78o RICHARD S.HOROWITZ struggle.Conservative officials took advantage of the diffusion of power to slow efforts at reform-and officials in the central govern- ment in Beijing faced particular difficulties in introducing and imple- menting reforms in the face of a vacillating court,and the number and power of conservative officials in the capital.After 1875,leader- ship in the self-strengthening process clearly shifted to the provincial officials.2 The one effort at reform from the throne,the Hundred Days reforms in 1898,fell apart in the face of entrenched opposition both at court and within the bureaucracy. Critics of the System before 1901 It is not surprising therefore,that long before the Xinzheng reforms began,Qing officials and outside observers began to articulate con- cerns about the functioning of the Qing system and the inability of the central government to act effectively.As early as 1866,the Zongli Yamen circulated to senior officials Customs Inspector Gen- eral Robert Hart's Bystander's Memorandum.'Hart sharply criti- cized the functioning of many aspects of the Qing state,but he par- ticularly noted that even the most reputable of central government officials were burdened with too many roles,and lacked the time to give proper attention to their responsibilities,and allowing subordin- ate officials to arrogate power for themselves-and act for selfish purposes rather than the public good.13 The fact that the Yamen, which could have buried (or heavily edited)the memorandum chose to circulate it,suggests that they saw some merit in these criticisms. Less than a decade later,concerned by the growing threats from the outside,the Zongli Yamen and especially its dying leader Wenxi- ang framed a series of memorials pressing for accelerated reforms. In a memorial that initiated the famous 1874-75 defense policy debate the Zongli Yamen leadership noted the problems it faced in pressing for urgently needed defense reforms,and keeping them going over the long haul.Those of one mind have been few and those with divergent arguments many.Because those at the center have been obtuse,and those outside have been unable to know the whole situation.The government therefore fails to solve its problems 12 Horowitz,104-14. 3Chouban yiwu shimo,tongzhi (Taipei:Wenhai chubanshe,1970),40:14-14b.See also,Kung-chuan Hsiao,A Modern China and a New World:Kang Yu-wei,Reformer and Utopian,1858-1927(Seattle:U.of Washington Press,1975),264
780 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ struggle. Conservative officials took advantage of the diffusion of power to slow efforts at reform-and officials in the central government in Beijing faced particular difficulties in introducing and implementing reforms in the face of a vacillating court, and the number and power of conservative officials in the capital. After 1875, leadership in the self-strengthening process clearly shifted to the provincial officials." The one effort at reform from the throne, the Hundred Days reforms in 1898, fell apart in the face of entrenched opposition both at court and within the bureaucracy. Critics of the System before 19go1 It is not surprising therefore, that long before the Xinzheng reforms began, Qing officials and outside observers began to articulate concerns about the functioning of the Qing system and the inability of the central government to act effectively. As early as 1866, the Zongli Yamen circulated to senior officials Customs Inspector General Robert Hart's 'Bystander's Memorandum.' Hart sharply criticized the functioning of many aspects of the Qing state, but he particularly noted that even the most reputable of central government officials were burdened with too many roles, and lacked the time to give proper attention to their responsibilities, and allowing subordinate officials to arrogate power for themselves-and act for selfish purposes rather than the public good.'3 The fact that the Yamen, which could have buried (or heavily edited) the memorandum chose to circulate it, suggests that they saw some merit in these criticisms. Less than a decade later, concerned by the growing threats from the outside, the Zongli Yamen and especially its dying leader Wenxiang framed a series of memorials pressing for accelerated reforms. In a memorial that initiated the famous 1874-75 defense policy debate the Zongli Yamen leadership noted the problems it faced in pressing for urgently needed defense reforms, and keeping them going over the long haul. 'Those of one mind have been few and those with divergent arguments many. Because those at the center have been obtuse, and those outside have been unable to know the whole situation. The government therefore fails to solve its problems 12 Horowitz, 104-14. 13 Choubanyiwu shimo, tongzhi (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1970), 40: 14-14b. See also, Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: Kang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, I858-I927 (Seattle: U. of Washington Press, 1975), 264
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 781 promptly making it an inviting target.'4 They hoped that an open debate among senior officials on the priorities of national defense would help to bring about change. At this time,Wenxiang,the most influential of the Zongli Yamen's leaders,took another tack.In a remarkable memorial he sought to coax the young Tongzhi Emperor into directly intervening to pro- mote reform and breaking down institutionalized opposition: We must change our minds and accept the urgency of the situation,have firm sense of purpose and stick to it for a long time.We must pursue [self- strengthening reforms]to a conclusion....Hereafter,when the statesmen and officials memorialize on matters concerning the current situation,I request that in accordance with precedent,[Your Majesty should]come forth and deliberate and discuss it thoroughly together with Prince Gong [the senior Grand Councilor and the titular leader of the Zongli Yamen], choose those suggestions which are appropriate and implement them.If the situation makes implementing them difficult,or you are unable to issue explicit instructions,in personal audience issue the edict orally in order that by making known your Majesty's thinking,in the future good words will not be hidden,and there will be a complete policy for self-strengthening.5 Ill with respiratory disease,Wenxiang concluded dramatically,giving the memorial the air of advice from the deathbed:'Your minister has been ill for a long time with no cure.I was only afraid that summoned to an audience,I would start to gasp for breath and would be unable to speak,and I would be unable to finish what I wished to say.'16 Wenxiang's goal in this appeal seems to have been to get the Emperor to support the reformist officials in two ways:first by look- ing to Prince Gong as a primary source of advice,and second by supporting the idea of reform even when it was impractical to imple- ment a specific measure,shift the tone of debate away from conser- vative criticism.Wenxiang's appeal went for naught.The Tongzhi emperor died within months,and Wenxiang himself succumbed to respiratory disease within two years.But this memorial suggests that in the eyes of a seasoned official,infuence from the throne could shape the tenor of the debate and was necessary to lubricate the creaky machinery of government. These examples point to some of the structural problems that advocates of reform faced.The Zongli Yamen leadership did not try Dao Xian Tong Guang sichao zouyi (Taipei:Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan,1970), vol.6:2610-11. 15Ibid.,26o6. 16 Ibid
BREAKING THE BONDS OF PRECEDENT 781 promptly making it an inviting target.'14 They hoped that an open debate among senior officials on the priorities of national defense would help to bring about change. At this time, Wenxiang, the most influential of the Zongli Yamen's leaders, took another tack. In a remarkable memorial he sought to coax the young Tongzhi Emperor into directly intervening to promote reform and breaking down institutionalized opposition: We must change our minds and accept the urgency of the situation, have firm sense of purpose and stick to it for a long time. We must pursue [selfstrengthening reforms] to a conclusion.... Hereafter, when the statesmen and officials memorialize on matters concerning the current situation, I request that in accordance with precedent, [Your Majesty should] come forth and deliberate and discuss it thoroughly together with Prince Gong [the senior Grand Councilor and the titular leader of the Zongli Yamen], choose those suggestions which are appropriate and implement them. If the situation makes implementing them difficult, or you are unable to issue explicit instructions, in personal audience issue the edict orally in order that by making known your Majesty's thinking, in the future good words will not be hidden, and there will be a complete policy for self-strengthening.'5 Ill with respiratory disease, Wenxiang concluded dramatically, giving the memorial the air of advice from the deathbed: 'Your minister has been ill for a long time with no cure. I was only afraid that summoned to an audience, I would start to gasp for breath and would be unable to speak, and I would be unable to finish what I wished to say."' Wenxiang's goal in this appeal seems to have been to get the Emperor to support the reformist officials in two ways: first by looking to Prince Gong as a primary source of advice, and second by supporting the idea of reform even when it was impractical to implement a specific measure, shift the tone of debate away from conservative criticism. Wenxiang's appeal went for naught. The Tongzhi emperor died within months, and Wenxiang himself succumbed to respiratory disease within two years. But this memorial suggests that in the eyes of a seasoned official, influence from the throne could shape the tenor of the debate and was necessary to lubricate the creaky machinery of government. These examples point to some of the structural problems that advocates of reform faced. The Zongli Yamen leadership did not try 14 Dao Xian Tong Guang sichao zouyi (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1970), vol. 6: 2610-11. '1 Ibid., 266. '6 Ibid
782 RICHARD S.HOROWITZ to alter the system,rather they hoped that new tactics would bring about change.But during the late nineteenth century,neither the intervention of the throne nor a broad based debate on the issues worked to advance the reform agenda.The throne was lukewarm to the self-strengthening efforts,and from the mid-187os onward the practice of using inclusive court conferences in which many senior officials participated in discussions of foreign policy crises further strengthened the hand of conservatives.7 The effort of the Guangxu emperor to personally spur reform in 1898 ran into entrenched opposition,spurring a coup d'etat. Perhaps the first prominent political figure to identify the central government administrative structure as a systemic obstacle to reform was the Cantonese intellectual and political reformer Kang Youwei.As early as 1888 Kang criticized the management of the Six Boards,arguing that Not one of the presidents and vice presidents has definite responsibility,'and that they did not give their whole attention'to their responsibilities 'as most of them hold concurrent posts in other parts of the government.'As a result,he argued,even capable men quickly gave up playing an active role.In 1895,in his second memorial to throne,Kang placed this in a historical context, arguing that since China had historically been surrounded by smaller and weaker states,primary attention had focused not on external threats but the potential for internal rebellion.During the Ming period,methods of control became even more thorough...For each responsibility there were several officials involved,and each official was given several responsibilities,thereby divided authority and lim- iting freedom of action.'In Kang's view,therefore,the diffusion of authority endemic to the Ming-Qing bureaucracy was directly related to China's autocratic system. By early 1898 Kang was convinced that the existing central bu- reaucracy was unalterably opposed to change.He suggested that the best route to reform would be to create a separate Bureau of Admin- istration (zhidu ju)divided into twelve offices:law,budget,education, agriculture,industry,commerce,railroads,postal services,mines, 17 Marianne Bastid,Ching-i and the Self-Strengthening Movement'in Qingji zigiang yundong yantao huilun wenji (Taipei:Institute of Modern History,Academia Sinica,1987),2:87393. Cited in Kung-chuan Hsiao,A Modern China and a New World:Kang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian,18581927(Seattle:U.of Washington Press,1975),p.263: Tang Zhijun (ed.),Kang Youwei zheng lun ji (Beijing:Zhonghua shuju,1981),1:57-8. 1 Tang Zhijun,1:151.See also Hsiao,265
782 RICHARD S. HOROWITZ to alter the system, rather they hoped that new tactics would bring about change. But during the late nineteenth century, neither the intervention of the throne nor a broad based debate on the issues worked to advance the reform agenda. The throne was lukewarm to the self-strengthening efforts, and from the mid-187os onward the practice of using inclusive court conferences in which many senior officials participated in discussions of foreign policy crises further strengthened the hand of conservatives." The effort of the Guangxu emperor to personally spur reform in 1898 ran into entrenched opposition, spurring a coup d'etat. Perhaps the first prominent political figure to identify the central government administrative structure as a systemic obstacle to reform was the Cantonese iritellectual and political reformer Kang Youwei. As early as 1888 Kang criticized the management of the Six Boards, arguing that 'Not one of the presidents and vice presidents has definite responsibility,' and that they did not give their 'whole attention' to their responsibilities 'as most of them hold concurrent posts in other parts of the government.' As a result, he argued, even capable men quickly gave up playing an active role.'8 In 1895, in his second memorial to throne, Kang placed this in a historical context, arguing that since China had historically been surrounded by smaller and weaker states, primary attention had focused not on external threats but the potential for internal rebellion. 'During the Ming period, methods of control became even more thorough ... For each responsibility there were several officials involved, and each official was given several responsibilities, thereby divided authority and limiting freedom of action."9 In Kang's view, therefore, the diffusion of authority endemic to the Ming-Qing bureaucracy was directly related to China's autocratic system. By early 1898 Kang was convinced that the existing central bureaucracy was unalterably opposed to change. He suggested that the best route to reform would be to create a separate Bureau of Administration (zhiduju) divided into twelve offices: law, budget, education, agriculture, industry, commerce, railroads, postal services, mines, 7 Marianne Bastid, 'Ching-i and the Self-Strengthening Movement' in Qingji ziqiangyundongyantao huilun wenji (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987), 2: 873-93. 18 Cited in Kung-chuan Hsiao, A Modern China and a New World: Kang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858-1927 (Seattle: U. of Washington Press, 1975), p. 263; Tang Zhijun (ed.),Kang Youwei zheng lunji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 1: 57-8. 19 Tang Zhijun, 1:151. See also Hsiao, 265