《税法 Tax Law》参考文献：英文原版教材——The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics

along a number of dimensions. Existing results may be solidified, better understood, and extended; solutions may emerge for previously intrac table pro and in some instances seemingly sound conclusions may be overturned. In addition, research agendas, both analytical and empirical, may be initiated, refined, or redirected in light of what is learned. Having undertaken this mission, it is my belief that the experi ence yields all of these rewards. Readers, of course, will judge this fo I began work on this book in earnest during the mid-1990s, producing hundreds of pages of manuscript that I aired to some extent. Upon resuming work five years later, after completing other projects, I decided to scrap my existing draft and begin afresh. Further reflection and in terim research had produced new ideas, refined my thinking, and ulti mately shifted my focus. Moreover, I wished to create a text more uni- form in depth and rigor, with a scope more finely tailored to my central theme. In the intervening years, my work frequently alternated between this book and spin -off articles (including a Handbook survey, Kaplow 2007g). While working on particular chapters, I often discovered im portant gaps or deficiencies that required independent, sustained atten tion. In the end, it is hard to say which articles came from the book and which chapters or sections of the book came from articles. In every case however, book chapters have been written from scratch in order to op- timize their fit with the current project. Although the first keystrokes for this venture were made in 1995, its intellectual origins are much earlier. During my economics training, Hugo Sonnenschein and Michael Spence were most responsible for culating in me the virtue of rigor, the value of tracing problems to their foundations, an appreciation of elegance, the importance of ex tracting and communicating core intuitions, and an understanding of welfare economics and the economics of information that underlies his endeavor. My interest in public economics, and taxation in particu lar, was sparked at an early stage by martin Feldstein, Richard Musgrave, Stanley Surrey, Alan Auerbach, and Lawrence Summers. Subsequently my thinking has been notably advanced and revised in reaction to lively 01_Kaplow_Prelims_pooi-pxoxii indd xi

preface xix along a number of dimensions. Existing results may be solidifi ed, better understood, and extended; solutions may emerge for previously intrac￾table problems; and in some instances seemingly sound conclusions may be overturned. In addition, research agendas, both analytical and empirical, may be initiated, refi ned, or redirected in light of what is learned. Having undertaken this mission, it is my belief that the experi￾ence yields all of these rewards. Readers, of course, will judge this for themselves. ••• I began work on this book in earnest during the mid-1990s, producing hundreds of pages of manuscript that I aired to some extent. Upon resuming work fi ve years later, after completing other projects, I decided to scrap my existing draft and begin afresh. Further refl ection and in￾terim research had produced new ideas, refi ned my thinking, and ulti￾mately shifted my focus. Moreover, I wished to create a text more uni￾form in depth and rigor, with a scope more fi nely tailored to my central theme. In the intervening years, my work frequently alternated between this book and spin-off articles (including a Handbook survey, Kaplow 2007g). While working on particular chapters, I often discovered im￾portant gaps or defi ciencies that required independent, sustained atten￾tion. In the end, it is hard to say which articles came from the book and which chapters or sections of the book came from articles. In every case, however, book chapters have been written from scratch in order to op￾timize their fi t with the current project. Although the fi rst keystrokes for this venture were made in 1995, its intellectual origins are much earlier. During my economics training, Hugo Sonnenschein and Michael Spence were most responsible for inculcating in me the virtue of rigor, the value of tracing problems to their foundations, an appreciation of elegance, the importance of ex￾tracting and communicating core intuitions, and an understanding of welfare economics and the economics of information that underlies this endeavor. My interest in public economics, and taxation in particu￾lar, was sparked at an early stage by Martin Feldstein, Richard Musgrave, Stanley Surrey, Alan Auerbach, and Lawrence Summers. Subsequently, my thinking has been notably advanced and revised in reaction to lively 01_Kaplow_Prelims_p00i-pxxii.indd xix 1_Kaplow_Prelims_p00i-pxxii.indd xix 10/16/2007 11:21:00 AM 0/16/2007 11:21:00 AM

REFACE discussions at regular meetings of the public economics group at the National Bureau of Economic Research and tax workshops at Harvard I received comments on the book manuscript and on related articles from participants at many additional workshops and conferences and in other, more individualized settings. Joel Slemrod, Steven Shavell, and David Weisbach have supplied the most extensive input. In addition over the course of two decades i have benefited from countless conver- sations with David Bradford; even since his untimely death, I find my- self contemplating how he might have reacted to new directions I have pursued. At various points, additional reactions were provided by alan Auerbach, Peter Diamond, James Hines, Daniel Shaviro, Alvin Warren referees and journal editors, university press reviewers, and additional individuals too numerous to mention am also grateful to a large and unusually skilled supporting cast Matt Seccombe and various individuals at Princeton University Press provided excellent editorial and related assistance; Molly Overholt and the late Regina Roberts offered secretarial and administrative support staff at the Harvard Law School library assembled materials; and many research assistants over the years helped review literature and checked the text, notes, derivations, and references. This latter group includes (with apologies to any accidently omitted) Susan Amble, Mary Bear, Elizabeth Bell, Clifford Chen, Ivan Chen, Eun Young Choi, Vicki Chou Derek Colla, Ryan Copus, Shelley de alth, Nicholas Degani, Sameer Doshi, Stephanie Gabor, Ryan Gavin, Yehonatan Givati, Thomas Gremi- llion, Zachary Gubler, Gregory Hannibal, Jeffrey Harris, James Hileman, Alexander Hooper, Anna Joo, Jasi Kamody, Lisa Keyfetz, Summer Sung Eun Kim, James Kvaal, Stacy Lau, Jonathan Lin, Richard Lin, Edward Locke, Daniel Lyons, Kenneth Moon, Kevin Mosher, Jesse Panuccio John Rackson, Manoj Ramachandran, Daniel Richenthal, Kathleen Saunders, Brian Sawers, Amy Sheridan, Moshe Spinowitz, Andrew Steinman, Eric Sublett, Kevin Terrazas, George Wang, Tzung-bor Wei Gregory Weston, and Jeremiah Williams. Finally, I appreciate receiving substantial financial support from the John M. Olin Center for Law Economics and Business and from Harvard Law School, as well as the encouragement of Deans Robert Clark and Elena Kagan 01_Kaplow_Prelims_pooi-pxoxii indd xx 10M1620071121:00AM

xx preface discussions at regular meetings of the public economics group at the National Bureau of Economic Research and tax workshops at Harvard. I received comments on the book manuscript and on related articles from participants at many additional workshops and conferences and in other, more individualized settings. Joel Slemrod, Steven Shavell, and David Weisbach have supplied the most extensive input. In addition, over the course of two decades I have benefi ted from countless conver￾sations with David Bradford; even since his untimely death, I fi nd my￾self contemplating how he might have reacted to new directions I have pursued. At various points, additional reactions were provided by Alan Auerbach, Peter Diamond, James Hines, Daniel Shaviro, Alvin Warren, referees and journal editors, university press reviewers, and additional individuals too numerous to mention. I am also grateful to a large and unusually skilled supporting cast. Matt Seccombe and various individuals at Princeton University Press provided excellent editorial and related assistance; Molly Overholt and the late Regina Roberts offered secretarial and administrative support; staff at the Harvard Law School library assembled materials; and many research assistants over the years helped review literature and checked the text, notes, derivations, and references. This latter group includes (with apologies to any accidently omitted) Susan Amble, Mary Bear, Elizabeth Bell, Clifford Chen, Ivan Chen, Eun Young Choi, Vicki Chou, Derek Colla, Ryan Copus, Shelley de Alth, Nicholas Degani, Sameer Doshi, Stephanie Gabor, Ryan Gavin, Yehonatan Givati, Thomas Gremi￾llion, Zachary Gubler, Gregory Hannibal, Jeffrey Harris, James Hileman, Alexander Hooper, Anna Joo, Jasi Kamody, Lisa Keyfetz, Summer Sung Eun Kim, James Kvaal, Stacy Lau, Jonathan Lin, Richard Lin, Edward Locke, Daniel Lyons, Kenneth Moon, Kevin Mosher, Jesse Panuccio, John Rackson, Manoj Ramachandran, Daniel Richenthal, Kathleen Saunders, Brian Sawers, Amy Sheridan, Moshe Spinowitz, Andrew Steinman, Eric Sublett, Kevin Terrazas, George Wang, Tzung-bor Wei, Gregory Weston, and Jeremiah Williams. Finally, I appreciate receiving substantial fi nancial support from the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business and from Harvard Law School, as well as the encouragement of Deans Robert Clark and Elena Kagan. 01_Kaplow_Prelims_p00i-pxxii.indd xx 1_Kaplow_Prelims_p00i-pxxii.indd xx 10/16/2007 11:21:00 AM 0/16/2007 11:21:00 AM

The Theory of taxation and public economics 01_Kaplow_Prelims_p0oi-pxoxii indd xxi

The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics a 01_Kaplow_Prelims_p00i-pxxii.indd xxi 1_Kaplow_Prelims_p00i-pxxii.indd xxi 10/16/2007 11:21:00 AM 0/16/2007 11:21:00 AM

Introduction This book develops and applies a unifying framework for the analysis of taxation and related subjects in public economics. Its two central fea- tures are explicit attention to the social objective of welfare maximiza- tion and direct examination of how various government instruments should be orchestrated to achieve that objective. Consistent application of this approach solidifies and extends some familiar results and intu itions, overcomes seemingly intractable obstacles regarding other issues, and overturns several important settled understandings Mirrlees(1971), although most remembered for pathbreaking tecl nical analysis of optimal nonlinear income taxation, also provides the seminal modern articulation of this research agenda. Concerns about distribution and distortion and the tradeoff between them, the key is- sues in his article, arise in connection with many topics in public eco- nomics, ranging from all forms of taxation to public goods and the gulation of externalities to social insurance. Nevertheless, literatures vary widely in the extent to which analysis is related to a social welfare function and connected to the backbone of modern fiscal systems, some form of labor income taxation. Even though optimal income tax writing has hewed closely to the course of inquiry suggested by Mirrlees and opted here, work on the taxation of capital income, transfer programs, goods, regulation, social insurance, and other subjects often ha not done so, and research on other topics such as transfer(estate and ift)taxation and the tax treatment of different family units only rarely attempts the necessary linkages It is worth pausing to emphasize the pivotal role of the income tax in studying different types of taxation and many other problems in pub- lic economics. The truism that the optimal use of any policy instrument 02_Kaplow_cho1_p001-p010ndd

1 Introduction a This book develops and applies a unifying framework for the analysis of taxation and related subjects in public economics. Its two central fea￾tures are explicit attention to the social objective of welfare maximiza￾tion and direct examination of how various government instruments should be orchestrated to achieve that objective. Consistent application of this approach solidifi es and extends some familiar results and intu￾itions, overcomes seemingly intractable obstacles regarding other issues, and overturns several important settled understandings. Mirrlees (1971), although most remembered for pathbreaking tech￾nical analysis of optimal nonlinear income taxation, also provides the seminal modern articulation of this research agenda. Concerns about distribution and distortion and the tradeoff between them, the key is￾sues in his article, arise in connection with many topics in public eco￾nomics, ranging from all forms of taxation to public goods and the regulation of externalities to social insurance. Nevertheless, literatures vary widely in the extent to which analysis is related to a social welfare function and connected to the backbone of modern fi scal systems, some form of labor income taxation. Even though optimal income tax writing has hewed closely to the course of inquiry suggested by Mirrlees and adopted here, work on the taxation of capital income, transfer programs, public goods, regulation, social insurance, and other subjects often has not done so, and research on other topics such as transfer (estate and gift) taxation and the tax treatment of different family units only rarely attempts the necessary linkages. It is worth pausing to emphasize the pivotal role of the income tax in studying different types of taxation and many other problems in pub￾lic economics. The truism that the optimal use of any policy instrument 02_Kaplow_Ch01_p001-p010.indd 1 2_Kaplow_Ch01_p001-p010.indd 1 10/16/2007 11:21:13 AM 0/16/2007 11:21:13 AM

CHAPTER 1 generally depends on what other ones are feasible is particularly apt when one of the available instruments is the income tax. Consider optimal commodity taxation, explored more fully in chapter 6. The familiar Ramsey(1927)result for the basic case with no demand interdependen cies is that commodity tax rates should vary inversely with own-demand elasticities; if heterogeneity is introduced so that income distribution matters, luxuries should be taxed more heavily than necessities, ceteris ibus. But these results assume that no income tax is feasible. when an income tax is employed and set optimally, Atkinson and Stiglitz(1976) show that, with weak labor separability in the utility function, no dif- ferentiation in commodity tax rates is optimal; indeed, this is so regard less of own-price elasticities and income elasticities. Yet much research ignores the income tax-presumably due to the complexity of optimal income tax analysis-and builds models like Ramseys, which may well yield conclusions that are inapplicable to an economy with income tax ation, such as most developed economies today This book relates the analysis of all of its subjects to the income tax nd attends to how both distribution and distortion influence social wel- fare. In many settings, it proves useful to accomplish this mission by em ploying a procedure that constructs distribution-neutral (and revenue- neutral)reform packages. Specifically, the income tax is adjusted to offset the distributive incidence of the modification to the policy instru ment directly under consideration, whether it be commodity taxation transfer taxation, public goods provision, or some means of regulating externalities. This method disregards neither the income tax nor impo tant aspects of social welfare. Yet the complexities of optimal income tax analysis are largely moot because the initial income tax need not be op- timal and the optimum need not be determined in order to implement this procedure. Moreover, as will now be explained, many second-best lly moved into the backgroun When the entire reform package is distribution neutral, it appropriate to ignore distributive effects since there are none. Fur- thermore, distribution-neutral reform packages will be shown to have o effect on labor supply in a benchmark case, indeed, in the same case of weak labor separability noted by Atkinson and Stiglitz(1976). In other words, under the proposed approach both distribution and labor supply-the elements of the tradeoff at the heart of the optimal income 02_Kaplow_Cho1_p001-p010 ndd 2

2 chapter 1 generally depends on what other ones are feasible is particularly apt when one of the available instruments is the income tax. Consider optimal commodity taxation, explored more fully in chapter 6. The familiar Ramsey (1927) result for the basic case with no demand interdependen￾cies is that commodity tax rates should vary inversely with own-demand elasticities; if heterogeneity is introduced so that income distribution matters, luxuries should be taxed more heavily than necessities, ceteris paribus. But these results assume that no income tax is feasible. When an income tax is employed and set optimally, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that, with weak labor separability in the utility function, no dif￾ferentiation in commodity tax rates is optimal; indeed, this is so regard￾less of own-price elasticities and income elasticities. Yet much research ignores the income tax—presumably due to the complexity of optimal income tax analysis—and builds models like Ramsey’s, which may well yield conclusions that are inapplicable to an economy with income tax￾ation, such as most developed economies today. This book relates the analysis of all of its subjects to the income tax and attends to how both distribution and distortion infl uence social wel￾fare. In many settings, it proves useful to accomplish this mission by em￾ploying a procedure that constructs distribution-neutral (and revenue￾neutral) reform packages. Specifi cally, the income tax is adjusted to offset the distributive incidence of the modifi cation to the policy instru￾ment directly under consideration, whether it be commodity taxation, transfer taxation, public goods provision, or some means of regulating externalities. This method disregards neither the income tax nor impor￾tant aspects of social welfare. Yet the complexities of optimal income tax analysis are largely moot because the initial income tax need not be op￾timal and the optimum need not be determined in order to implement this procedure. Moreover, as will now be explained, many second-best complications are successfully moved into the background. When the entire reform package is distribution neutral, it obviously is appropriate to ignore distributive effects since there are none. Fur￾thermore, distribution-neutral reform packages will be shown to have no effect on labor supply in a benchmark case, indeed, in the same case of weak labor separability noted by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). In other words, under the proposed approach both distribution and labor supply—the elements of the tradeoff at the heart of the optimal income 02_Kaplow_Ch01_p001-p010.indd 2 2_Kaplow_Ch01_p001-p010.indd 2 10/16/2007 11:21:13 AM 0/16/2007 11:21:13 AM