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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Political Economy of Money and Finance：Monetary System and Exchange Rate）Prolegomena to the Choice of an International Monetary System

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Prolegomena to the choice of an international monetary system Richard N.Cooper The international monetary system-the rules and conventions that govern financial relations between countries-is an important component of international relations. When monetary relations go well,other relations have a better chance of going well; when they go badly,other areas are likely to suffer too.Monetary relations have a pervasive influence on both domestic and international economic developments, and history is strewn with examples of monetary failure leading subsequently to economic and political upheaval.Recent years have seen considerable turmoil in international monetary relations,and a marked deterioration in relations between Europe,Japan,and America.Ideally,monetary relations should be inconspicuous, part of the background in a well-functioning system,taken for granted.Once they become visible and uncertain,something is wrong. As a consequence of this recent turmoil,intense official discussions on the nature and the future of the monetary system were belatedly begun in late 1972, under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).A year later,little real progress in these discussions could be recorded (official press releases to the contrary notwithstanding).De facto monetary relations between countries were on a radically different course from the official discussions. Many intricate details attend consideration of alternative monetary arrange- ments,and the details are often vitally important.It is not possible,however,to discuss them all in an essay charged with covering a broad spectrum of possible monetary arrangements and the broad implications of alternative monetary arrange- ments for the world as a whole,for groups of particular countries,and for particular groups within countries. This essay has a somewhat more limited purpose.It attempts to survey systematically various possible types of international monetary regimes,to identify criteria for choice between alternative monetary regimes,and to discover the Richard N.Cooper is a professor of economics at Yale University in New Haven,Connecticut. This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon,24 Jun 2013 04:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Prolegomena to the choice of an international monetary system Richard N. Cooper The international monetary system-the rules and conventions that govern financial relations between countries-is an important component of international relations. When monetary relations go well, other relations have a better chance of going well; when they go badly, other areas are likely to suffer too. Monetary relations have a pervasive influence on both domestic and international economic developments, and history is strewn with examples of monetary failure leading subsequently to economic and political upheaval. Recent years have seen considerable turmoil in international monetary relations, and a marked deterioration in relations between Europe, Japan, and America. Ideally, monetary relations should be inconspicuous, part of the background in a well-functioning system, taken for granted. Once they become visible and uncertain, something is wrong. As a consequence of this recent turmoil, intense official discussions on the nature and the future of the monetary system were belatedly begun in late 1972, under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A year later, little real progress in these discussions could be recorded (official press releases to the contrary notwithstanding). De facto monetary relations between countries were on a radically different course from the official discussions. Many intricate details attend consideration of alternative monetary arrangements, and the details are often vitally important. It is not possible, however, to discuss them all in an essay charged with covering a broad spectrum of possible monetary arrangements and the broad implications of alternative monetary arrangements for the world as a whole, for groups of particular countries, and for particular groups within countries. This essay has a somewhat more limited purpose. It attempts to survey systematically various possible types of international monetary regimes, to identify criteria for choice between alternative monetary regimes, and to discover the Richard N. Cooper is a professor of economics at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon, 24 Jun 2013 04:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

64 International Organization reasons for disagreement between nations and between groups within nations on the choice of an international monetary regime.It draws on recent monetary history and on current discussions of reform of the monetary system for illustra- tions,and tries to suggest why cost-benefit analysis,while an appropriate frame- work in principle,is in practice so difficult to execute in this area.If the essay carries any principal message,it is that sources of disagreement do not generally derive from divergent interests,but rather from diverse perspectives and hence different conjectures about the consequences of one regime as compared with another.In short,disagreement arises mainly from ignorance about the true effects, so that we must use reasoned conjecture rather than solid fact to guide our choices, and reasonable people may and do differ with respect to their conjectures.The essay concludes with some brief observations on the appropriate role of interna- tional organizations in the international monetary arena and on the broad direc- tions I believe the international monetary system should take. I define a regime as any particular set of rules or conventions governing monetary and financial relations between countries.Regime seems preferable to system or order,both of which are sometimes used in this context,since it encompasses arrangements that are neither orderly nor systematic.A monetary regime specifies which instruments of policy may be used and which targets of policy are regarded as legitimate,including of course the limiting cases in which there are no restrictions on either.I propose here to outline a number of international monetary regimes in terms of their major features,and to offer some brief comments on their costs and benefits.Each regime has many variants,variants that may either aggravate or mitigate the disadvantages,so that the distinctions between them are not in fact as sharp as I sometimes make it appear.Moreover, each regime may operate in many different ways,and a given regime may either be resoundingly successful or totally stymied,depending on how the participants operate within it.Some regimes lack the technical requisites for success and are bound to fail;others,internally consistent,can work effectively in one political milieu but not in another.Students of international relations too often focus on the political milieu to the neglect of requirements of internal consistency and technical proficiency;economists are prone to the opposite error. One possible regime would be to have no rules or conventions at all-to allow each country to do what it thinks best,without any form of coordination.This may be called a free-for-all regime,with the understanding that in international monetary affairs governments and central banks are principal actors,so that the term free-for-all refers primarily to their actions,not merely to those of private 1A particularly poignant example of the severe limits a given regime can impose on the use of instruments of policy,and of the psychological hold a regime of long standing can have on even well-informed observers,is the surprised anguish of Fabian socialist Sidney Webb when,in 1931,in the face of enormous unemployment,Britain abandoned the fixed price of gold and allowed the pound to float:"No one told us we could do this."(A.J.P.Taylor,English History,1914-1945 [New York:Oxford University Press,1965]p.297,cited in Fred Hirsch, Money International [Garden City,N.Y.:Doubleday,1969],p.4.) This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon,24 Jun 201304:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

64 International Organization reasons for disagreement between nations and between groups within nations on the choice of an international monetary regime. It draws on recent monetary history and on current discussions of reform of the monetary system for illustrations, and tries to suggest why cost-benefit analysis, while an appropriate framework in principle, is in practice so difficult to execute in this area. If the essay carries any principal message, it is that sources of disagreement do not generally derive from divergent interests, but rather from diverse perspectives and hence different conjectures about the consequences of one regime as compared with another. In short, disagreement arises mainly from ignorance about the true effects, so that we must use reasoned conjecture rather than solid fact to guide our choices, and reasonable people may and do differ with respect to their conjectures. The essay concludes with some brief observations on the appropriate role of international organizations in the international monetary arena and on the broad directions I believe the international monetary system should take. I define a regime as any particular set of rules or conventions governing monetary and financial relations between countries. Regime seems preferable to system or order, both of which are sometimes used in this context, since it encompasses arrangements that are neither orderly nor systematic. A monetary regime specifies which instruments of policy may be used and which targets of policy are regarded as legitimate, including of course the limiting cases in which there are no restrictions on either.' I propose here to outline a number of international monetary regimes in terms of their major features, and to offer some brief comments on their costs and benefits. Each regime has many variants, variants that may either aggravate or mitigate the disadvantages, so that the distinctions between them are not in fact as sharp as I sometimes make it appear. Moreover, each regime may operate in many different ways, and a given regime may either be resoundingly successful or totally stymied, depending on how the participants operate within it. Some regimes lack the technical requisites for success and are bound to fail; others, internally consistent, can work effectively in one political milieu but not in another. Students of international relations too often focus on the political milieu to the neglect of requirements of internal consistency and technical proficiency; economists are prone to the opposite error. One possible regime would be to have no rules or conventions at all-to allow each country to do what it thinks best, without any form of coordination. This may be called a free-for-all regime, with the understanding that in international monetary affairs governments and central banks are principal actors, so that the term free-for-all refers primarily to their actions, not merely to those of private I A particularly poignant example of the severe limits a given regime can impose on the use of instruments of policy, and of the psychological hold a regime of long standing can have on even well-informed observers, is the surprised anguish of Fabian socialist Sidney Webb when, in 1931, in the face of enormous unemployment, Britain abandoned the fixed price of gold and allowed the pound to float: "No one told us we could do this." (A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1 945 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1965] p. 297, cited in Fred Hirsch, Money International [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969], p. 4.) This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon, 24 Jun 2013 04:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choice of a monetary system 65 transactors.In contrast,a regime of freely floating exchange rates and no controls on private international transactions,that is,a regime in which governments agree not to interfere either with transactions or with the foreign exchange market in any way,is definitely not a system without rules;indeed,it involves extraordinarily stringent proscriptions. A free-for-all regime does not commend itself.It would allow large nations to try to exploit their power at the expense of smaller nations.It would give rise to attempts by individual nations to pursue objectives that were not consistent with one another (e.g.,inconsistent aims with regard to a single exchange rate between two currencies),with resulting disorganization of markets.Even if things finally settled down,the pattern would very likely be far from optimal from the viewpoint of all the participants. A well-analyzed sequence from the realm of trade policy that encompasses all three of these disadvantages illustrates the possibilities.A large nation attempts to exploit its monopolistic position at the expense of other nations by imposing an optimum tariff.Other things being equal,it can gain by imposition of a tariff,the appropriate size of which depends on the monopoly position of the country.But other things do not generally remain equal,for other countries can also gain through the imposition of tariffs.Such retaliation creates a new situation for the first country,which should then alter its tariff,perhaps by raising it,to exploit fully its monopoly position.And so the tariff war goes,creating much turmoil with trade during the process,until a point is reached at which no country can gain further through unilateral action.Furthermore,the resulting pattern of tariffs will almost certainly leave all countries worse off than they would have been if the first country had not attempted to exploit its advantage.2 A regime that prohibits or limits tariff warfare would be mutually beneficial. Similar examples can be found in the monetary realm.For instance,a general shortage of liquidity under a gold standard regime might lead various countries to devalue their currencies in terms of gold in order to improve their payments positions for the purpose of adding to their stocks of money.This behavior would lead to competitive depreciation all around,with an ultimate write-up in the value of gold in terms of all currencies and possibly some stimulation of new gold production,but only after a painful and acrimonious transition.It would be far better to agree together on a"uniform change in par values"(in the language of the Bretton Woods Agreement)of currencies against gold,thus avoiding the needless change in relative currency values and the disruptions to national economies that would obtain under the hypothesized circumstances.It would be better still to abandon reliance on a commodity in short supply and create,by agreement,some 2Harry G.Johnson has pointed out that in the final equilibrium it is possible for one country to be left better off than in the free trade situation;but both countries taken together will certainly be worse off,and I judge that in most circumstances each country taken separately would be left worse off.See his "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation,"in his International Trade and Economic Growth:Studies in Pure Theory (Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1967). This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon,24 Jun 2013 04:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Choice of a monetary system 65 transactors. In contrast, a regime of freely floating exchange rates and no controls on private international transactions, that is, a regime in which governments agree not to interfere either with transactions or with the foreign exchange market in any way, is definitely not a system without rules; indeed, it involves extraordinarily stringent proscriptions. A free-for-all regime does not commend itself. It would allow large nations to try to exploit their power at the expense of smaller nations. It would give rise to attempts by individual nations to pursue objectives that were not consistent with one another (e.g., inconsistent aims with regard to a single exchange rate between two currencies), with resulting disorganization of markets. Even if things finally settled down, the pattern would very likely be far from optimal from the viewpoint of all the participants. A well-analyzed sequence from the realm of trade policy that encompasses all three of these disadvantages illustrates the possibilities. A large nation attempts to exploit its monopolistic position at the expense of other nations by imposing an optimum tariff. Other things being equal, it can gain by imposition of a tariff, the appropriate size of which depends on the monopoly position of the country. But other things do not generally remain equal, for other countries can also gain through the imposition of tariffs. Such retaliation creates a new situation for the first country, which should then alter its tariff, perhaps by raising it, to exploit fully its monopoly position. And so the tariff war goes, creating much turmoil with trade during the process, until a point is reached at which no country can gain further through unilateral action. Furthermore, the resulting pattern of tariffs will almost certainly leave all countries worse off than they would have been if the first country had not attempted to exploit its advantage.2 A regime that prohibits or limits tariff warfare would be mutually beneficial. Similar examples can be found in the monetary realm. For instance, a general shortage of liquidity under a gold standard regime might lead various countries to devalue their currencies in terms of gold in order to improve their payments positions for the purpose of adding to their stocks of money. This behavior would lead to competitive depreciation all around, with an ultimate write-up in the value of gold in terms of all currencies and possibly some stimulation of new gold production, but only after a painful and acrimonious transition. It would be far better to agree together on a "uniform change in par values" (in the language of the Bretton Woods Agreement) of currencies against gold, thus avoiding the needless change in relative currency values and the disruptions to national economies that would obtain under the hypothesized circumstances. It would be better still to abandon reliance on a commodity in short supply and create, by agreement, some 2Harry G. Johnson has pointed out that in the final equilibrium it is possible for one country to be left better off than in the free trade situation; but both countries taken together will certainly be worse off, and I judge that in most circumstances each country taken separately would be left worse off. See his "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," in his International Trade and Economic Growth: Studies in Pure Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon, 24 Jun 2013 04:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

66 International Organization form of fiduciary asset,such as domestic paper money within economies and special drawing rights at the international level. Moreover,a free-for-all regime ignores the vital point that money,including international money,is a social convention,a collective human contrivance of the highest order.One after another during the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- turies,nations evolved domestic monies and then endowed them with legal tender status.At the international level,some kind of international money has also evolved.First came the commodity monies,silver and gold,then the national monies,sterling and the dollar.All served better than nothing but all fell short of an optimal solution.International agreement is required to do better. Types of international monetary regimes Perceiving that some form of order is necessary does not determine what kind of order.Many are possible,indeed,too many to discuss comprehensively.I thus confine the following discussion to three broad features,or dimensions,of a monetary regime,and to various possible stopping points along each dimension. The choice of these particular dimensions among many is influenced by the fact that they are the most prominent in current discussions of reform of the monetary system.The dimensions are (1)the role of exchange rates,(2)the nature of the reserve asset(s),and(3)the degree of control of international capital movements. These features can be viewed as varying along a continuum,but for purposes of discussion it is perhaps more useful to specify particular points in each of these dimensions.Thus table 1 sets out an array of possible monetary regimes,drawing one element from each of the columns.Logically there would be 45 regimes (5x3x3)on the basis of the elements in table 1,but freely floating exchange rates strictly would require no reserve asset,so that in fact only 39 different regimes are described there-still too many to discuss comfortably,even before allowing for the many variants of each. The textbook gold standard,which still provides the historical basis for comparison in many discussions of the international monetary systems,is entry I.A.1.in table 1:fixed exchange rates(except for modest variation within the gold points),gold reserves,and full freedom of capital movements.The original Bretton Woods system is entry II.A.3.in table 1,although the requirement that capital movements be controlled was implicit rather than explicit in that agreement. During the 1950s and again since 1970,Canada adopted the system IV.C.1.,that is, a regime of managed flexibility in exchange rates and reliance on the United States dollar as its principal reserve asset. The last example illustrates the important point that not all countries need abide by the same conventions within a given international monetary regime.Thus the European Community countries have set themselves the objective of adopting I.D.1.(where D stands for the as yet undetermined new European reserve asset), This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon,24 Jun 2013 04:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

66 International Organization form of fiduciary asset, such as domestic paper money within economies and special drawing rights at the international level. Moreover, a free-for-all regime ignores the vital point that money, including international money, is a social convention, a collective human contrivance of the highest order. One after another during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nations evolved domestic monies and then endowed them with legal tender status. At the international level, some kind of international money has also evolved. First came the commodity monies, silver and gold, then the national monies, sterling and the dollar. All served better than nothing but all fell short of an optimal solution. International agreement is required to do better. Types of international monetary regimes Perceiving that some form of order is necessary does not determine what kind of order. Many are possible, indeed, too many to discuss comprehensively. I thus confine the following discussion to three broad features, or dimensions, of a monetary regime, and to various possible stopping points along each dimension. The choice of these particular dimensions among many is influenced by the fact that they are the most prominent in current discussions of reform of the monetary system. The dimensions are (1) the role of exchange rates, (2) the nature of the reserve asset(s), and (3) the degree of control of international capital movements. These features can be viewed as varying along a continuum, but for purposes of discussion it is perhaps more useful to specify particular points in each of these dimensions. Thus table 1 sets out an array of possible monetary regimes, drawing one element from each of the columns. Logically there would be 45 regimes (5x3x3) on the basis of the elements in table 1, but freely floating exchange rates strictly would require no reserve asset, so that in fact only 39 different regimes are described there-still too many to discuss comfortably, even before allowing for the many variants of each. The textbook gold standard, which still provides the historical basis for comparison in many discussions of the international monetary systems, is entry I.A. 1. in table 1: fixed exchange rates (except for modest variation within the gold points), gold reserves, and full freedom of capital movements. The original Bretton Woods system is entry II.A.3. in table 1, although the requirement that capital movements be controlled was implicit rather than explicit in that agreement. During the 1950s and again since 1970, Canada adopted the system IV.C.1., that is, a regime of managed flexibility in exchange rates and reliance on the United States dollar as its principal reserve asset. The last example illustrates the important point that not all countries need abide by the same conventions within a given international monetary regime. Thus the European Community countries have set themselves the objective of adopting I.D. 1. (where D stands for the as yet undetermined new European reserve asset), This content downloaded from 211.80.95.69 on Mon, 24 Jun 2013 04:23:40 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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