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《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Realism and Liberalism in Political Economy）Do Relative Gains Matter

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Do Relative Gains Michael Mastanduno Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy For the United States, which future world is preferable:one in which the U.S.economy grows at 25 percent over the next decade,while the Japanese economy grows at 75 percent,or one in which the U.S.grows at only 10 percent,while that of Japan grows 10.3 percent?Robert Reich of Harvard's John F.Kennedy School posed that choice in 1990 in a series of meetings with graduate students, U.S.corporate executives,investment bankers,citizens of Massachusetts, senior State Department officials,and professional economists.A majority of every group,with one exception,expressed a preference for the latter outcome.The economists unanimously chose the former,and,Reich reports, were surprised that other Americans would voluntarily forgo fifteen per- centage points of economic growth in the interest of hampering the progress of one of America's principal trade and financial partners.1 While Reich may have biased the results somewhat by projecting Japanese growth at three times the rate of that of the United States,the overall results of his informal survey are consistent with the findings of other recent sam- plings of American attitudes.A Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll taken in July 1990 found that an overwhelming majority (86 percent)of Americans would prefer a policy of slower growth in both Japan and the United States, I would like to thank Andrew Moravcsik,Richard Samuels,David Lake,Robert Art,Louis Pauly, Joseph Grieco,Robert Jervis,Michael Hawes,Robert Wolfe,and Richard P.Suttmeier for their comments and suggestions.Robert Martinage provided valuable research assistance.I also benefited from discussions of this paper at the 1990 Meeting of the American Political Science Association,at a Queen's University Conference on "Japan,the United States and Canada:The Political Economy of Systems Change,"and at an International Political Economy Seminar at Columbia University.During 1989,I served as a Council of Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the United States Trade Representative.I wish to express my gratitude to officials in that agency,especially Ambassadors Carla A.Hills and S.Linn Williams, and Assistant United States Trade Representatives Joseph A.Massey and James M.Murphy, for providing me with the opportunity to participate in the U.S.policy process and in negotia- tions with the European Community and Japan. Michael Mastanduno is an Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. 1.Robert Reich,"Do We Want U.S.to Be Rich Or Japan Poor?"Wall Street Journal,June 18, 1990,P.A10. International Security,Summer 1991 (Vol.16,No.1) 1991 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 73

DORelafive Gains 1 Michael Mastanduno Matter? ( America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy I For the United States, which future world is preferable: one in which the U.S. economy grows at 25 percent over the next decade, while the Japanese economy grows at 75 percent, or one in which the U.S. grows at only 10 percent, while that of Japan grows 10.3 percent? Robert Reich of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School posed that choice in 1990 in a series of meetings with graduate students, U.S. corporate executives, investment bankers, citizens of Massachusetts, senior State Department officials, and professional economists. A majority of every group, with one exception, expressed a preference for the latter outcome. The economists unanimously chose the former, and, Reich reports, were surprised that other Americans would voluntarily forgo fifteen percentage points of economic growth in the interest of hampering the progress of one of America's principal trade and financial partners.' While Reich may have biased the results somewhat by projecting Japanese growth at three times the rate of that of the United States, the overall results of his informal survey are consistent with the findings of other recent samplings of American attitudes. A Wall Street JournallNBC News poll taken in July 1990 found that an overwhelming majority (86 percent) of Americans would prefer a policy of slower growth in both Japan and the United States, I would like to thank Andrew Moravcsik, Richard Samuels, David Lake, Robert Art, Louis Pauly, Joseph Grieco, Robert Jervis, Michael Hawes, Robert Wolfe, and Richard P. Suttmeier for their comments and suggestions. Robert Martinage provided valuable research assistance. I also benefited from discussions of this paper at the 1990 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, at a Queen's University Conference on "Japan, the United States and Canada: The Political Economy of Systems Change," and at an International Political Economy Seminar at Columbia University. During 1989, I served as a Council of Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the United States Trade Representative. I wish to express my gratitude to officials in that agency, especially Ambassadors Carla A. Hills and S. Linn Williams, and Assistant United States Trade Representatives Joseph A. Massey and James M. Murphy, for providing me with the opportunity to participate in the U.S. policy process and in negotiations with the European Community and Japan. Michael Mastanduno is an Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College 1. Robert Reich, "Do We Want U.S. to Be Rich Or Japan Poor?" Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1990, p. A10. I~~ter~~ntio~tal Security, Summer 1991 (Vol. 16, No. 1) 01991 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

International Security 16:174 over one in which both grew faster,if the latter meant allowing Japan to take the lead economically.A New York Times poll conducted at about the same time found Americans believing that Japan would be the number one eco- nomic power in the world in the next century,and,by a substantial margin, that Japanese economic power posed a greater threat to American security than did the military power of the Soviet Union.2 These surveys suggest,among other things,that a significant part of the American public is concerned about relative gains,or relative position,in the country's economic relationship with Japan.Americans are concerned that even if both countries prosper from their relationship,Japan may grow faster than the United States,acquire a greater share of world markets and financial assets,or dominate the United States in the development and application of advanced technology.Over the long run,such developments could pose a threat to America's economic welfare,political autonomy,and perhaps even to its military security.As Reich notes,such concerns are the dark side of the U.S.-Japanese relationship-infrequently discussed,yet ever-present in the thinking of Americans,and perhaps of Japanese as well. This article addresses how much the U.S.government shares these con- cerns,and the extent to which they are reflected in American economic policy toward Japan.Do "relative gains concerns"-concerns that economic inter- action with Japan,while mutually beneficial,may benefit Japan more than the United States and thereby pose a threat to American national security, broadly defined-have a significant influence on official U.S.thinking and policy?If so,why,in what ways,and under which circumstances?Are such concerns spread uniformly,or are they concentrated within certain executive agencies?Do they reflect anxiety over economic welfare,political autonomy, or military security? I seek to answer these questions by examining America's response during the late 1980s to Japanese industrial policy in three areas-aircraft,satellites, and high-definition television (HDTV).My overall finding is that relative gains concerns do matter significantly,but not unconditionally.A sensitivity 2.Urban C.Lehner and Alan Murray,"Will the U.S.Find the Resolve to Meet the Japanese Challenge?"Wall Street Journal,July 2,1990,p.A1;and Michael Oreskes,"Americans Express Worry on Japan,As Feelings in Tokyo Seem to Soften,"New York Times,July 10,1990,p.A11. The latter reported that by a margin of 58 percent to 26 percent,Americans viewed the economic power of Japan as a greater threat to American security than the military power of the Soviet Union

International Security 16:1 1 74 over one in which both grew faster, if the latter meant allowing Japan to take the lead economically. A New York Times poll conducted at about the same time found Americans believing that Japan would be the number one economic power in the world in the next century, and, by a substantial margin, that Japanese economic power posed a greater threat to American security than did the military power of the Soviet Uni~n.~ These surveys suggest, among other things, that a significant part of the American public is concerned about relative gains, or relative position, in the country's economic relationship with Japan. Americans are concerned that even if both countries prosper from their relationship, Japan may grow faster than the United States, acquire a greater share of world markets and financial assets, or dominate the United States in the development and application of advanced technology. Over the long run, such developments could pose a threat to America's economic welfare, political autonomy, and perhaps even to its military security. As Reich notes, such concerns are the dark side of the U.S.-Japanese relationship-infrequently discussed, yet ever-present in the thinking of Americans, and perhaps of Japanese as well. This article addresses how much the U.S. government shares these concerns, and the extent to which they are reflected in American economic policy toward Japan. Do "relative gains concernsu-concerns that economic interaction with Japan, while mutually beneficial, may benefit Japan more than the United States and thereby pose a threat to American national security, broadly defined-have a significant influence on official U.S. thinking and policy? If so, why, in what ways, and under which circumstances? Are such concerns spread uniformly, or are they concentrated within certain executive agencies? Do they reflect anxiety over economic welfare, political autonomy, or military security? I seek to answer these questions by examining America's response during the late 1980s to Japanese industrial policy in three areas-aircraft, satellites, and high-definition television (HDTV). My overall finding is that relative gains concerns do matter significantly, but not unconditionally. A sensitivity 2. Urban C. Lehner and Alan Murray, "Will the U.S. Find the Resolve to Meet the Japanese Challenge?" Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1990, p. Al; and Michael Oreskes, "Americans Express Worry on Japan, As Feelings in Tokyo Seem to Soften," New York Times, July 10, 1990, p. All. The latter reported that by a margin of 58 percent to 26 percent, Americans viewed the economic power of Japan as a greater threat to American security than the military power of the Soviet Union

Do Relative Gains Matter?75 to such concerns was strongly evident in the U.S.policy process in each of the three cases,and reflected primarily anxiety over U.S.economic welfare. Policy outcomes,however,varied.In one case-satellites-U.S.officials adopted a controversial policy initiative that reflected relative gains consid- erations fully and unambiguously.In a second case-aircraft-relative gains concerns compelled U.S.officials to undertake,at considerable diplomatic cost,a major policy change,involving the reconsideration of a defense pro- duction agreement with Japan.Once the United States reconsidered,how- ever,relative gains concerns were not decisive in shaping its final policy.In the third case-HDTV-relative gains concerns were apparent yet affected U.S.policy only modestly,if at all. My explanation for this pattern is lodged at the intersection of international and domestic levels of analysis.International structural changes-the relative decline of U.S.economic power,the concomitant rise of that of Japan,and the diminution of the Soviet military threat-account for the increasing sen- sitivity of the United States to relative gains considerations during the latter half of the 1980s.In the absence of such changes,it is inconceivable that relative gains concerns or the policies associated with them would have emerged as prominently as they did in the formulation of U.S.policy toward Japan.U.S.officials,however,were deeply divided over the utility and desirability of a relative gains strategy.Officials at the Commerce Department and to a lesser extent at the Office of the U.S.Trade Representative(USTR) were sympathetic;those at the State and Defense Departments and at the Council of Economic Advisors(CEA)were largely skeptical.These prefer- ences reflected primarily the institutional missions of their respective agen- cies.Given these divisions,a struggle over policy emerged in each of the three areas under investigation.The outcomes of those struggles,and thus the extent to which relative gains concerns were ultimately translated into policy,were shaped by domestic factors,in particular ideology and the institutional setting within which the policy struggles took place. The next section of this article places the concern over relative gains in the context of American foreign policy and international relations theory.The following three sections examine,respectively,the FSX fighter aircraft con- troversy,the decision to identify Japanese satellite practices as a "Super 301" target under the 1988 trade act,and the dispute over whether to provide U.S.government support for HDTV.A concluding section summarizes the argument and explores its analytical and policy implications

Do Relative Gains Matter? 1 75 to such concerns was strongly evident in the U.S. policy process in each of the three cases, and reflected primarily anxiety over U.S. economic welfare. Policy outcomes, however, varied. In one case-satellites-U.S. officials adopted a controversial policy initiative that reflected relative gains considerations fully and unambiguously. In a second case-aircraft-relative gains concerns compelled U.S. officials to undertake, at considerable diplomatic cost, a major policy change, involving the reconsideration of a defense production agreement with Japan. Once the United States reconsidered, however, relative gains concerns were not decisive in shaping its final policy. In the third case-HDTV-relative gains concerns were apparent yet affected U.S. policy only modestly, if at all. My explanation for this pattern is lodged at the intersection of international and domestic levels of analysis. International structural changes-the relative decline of U.S. economic power, the concomitant rise of that of Japan, and the diminution of the Soviet military threat-account for the increasing sensitivity of the United States to relative gains considerations during the latter half of the 1980s. In the absence of such changes, it is inconceivable that relative gains concerns or the policies associated with them would have emerged as prominently as they did in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Japan. U.S. officials, however, were deeply divided over the utility and desirability of a relative gains strategy. Officials at the Commerce Department and to a lesser extent at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) were sympathetic; those at the State and Defense Departments and at the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) were largely skeptical. These preferences reflected primarily the institutional missions of their respective agencies. Given these divisions, a struggle over policy emerged in each of the three areas under investigation. The outcomes of those struggles, and thus the extent to which relative gains concerns were ultimately translated into policy, were shaped by domestic factors, in particular ideology and the institutional setting within which the policy struggles took place. The next section of this article places the concern over relative gains in the context of American foreign policy and international relations theory. The following three sections examine, respectively, the FSX fighter aircraft controversy, the decision to identify Japanese satellite practices as a "Super 301" target under the 1988 trade act, and the dispute over whether to provide U.S. government support for HDTV. A concluding section summarizes the argument and explores its analytical and policy implications

International Security 16:1 76 Relative Gains,Realism,and American Foreign Policy The question of America's sensitivity to relative gains considerations is rel- evant to both American foreign policy and international relations theory.The policy significance stems from the fact that over the past several years,a debate has emerged within the United States over how to deal with the growing economic power of Japan,pitting "traditionalists"against"revision- ists."Although it is not generally characterized as such,the fundamental cleavage between the two schools involves whether U.S.policy-makers should think and act in terms of relative gains. Traditionalists believe that to focus on the pursuit of relative gains is at best misguided,and at worst,potentially destructive to the U.S.-Japan rela- tionship.3 It is misguided because both the United States and Japan benefit a great deal in absolute terms from their economic interaction,and their growing interdependence assures that neither side can effectively exploit the economic relationship to take advantage of the other politically.As Raymond Vernon has recently argued,in economic terms each country "has a hand on the other's throat,"and for either to threaten the other would be tanta- mount to threatening a nuclear first strike.4 Relative gains calculations can be destructive,to the extent that they lead to or reinforce the twin evils of protectionism and nationalism.A U.S.protectionist strategy-designed,per- haps,to slow the economic growth or technological progress of Japan- would be damaging in and of itself,and also could lead to a trade and investment war,which would leave both sides even worse off.Moreover,by casting the relationship in terms of a competition for relative gains,U.S. officials would risk inciting nationalist fervor,as America's "Japan bashers" and Japan's "America bashers"reinforced each other's worst tendencies.5 3.See,for example,I.M.Destler and Michael Nacht,"Beyond Mutual Recrimination:Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in the 1990s,"International Security,Vol.15,No.3(Winter 1990/ 91),pp.92-119;Philip Tresize,"Japan,the Enemy?"The Brookings Review (Winter 1989/90) Pp.3-13;Kan Ito,"Trans-Pacific Anger,"Foreign Policy,No.78(Spring 1990),pp.131-52;David Brock,"The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing,"The National Interest,No.17 (Fall 1989), Pp.17-28;Alan Romberg,"U.S.-Japan Relations:A Partnership in Search of Definition,"Critical Issues 1988-1 (New York:Council on Foreign Relations,1988);and George R.Packard,"The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis,"Foreign Affairs,Vol.66,No.2 (Winter 87-88),pp.348-367. 4.Raymond Vernon,"On Glass Houses and Japan-Bashing,New York Times,June 21,1989,p. A25.Vernon refers,presumably,to a situation of mutual assured destruction in which strike and retaliation would devastate both. 5.American revisionists are frequently accused of "Japan-bashing"by their critics.The most celebrated example of Japanese "America-bashing"is Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara,The Japan That Can Say No:The New UI.S.-Japan Relations Card(Kobunsha:Kappa-Holmes,1989),an unofficial English translation of which circulated widely in Washington during 1989 and 1990

International Security 16:1 1 76 Relative Gains, Realism, and American Foreign Policy The question of America's sensitivity to relative gains considerations is relevant to both American foreign policy and international relations theory. The policy significance stems from the fact that over the past several years, a debate has emerged within the United States over how to deal with the growing economic power of Japan, pitting "traditionalists" against "revisionists." Although it is not generally characterized as such, the fundamental cleavage between the two schools involves whether U.S. policy-makers should think and act in terms of relative gains. Traditionalists believe that to focus on the pursuit of relative gains is at best misguided, and at worst, potentially destructive to the U.S.-Japan relati~nship.~It is misguided because both the United States and Japan benefit a great deal in absolute terms from their economic interaction, and their growing interdependence assures that neither side can effectively exploit the economic relationship to take advantage of the other politically. As Raymond Vernon has recently argued, in economic terms each country "has a hand on the other's throat," and for either to threaten the other would be tantamount to threatening a nuclear first strike.%elative gains calculations can be destructive, to the extent that they lead to or reinforce the twin evils of protectionism and nationalism. A U.S. protectionist strategy-designed, perhaps, to slow the economic growth or technological progress of Japanwould be damaging in and of itself, and also could lead to a trade and investment war, which would leave both sides even worse off. Moreover, by casting the relationship in terms of a competition for relative gains, U.S. officials would risk inciting nationalist fervor, as America's "Japan bashers" and Japan's "America bashers" reinforced each other's worst tenden~ies.~ 3. See, for example, I.M. Destler and Michael Nacht, "Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in the 1990s," I~zternational Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 19901 91), pp. 92-119; Philip Tresize, "Japan, the Enemy?" The Brookings Review (Winter 1989190), pp. 3-13; Kan Ito, "Trans-Pacific Anger," Foreign Policy, No. 78 (Spring 1990), pp. 131-52; David Brock, "The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing," The National Interest, No. 17 (Fall 1989), pp. 17-28; Alan Romberg, "U.S.-Japan Relations: A Partnership in Search of Definition," Critical Issties 1988-1 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); and George R. Packard, "The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis," Forelgn Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Winter 87-88), pp. 348-367. 4. Raymond Vernon, "On Glass Houses and Japan-Bashing," New York Times, June 21, 1989, p. A25. Vernon refers, presumably, to a situation of mutual assured destruction in which strike and retaliation would devastate both. 5. American revisionists are frequently accused of "Japan-bashing" by their critics. The most celebrated example of Japanese "America-bashing" is Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No: The New U.S.-lapan Relations Card (Kobunsha: Kappa-Holmes, 1989), an unofficial English translation of which circulated widely in Washington during 1989 and 1990

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