Taking Preferences Seriously:A Liberal Theory of International Politics STOR Andrew Moravcsik International Organization,Vol.51,No.4.(Autumn,1997),pp.513-553 Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199723%2951%3A4%3C513%3ATPSALT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C International Organization is currently published by The MIT Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use,available at http://www.istor org/about/terms html.JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides,in part,that unless you have obtained prior permission,you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles,and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal,non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work.Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/mitpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world.The Archive is supported by libraries,scholarly societies,publishers, and foundations.It is an initiative of JSTOR,a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology.For more information regarding JSTOR,please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sun Sep1622:02:352007
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics Andrew Moravcsik International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4. (Autumn, 1997), pp. 513-553. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199723%2951%3A4%3C513%3ATPSALT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C International Organization is currently published by The MIT Press. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/mitpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. http://www.jstor.org Sun Sep 16 22:02:35 2007
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics Andrew Moravcsik This article reformulates liberal international relations (IR)theory in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science.Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations-the relationship of states to the domestic and transna- tional social context in which they are embedded-have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics.Societal ideas,interests,and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences,that is,the fundamental social purposes underlying the strate- gic calculations of goverments.For liberals,the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics-not,as realists argue,the configuration of capabilities and not,as institutionalists(that is,functional regime theorists)maintain,the configuration of informa- tion and institutions.This article codifies this basic liberal insight in the form of three core theoretical assumptions,derives from them three variants of liberal theory,and demon- strates that the existence of a coherent liberal theory has significant theoretical,methodologi- cal,and empirical implications.Restated in this way,liberal theory deserves to be treated as a paradigmatic alternative empirically coequal with and analytically more fundamen- tal than the two dominant theories in contemporary IR scholarship:realism and insti- tutionalism. For detailed comments and criticisms,I am grateful above all to Anne-Marie Slaughter,who was there from the beginning,and to Lea Brilmayer,Lawrence Broz,Marc Busch,James Caporaso,Dale Copeland, David Dessler,Jeffry Frieden,Martha Finnemore,Charles Glazer,Michael Griesdorf,Stefano Guzzini, Ernst Haas,Stanley Hoffmann,Stephen Holmes,Ted Hopf,Alan Houston,David Lumsdaine,Robert Keohane,Yuen Khong,Larry Kramer,David Long,Steven Lukes,James Marquart,Lisa Martin,Jonathan Mercer,Henry Nau,Kalypso Nicolaidis,James Nolt,Joseph Nye,John Odell,Kenneth Oye,Robert Paarlberg,Daniel Philpott,Gideon Rose,Judith Shklar,David Skidmore,Allison Stanger,Janice Stein, Andrew Wallace,Celeste Wallander,Stephen Walt,Alexander Wendt,Mark Zacher,Fareed Zakaria,Michael Zurn,and three anonymous referees.I thank also two other critics:Peter Katzenstein encouraged a more direct comparison with constructivist approaches and John Mearsheimer invited me to state the liberal case vis-a-vis realism in a series of public debates.I am also indebted to participants in seminars at the Program on International Politics,Economics,and Security (PIPES),University of Chicago;University of Konstanz:University of Toronto;University of California,San Diego:Olin Institute and Center for Inter- national Affairs,Harvard University;International Jurisprudence Colloquium,New York University Law School;Fletcher School,Tufts University;and the European University Institute.For research support,I thank Amit Sevak,Brian Portnoy,and PIPES.For more detailed and documented versions of this article, see Moravcsik 1992. International Organization 51,4,Autumn 1997,pp.513-53 1997 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics Andrew Moravcsik This article reformulates liberal international relations (R) theory in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science. Liberal R theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations-the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded-have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics. Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics-not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists) maintain, the configuration of information and institutions. This article codifies this basic liberal insight in the form of three core theoretical assumptions, derives from them three variants of liberal theory, and demonstrates that the existence of a coherent liberal theory has significant theoretical, methodological, and empirical implications. Restated in this way, liberal theory deserves to be treated as a paradigmatic alternative empirically coequal with and analytically more fundamental than the two dominant theories in contemporary IR scholarship: realism and institutionalism. For detailed comments and criticisms, I am grateful above all to Anne-Marie Slaughter, who was there from the beginning, and to Lea Brilmayer, Lawrence Broz, Marc Busch, James Caporaso, Dale Copeland, David Dessler, Jeffry Frieden, Martha Finnemore, Charles Glazer, Michael Griesdorf, Stefano Guzzini, Ernst Haas, Stanley Hoffmann, Stephen Holmes, Ted Hopf, Alan Houston, David Lumsdaine, Robert Keohane, Yuen Khong, Larry Kramer, David Long, Steven Lukes, James Marquart, Lisa Martin, Jonathan Mercer, Henry Nau, Kalypso Nicolai'dis, James Nolt, Joseph Nye, John Odell, Kenneth Oye, Robert Paarlberg, Daniel Philpott, Gideon Rose, Judith Shklar, David Skidmore, Allison Stanger, Janice Stein, Andrew Wallace, Celeste Wallander, Stephen Walt, Alexander Wendt, Mark Zacher, Fareed Zakaria, Michael Ziirn, and three anonymous referees. I thank also two other critics: Peter Katzenstein encouraged a more direct comparison with constructivist approaches and John Mearsheimer invited me to state the liberal case vis-8-vis realism in a series of public debates. I am also indebted to participants in seminars at the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES), University of Chicago; University of Konstanz; University of Toronto; University of California, San Diego; Olin Institute and Center for International Affairs, Harvard university; International Jurisprudence Colloquium, New York university Law School; Fletcher School, Tufts University; and the European University Institute. For research support, I thank Amit Sevak, Brian Portnoy, and PIPES. For more detailed and documented versions of this article, see Moravcsik 1992. International Organization 5 1,4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-53 o 1997 by The I0 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
514 International Organization Grounding liberal theory in a set of core social scientific assumptions helps over- come a disjuncture between contemporary empirical research on world politics and the language employed by scholars to describe IR as a field.Liberal hypotheses stressing variation in state preferences play an increasingly central role in IR scholar- ship.These include explanations stressing the causal importance of state-society re- lations as shaped by domestic institutions(for example,the "democratic peace"),by economic interdependence(for example,endogenous tariff theory),and by ideas about national,political,and socioeconomic public goods provision(for example,theories about the relationship between nationalism and conflict).Liberal hypotheses do not include,for reasons clarified later,functional regime theory.Yet the conceptual lan- guage of IR theory has not caught up with contemporary research.IR theorists con- tinue to speak as if the dominant theoretical cleavage in the field were the dichotomy between realism and ("neoliberal")institutionalism.The result:liberal IR theory of the kind outlined earlier is generally ignored as a major paradigmatic alternative. Worse,its lack of paradigmatic status has permitted critics to caricature liberal theory as a normative,even utopian,ideology.Postwar realist critics such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H.Carr took rhetorical advantage of liberalism's historical role as an ideology to contrast its purported altruism(“idealism,“legalism,”“moralism,” or "utopianism")with realism's "theoretical concern with human nature as it actu- ally is [and]historical processes as they actually take place."Forty years later,little has changed.Robert Gilpin's influential typology in international political economy juxtaposes a positive mercantilist view("politics determines economics")against a narrower and conspicuously normative liberal one ("economics should determine politics").Kenneth Waltz,a realist critic,asserts that "if the aims...of states be- come matters of...central concern,then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be drawn."2 Liberals have responded to such criticisms not by proposing a unified set of positive social scientific assumptions on which a nonideological and nonutopian liberal theory can be based,as has been done with considerable success for realism and institutionalism,but by conceding its theoretical incoherence and turning instead to intellectual history.It is widely accepted that any nontautological social scientific theory must be grounded in a set of positive assumptions from which arguments,explanations,and predictions can be de- rived.3 Yet surveys of liberal IR theory either collect disparate views held by "classical" liberal publicists or define liberal theory teleologically,that is,according to its purported optimism concerning the potential for peace,cooperation,and intemational institutions in world history.Such studies offer an indispensable source of theoretical and normative inspi- ration.Judged by the more narrowly social scientific criteria adopted here,however,they do not justify reference to a distinct "liberal"IR theory. Leading liberal IR theorists freely concede the absence of coherent microfounda- tional assumptions but conclude therefrom that a liberal IR theory in the social scien- 1.See Morgenthau 1960,4;Keohane 1989,68,n.17;and Howard 1978,134. 2.See Waltz 1979,65,27;Gilpin 1975,27 (emphasis in original);and Gilpin 1987. 3.See Bueno de Mesquita 1996,64-65;and Keohane 1986
514 International Organization Grounding liberal theory in a set of core social scientific assumptions helps overcome a disjuncture between contemporary empirical research on world politics and the language employed by scholars to describe IR as a field. Liberal hypotheses stressing variation in state preferences play an increasingly central role in IR scholarship. These include explanations stressing the causal importance of state-society relations as shaped by domestic institutions (for example, the "democratic peace"), by economic interdependence (for example, endogenous tariff theory), and by ideas about national, political, and socioeconomic public goods provision (for example, theories about the relationship between nationalism and conflict). Liberal hypotheses do not include, for reasons clarified later, functional regime theory. Yet the conceptual language of IR theory has not caught up with contemporary research. IR theorists continue to speak as if the dominant theoretical cleavage in the field were the dichotomy between realism and ("neoliberal") institutionalism. The result: liberal IR theory of the kind outlined earlier is generally ignored as a major paradigmatic alternative. Worse, its lack of paradigmatic status has permitted critics to caricature liberal theory as a normative, even utopian, ideology. Postwar realist critics such as Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr took rhetorical advantage of liberalism's historical role as an ideology to contrast its purported altruism ("idealism," "legalism," "moralism," or "utopianism") with realism's "theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is [and] historical processes as they actually take place."' Forty years later, little has changed. Robert Gilpin's influential typology in international political economy juxtaposes a positive mercantilist view ("politics determines economics") against a narrower and conspicuously normative liberal one ("economics should determine politics"). Kenneth Waltz, a realist critic, asserts that "if the aims . . . of states become matters of. . . central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be dra~n."~ Liberals have responded to such criticisms not by proposing a unified set of positive social scientific assumptions on which a nonideological and nonutopian liberal theory can be based, as has been done with considerable success for realism and institutionalism, but by conceding its theoretical incoherence and turning instead to intellectual history. It is widely accepted that any nontautological social scientific theory must be grounded in a set of positive assumptions from which arguments, explanations, and predictions can be derived.3 Yet surveys of liberal IR theory either collect disparate views held by "classical" liberal publicists or define liberal theory teleologically, that is, according to its purported optimism concerning the potential for peace, cooperation, and international institutions in world history. Such studies offer an indispensable source of theoretical and normative inspiration. Judged by the more narrowly social scientific criteria adopted here, however, they do not jusa reference to a distinct "liberal" IR theory. Leading liberal IR theorists freely concede the absence of coherent microfoundational assumptions but conclude therefrom that a liberal IR theory in the social scien- 1. See Morgenthau 1960,4; Keohane 1989,68, n. 17; and Howard 1978, 134. 2. See Waltz 1979,65,27; Gilpin 1975, 27 (emphasis in original); and Gilpin 1987. 3. See Bueno de Mesquita 1996,64-65; and Keohane 1986
Liberal Theory of International Politics 515 tific sense cannot exist.Robert Keohane,an institutionalist sympathetic to liberal- ism,maintains that"in contrast to Marxism and Realism,Liberalism is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural theory."Michael Doyle,a pioneer in ana- lyzing the "democratic peace,"observes that liberal IR theory,unlike others,lacks "canonical"foundations.Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew,sympathetic liberals, assert that liberalism should be considered an "approach,"not a theory,since "its propositions cannot be...deduced from its assumptions."4 Accurate though this may be as a characterization of intellectual history and current theory,it is second- best social science. I seek to move beyond this unsatisfactory situation by proposing a set of core assumptions on which a general restatement of positive liberal IR theory can be grounded.In the first section of the article I argue that the basic liberal insight about the centrality of state-society relations to world politics can be restated in terms of three positive assumptions,concerning,respectively,the nature of fundamental so- cial actors,the state,and the international system. Drawing on these assumptions,I then elaborate three major variants of liberal theory-each grounded in a distinctive causal mechanism linking social preferences and state behavior.Ideational liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and compatibility among collective social values or identities concerning the scope and nature of public goods provision.Commercial liberalism stresses the im- pact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange.Republican liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incen- tives for social groups to engage in rent seeking.5 Finally,I demonstrate that the identification of coherent theoretical assumptions is not simply an abstract and semantic matter.It has significant methodological,theo- retical,and empirical implications.The utility of a paradigmatic restatement should be evaluated on the basis of four criteria,each relevant to the empirical researcher: superior parsimony,coherence,empirical accuracy,and multicausal consistency First,a theoretical restatement should be general and parsimonious,demonstrat- ing that a limited number of microfoundational assumptions can link a broad range of previously unconnected theories and hypotheses.This restatement does so by show- ing how liberalism provides a general theory of IR linking apparently unrelated areas of inguiry.The theory outlined here applies equally to liberal and nonliberal states,economic and national security affairs,conflictual and nonconflictual situa- tions,and the behavior both of individual states ("foreign policy")and of aggrega- tions of states ("international relations").Liberal theory,moreover,explains impor- tant phenomena overlooked by alternative theories,including the substantive content of foreign policy,historical change,and the distinctiveness of interstate relations among modern Western states. 4.See Keohane 1990,166,172-73;Doyle 1986,1152;Zacher and Matthew 1992,2;Matthew and Zacher1995,107-11,117-20;Hoffmann1987,1995:and Nye1988. 5.For other such distinctions,see Keohane 1990;and Doyle 1983
Liberal Theory of International Politics 515 tific sense cannot exist. Robert Keohane, an institutionalist sympathetic to liberalism, maintains that "in contrast to Marxism and Realism, Liberalism is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural theory." Michael Doyle, a pioneer in analyzing the "democratic peace," observes that liberal IR theory, unlike others, lacks "canonical" foundations. Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, sympathetic liberals, assert that liberalism should be considered an "approach," not a theory, since "its propositions cannot be . . . deduced from its assumption^."^ Accurate though this may be as a characterization of intellectual history and current theory, it is secondbest social science. I seek to move beyond this unsatisfactory situation by proposing a set of core assumptions on which a general restatement of positive liberal IR theory can be grounded. In the first section of the article I argue that the basic liberal insight about the centrality of state-society relations to world politics can be restated in terms of three positive assumptions, concerning, respectively, the nature of fundamental social actors, the state, and the international system. Drawing on these assumptions, I then elaborate three major variants of liberal theory--each grounded in a distinctive causal mechanism linking social preferences and state behavior. Ideational liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of conflict and compatibility among collective social values or identities concerning the scope and nature of public goods provision. Commercial liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange. Republican liberalism stresses the impact on state behavior of varying forms of domestic representation and the resulting incentives for social groups to engage in rent ~eeking.~ Finally, I demonstrate that the identification of coherent theoretical assumptions is not simply an abstract and semantic matter. It has significant methodological, theoretical, and empirical implications. The utility of a paradigmatic restatement should be evaluated on the basis of four criteria, each relevant to the empirical researcher: superior parsimony, coherence, empirical accuracy, and multicausal consistency. First, a theoretical restatement should be general and parsimonious, demonstrating that a limited number of microfoundational assumptions can link a broad range of previously unconnected theories and hypotheses. This restatement does so by showing how liberalism provides a general theory of IR linking apparently unrelated areas of inquiry. The theory outlined here applies equally to liberal and nonliberal states, economic and national security affairs, conflictual and nonconflictual situations, and the behavior both of individual states ("foreign policy ") and of aggregations of states ("international relations"). Liberal theory, moreover, explains important phenomena overlooked by alternative theories, including the substantive content of foreign policy, historical change, and the distinctiveness of interstate relations among modem Western states. 4. See Keohane 1990, 166, 172-73; Doyle 1986, 1152; Zacher and Matthew 1992, 2; Matthew and Zacher 1995, 107-1 1, 117-20; Hoffmann 1987, 1995; and Nye 1988. 5. For other such distinctions, see Keohane 1990; and Doyle 1983
516 International Organization Second,a theoretical restatement should be rigorous and coherent,offering a clear definition of its own boundaries.This restatement does so by demonstrating that institutionalist theories of regimes-commonly treated as liberal due to ideological and historical connotations-are in fact based on assumptions closer to realism than to liberalism.This helps to explain why IR theorists have found it difficult to distill a set of coherent microfoundational assumptions for liberal theory. Third,a theoretical restatement should demonstrate empirical accuracy vis-a-vis other theories;it should expose anomalies in existing work,forcing reconsideration of empirical findings and theoretical positions.This restatement of liberal theory meets this criterion by revealing significant methodological biases in empirical evalu- ations of realist theories of "relative gains-seeking"and constructivist analyses of ideas and IR due to the omission of liberal alternatives.If these biases were corrected, liberal accounts might well supplant many widely accepted realist and institutional- ist,as well as constructivist,explanations of particular phenomena in world politics. Fourth,a theoretical restatement should demonstrate multicausal consistency.By specifying the antecedent conditions under which it is valid and the precise causal links to policy outcomes,a theory should specify rigorously how it can be synthe- sized with other theories into a multicausal explanation consistent with tenets of fundamental social theory.This restatement does so by reversing the nearly universal presumption among contemporary IR theorists that"systemic"theories like realism and institutionalism should be employed as an analytical "first cut,"with theories of "domestic"preference formation brought in only to explain anomalies-a prescrip- tion that is both methodologically biased and theoretically incoherent.In its place,this restatement dictates the reverse:Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold. If this proposed reformulation of liberal IR theory meets these four criteria,as I argue it does,there is good reason to accord it a paradigmatic position empirically coequal with and analytically prior to realism and institutionalism,as well as construc- tivism,in theory and research on world politics. Core Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory Liberal IR theory's fundamental premise-that the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded criti- cally shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state pref- erences-can be restated in terms of three core assumptions.These assumptions are appropriate foundations of any social theory of IR:they specify the nature of societal actors,the state,and the international system. Assumption 1:The Primacy of Societal Actors The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity,conficting values,and variations in societal influence
516 International Organization Second, a theoretical restatement should be rigorous and coherent, offering a clear definition of its own boundaries. This restatement does so by demonstrating that institutionalist theories of regimes-commonly treated as liberal due to ideological and historical connotations-are in fact based on assumptions closer to realism than to liberalism. This helps to explain why IR theorists have found it difficult to distill a set of coherent microfoundational assumptions for liberal theory. Third, a theoretical restatement should demonstrate empirical accuracy vis-a-vis other theories; it should expose anomalies in existing work, forcing reconsideration of empirical findings and theoretical positions. This restatement of liberal theory meets this criterion by revealing sign$cant methodological biases in empirical evaluations of realist theories of "relative gains-seeking" and constructivist analyses of ideas and IR due to the omission of liberal alternatives. If these biases were corrected, liberal accounts might well supplant many widely accepted realist and institutionalist, as well as constructivist, explanations of particular phenomena in world politics. Fourth, a theoretical restatement should demonstrate multicausal consistency. By specifying the antecedent conditions under which it is valid and the precise causal links to policy outcomes, a theory should specify rigorously how it can be synthesized with other theories into a multicausal explanation consistent with tenets of fundamental social theory. This restatement does so by reversing the nearly universal presumption among contemporary IR theorists that "systemic" theories like realism and institutionalism should be employed as an analytical "first cut," with theories of "domestic" preference formation brought in only to explain anomalies-a prescription that is both methodologically biased and theoretically incoherent. In its place, this restatement dictates the reverse: Liberal theory is analytically prior to both realism and institutionalism because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold. If this proposed reformulation of liberal IR theory meets these four criteria, as I argue it does, there is good reason to accord it a paradigmatic position empirically coequal with and analytically prior to realism and institutionalism, as well as constructivism, in theory and research on world politics. Core Assumptions of Liberal IR Theory Liberal IR theory's fundamental premise-that the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences--can be restated in terms of three core assumptions. These assumptions are appropriate foundations of any social theory of IR: they specify the nature of societal actors, the state, and the international system. Assumption I: The Primacy of Societal Actors The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence