their theoretical strength and perceived empirical veracity-and in part on the persuasive capacities of those who pressed them upon policymakers.It 6.The Earl of Shelburne (1737-1805)was born into a wealthy Irish family recently raised to the British peerage.As prime minister(1782-83),Shelburne managed the peace negotiations that ended the American Revolutionary War. 7.This narrative parallels Douglas Irwin's account of Robert Peel's conversion to laissez-faire liberalism in the 1840s.Irwin 1989. 8.See Heckscher 1922,19;Benians 1925;Fay 1934 and 1956,114;Stevens 1975;Willis 1979, 532;Ross1995,295;and Phillipson2010,262-63. 9.Smith instructed the executors of his will to burn his papers.Smith 1997,viii.Scholars disagree about no less important an issue than Smith's influence on the Townshend duties.See Scott 1935;Fay 1956,116;and Viner1965,85. 10.See Fitzmaurice 1875-76;Harlow 1952;Norris 1963;and Ritcheson 1983.Even supposedly comprehensive accounts of the American Revolution treat Shelburne as a peripheral figure.Middle- kauff 2007

Britain’s shift depended on a previously unnoticed variable: the influence of an enterprising intellectual on a key policymaker at a critical juncture+ The intellectual was Adam Smith+ The policymaker was William Petty, the second Earl of Shelburne+ 6 And the critical juncture was the American Revolutionary War+ A leading member of Parliament, Shelburne commanded the support the opposition needed to capture the government, grant the American colonies independence, and reform Britain’s commercial policy+ Initially, Shelburne extolled the mercantile system as the best means to preserve Britain’s empire, emphatically arguing that commercial regulation was the solution to—rather than the cause of—the American Revolution+ Shelburne’s repeated engagement with Smith, however, caused him to rethink this assumption+ Ireland’s 1779 uprising in favor of free trade provided the empirical evidence that confirmed, in Shelburne’s mind, Smith’s prediction that mercantilism engenders conflict+ When he became prime minister in 1782, Shelburne designed the postwar settlement to embody Smith’s prescriptions: American independence, peace with Europe, and trade liberalization for all+ Despite the brief tenure of his government, Shelburne’s initiatives provided the framework for the liberalizing reforms that followed in the 1780s and beyond+ 7 No previous scholar has identified the decisive role Smith played in the political battles that determined America’s fate+ 8 This may be due to the difficulties inherent in studying Smith and Shelburne+ Understanding Smith’s role has proven elusive because the fragmentary evidence supports multiple interpretations+ 9 Shelburne presents the inverse challenge: much of his corpus survives, but he has received only a few serious treatments in several centuries+ 10 In addition to revising our understanding of the origins of the first era of openness, this article deepens our understanding of the role ideas play in shaping foreign policy+ Rather than treating “ideas” as disembodied formulations accounting for unexplained variation, this article reembodies ideas in the intellectuals who developed, saw adopted, and helped to implement their policymaking frameworks+ It shows that policy-influencing ideas were chosen in part on their intellectual merits—their theoretical strength and perceived empirical veracity—and in part on the persuasive capacities of those who pressed them upon policymakers+ It 6+ The Earl of Shelburne ~1737–1805! was born into a wealthy Irish family recently raised to the British peerage+ As prime minister ~1782–83!, Shelburne managed the peace negotiations that ended the American Revolutionary War+ 7+ This narrative parallels Douglas Irwin’s account of Robert Peel’s conversion to laissez-faire liberalism in the 1840s+ Irwin 1989+ 8+ See Heckscher 1922, 19; Benians 1925; Fay 1934 and 1956, 114; Stevens 1975; Willis 1979, 532; Ross 1995, 295; and Phillipson 2010, 262–63+ 9+ Smith instructed the executors of his will to burn his papers+ Smith 1997, viii+ Scholars disagree about no less important an issue than Smith’s influence on the Townshend duties+ See Scott 1935; Fay 1956, 116; and Viner 1965, 85+ 10+ See Fitzmaurice 1875–76; Harlow 1952; Norris 1963; and Ritcheson 1983+ Even supposedly comprehensive accounts of the American Revolution treat Shelburne as a peripheral figure+ Middlekauff 2007+ Origins of the First Era of Globalization 397

398 International Organization also bolsters the case for the causal power of ideas by recounting an instance where a leading policymaker changed his mind at considerable political and personal cost. This analysis provides further evidence of the value in combining modern social scientific frameworks with the "old history"focus on pivotal actors'shifting responses to evolving material circumstances.In the language of modern social science,Britain's imperial crisis in the 1770s and 1780s constituted a "critical juncture"-a "relatively short [period]of time during which there [was]a substan- tially heightened probability that agents'choices will affect the outcome of inter- est."At such points,"contingency...becomes paramount."2 But to say that outcomes are contingent is not to say that they cannot be studied with analytic rigor.Scholars in a range of fields have employed numerous approaches-formal and informal-to grapple with contingent events.3 Recently,Capoccia and Kele- men synthesized these disparate approaches into two highly specified techniques: "counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing.This article utilizes both methods to explain Britain's radical policy reorientation in the 1780s. I first challenge the hegemonic stability theorists'choice of dependent variable, showing that their focus on the "openness"achieved,rather than the commercial strategy pursued,is problematic theoretically and empirically.After reviewing the dominant(materialist)explanations for the reforms of the 1780s,the next section proposes that key policymakers'ideas played a crucial role in initiating Britain's shift.Making way for ideational variables,however,requires challenging the con- sensus that Britain's reforms followed inevitably as a result of its military defeat in the American Revolution.I issue that challenge using counterfactual analysis and specify a model showing how intellectuals influence policy at critical junctures.I then develop a narrative that demonstrates the influence both of Smith on Shel- burne and of Shelburne on the transformation of British foreign economic policy. The Dependent Variable:Commercial Strategy versus“Openness'' Krasner attempted to explain the "structure of the international trading system," which he gauged according to observed policies and economic outcomes.For Kras- ner,policymakers'ideas were irrelevant."Stupidity,"after all,"is not a very inter- esting analytic category."5 But interesting or not,"stupidity"is a crucial analytic category.A growing literature recognizes that policymakers'ideas shape not just 11.Rakove2004,3. 12.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,343,348. 13.These approaches include everything from "analytic narratives"to "virtual history."See Bates et al.1998;and Ferguson 1999. 14.Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,343. 15.Krasner1976.319,323-32

also bolsters the case for the causal power of ideas by recounting an instance where a leading policymaker changed his mind at considerable political and personal cost+ This analysis provides further evidence of the value in combining modern social scientific frameworks with the “old history” focus on pivotal actors’ shifting responses to evolving material circumstances+ 11 In the language of modern social science, Britain’s imperial crisis in the 1770s and 1780s constituted a “critical juncture”—a “relatively short @period# of time during which there @was# a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest+” At such points, “contingency +++ becomes paramount+”12 But to say that outcomes are contingent is not to say that they cannot be studied with analytic rigor+ Scholars in a range of fields have employed numerous approaches—formal and informal—to grapple with contingent events+ 13 Recently, Capoccia and Kelemen synthesized these disparate approaches into two highly specified techniques: “counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing+”14 This article utilizes both methods to explain Britain’s radical policy reorientation in the 1780s+ I first challenge the hegemonic stability theorists’ choice of dependent variable, showing that their focus on the “openness” achieved, rather than the commercial strategy pursued, is problematic theoretically and empirically+ After reviewing the dominant ~materialist! explanations for the reforms of the 1780s, the next section proposes that key policymakers’ ideas played a crucial role in initiating Britain’s shift+ Making way for ideational variables, however, requires challenging the consensus that Britain’s reforms followed inevitably as a result of its military defeat in the American Revolution+ I issue that challenge using counterfactual analysis and specify a model showing how intellectuals influence policy at critical junctures+ I then develop a narrative that demonstrates the influence both of Smith on Shelburne and of Shelburne on the transformation of British foreign economic policy+ The Dependent Variable: Commercial Strategy versus “Openness” Krasner attempted to explain the “structure of the international trading system,” which he gauged according to observed policies and economic outcomes+ For Krasner, policymakers’ ideas were irrelevant+ “Stupidity,” after all, “is not a very interesting analytic category+”15 But interesting or not, “stupidity” is a crucial analytic category+ A growing literature recognizes that policymakers’ ideas shape not just 11+ Rakove 2004, 3+ 12+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343, 348+ 13+ These approaches include everything from “analytic narratives” to “virtual history+” See Bates et al+ 1998; and Ferguson 1999+ 14+ Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343+ 15+ Krasner 1976, 319, 323–32+ 398 International Organization

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